AbstractThe Physical Computability Thesis (PCT) states that the physical world is computable. Sometimes it is argued that a well-evidenced logical principle, the Church-Turing Thesis, entails PCT. But this reasoning is faulty. I argue that it is an open question whether PCT is true: even if the universe is finite, physics may turn out to confound PCT. What would a non-computable physics look like, and what would be the implications for scientists and engineers? I review potential countermodels to various formulations of PCT.
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Copeland, J. Physical Uncomputability. Proceedings 2017, 1, 160.
Copeland J. Physical Uncomputability. Proceedings. 2017; 1(3):160.Chicago/Turabian Style
Copeland, Jack. 2017. "Physical Uncomputability." Proceedings 1, no. 3: 160.
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