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Article

Between Constraint and Opportunity: Egypt’s Niche Diplomacy in a Shifting Global Order

by
Mordechai Chaziza
1,* and
Carmela Lutmar
2
1
Department of Politics and Governance, Division of Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science, Ashkelon Academic College, Ashkelon 7823224, Israel
2
The Division of International Relations, School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa 3103301, Israel
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
World 2025, 6(4), 138; https://doi.org/10.3390/world6040138
Submission received: 28 July 2025 / Revised: 25 September 2025 / Accepted: 9 October 2025 / Published: 14 October 2025

Abstract

This study examines Egypt’s evolving role as a middle power through the lens of niche diplomacy. It analyzes how Cairo leverages its strategic advantages to assert influence within an increasingly multipolar international order. Egypt’s global profile has expanded beyond its immediate regional sphere through four key domains: mediation, its bid to serve as an energy hub, its geopolitical positioning at the Arab-African and Mediterranean crossroads, and its promotion of religious, cultural, and heritage diplomacy. The analysis shows that these niches enable Egypt to maintain agency, manage external dependencies, and project influence despite structural vulnerabilities. The study advances the literature on middle powers by illustrating how a Global South state adapts niche diplomacy to contemporary geopolitical pressures. Egypt’s case demonstrates that structural geography, historical legacy, and interregional identity can sustain middle-power relevance, extending the niche diplomacy concept beyond models centered on wealth or ideational leadership.

1. Introduction

Egypt’s position as a middle power in the Middle East is fundamentally shaped by its enduring structural factors—its historical legacy, demographic weight, unique geographic location, and cultural influence—rather than contingent policy decisions or economic fluctuations. These core characteristics have given Cairo a persistent capacity for regional influence, allowing it to maintain relevance and agency amid shifting power dynamics and internal challenges. This structural foundation distinguishes Egypt’s role in the region, enabling it to adapt to changing geopolitical contexts while sustaining its status as a middle power actor within the Middle East’s evolving power architecture [1].
Egypt’s geostrategic position, anchored by the Nile River, its access to the Mediterranean and Red Seas, and its possession of the Sinai Peninsula, places it at the intersection of African, Middle Eastern, and global critical geopolitical spheres. The Nile ties Egypt to sub-Saharan Africa, while the Suez Canal secures its role in international trade by linking Europe, Asia, and Africa. Egypt’s Mediterranean coastline enables direct engagement with Europe, while its Red Sea access positions it as a gateway to Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. The Sinai Peninsula is a land bridge to Asia and connects Egypt directly to Levantine security dynamics. This unique positioning enables Egypt to operate simultaneously across African, Arab, and broader international platforms, reinforcing its relevance and agency within multiple geopolitical arenas [2].
Despite periods of internal upheaval, particularly following the 2011 Arab Spring, and broader regional transformations such as the “Gulfization” of Arab politics and the fragmentation of pan-Arab solidarity, Cairo continues to possess the core assets that define a middle power in the region [3]. These include its demographic and geographic weight, infrastructural assets, and institutional engagement with key regional and international organizations, including the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [4]. These provide it with platforms to exert diplomatic influence and shape regional agendas. These institutional ties reinforce Egypt’s ability to navigate shifting regional dynamics and project its interests across multiple spheres.
As global multipolarity deepens, shaped by geopolitical contestation, regional instability, and the assertive re-emergence of non-Western powers, Cairo has adapted and recalibrated its foreign policy to navigate the changing tides. Rather than aligning exclusively with any single bloc, Egypt has adopted a strategy of diversified partnerships, maintaining its traditional security relationship with the US and the West, while deepening economic and diplomatic ties with China, Russia, and emerging blocs like BRICS [5]. As a pivotal actor linking Africa, Asia, and Europe, Egypt is central in shaping regional dynamics and engaging with evolving global power structures [6,7].
Egypt’s foreign policy is characterized by a multidimensional and niche-focused approach, combining strategic, political, economic, geographical, historical, religious, and cultural instruments to shape regional and international dynamics. Niche diplomacy enables middle powers to focus their resources on specialized areas where they can exert meaningful influence despite material constraints [8]. By prioritizing these assets, Cairo strengthens its global relevance, positioning itself as a stabilizing force in regions marked by volatility and crisis.
Middle powers occupy a position between great and small powers in the global hierarchy, leveraging economic, military, diplomatic, and political resources to form alliances, lead initiatives, and engage actively in international affairs [9]. Niche diplomacy allows these states to capitalize on their unique geographic, economic, or cultural strengths by forming strategic partnerships and focusing on specialized areas to advance their foreign policy objectives [10,11]. Cairo exemplifies a middle power due to its material capabilities, diplomatic behavior, and strategic engagements [12].
This study examines how Egypt employs niche diplomacy to advance its foreign policy goals and evaluates its wider impact on regional and global politics. It focuses on key components of Cairo’s niche diplomacy, including mediation efforts, emergence as an energy hub, role as a bridge between the Arab world and Africa, geopolitical position, and efforts to promote its religious, cultural, and heritage. The study argues that Egypt’s ability to leverage its unique strengths significantly boosts its influence on the international stage, raising its profile and strategic relevance in regional and global affairs in the 21st century.
Despite the growing recognition of middle powers within International Relations (IR) theory, research on middle powers in the Middle East remains limited, as scholarship has traditionally centered on great powers [13,14,15]. This study seeks to address this gap by analyzing Egypt’s foreign policy through the lens of niche diplomacy. It explores how middle powers leverage specialized capabilities to enhance their influence, particularly in global rivalry and shifting geopolitical alignments. The study contributes to the broader understanding of middle power strategies and their implications for international diplomacy.
The following section reviews the literature review on middle powers and niche diplomacy, tracing their evolution within IR scholarship. Subsequently, the study analyzes Egypt’s foreign policy, emphasizing its niche sectors, geopolitical role, mediation, humanitarian aid, energy, and identity-based diplomacy. The final section summarizes the findings and offers theoretical insights and practical conclusions.

