ESG as a Measure of Credit Ratings
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Impact of ESG Measures on the Companies’ Financial Condition
2.2. Impact of Financial Condition Measures on Corporate Credit Ratings
3. Data Description and Methodology
4. Results
4.1. Impact of ESG Measures on the Corporate Credit Ratings
4.2. Financial Indicators Significance during the Corporate Credit Rating Estimation
5. Conclusions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Description of Financial Factors
Variable Name | Description | Abbreviation |
Profitability | ||
Gross Margin | This item is calculated as Gross Profit (Industrial and Utility) for the fiscal year divided by Primary Revenue for the same period and multiplied by 100. | GM |
Effective Tax Rate | This value is Total Income Tax for the fiscal year divided by the same period’s Income Before Taxes and is expressed as a percentage. | TAX |
Earning Power | ||
Asset Turnover | The amount of revenue generated for each unit of assets, also known as TAT. It is calculated as Primary Revenue for the fiscal year divided by the Average Total Assets for the same period. | ASS |
Pretax ROA | This item represents the return on assets before taxes. It is calculated as Income Before Tax for the fiscal year divided by the Average Total Assets for the same period and is expressed as a percentage. | ROA |
Earnings Retention | This is a ratio of Retained Earnings to Income Available to Common Excluding Extraordinary Items for the fiscal year and expressed as a percentage. | RET |
Reinvestment Rate | This ratio is calculated by dividing Retained Earnings for the fiscal year by the average Common Shareholders Equity for the same period and is expressed as a percentage. Retained Earnings refer to the Income Available to Common Excluding Extraordinary Items minus Gross Dividends (Common Stock). | RINV |
Liquidity | ||
Current Ratio | This is the ratio of Total Current Assets for the fiscal year divided by Total Current Liabilities for the same period. This item does not distinguish between current and long-term assets and liabilities. | CUR |
Time Interest Earned | Measures the number of times within a fiscal year the company generates enough operating income to meet its interest payments. It is calculated as Earnings Before Interest and Taxes for the fiscal year divided by Interest Expense for the same period. | IN |
Leverage | ||
Debt/Equity | This is the ratio of Total Debt as of the end of the fiscal year to Common Shareholders Equity for the same period and is expressed as a percentage. Not available for Banks. | DEB |
LT Debt/Capital | This is the ratio of Long-Term Debt divided by Total Capital at the end of the fiscal year and is expressed as a percentage. Total Capital is the sum of Total Equity, Total Debt, and Minority Interest. | LTD |
(Total Debt-Cash)/EBITDA | This is the average Net Debt divided by the EBITDA for the fiscal year. EBITDA is EBIT for the fiscal year plus the same period’s Depreciation and Amortization expenses. | NET |
Operating | ||
A/R Turnover | This item measures the number of times receivables are cycled through in a given period. It is calculated as Primary Revenue for the fiscal year divided by the Average Total Net Receivables for the same period. | AR |
Inv Turnover | This is the ratio of Total Cost of Revenue for the fiscal year to the average Total Inventory for the same period. | INT |
Fixed Assets Turnover | The amount of revenue generated for each unit of fixed assets. It is calculated as primary revenue for the fiscal year divided by the sum of Total Net Property, Plant and Equipment, and Total Net Utility Plant for the same period. | FIX |
WC/Sales Growth | This is the change in Working Capital to Sales for the fiscal year. | WC |
Source: own elaboration. |
Appendix B. Sector Description
Name of Sector | Name of Subsectors |
Energy | Oil and Gas Drilling, Oil and Gas Transportation Services, Oil Related Services and Equipment, Integrated Oil and Gas, Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Oil and Gas Refining and Marketing, Coal, Renewable Energy Equipment and Services, Renewable Fuels, Uranium |
Basic Materials | Agricultural Chemicals, Commodity Chemicals, Diversified Chemicals, Specialty Chemicals, Construction Materials, Diversified Mining, Mining Support Services and Equipment, Specialty Mining and Metals, Gold, Aluminum, Iron and Steel, Non-Gold Precious Metals and Minerals, Non-Paper Containers and Packaging, Paper Packaging, Forest and Wood Products, Paper Products |
