The Origin of Human Theory-of-Mind
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. The Theory-of-Mind from 2003 Until Now
2.1. A Very Brief Summary
2.2. Discussing Some Proposals About the Difference Between the Primitive and Advanced Theory-of-Mind
3. Expectations and Vicarious Expectations
3.1. Expectations in General
Does the ‘Language of Thought’ Exist?
3.2. Vicarious Expectations
3.2.1. Can They Also Be Described as Empty Profiles?
3.2.2. An Argument That Favors That Application: Primates’ Mirror-Neurons
3.2.3. Some Clarifications on Vicarious Expectations
4. Primitive and Advanced Theory-of-Mind
4.1. Working-Memory and Non-Verbal Tests of False Belief
4.2. What Made the Estimation of Foreign Mental Contents Originally Advantageous?
5. Self-Conscious Emotions
5.1. Self-Conscious Emotions Are Useful in the Human Lifestyle
5.2. Self-Conscious Emotions and the Estimation of Foreign Contents: The Two Connections Between Both Traits
6. The Human Theory-of-Mind Beyond Its Origin
7. The Advanced Reception of Pointing
7.1. Apes and Pointing Gestures
7.1.1. Responding to a Possible Objection: Pointing in Apes
7.1.2. Authors Who, When Dealing with Pointing in Apes, Have Focused on Reception
7.1.3. Unlearned Production in Apes
7.2. Reception of Pointing Gestures in Chimpanzees and in Humans
7.3. The Human Eye and the Unified Reception of Pointing Gestures
8. General Outline
9. Summarizing, and Looking Towards the Future
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | Even if population size and connectivity have been strong drivers of the cultural advances and also—mainly in the African Middle Stone Age—of cultural droppings: (Scerri & Will, 2023). |
2 | However, I agree that apes’ ability in those tests is related to “affective empathy” (Lurz et al., 2022). Or, in my words (Bejarano, 2022), ‘vicarious expectations’ are related to ‘spontaneous altruism’. |
3 | However, the methodological, more particular matter of the violation-of-expectation paradigm (see the general review by Margoni et al., 2023) will not be discussed here. |
4 | Nowadays it is known that unexpected events can only be connected to superficial layers of the visual primary area, while expected events are also connected to the deeper levels of that area—Thomas et al. (2024)—, and, thus, it is possible to suspect that expectations are coded in the brain in a different format than perceptions. (This publication studied human adults. That does not conflict at all with my proposal. Humans, although we can evoke absent things, also have our empty expectations). |
5 | Such communications would already use non-innate resources (based not only on iconicity but, perhaps even more, as Cartmill et al. (2024, preprint) suggest, on ‘past conditioned associations known by the group’). However, most likely, these cultural gestures or calls still lacked ‘super-high fidelity’ transmission (which supports articulatory-phonetic imitation). In addition, let’s note that in the reception of these messages, the principle of “Teleology, first” in Theory-of-Mind (Perner et al., 2018) was, of course, obeyed. We could even suppose that such type of individual message attempted, firstly, to become more and more choral to, finally, influence group behavior: In other words, it would not be ‘dialogic’. All these features would place this type of message far from even prelinguistic human communication. Despite this, such messages would go beyond empty expectations of goals. |
6 | “The first words ever spoken is a key issue for the research in the evolution of language” (Gasparri, 2023). I agree with the importance of such an issue. |
7 | Planer (2019) (an article defending languages-of-thought) understands perfectly that “if the brains of many animals instantiate languages of thought, then we face a serious explanatory challenge. That challenge is to explain how languages-of-thought might have evolved”. But I am not persuaded by his explanation. |
8 | Or, more precisely, without a semantic content either produced simultaneously with the prosodic cue, or immediately previous in a dialogue—I add. This second type can be produced with a minimal articulation originally empty of meaning (e.g., the ‘huh?’ of Dingemanse et al., 2013). |