2. Theoretical Framework: Middle Power and Niche Diplomacy

The concept of middle powers in IR remains ambiguous, as traditional metrics like GDP, population, or land area fail to capture their influence. While middle powers lack the comprehensive strength of great powers, they shape regional environments, moderate global affairs, and resist domination [16,17,18,19]. Their influence is often assessed through behavioral or functional roles rather than strict material criteria, making their classification fluid and context-dependent [20]. Middle powers are typically defined by their commitment to multilateralism, peacekeeping, and global stability. They act as mediators, coalition-builders, and international law advocates, balancing self-interest with activism. Unlike great powers, they do not pursue hegemonic ambitions but focus on defending strategic yet limited interests [21,22,23,24].
Scholars categorize middle powers through three lenses: functional, where influence shifts based on issue-specific leadership; behavioral, emphasizing diplomatic activism and global citizenship; and hierarchical, which ranks states by institutional influence [19,21,23,25,26,27]. A key strategy for middle powers is niche diplomacy, where they concentrate on specialized areas to maximize their impact. This involves leveraging unique strengths, such as resources, geographic positioning, or expertise, to influence targeted global issues [8,28,29,30,31,32].
Niche diplomacy is effective when states meet three criteria: (1) offering specialized, high-demand expertise, (2) sustaining long-term engagement and networks, and (3) securing formal recognition through institutional roles. Middle powers amplify their influence beyond their material constraints by acting as coalition-builders, bridge-builders, and norm-setters [33]. This strategic focus requires sustained investment, adaptability, and alignment with both national interests and global priorities [8].
In the Middle East, IR scholarships traditionally focused on great powers, overlooking the role of regional middle powers [34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44]. This study fills that gap by analyzing their behavior through the lens of niche diplomacy. Diplomacy is crucial in determining how middle powers leverage their resources and position themselves in global affairs. Understanding their diplomatic strategies offers insights into their evolving role in international relations.

