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Keywords = Monty Hall game

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17 pages, 1902 KiB  
Article
Sleeping Beauty on Monty Hall
by Michel Janssen and Sergio Pernice
Philosophies 2020, 5(3), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies5030015 - 13 Aug 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3158
Abstract
Inspired by the Monty Hall Problem and a popular simple solution to it, we present a number of game-show puzzles that are analogous to the notorious Sleeping Beauty Problem (and variations on it), but much easier to solve. We replace the awakenings of [...] Read more.
Inspired by the Monty Hall Problem and a popular simple solution to it, we present a number of game-show puzzles that are analogous to the notorious Sleeping Beauty Problem (and variations on it), but much easier to solve. We replace the awakenings of Sleeping Beauty by contestants on a game show, like Monty Hall’s, and increase the number of awakenings/contestants in the same way that the number of doors in the Monty Hall Problem is increased to make it easier to see what the solution to the problem is. We show that these game-show proxies for the Sleeping Beauty Problem and variations on it can be solved through simple applications of Bayes’s theorem. This means that we will phrase our analysis in terms of credences or degrees of belief. We will also rephrase our analysis, however, in terms of relative frequencies. Overall, our paper is intended to showcase, in a simple yet non-trivial example, the efficacy of a tried-and-true strategy for addressing problems in philosophy of science, i.e., develop a simple model for the problem and vary its parameters. Given that the Sleeping Beauty Problem, much more so than the Monty Hall Problem, challenges the intuitions about probabilities of many when they first encounter it, the application of this strategy to this conundrum, we believe, is pedagogically useful. Full article
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10 pages, 303 KiB  
Article
Quantum PBR Theorem as a Monty Hall Game
by Del Rajan and Matt Visser
Quantum Rep. 2020, 2(1), 39-48; https://doi.org/10.3390/quantum2010003 - 31 Dec 2019
Cited by 6 | Viewed by 3728
Abstract
The quantum Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) theorem addresses the question of whether the quantum state corresponds to a ψ-ontic model (system’s physical state) or to a ψ-epistemic model (observer’s knowledge about the system). We reformulate the PBR theorem as a Monty Hall game [...] Read more.
The quantum Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) theorem addresses the question of whether the quantum state corresponds to a ψ-ontic model (system’s physical state) or to a ψ-epistemic model (observer’s knowledge about the system). We reformulate the PBR theorem as a Monty Hall game and show that winning probabilities, for switching doors in the game, depend on whether it is a ψ-ontic or ψ-epistemic game. For certain cases of the latter, switching doors provides no advantage. We also apply the concepts involved in quantum teleportation, in particular for improving reliability. Full article
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21 pages, 417 KiB  
Article
The Monty Hall Problem as a Bayesian Game
by Mark Whitmeyer
Games 2017, 8(3), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030031 - 26 Jul 2017
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 10235
Abstract
This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies [...] Read more.
This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty’s motives and incentives. We endow Monty and the contestant with common prior probabilities (p) about the motives of Monty and show that, under certain conditions on p, the unique equilibrium is one in which the contestant is indifferent between switching and not switching. This coincides and agrees with the typical responses and explanations by experimental subjects. In particular, we show that our formulation can explain the experimental results in Page (1998), that more people gradually choose switch as the number of doors in the problem increases. Full article
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