9 | “In human infants, shoulder movements, controlled by ipsilateral motor pathways from the right hemisphere, precede the left-hemisphere control of the right hand” (Rönnqvist, 2003) and also of culturally learned motor sequences. Nowadays it is also known that in humans, certain muscles that are mainly associated with shoulder movement—and, therefore, also with the expressive gestures that involve arm movement—are likely to interact with the voice (Pouw et al., 2023). Thus, the superiority of arm-gestures over vocal resources that is observed in intentionally addressed communications of non-human primates, that indisputable (even if relative, Lameira et al., 2024) superiority, could perhaps be conserved in multimodal communication of human infants as the anteriority of arm-gestures—less complex than hand-movements—over cultural vocal learning. If that were so, then we could suspect that such anteriority, interacting with the voice, caused the new, broader intonational unit, and, in this way, paradoxically ended up giving rise to the mentioned ‘victory of voice on gestural communication’. We must take into account that “in apes, communicative gestures, unlike manipulative movements, are controlled by areas that in the human brain are responsible for human language”: Becker et al. (2021), Becker et al. (2022), Meguerditchian et al. (2011). In short, I wonder if the following similarity has a basis in the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of our brain: Culturally learned movements of the right hand (controlled, of course, by the left hemisphere) are embedded in a previous, simpler arm movement (right hemisphere), and, similarly, culturally learned articulatory-phonetic signifiers (left hemisphere) are embedded in an intonational pattern (perhaps right hemisphere: Gainotti (2024) again vindicates the recently challenged “graded, right-hemisphere dominance for emotions”). |
10 | Bejarano (2011, p. 126) underlined three points: First, “the imitation of complex motor patterns (or ‘kinetic melodies’, as Luria calls them) which are new to the subject requires, according to Piaget (1954), that there to have been, during the observation of the model, a latent imitation”. Second, “since ‘any body representation which is used for action continuously tracks the positions of our body parts as we move’ (Haggard & Wolpert, 2005), why would the same thing not occur in a motor sequence that occurs latently?” Third, “we can conclude that the latent learning of kinetic melodies requires that any step other than the first in the sequence be imitated through fictionalization of the posture derived from the unexecuted previous motor step”. Certainly, this is too narrow a framework to support the difficulty of learning those sequences: It is clearly a far cry from Lind’s extensive and updated argumentation (see its most recent summary in Lind & Jon-And, 2024) against sequence learning by animals. However, my old framework led me to suspect that super-high fidelity imitation was a fairly late skill. |
11 | So, I am wondering about the possibility that the early language did not depend on the ‘super-high fidelity copying’. Planer et al. (2024, preprint) focus on a similar puzzle—“an early language previous to know-how copying”, although these authors perhaps do not sufficiently emphasize the difference between ‘know-how copying’ and the vocal ‘super-high fidelity copying’, and thus they choose as a solution to the puzzle the idea of a merely gestural-iconic origin of early language. For my part, I prefer to suggest the possibility that the vocal component of the syntactic multimodal language did not originally involve our current imitation of articulatory-phonetic sequences. Note, please, that the delay in the appearance of articulatory-phonetic sequences is a reliable fact in the first manifestations of writing. Could the same thing have happened in oral language? This suggestion, already put forward by Hockett (1960), has been defended by Fleming (2017), in the context of studying the ‘clicks’ of South African languages. |
12 | That article shows that chimpanzees used ‘know-how social learning’ (from a chimpanzee that experimenters had taught) to acquire a skill they failed to innovate. Thus, we can think that if wild chimpanzees use such type of learning only very infrequently, it is because they don’t produce complex innovations. |
13 | Certainly, recent research—Steven et al. (2022)—points to perspective-taking as a flexible and context-specific suite of abilities. However, here we can continue with Flavell’s dichotomy. |
14 | If this hypothesis turns out correct, then we could deduce that the so-called ‘audio-motor mirror neurons of birds’ cannot be mirror neurons. Note that, while learning the song-dialect, the bird does not sing yet. Therefore, the externally perceived dialect (that is, the dialectal enrichment of the innate template) is stored without any connection with proprioceptive expectations. Thus, if the proposal of Keysers & Perrett is accepted, the research about ‘the mirroring’ would have to refocus on primates, without it meaning undervaluing any type of ‘analogous similarities’ (underlined, for instance, by De Waal & Ferrari, 2010). |