3. Egyptian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Egypt’s foreign policy under Hosni Mubarak in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was anchored in two main pillars: upholding the Camp David Accords, cementing peace with Israel and integrating into the US-led regional security order, and maintaining strong strategic and financial ties with Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia. Egypt’s pivot from Soviet alignment to the US-led regional order elevated it as a cornerstone of the American security architecture in the Middle East [45]. This alignment brought military and economic dividends but gradually eroded Cairo’s traditional leadership role in Arab affairs [46].
Egypt’s growing fiscal reliance on Gulf states, intensified during the 1990 Gulf War when military support for the U.S.-led coalition yielded debt relief and renewed Gulf patronage—underscored structural economic vulnerabilities [47,48]. From this juncture, Egypt’s national security doctrine explicitly linked the stability of the Gulf to its strategic calculus. This alignment institutionalized Egypt’s role as a stakeholder in Gulf security, embedding economic interdependence within its broader foreign policy [49].
Post-9/11 developments and the US occupation of Iraq further consolidated Egypt’s security alignment with Washington. While this bolstered intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation, it entrenched Egypt’s subordinate position within a US-centric security framework, limiting its regional agency [50,51]. By the end of Mubarak’s rule, Egypt’s foreign policy had stagnated, defined by strategic inertia and overdependence on Washington and Gulf capitals. This created a vacuum that more assertive regional actors, such as Turkey and Qatar, readily exploited [45,52].
The post-Mubarak transition, spanning the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) period and Morsi’s presidency, highlighted the persistence of Egypt’s traditional foreign policy orientations. Despite the revolutionary rhetoric and aspirations for change, Egypt’s key elements, such as alignment with US interests and cooperation with Gulf states, remained largely unchanged, reflecting the durability of its foreign policy framework amid political turbulence [53].
Nevertheless, under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egyptian foreign policy has undergone its most significant transformation since the Sadat era, moving away from reliance on global patrons toward a more autonomous, interest-driven approach known as the “Egypt First” or “Sisi Doctrine.” This doctrine is structured around three main pillars: (1) a balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis global powers; (2) strict adherence to sovereignty and non-intervention; and (3) nationalistic reassertion of Egypt’s strategic autonomy [52,54,55]. This strategic reorientation has produced notable shifts in Egypt’s regional and international posture, reflecting a pragmatic, security-focused, and self-reliant foreign policy [56].
Egypt has actively diversified its diplomatic relationships, moving beyond its traditional reliance on Washington and Europe to deepen ties with powers such as Russia and China [57,58,59]. This multidirectional approach reduces dependence on Western support and enhances Egypt’s strategic autonomy. Egypt’s engagement with Moscow and Beijing, including major arms deals, joint military exercises [60], and participation in initiatives like the Belt and Road and BRICS, has accelerated, particularly as Cairo perceived its status with Washington diminishing, especially during the Trump administration [7,61].
Simultaneously, Egypt has positioned itself as a defender of state sovereignty and a counterforce to destabilizing sectarian influences, particularly those from Ankara and Tehran. Tensions with Turkey escalated after the 2013 ouster of Morsi and the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which Ankara continued to support, deepening the rivalry between Cairo and Ankara [62,63]. At the same time, Egypt has taken an assertive approach in regional arenas such as Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Nile Basin, advancing its geopolitical interests through diplomacy, deterrence, and building strategic partnerships [64,65].
Nonetheless, Egypt’s growing assertiveness is constrained by structural vulnerabilities. Chief among these is its enduring economic dependence on the Gulf states, whose financial backing remains critical to domestic stability. Foremost is its sustained economic dependence on Gulf states, whose investments and financial support are vital to Egypt’s fiscal stability and have led to significant Gulf influence over key sectors and strategic assets. This reliance raises concerns about national autonomy and leaves Egypt exposed to shifts in Gulf priorities [66]. Furthermore, internal security challenges expose Egypt to challenging security threats, particularly in Sinai and regional crises (e.g., Libya, Sudan, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with Ethiopia), complicating its ability to project power and maintain regional influence [67,68].
Ultimately, the Sisi Doctrine represents a strategic recalibration rather than a doctrinal rupture. It reflects a shift toward pragmatic realism, prioritizing regime security, economic diversification, and multipolar balancing over ideological commitments or pan-Arab leadership. While Egypt seeks to reassert itself as a regional power, its foreign policy remains shaped by the tension between ambition and constraint, autonomy and dependency [52].
These dynamics highlight the structural constraints that have shaped Egyptian foreign policy since 2013. Security threats in Sinai, instability in Libya, Gaza, and Sudan, and the unresolved the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute have restricted Cairo’s ability to project sustained influence. Coupled with the delegitimating crisis after the Arab Spring and the 2013 coup and persistent economic fragility, marked by reliance on Gulf aid, limited foreign investment, and recurring balance-of-payments pressures, these vulnerabilities have narrowed Egypt’s room for maneuver. Together, they delimit the scope of the “Sisi Doctrine,” showing how domestic weakness and regional turbulence continue to circumscribe Cairo’s ambitions, even as it pursues diversified partnerships and seeks to reclaim regional agency.

4. Egypt’s Niche Diplomacy

Cairo has been actively pursuing a form of niche diplomacy that leverages its geopolitical position, historical legacy, and cultural influence to strengthen its role in regional and global affairs. This approach encompasses mediation efforts, a regional energy hub, geopolitical role, and efforts to promote its cultural, religious, and historical heritage. Through this multifaceted niche diplomacy, Egypt navigates the evolving landscape of international geopolitics, aiming to safeguard its interests and elevate its global standing. The following sections elaborate on key aspects of Cairo’s niche diplomacy.

