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Keywords = Multidimensional Bayesian game

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31 pages, 883 KB  
Article
Pure Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Bayesian Games with Multidimensional Vector Types and Linear Payoffs
by Sébastien Huot and Abbas Edalat
Games 2025, 16(4), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16040037 - 14 Jul 2025
Viewed by 930
Abstract
In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a [...] Read more.
In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those with a continuous type space. More specifically, we are interested in the existence of pure Bayesian Nash equilibriums for such games and efficient algorithms to find them. For continuous priors, we suggest a methodology to perform Nash equilibrium searches in simple cases. For discrete priors, we present algorithms that can handle two-action and two-player games efficiently. We introduce the core concept of threshold strategy and, under some mild conditions, we show that these games have at least one pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We illustrate our results with several examples like the double-game prisoner’s dilemma (DGPD), the game of chicken, and the sustainable adoption decision problem (SADP). Full article
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24 pages, 431 KB  
Article
Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments
by Abbas Edalat, Samira Hossein Ghorban and Ali Ghoroghi
Games 2018, 9(4), 85; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040085 - 24 Oct 2018
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 8625
Abstract
We show that a Bayesian game where the type space of each agent is a bounded set of m-dimensional vectors with non-negative components and the utility of each agent depends linearly on its own type only is equivalent to a simultaneous competition [...] Read more.
We show that a Bayesian game where the type space of each agent is a bounded set of m-dimensional vectors with non-negative components and the utility of each agent depends linearly on its own type only is equivalent to a simultaneous competition in m basic games which is called a uniform multigame. The type space of each agent can be normalised to be given by the ( m − 1 ) -dimensional simplex. This class of m-dimensional Bayesian games, via their equivalence with uniform multigames, can model decision making in multi-environments in a variety of circumstances, including decision making in multi-markets and decision making when there are both material and social utilities for agents as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Trust Game. We show that, if a uniform multigame in which the action set of each agent consists of one Nash equilibrium inducing action per basic game has a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the boundary of its type profile space, then it has a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the whole type profile space. We then develop an algorithm, linear in the number of types of the agents in such a multigame, which tests if a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the vertices of the type profile space can be extended to a pure ex post Nash equilibrium on the boundary of its type profile space in which case we obtain a pure ex post Nash equilibrium for the multigame. Full article
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