15 | But, beyond that compatibility, the contrast shown by Schüler et al. (2024) puts a very interesting need at the center of the scene. The human Theory-of-Mind (which will be fully deployed in Section 6) must prevent all those internal, perceptually decoupled representations from influencing our behavior. Such prevention—I add—is a much more difficult task than the one required in nightmares, for example. While in this latter case, there is only one line of mental content—nightmare situations–, in the human Theory-of-Mind, however, there are ‘two lines’ of content, and, therefore, in the default network (in this peculiar, human ‘resting-state’) the prevention must be much more subtle and complex than mere muscle paralysis. |
16 | In Bejarano (2022) I have focused on that second type, and differentiated it from both spontaneous altruism and caring for one’s own reputation. The proposal of that article is that, while the ‘(ultimately perceptual) estimation of foreign mental contents’ is an adaptively very advantageous resource in human lifestyle, it however caused that the two typical features of perceptions—one, that of informing about the surroundings, i.e., of being true, and the other, that of being useful to the subject’s interests—became, for the first time in evolution, dissociated from each other. Thus, the perception of foreign mental contents—which include, of course, another individual’s needs and interests—is the basis of a demanding moral capacity that, not being adaptive either for the entire group (as spontaneous altruism is) or for the individual (as happens with the care of one’s own reputation), is—almost paradoxically and therefore more wonderfully—built by evolution. More concretely, while in Joyce (2007) or Wilkins and Griffiths (2013) (see also Levy & Weinshtock-Saadon, 2023) moral beliefs are “debunked” by evolution (since they, having been selected for adaptive reasons, are epistemically suspect), I propose how a base (however poor and weak) for that most demanding moral capacity could really arise in evolution. From the recommendations made to me by Reviewer 1, it can be inferred that he/she asks me to pay more attention to the dualism soul-body. In my view, a key core of that issue is whether outside of the acceptance of such dualism there is still a base for the capacity to choose between egoism (which intervenes even in the refined self-control that cares for one’s reputation) and truth, and that is precisely the question—“Could a base (however poor and weak) for this capacity arise in evolution?”—that Bejarano (2022) attempts to answer. |
17 | Thornton and Tamir (2024) (who use the term ‘affordances’) may perhaps make us see the very different ways in which general expectations are activated in humans. |
18 | Corballis (2000) and Corballis (2001) claimed that we interpret the ‘images in the mirror’ as the left-right reversal of the original objects, and that, while a reflection’s reversal is a product of optics, “such particular interpretation comes from neuroscience”. This link with neuroscience could be lengthened: The sudden acknowledgment of standing before a mirror and not before a peer (/or conversely, the sudden acknowledgment of standing before a peer and not before a mirror) inhibits (/activates) the mentioned high-level resource. |
19 | L. Lewis and Krupenye (2022), for example, underline apes’ competitive motivation. About infants’ motivation, see an interesting proposal in Woo et al. (2022) and Woo and Spelke (2022), who apply to this question (infants’ estimation of others’ false belief) an idea relatively similar to the link between “look for cheaters” and reasoning (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, or Cosmides, 1989). In short, the mentioned proposal underlines that, since in some contexts “the estimation of others’ false beliefs may facilitate the ability to morally evaluate others’ actions”, such estimation is an adaptive task even in toddlers. But, according to my hypothesis, even if that interesting proposal becomes discarded, children’s curiosity about the interiority of others would still be extremely adaptive. |
20 | Any mammal or bird has expectations about the behavior of animals that are vastly different from him. But those are general, non-vicarious expectations. |
21 | Thus, it is not surprising that, for example, pride, when it is compared to joy, involves what Bornstein et al. (2023) call “a relatively more distant perspective”. |
22 | We could also remember Baader’s anti-Cartesian formulation (“Cogitor, ergo sum”), even if Baader (who lived from 1765 to 1841) interpreted it “more theologically than interpersonally” (Geldhof, 2005). I would reformulate it in the following way: ‘If I grasp foreign (i.e., others’) thoughts that involve me, I am human’. |