4.1. Mediation

Egypt has long positioned itself as a key mediator in Middle Eastern and African conflicts, with a particularly prominent role in the Israeli–Palestinian arena, the Libyan peace process, and the Sudanese crisis [69,70,71]. This role aligns with Egypt’s position as a middle power, strategic location, historical influence in the Arab world, and institutional capabilities that make it an important player to project influence beyond its borders. Cairo uses mediation as a niche diplomacy tool and mechanism to advance its national security, consolidate regional leadership, and accumulate political capital and prestige in the international arena [2,72].
Egypt’s mediation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is rooted in its historic engagement in the Arab–Israeli wars and its landmark 1979 peace treaty with Israel [73]. Since the Oslo Accords and especially after Hamas’s 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip, Egypt has emerged as a pivotal broker, leveraging its geographic proximity, control over the Rafah crossing, and longstanding ties with Israel and Palestinian factions [63,74]. Its intelligence services, regional stature, and deep networks have enabled it to mediate ceasefires, facilitate humanitarian corridors, and negotiate prisoner exchanges during major escalations, such as in 2008–2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and the ongoing 2023 “Iron Swords War” [72,75]. However, Cairo efforts have largely failed to address structural issues such as the blockade of Gaza, inter-Palestinian divisions, and the absence of a sustainable political settlement. Egypt’s mediation in the Gaza conflict faces several challenges, including the fragile nature of ceasefires, the deep political divisions between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and the broader geopolitical dynamics of the region [76].
Nevertheless, pragmatic calculus shapes Egypt’s mediation efforts more than normative commitment to conflict resolution. Rather than pursuing a durable political settlement, Cairo has institutionalized its mediator function to secure tactical gains, diplomatic leverage, international visibility, and regional status, while minimizing the risks of Gaza’s instability. Mediation thus becomes a tool for regime consolidation and international engagement, especially with Western partners, without incurring the costs associated with full-scale involvement or long-term solutions [69].
Following the 7 October 2023, Egypt quickly reasserted its traditional mediator status in regional diplomacy. Alongside Qatar and the US, it played a crucial role in brokering temporary truces, coordinating humanitarian aid via Rafah, and facilitating hostage and prisoner exchanges. Egypt’s convening of the Cairo Peace Summit, with participation from over 30 countries and international organizations, underscored its bid to reclaim its traditional diplomatic centrality amid shifting regional alignments [69,75]. However, Egypt’s influence remains constrained. While it opposed the Trump administration’s controversial 2025 plan to depopulate Gaza, proposing instead a $53 billion reconstruction initiative backed by the Arab League, its alternative vision—emphasizing Palestinian presence and PA governance—was rejected by both Washington and Israel [77,78]. The episode highlighted Cairo’s middle power strength to mobilize regional consensus and the structural limits of its leverage vis-à-vis great powers and on-the-ground realities.
While Egypt continues to play a visible role in mediation, particularly in the Israel-Palestine arena, its influence is increasingly circumscribed compared to other regional middle powers. Qatar, for instance, has cultivated direct channels with Hamas and other Islamist actors, enabling it to act as a financial and political broker in Gaza with greater credibility among local stakeholders [74,75]. Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a sponsor of broad regional realignments, most notably through the Abraham Accords framework and its attempts to balance relations with Washington and Tehran [32]. Turkey, meanwhile, has combined ideological affinity with assertive military presence, particularly in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, to project influence more aggressively than Cairo [64]. In contrast, Egypt’s approach remains pragmatic and securitized, prioritizing border stability and regime survival over transformative settlements. This comparative lens illustrates that, while Cairo retains convening power and institutional legitimacy, its niche diplomacy is constrained by structural vulnerabilities and often reactive. In contrast, Gulf and Turkish counterparts deploy greater financial resources, ideological capital, or military tools to carve out their spheres of middle-power influence.
Beyond the Palestinian arena, Egypt sought to institutionalize its peacemaking role across North and East Africa. In Libya, Egypt has hosted multiple rounds of negotiations between rival factions, contributing to efforts to create a roadmap for national elections and political reconciliation [79]. In Sudan, Cairo convened regional summits to coordinate responses to the civil conflict, primarily to prevent spillover effects, manage refugee flows, and counter foreign interventions. These efforts reflect Egypt’s securitized approach to mediation, shaped by concerns over border stability, the containment of conflict spillover, and the preservation of its regional influence [80]. While Egypt’s initiatives have helped keep diplomatic channels open and maintain its status as a key regional actor, their effectiveness has often been constrained by deep-rooted divisions among local actors and competition with other external mediators [81].
Egypt’s role in African conflict resolution includes its hosting of the African Union’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre and leadership in the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), where President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi serves as chair of the Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee. Cairo also invests in diplomatic training and peacekeeping initiatives [82]. Such institutional investments reinforce Cairo’s ambition to shape African-led solutions and bolster its image as a stabilizing actor on the continent. However, the durability of Egypt’s mediation outcomes remains limited by regional rivalries, internal capacity constraints, and the often transactional nature of its diplomatic interventions.
Egypt’s mediation strategy illustrates its use of niche diplomacy as a middle power, leveraging its role as a regional stabilizer to advance national interests and bolster its regional and international posture image. Cairo employs pragmatic flexibility, skillfully balancing ties with global and regional powers while pursuing diplomatic and economic dividends through multi-alignment and selective engagement. Nevertheless, its ability to shape long-term solutions in Middle Eastern and African conflicts remains constrained by geopolitical realities, internal vulnerabilities, and the often temporary nature of its mediation outcomes [44].

