Search Results (82)

Drawing on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Duncan Pritchard argues for a position he calls quasi-fideism. Quasi-Fideism is the view that hinge commitments such as “God exists” are exempt from rational scrutiny within the language game of religion. However, other religious beliefs, which are not part of the framework of hinge commitments, can be rationally assessed and evaluated. This view is to be contrasted with pure fideism, in which all aspects of religion are exempt from rational scrutiny. The success of quasi-fideism depends on demonstrating that “God exists” is, indeed, a hinge commitment. In this paper, I will review and criticize some of Pritchard’s reasons for arguing that God’s existence should be considered a hinge commitment. Additionally, I will offer reasons why “God exists” cannot be a hinge commitment. Considering the rational problem of evil, single and multiple divine attributes, and the emotional problem of evil, I will show that the non-circular rational criticism of God’s existence is possible. Following the distinction between subjective and objective certainty in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I will suggest that a more fruitful line of inquiry for Wittgensteinians is to examine God as a subjective certainty. Full article

Origen’s theology is fundamentally rooted in the question of whether he upheld the pre-existence of the soul or focused more on the soul’s superiority over the body and its perfection. While inheriting many ideas from Plato, Origen adapted them in accordance with Christian doctrine. Both Origen and Plato emphasized that the soul governs the body and is superior to it in both status and importance. The image of God resides in human soul, not the body, guiding individuals toward the perfection of the soul and the attainment of the whole virtues. Origen’s tripartite distinction of spirit, soul, and body is intrinsically connected to Plato’s tripartite theory of the soul, with the intermediary of the incarnate soul corresponding to the ambiguous role of thumos (spiritedness) in Plato’s dialogue. This suggests that humans are capable of both good and evil, a potential grounded in free will rather than the sin of the body. Nevertheless, Origen assigned the body a more important role, asserting that the Incarnation not only depended on the body but also facilitated the practice of virtue, positioning the body as central to his theory of resurrection. Origen also adopted Plato’s epistemology, teleology of knowledge, and theory of participation. He emphasized that the perfection of the soul requires liberation from the dominance of the senses, using Plato’s dialectical method and drawing inspiration from the Holy Spirit to achieve comprehensive knowledge and spiritual maturity. Origen should not be viewed as merely a Platonist or an anti-Platonist. Both he and Plato shared concerns about the correct way of life and perfect knowledge, and both sought to bridge the gap between the majority and the minority, avoiding both elitism and populism. Full article

This article aims to offer Yi Kwangsu’s The Heartless (Mujŏng, 1917), the first modern Korean novel, as an emblem of hybrid religiosity in colonial modernity that sheds light on an ambivalent alterity in the problem of hell in non-Western cultures. To the extent that the problem of hell in Christianity pertains to the question of why God allows evil to exist eternally, God’s omnipotent authority with justice and fairness beyond the grave is placed at the center of the inquiry into the ultimate standard of moral goodness the religious feasibility of which justifies the existence of sinners suffering eternal damnation in hell. But the co-existence of the omnipotent God and unrepentant sinners is not always questioned in the religiosity of hell in non-Western cultures. The Christian imaginary of hell in non-Western cultures often demarcates the question of God’s sovereignty from the sufferings of sinners in the problem of hell. Based on these observations, this article will investigate Yi’s narratives of hell in The Heartless, which are associated with Christianity but intertwined with his ethical demands for shaping a new individuality beyond the traditional hybrid religiosity of hell. Specifically, first, we will show that Yi’s Christian imaginary of hell is reformulated through the traditional imaginaries of hell in which, regardless of the existence of God’s sovereignty over the created order, the sufferings of sinners in hell function to secure social norms and orders. In doing so, we claim that the Christian imaginary of hell in The Heartless is relegated to a rhetorical means to beget the need for the self-awakening of the inner-self through which individual desires can be freed from the influences of Confucian morality as well as Christian theodicy. Second, in comparison with Lu Xun’s sympathetic relocation of Christian spirituality within the traditional Chinese imaginaries of hell in his longing for modern subjectivity, we explore Yi’s hybrid religiosity within colonial modernity, the vitality of which cannot be confined within the simple dichotomy between Western and non-Western cultures. At this juncture, the upshot of Yi’s hybrid religiosity within colonial modernity is that the theodicy of hell in Christianity can be displaced and thereby disenfranchised from the centrality of the search for a new individuality. Full article

This study examines how Ibn Arabi’s metaphysics can address key challenges in the contemporary philosophical debate on the problem of evil. John Mackie famously argues that the existence of an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil, suggesting that theism must relinquish one of these divine attributes to resolve this contradiction. Alvin Plantinga, through his Free Will Defense, demonstrates that no logical contradiction undermines the coherence of the theistic conception of God. Although Mackie concedes this point, he contends that Plantinga’s defense does not sufficiently explain why God permits evil. With the resolution of the logical problem of evil, the evidential problem has gained prominence in the theistic debate, where Plantinga’s defense remains inadequate. While Plantinga invites theists to explore potential theological reasons for God’s allowance of evil, he acknowledges that this approach may not yield strong philosophical results. In contrast, Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical framework offers a more comprehensive solution. By integrating ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics to establish a coherent relationship between God, the universe, and humanity, Ibn Arabi renders Mackie’s logical critique irrelevant. Furthermore, his approach fills the gaps left by Plantinga’s defense, offering a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between God and evil. Full article