23 | Baumard et al. (2013) propose: “The best care of reputation (the most adaptively advantageous one, since the error of mistakenly assuming that no one is paying attention to a blatantly selfish action may compromise an agent’s reputation) is the genuinely moral habit”. This, of course, is also proposed by many other authors, for example, Boileau (“Pour paraître honnête homme, il faut l’être”). I shall not comment on such a proposal here, but see Bejarano (2022). |
24 | This more intense care could relate to what, on a higher, later level, Di Francesco et al. (2021) said: “People’s self-defining life stories have an intrinsically defensive nature; the description-narration of one’s own inner life is organized on the basis of the fundamental need to construct and defend a self-image endowed with an at least minimal solidity”. |
25 | According to my option, pride originally arose interpersonally: The “hubristic, narcissist pride” that is mentioned by Tracy et al. (2024) would have been a late (“evolved”) intrapersonal derivation. |
26 | As said above, while none of the earliest technological abilities implied high-fidelity transmission, this type of transmission not only supported later technologies, but also what I called (in Section “Does the ‘Language of Thought’ Exist?”) the set of all ‘super-high fidelity copying’—the articulatory-phonetic copying, and the learning of songs or dances. (Obviously, in these skillful tasks the conscious activity of memorizing and copying the model gives way, after multiple repetitions, to subconsciously memorized actions, and this allows attention to be focused on a higher level). |
27 | The underlining of pride is also useful to prevent the concept of self-control from being incorrectly narrowed. See Bermúdez et al. (2024): “Apathy is a normally overlooked kind of self-control problem. However, compared to negative self-control (i.e., self-control against temptations), which relies more on situational strategies, positive self-control requires more intrapsychic work to get motivation (my emphasis)”. |
28 | ‘Self-control’ (Shilton et al., 2020)? Or ‘self-domestication’ (Benítez-Burraco & Nikolsky, 2023, to choose a recent example)? I can only say that the connotations of the term ‘self-domestication’ (even if this is very different from ‘submission’—the evolutionary precedent of shame, according to Maibom, 2010) are less suitable for a capacity that, “even when it takes us to meekness, means the strength and power to use one’s energy” for one’s previously chosen purposes: Roszak (2022). (This author, instead of “self-control”, uses the traditionally moral term “fortitude”. But I cannot adopt such a use, since in my view—Bejarano (2022)—, self-control is not necessarily moral). |
29 | Could Bryant et al. (2024) reinforce that claim? They state: “Our findings support a two-step evolutionary process, in which changes in prefrontal cortex organization emerge prior to changes in temporal areas”. |
30 | Certainly, I’m not really proposing these examples, but just putting them here to facilitate the exposition. However, I want to mention Breil et al. (2022), who investigated the unified reception (in their words, “the early temporal integration”) of gaze and emotion cues, and “suggest a processing benefit when emotional expression (happy/disgusted) and gaze (direct/averted) are congruent in terms of approach- or avoidance-orientation”. |
31 | Remember that, much later in development, also our current narrative speech uses gestural ‘theatricalization’ (whose effects Rühlemann & Trujillo, 2024 have studied in detail) and affective prosody. Likewise, ‘symbolic play’—or ‘pretense’—might train this ‘intentional control and use’ of behavioral and even ‘autonomic’ levels. |
32 | This capacity of recognition is so adaptive that ‘the possibility of false positives’ (i.e., the currently very mentioned ‘overextension of Theory-of-Mind’–see, e.g., Bering, 2011) doesn’t matter, especially since exercising that capacity makes it stronger. This is a repetition of what happened at a much earlier point in evolution with the detection of agency. |
33 | Obviously, there is an easier type of communication that is present in many more animal species: In it, individuals accumulate evidence through ‘many pairs of eyes’, for example. Thus, “cues and signals from other individuals (e.g., fleeing movements and alarm calls) reduce uncertainty about predator risk” (Hahn et al., 2024, preprint). |
34 | Likewise, human infants produce ”ostensive gestures with an object” months before making pointing gestures: Rodríguez et al. (2015) and Guevara et al. (2024). |
35 | Ontogenetically that estimation is a difficult process, even in its previous requisite: Note that caregivers may naturally express their emotions in ways that maximize learning possibilities—e.g., “emotionese”: see Benders (2013), or A. Ruba and Repacholi (2020). |