4.2. Egypt’s Geopolitical Role

Egypt’s geopolitical role is best understood as a synthesis of its strategic geography and its dual Arab-African identity, which together underpin its ability to act as both a global trade hub and a regional bridge between two political and cultural spheres. Egypt occupies a geostrategically unique position at the intersection of Africa, Asia, and Europe, enabling it to practice a form of niche diplomacy grounded in geographic centrality, logistical connectivity, and strategic multi-alignment. Egypt’s control of the Suez Canal is central to this positioning, a critical maritime chokepoint that serves as both an economic artery and a geopolitical lever in global affairs [83,84].
Over recent decades, the Suez Canal has been central to Egypt’s emergence as a regional middle power, functioning as a critical economic asset and a strategic lever of geopolitical influence. Control over this vital maritime chokepoint grants Cairo substantial diplomatic capital, particularly in an era of global trade heavily dependent on maritime routes. Egypt has effectively converted its geographic advantage into political and economic niche power at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The canal generates essential foreign currency revenue and underpins national development initiatives, notably through the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone), which has attracted foreign investment and spurred industrial growth [85,86,87,88]. As the shortest and most efficient maritime link between Europe and Asia, the 193-km waterway facilitates around 12 percent of global trade, including 30 percent of container traffic and a significant share of global energy flows. Its role in sustaining global supply chains underscores Egypt’s enduring relevance in the international economic and geopolitical order [89].
Strategically, control over the canal enhances Egypt’s diplomatic standing by granting it leverage over global shipping, an asymmetrical advantage relative to its broader economic performance, making it a focal point in global security calculations. The canal has also become integral to regional security dynamics, positioning Cairo as a stakeholder and actor in maritime stability [2,90]. However, recent disruptions, such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, have revealed structural vulnerabilities, undermined revenues, and exposed the limits of Egypt’s regional influence amid growing instability [91]. Nonetheless, the canal remains a core of Egypt’s middle power identity, anchoring its economic resilience and strategic relevance in an increasingly fluid geopolitical landscape.
However, the Suez Canal is not without vulnerabilities. Geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, physical limitations of the canal, and occasional blockages, such as the 2021 Ever Given incident, underscore the canal’s susceptibility to disruption [92]. In response, Egypt has pursued a series of infrastructure upgrades, most notably the 2014 canal expansion. It has developed the SCZone that attracted $8.1 billion in investments for 255 projects across logistics, manufacturing, petrochemicals, and renewable energy sectors, positioning the zone as a regional hub for industry and trade [93]. These efforts aim to enhance resilience, attract foreign investment, and diversify the national economy.
The canal’s strategic relevance is further underscored by its integration into global initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Maritime Silk Road segment of the BRI relies heavily on the Suez Canal to connect East Asia to Europe, making Egypt a key node in the emerging global trade architecture [57,58]. Complementary infrastructure, such as the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline (SUMED), which transports crude oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, adds further redundancy and strategic depth to Egypt’s energy transit role, despite its diminished use following canal modernization [94].
Egypt’s strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe, combined with its control over the Suez Canal, serves as a key instrument of its niche diplomacy and underscores its centrality in global trade and geopolitics [95]. This geographic advantage enables Cairo to act as a vital logistical hub, facilitating the movement of goods between East and West and reinforcing its importance as a maritime transit point. By leveraging its stewardship of the Suez Canal, a critical chokepoint through which a significant share of global trade passes, Egypt has bolstered its economic standing and enhanced its diplomatic influence through targeted partnerships with regional and international powers. This stewardship allows Egypt to project influence that exceeds its material resources, making it a regional middle power and a critical player in shaping the dynamics of international trade and security.
Egypt also leverages its unique geostrategic position and dual Arab-African identity to act as a diplomatic and institutional intermediary between the African Union (AU) and the Arab League. This bridging role is not merely symbolic; it reflects Cairo’s long-standing niche efforts to shape interregional cooperation and assert its leadership across both spheres [3,96]. Through active engagement, mediation, and the promotion of joint initiatives, Cairo continues to shape interregional cooperation and assert its leadership, making its bridging role practical and pivotal in the evolving dynamics of Africa and the Middle East [97].
Egypt’s longstanding civilizational and political connections with sub-Saharan Africa are deeply rooted, with historical and cultural ties spanning thousands of years. Following the wave of decolonization in the mid-20th century, Egypt emerged as a pivotal African power, actively supporting liberation movements and collaborating closely with newly independent states such as Ghana and Guinea in the broader struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism [3,98]. Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt positioned itself as a champion of African sovereignty. It played a significant role in forming the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and hosting its second summit in Cairo in 1964 [99]. Egypt was also instrumental in advancing continental security and disarmament, exemplified by its role in the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in Cairo in 1996. Despite relocating the AU headquarters to Addis Ababa, Egypt perceives Africa as a strategic arena for reasserting its regional leadership, especially amid fragmentation in the Arab world.
Egypt also actively leverages economic and institutional initiatives to deepen interregional integration between Arab and African markets, positioning itself as a central actor in trade, infrastructure, and security cooperation. Through initiatives such as the Arab Africa Trade Bridges (AATB) program, Cairo seeks to institutionalize trade, investment, and food security channels, reinforcing its role as a facilitator of South–South cooperation [100,101]. Infrastructure projects like the proposed Red Sea Bridge with Saudi Arabia reflect a broader vision to recalibrate regional connectivity by bypassing traditional chokepoints and enabling direct economic linkages between Arab and African markets [102]. These initiatives are designed to enhance the cross-border movement of goods, people, and capital, thereby consolidating Egypt’s influence as a regional logistical hub.
Meanwhile, maritime cooperation under entities like the Arab Bridge Maritime Company and Egypt’s participation in the African Union’s Peace and Security Council underscore its institutional activism [103]. These niche platforms elevate Egypt’s regional profile and enable it to shape policy agendas across development, security, and migration at the interregional level. By sustaining critical transport links and guiding continental security policy, Egypt consolidates its position as a key intermediary and agenda-setter in both Arab and African spheres.