This article employs a Christological lens, deeply informed by Bernard J. F. Lonergan’s theology of history and soteriology, to discern the conditions necessary for all-inclusive solidarity. It highlights the twofold kenotic aspect of solidarity, addressing a gap in mainstream theological discourses that often emphasize ‘particular’ solidarity with those in need while neglecting its ‘universal’ (all-inclusive) dimension. Affirming ‘universal’ solidarity necessitates guarding against a misleading notion of neutrality and against totalization, as well as resisting a truncated understanding of intersubjectivity that is prone to group bias. After laying the foundations for understanding solidarity in light of its secular origins and Christian theological context, the article concludes that redemptive solidarity cannot exist without a christomorphic kenosis, which encompasses two incommensurable dimensions: solidarity with victims and solidarity with victimizers as potential converts (that is, as capable of metanoia). In the pursuit of transforming evil into good in history, kenotic solidarity requires prioritizing the common good over personal advantage, even to the extent of refusing to exploit what is (or seems to be) rightfully one’s own—whether privilege, possessions, or the right to strict retribution— just as Christ did when he did not exploit his equality with God to his own advantage (Phil 2:6). Full article

This paper argues that reflections on evil and its origin formed part of philosophical inquiry already in the times of the Presocratics. It considers only those thinkers whose contribution to the issue may be characterised as noteworthy: Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and the Atomists. It is undeniable that none of the Presocratics presented an articulate theory of evil or a theodicy; therefore, the suggestions presented here are bound to remain conjectural. Still, it is my conviction that their fragments contain significant ideas related to evil’s origins. Insofar as they turned their attention to the problem of evil, the Presocratics displayed the following tendencies: (a) they declined to ascribe the existence of evil to the will of the gods. Instead, (b) the emergence of badness was seen as instigated by the disruption of the primeval harmony (Anaximander), or (c) coeval opposed principles in constant struggle for dominance were posited, one of which was the cause of good, the other of evil (Pythagoreans and Empedocles). (d) Attempts were made to make good’s existence dependent on the existence of evil or to declare the latter illusory (Heraclitus and Parmenides). (e) Emphasis was placed on the moral agents’ personal responsibility for badness (Democritus). Full article

(1) Background: The rise of fascism in American and, indeed, throughout the world, prompts a question: why does fascism remain persistent in human existence? The question is one that Karl Jaspers might have asked regarding the origin and goal of history. The political description of fascism is not adequate to describe the lived experience of those drawn to it, and to assume such people to be irrational does not suffice. Rather, culture provides semiotic structure, which is phenomenologically embodied by people in a Mitwelt. (2) Results: Perhaps what is needed is not a political description of fascism but a communicological analysis that proceeds as a semiotic phenomenology of fascism as it is culturally embodied. Jaspers’ concept of evil frames fascism as colonialism turned against itself, disguised banally in such phenomena as Schadenfreude, as described by Lanigan. (3) I approach this question using a semiotic phenomenological method. (4) Conclusions: The fading colonial dominance in the form of cultural hegemony creates Laingian ontological insecurity and a desire for one’s inner fascist to identify itself in others. Addressing fascism requires new politics of experience. Full article

In this paper, I propose a defence against the problem of evil. This defence does not involve either free will or soul-making, but, rather, is intended as a replacement for the traditional theodicies. The defence will have two components: firstly, a proposal for why a good God would not intervene to eliminate the evil (natural or moral) in the world; and second, a proposal for why a good God would need to allow evil to exist in the world in the first place. I identify four desiderata for defences against the problem of evil and I argue that this new defence achieves all of these at least as well as traditional defences involving free will and/or soul-making. Full article

The main aim of this paper is to provide an account of Leibniz’s engagement with the doctrine of cosmic dualism in his Theodicy, i.e., the view that there are two distinct fundamental principles that are responsible for the existence of the created world, one good and the other evil. Leibniz’s discussion is primarily a response to arguments in favour of cosmic dualism that he finds in the writings of Pierre Bayle. However, in addition, he presents a genealogical argument that appears to be intended to provide reasons to reject the view. The paper also contains a critical discussion of Leibniz’s case, and finishes by drawing attention to some issues which arise that are worthy of further consideration. Full article

This paper explores the cross-cultural interpretation of “the goodness and evil of human nature” by Jesuit missionary Giulio Aleni in the late Ming Dynasty, and it examines the intersections and complementarity between Catholicism and Confucianism in moral ethics based on Aleni’s integration. The study finds that Aleni, while basically adhering to the Catholic “original sin”, connected the “spirituality” endowed to humans at the beginning of God’s creation with the Confucian ontological concepts such as “ultimate good” (zhishan 至善); centering on “self-mastery” (zizhuan 自專), “sharpening” (dili 砥礪), and “overcoming nature” (kexing 克性), he actively guided the goodness–evil debate towards a Confucian practical morality, and sacred doctrines are served as an impetus of moral practices. The redemption, together with reward and punishment of God, further intensifies the ultimate concern and the way of transcendence. Aleni’s bridging and synthesizing of the two traditions is highly significant: concerning both sanctity and practicality of ethics can to some extent overcome the risks brought by the instrumentalization of ethics or the illusory issues of existence. This has important implications for the self-development and integration of Christian and Confucian morality. Full article