36 | Thus, the pleasure of laughter (a pleasure not entirely exclusive to humans, but certainly a universally human characteristic) arose in evolution because it might—I choose this explanation– prevent frequent failures from discouraging primate brains from making ever more complex expectations. The infant and the chimpanzee know when they are going to be tickled, but they fail to predict the exact point or the exact instant. Likewise, we laugh when, after activating the vicarious expectation that the observed individual will sit down, we see him fall over. However, the predictive failure of the continuation of the narrative after the punchline is not a failure of prediction directly, but one of inadequate and incomplete understanding of the preceding part. Thus it is only this kind of laughter that fosters the cognitive humility that is necessary for creativity. |
37 | ‘Say’ was even later used in ‘first person + present + affirmative’, an apparently tautological use which came to fulfill a new function, but still originally related, in my view, to ‘referred speech’. With these uses the speaker communicates that he is aware of how his speech looks—and could be referred—from the outside. This may have been the ‘interpersonal’ origin of the (later, more culturally and institutionally supported) ‘performatives’: Let’s compare ‘I say that…’ with ‘I swear that…’ (which was the example chosen by Benveniste, 1958/1966). |
38 | In grateful response to Reviewer 1, I want to add that I highly value Donald (1991) (of which I published in 1996 “Recensión de Donald, 1991 y 1993”), especially the idea that beyond animal memory (which probably only stores the—so to speak—‘moral of the story’ of past events, that is, only what may ever be immediately useful), there are three memory transitions (in my view, supported respectively by non-syntactic multimodal communications, syntactic language, and writing). |
39 | The appeal to such a ‘genetic start-kit’ is, unsurprisingly, rejected in writings in the behaviorist tradition dealing with Theory-of-Mind. One such paper is Schlinger (2009) (which was recommended to me by Reviewer 1). As for Schlinger, I, while not accepting his rejection of the genetic basis of Theory-of-Mind, do share his criticism that (sometimes, I would qualify) “discussions of ToM focus almost exclusively on inferred cognitive structures and processes and shed little light on the actual behaviors involved” (See, for example, in Section 5.2, my question about how the experiencer of self-conscious emotions is aware of what others think of him/her). |
40 | In the words of Uomini and Ruck (2019) (who exemplify this attitude in their study of the emergence of human handedness): “The paucity of data is an obstacle in studying cognitive evolution, but this has not stopped researchers from trying”. I love that “but”. |
41 | About ‘spontaneous altruism’: See M. Tomasello (2012), Rand et al. (2012), and, especially, “self-other merging” (Miyazono & Inarimori, 2021) and “goal slippage” (Michael & Székely, 2019). Let us also focus on the unquestionable footprints of caring for the ill or the wounded that have been found in Neanderthals: At least we cannot doubt “the selective advantages of reducing the risk of mortality of other group members in small groups whose members are highly interdependent” (Spikins et al., 2019, my emphasis). Spontaneous altruism is ontogenetically earlier than the motivation to improve one’s reputation by helping: See Hepach et al. (2022). About the (probably, very primitive) type of spontaneous altruism that, “connected to reactive, non-cognitive fear circuits, helps others under threat” (for instance, in social hunters): See J. B. Vieira et al. (2020), J. Vieira and Olsson (2022). |
42 | According to M. Tomasello and Call (2019), “attention-getters, since they manipulate attention of addressees, evolutionarily precede pointing gestures, while intention-movements, since they manipulate the imagination, precede pantomimes”. I agree with such a difference, but my interest is now in the similarity of both receptions. |
43 | See also Bohn et al. (2020), who report that apes do not learn from iconic gestures. |
44 | When infants first understand pointing in a unified way, do they understand it only when the producer addresses it to them? Clark (1996) claimed: “The basic arena for social interaction is the dyad”. Certainly, some findings might seem to challenge that claim. (Thiele et al., 2023 report that “observed joint attention” already modulates 9-month-old infants’ object encoding. Likewise, according to Goupil et al. (2024), both humans and macaques show spontaneous preference to look at two bodies facing towards each other). However, those findings do not seem to me to involve that challenge. People’s movements are always salient stimuli, of course, but, in my view, the ‘ability to capture other people’s mental contents’ is not required in those experimental situations. Thus, according to my proposal, “the dyad” can be maintained for the very origin of the human mode of receiving pointing gestures. |