4.3. Religious, Cultural, and Heritage

Egypt actively leverages its religious, cultural, and heritage assets to enhance its international image and influence, with Al-Azhar University serving as a central pillar of this niche diplomacy. As a globally recognized authority in Islamic scholarship and Arabic studies, Al-Azhar enables Egypt to project itself as a guardian of moderate Islam and a counterweight to extremist ideologies [104]. The institution reinforces Cairo’s normative influence within the Sunni Muslim world through its transnational educational networks, outreach initiatives, and religious diplomacy. By promoting interfaith dialog, issuing fatwas that delegitimize violence, and advancing narratives of coexistence, particularly in opposition to groups such as ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Azhar not only consolidates Egypt’s religious leadership but also aligns with the state’s broader foreign policy objectives of promoting stability, countering political Islam, and enhancing its international legitimacy [105,106].
Egypt’s cultural diplomacy is a central niche of its foreign policy, mainly through its active engagement in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to which it has belonged since its founding in 1969. This membership underscores Cairo’s longstanding commitment to shaping the Islamic world’s collective agenda and amplifying its influence in multilateral forums. Egypt played a key role in shaping the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam [107]. It hosted the 12th OIC summit in 2013, asserting its leadership on issues such as Islamophobia, counterterrorism, and interfaith dialog [108,109]. These platforms amplify Cairo’s voice in multilateral settings and allow it to frame global debates in line with its national interests and religious identity.
Beyond religion, Egypt capitalizes on its Pharaonic, Islamic, and Coptic heritage as a niche diplomatic resource, using its rich and diverse cultural legacy to enhance its global image and influence. Egypt disseminates its heritage narrative to global audiences through cultural attachés, traveling exhibitions, digital archives, and partnerships with international institutions [110]. These initiatives are not merely symbolic; they cultivate mutual understanding, attract tourism, reinforce Egypt’s image as a cradle of civilization, and contribute to a hub of cultural innovation and the accumulation of international prestige [111].
Egypt’s commitment to heritage protection is another niche asset further evidenced by its active participation in international agreements and conventions, such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention on prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property, and the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention [111]. Egypt has also entered into bilateral agreements, such as those with Peru, to facilitate the protection and restitution of cultural objects to their countries of origin [112]. This positions Egypt as a key actor in global heritage governance and fosters cooperation with UNESCO and other cultural bodies [113,114]. The ongoing restoration of monuments and archeological projects serves dual purposes: safeguarding national identity and projecting Egypt as a responsible steward of world heritage.
Egyptology provides Egypt with a unique niche in cultural diplomacy, leveraging the global fascination with its ancient civilization to foster academic, scientific, and tourism-related ties. The international appeal of Egyptology translates into robust academic exchanges, joint archeological excavations, and scientific collaborations that deepen diplomatic relations and reinforce Egypt’s position in the academic and tourism sectors. These partnerships not only facilitate the exchange of knowledge and expertise but also enable the retelling of Egypt’s history with greater accuracy, enhancing Egypt’s image as the cradle of civilization and supporting the development of new historical narratives [115,116].
Moreover, Egypt’s historical legacy as a cradle of Islam and Christianity positions it to engage in interfaith dialog and promote religious tolerance, enhancing its image as a culturally rich and ideologically moderate state. This niche dimension supports Egypt’s regional and international standing, particularly in narratives of coexistence and moderation [117]. However, persistent reports from human rights organizations highlight ongoing discrimination and restrictions faced by religious minorities such as Coptic Christians, Jews, and Baha’is [118,119,120]. Nonetheless, Egypt’s efforts in interfaith engagement, underpinned by its religious heritage, continue to serve its interests and bolster its role in regional stability and cross-cultural dialog.