This paper aims to illustrate the dialogues on the issues of theodicy in late Ming Fujian. The Catholicism that entered China in the late Ming dynasty had a competitive relationship with indigenous religions in terms of their meaning systems. Catholicism emphasized the omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence of God, which created tensions and contradictions with the reality of phenomena such as the suffering of good people and the existence of evil. In the late Ming period, scholars, believers, and missionaries in the Fujian region engaged in deep exchanges and dialogues on theodicy, reflecting the significant attention and consideration given to the problem of evil. This paper first analyzes the dialogues on theodicy between the Fujian scholar Ye Xianggao (1559–1627) and the missionary Giulio Aleni (1582–1649). Next, it explores the discussions on the problem of evil between ordinary believers in the Fujian region and Giulio Aleni in their daily lives. Finally, it examines how anti-Catholics used the problem of evil to criticize Catholicism, and it also identifies the characteristics and impacts of Catholic theodicy in the late Ming and early Qing periods. Full article

In Philippians 3:8, Paul holds all things to be loss (ζημία) and even dung (σκύβαλον) in comparison with Christ. Similarly, beside a precise conception of the good (ἀγαθὸν), Epictetus considers earthly achievements and physical benefits as “indifferents” (ἀδιάφορα), which he defines as things that are neither good nor evil. This paper employs a comparative analysis of Paul and Epictetus to examine the tension inherent in both authors as they seek to explain the sufferings and enjoyments of human existence in light of humankind’s ultimate end. Despite Paul’s strong language, he still recognizes the value of temporal goods, including release from prison, recovery from illness, and financial assistance. Thus, a person can value these benefits when they are joined to the greatest good, as illustrated by Augustine’s conception of ordered loves. Like Paul, Epictetus affirms the lesser value of indifferents, particularly when they enable participation in the good. This paper argues that both Paul and Epictetus acknowledge a secondary value in things that are joined to the supreme good, but that Paul differs from Epictetus in classifying them as goods that can be rightly desired and in acknowledging temporary sufferings to be an evil even as they can bring about good. Full article

Building on my recent argument that an all-good, all-powerful God is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world, I explore what grounding ethics can have without the God of traditional theism. While theists have argued that ethics is grounded either in God’s commands and/or in his nature, I show that no such adequate grounding exists, even if my argument—showing that the God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world—were shown to be unsuccessful, and I further show that such a grounding is impossible, given that my argument is successful. I then go on to provide an account of the norms on which an ethics without God can be appropriately grounded and show how an ethics, so grounded, can be appropriately related to our biological and cultural past, present, and future, as understood through Darwinian evolutionary theory. In this way, I hope to undercut a recent attempt to use Darwinian evolutionary theory to debunk ethics. Full article

Since the second half of the 20th century, missiology has continued to elevate Missio Dei to a topic of the highest importance in theology. According to Missio Dei, the salvific mission is more theocentric than anthropocentric in that its actuality is wholly rooted in the nature of God. However, much work remains to be conducted to evaluate and reconcile the modern interpretation of the Missio Dei and its predecessor theological doctrines, to avoid illogicalities. Consequently, the responsibility to identify any discrepancies in the systematic knowledge of the Missio Dei falls on the broad shoulders of theology in general, but of missiology in particular. In keeping with this unavoidable intellectual duty, this article interrogates the literature on modern theodicies to improve the conceptualization of the Missio Dei and missionary God in the context of evil and human suffering. The inter-comparative analysis of the biblical Job serves to relate divine perfection and human suffering within process theodicy. Consequently, the intellectual enterprise of this work, with all its shortcomings, not only illuminates another facet of Missio Dei but also motivates further investigation to reconcile mission Dei with the reality of evil, free will, and human suffering. Full article

The Dominican theologian Durand of Saint-Pourçain (ca. 1275–1334), breaking from the wide consensus, made a two-pronged attack on concurrentism (i.e., the theory according to which God does more than conserving creatures in existence and co-causes all their actions). On the one hand, he shows that the concurrentist position leads to the unacceptable consequence that God is the direct cause of man’s evil actions. On the other hand, he attacks the metaphysical foundations of concurrentism, first in the version offered by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and then in a more general way. Against Thomas and Giles, he challenges Neoplatonic assumptions about causality and being. More generally, he establishes that God’s action and a creature’s action can be neither identical nor different, and thus cannot both be direct causes of the same effect. Without claiming that Durand’s series of objections are definitely unanswerable, we may at least observe that they have generally been underestimated (which earned him the lowly role of the mere foil of the concurrentist view in the history of philosophy) and are able to do considerable damage to concurrentism. Full article