45 | Bejarano (2011), Chapter 6: My argumentation started by focusing on the reception (see Rubio-Fernandez, 2020) of the most egocentric deictics (here vs. there; this vs. that; I vs. you), i.e., of the words that the addressee has to understand in a different way than the way he, the now addressee, uses them when he is the speaker. But I extended it to any linguistic reception. |
46 | What about dogs? Eye contact—i.e., the communicator making eye contact with the dog—is the major cue that dogs use to determine when a human pointing is intended for them. (See Kaminski & Nitzschner, 2013; Téglás et al., 2012). However, Lyn et al. (2024, preprint) may have slightly lowered the initial triumphalism: Since dogs have more difficulty in following contralateral pointing, these authors suggest that ipsilateral points are learned through associative mechanisms. In general, Project MANYDOGS will try to replicate previous findings. But it is worth remembering Zuberbühler (2008): “Social carnivores must decide on one particular prey individual prior to group hunting”. Thus, if the dominant wolf remains for a few moments looking at—or making some movement towards—a particular prey, this could be an innately communicative signal, which would pre-activate in the members of the herd a plan of attack in the signaled direction. So, when, shortly after, the wolf-recipient feels that he is being looked at by the dominant individual, he starts its previously pre-activated attack plan. In this way, dogs would just make richer their innate expectation of the first signal—i.e., they would learn to associate their innate expectation with some other features (hand or finger). |
47 | This possibility is not at all an absurd suggestion. Firstly, within the lineage of Sapiens and even in dates totally within the (formerly so-called) ‘anatomically modern humans’, there is a marked evolution in the shape of the cranium: See Neubauer et al. (2018) (although, at least since 160.000 b. p., these differences with living humans would mainly affect, according to Zollikofer et al., 2022, the face and cranial base). See also Freidline et al. (2024): “The unique facial growth pattern of Homo sapiens post-dated the Middle Stone Age”. Secondly, regarding our progressive absence of prominent brow bridges—which were very prominent in Neanderthals–, Godinho et al. (2018) reject the old hypotheses on such absence and suggest “its potential role in social communication”. (See Siposova et al., 2018, who underline the role of raised and highly mobile eyebrows in “the reception of communicative looks”. Likewise, Gast (2023) focuses on the link between linguistic prosody and eyebrow movement). In addition, I ask: Could the chin, whose absence in Neanderthal has been so studied (cf. Meneganzin et al., 2024), strengthen the gestural, emotional expressivity of the mouth? (Remember Section 5.2 above). |
48 | ‘Embodied’ is a term that I have decided to use, although it does not really make sense in a position (such as mine) that opposes dualisms, both the body-mind dualism of the cognitive revolution (about this debate, see an excellent summary in Barrett & Stout, 2024) and the various body-soul dualisms. Indeed, I believe not only that animal consciousness emanates from the evolved complexity of the animal body, but also that the most spiritual capacities of human beings (see previous note 16) are the product of the extremely, wonderfully evolved matter that forms our bodies. |
49 | Regarding such later rest, I would underline: (1) creative (technical, artistic, or scientific) problem-solving, that is, the ability to transform one’s insufficient mental contents into sufficient ones to solve the problem, and (2) what I called in previous note 16 ‘the most demanding moral capacity’. |
50 | Bejarano (2022): “The current focus on hominids and Neanderthals opens a new door for us which was undreamt of for previous philosophers and scholars”. Or, much more precisely, Currie et al. (2024): “Philosophical methodology can benefit greatly from interaction with cognitive paleoanthropology. […] Coherent evolutionary narratives is a means of readmitting synthesis to the philosophical toolkit”. |
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Bejarano, T. The Origin of Human Theory-of-Mind. Humans 2025, 5, 5. https://doi.org/10.3390/humans5010005
Bejarano T. The Origin of Human Theory-of-Mind. Humans. 2025; 5(1):5. https://doi.org/10.3390/humans5010005
Chicago/Turabian StyleBejarano, Teresa. 2025. "The Origin of Human Theory-of-Mind" Humans 5, no. 1: 5. https://doi.org/10.3390/humans5010005
APA StyleBejarano, T. (2025). The Origin of Human Theory-of-Mind. Humans, 5(1), 5. https://doi.org/10.3390/humans5010005