4.4. Energy Hub

Egypt aims to become an Eastern Mediterranean energy hub, leveraging its vast offshore gas reserves (e.g., the Zohr field), two major LNG export terminals (e.g., Idku and Damietta) [121], founding member and host of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) [122], and advancing large-scale renewable energy projects and exploring green hydrogen initiatives. Cairo has a significant role in international energy transit, being one of the major economies in the Northern and Middle East African regions, and it is one of the Sunbelt countries and one of Africa’s top natural gas producers [123].
Egypt has a significant role in the international energy market due to its unique geographic position [124]. Situated in North Africa and the Arab region, Egypt boasts nearly 3000 km of coastline along the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba, placing it at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. This central location provides Egypt with direct access to major global markets and trade routes, making it an essential link for energy supply and transit between continents. Additionally, two of the world’s most critical energy transit routes—the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline—are located in Egypt [125]. These infrastructures handle a significant share of global oil and LNG flows, reinforcing Egypt’s status as a strategic chokepoint in global energy logistics [126]. These help Egypt be strategically positioned in energy supply, transit, and the broader transition toward sustainable energy systems, making it a linchpin in regional and global energy markets.
Egypt’s natural gas sector remains at the heart of its energy niche diplomacy, serving as a strategic tool in its pursuit to become a regional trade hub connecting North Africa, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean [127]. This ambition is anchored in major offshore discoveries and the developing key liquefaction infrastructure, enabling flexible export routes to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa [128,129]. Following post-2011 disruptions, the government implemented structural reforms and accelerated licensing processes, leading to a marked production and export capacity recovery. Infrastructure rehabilitation and new discoveries (Zohr, Atoll, Nooros, West Nile Delta) have re-established Egypt as a net gas exporter [130].
Cairo’s role in re-exporting Israeli gas and its leadership in hosting the EMGF enhance its diplomatic leverage, positioning Egypt as a Middle power in regional energy cooperation. This strategy aligns with European efforts to diversify gas supplies amid declining dependence on Russian energy. Through the targeted deployment of its gas assets and infrastructure, Egypt exemplifies niche diplomacy, leveraging energy interdependence to strengthen its regional and international influence.
A core pillar of Egypt’s energy niche diplomacy is the strategic expansion of large-scale renewable energy infrastructure. Under its Vision 2030 framework, Egypt aims for renewable sources to comprise 42 percent of its total electricity generation capacity by 2035 [131], supported by landmark projects such as the Benban Solar Park and Ras Ghareb wind farm [132]. This ambition reflects domestic energy diversification goals and Egypt’s broader pursuit of regional influence and climate leadership. These efforts reinforce its image as a proactive and responsible actor in global energy governance. By leveraging its abundant solar and wind resources, Egypt is a regional hub for clean energy cooperation and export. Egypt is also advancing regional energy integration through cross-border electricity links with Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, and Sudan, with potential future expansion to Chad [133].
Egypt holds significant potential for hydrogen production from fossil fuels and renewable energy sources, supported by its well-developed energy infrastructure and strategic geographic position [134]. The updated Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy (ISES) to 2040, alongside the recently launched National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Strategy [135], reflects Egypt’s ambition to diversify its energy mix, accelerate the deployment of renewables, and capture a 5–8 percent share of the global green hydrogen market by 2040 [136]. Key projects include what is projected to be the world’s largest green hydrogen plant in South Sinai (400,000 tons/year) [137], and large-scale green ammonia facilities in Damietta Port and the Suez Canal Economic Zone [138]. However, despite this strategic momentum, development is constrained by significant financial, technical, and regulatory barriers [135]. While Egypt’s existing natural gas infrastructure offers a potential pathway for hydrogen transport, its conversion would demand extensive investment and comprehensive feasibility assessments.
Egypt’s bid to position itself as a regional energy hub takes shape within a highly competitive landscape where multiple states advance parallel strategies. Israel, for instance, has used its offshore reserves in the Tamar and Leviathan fields to emerge as a net exporter, with much of this gas currently processed in Egyptian LNG facilities. While this arrangement underscores Cairo’s infrastructural edge, it also exposes the potential for rivalry: Israeli efforts to develop independent export routes, from prospective pipelines to Europe to possible domestic liquefaction capacity, could gradually erode Egypt’s leverage [139]. The establishment of the EMGF, with its headquarters in Cairo, was designed to institutionalize cooperation in this contested space. However, the persistent tensions among Egypt, Israel, and Türkiye reveal that energy diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean is as much about strategic positioning as technical collaboration.
Beyond the Levant, Arab states are also advancing their own hub strategies. Qatar retains unrivaled dominance in the LNG sector through its vast North Field expansion, overshadowing Egypt’s export capacity [140]. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are channeling resources into hydrogen and renewable energy to become global suppliers in emerging energy markets. Even Oman is carving out a role as a significant LNG exporter and a rising player in renewables [141]. Within this broader context, Egypt’s energy ambitions cannot be viewed in isolation: they are part of a wider regional contest in which hydrocarbon and renewable assets are deployed as instruments of niche diplomacy and middle-power influence.
These dynamics highlight both the opportunities and constraints Egypt faces. Its strategic chokepoints, LNG infrastructure, and geographic centrality remain formidable assets. Yet the country’s ability to consolidate its position as the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy hub will depend on how it navigates an evolving environment shaped by cooperation and rivalry, where regional competitors are equally intent on leveraging energy for influence and prestige.

5. Conclusions

Egypt’s niche diplomacy reflects both its enduring assets and its structural constraints. The analysis demonstrates several clear findings. First, mediation remains a cornerstone of Cairo’s foreign policy, providing visibility and reinforcing its role as a stabilizing actor. Yet these initiatives yield tactical gains rather than lasting settlements, reflecting the limits of Egypt’s capacity to shape durable regional outcomes. Second, energy diplomacy has bolstered Egypt’s leverage through offshore discoveries, LNG infrastructure, and control of key transit chokepoints. This position, however, is increasingly contested by Israel’s pursuit of independent export routes and the Gulf monarchies’ expanding LNG and hydrogen strategies. Third, Egypt’s geopolitical weight, anchored in the Suez Canal and its Arab-African bridging role, continues to serve as a foundational asset, but one that is vulnerable to supply chain shocks and regional insecurity. Finally, cultural and heritage diplomacy provides symbolic capital but remains secondary to economic and security instruments.
These findings suggest that Egypt’s niche diplomacy functions as a strategy of adaptation: it sustains a degree of middle-power relevance despite economic fragility and limited material capacity. However, its niches are uneven in effectiveness. Unlike Qatar or the UAE, which leverage financial resources and global branding, or Türkiye, which projects an assertive ideological narrative, Egypt relies primarily on structural geography and historical legacy. These advantages confer visibility and prestige but are less easily transformed into sustainable influence.
Egypt’s ability to consolidate its niches will depend on translating functional roles into durable strategic advantages. This will require domestic economic stabilization, deeper investment in renewable energy and green hydrogen, and the institutionalization of mediation within regional and multilateral frameworks. Absent such developments, rising competition from Israel, the Gulf states, and Türkiye threatens to erode Cairo’s comparative strengths. Egypt’s experience thus illustrates both the opportunities and the fragilities of middle-power strategies in the Global South: resilient enough to ensure relevance, but vulnerable to eclipse by wealthier or more agile competitors.
This study advances scholarship on middle powers and niche diplomacy by examining how an authoritarian and resource-constrained state adapts to a crowded regional environment. Much of the literature highlights the entrepreneurial strategies of wealthy middle powers, such as Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, or the traditional cases of Canada and Australia [31,32]. Egypt represents a different variant: structural geography, civilizational legacy, and interregional identity are the principal niches rather than financial resources or ideational leadership. By tracing this model, the study broadens the theoretical scope of niche diplomacy beyond liberal-democratic or resource-rich contexts. It underscores how Global South middle powers maintain relevance through reactive, adaptive, and structurally embedded strategies.

Author Contributions

Formal analysis, M.C. and C.L.; writing—original draft preparation, M.C. and C.L.; writing—review and editing, M.C. and C.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

Data is contained within the article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Chaziza, M.; Lutmar, C. Between Constraint and Opportunity: Egypt’s Niche Diplomacy in a Shifting Global Order. World 2025, 6, 138. https://doi.org/10.3390/world6040138

AMA Style

Chaziza M, Lutmar C. Between Constraint and Opportunity: Egypt’s Niche Diplomacy in a Shifting Global Order. World. 2025; 6(4):138. https://doi.org/10.3390/world6040138

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Chaziza, Mordechai, and Carmela Lutmar. 2025. "Between Constraint and Opportunity: Egypt’s Niche Diplomacy in a Shifting Global Order" World 6, no. 4: 138. https://doi.org/10.3390/world6040138

APA Style

Chaziza, M., & Lutmar, C. (2025). Between Constraint and Opportunity: Egypt’s Niche Diplomacy in a Shifting Global Order. World, 6(4), 138. https://doi.org/10.3390/world6040138

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