Industrials | Electrical Components and Equipment, Heavy Electrical Equipment, Heavy Machinery and Vehicles, Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Shipbuilding, Aerospace and Defense, Business Support Services, Business Support Supplies, Commercial Printing Services, Employment Services, Environmental Services and Equipment, Professional Information Services, Diversified Industrial Goods Wholesale, Construction and Engineering, Airport Operators and Services, Highways and Rail Tracks, Marine Port Services, Airlines, Passenger Transportation, Ground and Sea, Courier, Postal, Air Freight and Land-based Logistics, Ground Freight and Logistics, Marine Freight and Logistics |
Consumer Cyclicals | Auto and Truck Manufacturers, Auto, Truck and Motorcycle Parts, Tires and Rubber Products, Recreational Products, Toys and Children’s Products, Appliances, Tools and Housewares, Home Furnishings, Construction Supplies and Fixtures, Homebuilding, Apparel and Accessories, Footwear, Textiles and Leather Goods, Advertising and Marketing, Broadcasting, Consumer Publishing, Entertainment Production, Casinos and Gaming, Hotels, Motels and Cruise Lines, Leisure and Recreation, Restaurants and Bars, Apparel and Accessories Retailers, Auto Vehicles, Parts and Service Retailers, Computer and Electronics Retailers, Home Furnishings Retailers, Home Improvement Products and Services Retailers, Miscellaneous Specialty Retailers, Department Stores, Discount Stores |
Consumer Non-Cyclicals | Fishing and Farming, Food Processing, Tobacco, Brewers, Distillers and Wineries, Non-Alcoholic Beverages, Household Products, Personal Products, Personal Services, Drug Retailers, Food Retail and Distribution, Consumer Goods Conglomerates |
Helathcare | Healthcare Facilities and Services, Advanced Medical Equipment and Technology, Medical Equipment, Supplies and Distribution, Biotechnology and Medical Research, Pharmaceuticals |
Technology | Integrated Telecommunications Services, Computer Hardware, Household Electronics, Phones and Handheld Devices, Office Equipment, Electronic Equipment and Parts, Communications and Networking, Semiconductor Equipment and Testing, Semiconductors, IT Services and Consulting, Online Services, Software, Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, Financial Technology (Fintech), Miscellaneous Educational Service Providers, Wireless Telecommunications Services |
Utilities | Multiline Utilities, Water and Related Utilities, Natural Gas Utilities, Electric Utilities, Independent Power Producers |
Source: own elaboration. |
1 | Variables are described in the Appendix A. |
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Anis and Utama (2016) | 2011–2014, OLS regression and 2SLS with PLS, published CSR Disclosure and Corporate Governance disclosure in annual Manufacturing Industry report (Indonesia Stock Exchange). The indirect positive effect of CSR disclosure on the cost of debt was observed. |
Cooper and Uzur (2015) | 2006–2011, US Companies, multi-regression model, KLD Stat; Bloomberg; Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database. A lower cost of debt was noticed. |
Ge and Lui (2015) | 1992–2009, 4260 new bond issues, multi-regression model, RiskMetrics Group; KLD STATS database; Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database; Compustat. Bonds issued at a lower cost. |
Goss and Roberts (2011) | 1991–2006, 3996 loans, simultaneous equations, instrumental variable, 56 regressions, Heckman selection model, KLD Research and Analytics Inc.; Dealscan. Higher loan pricing was noticed. |
Hoepner et al. (2016) | 2005–2012, 470 loan agreements based in 28 different countries, Msci KLD Stats. Higher country sustainability was associated with lower costs of bank loans. |
Menz (2010) | 2004–2007, Merrill Lynch index system, 498 bonds, OLS—fixed and random effect model. CSR–ESG caused higher bond spreads. |
Nandy and Lodh (2012) | 1991–2006, Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Research and Analytics, Inc.; Compustat; Dealscan database, 3000 U.S. firms, OLS; fixed effect; Wald test to confirm. ESG–CSR factors decreased the cost of loan negotiation. |
Pavelin et al. (2014) | 1991–2008, by 742 different firms, KLD STATS and Datastream, 3240 bonds issued. Social posture impacts the cost of debt financing and the credit quality of its bond issues. |
Zeidan et al. (2015) | Qualitative questionnaire from a subsidiary bank in Brazil to develop the sustainability credit scoring. ESG–CSR decreased default probability. |
Jang et al. (2020) | 2010–2015, Korean corporate bonds, panel data models. Only environmental scores have a significant impact on bond returns. They reduced the cost of debt in the case of small firms. Credit ratings cannot explain the ESG effect in predicting future bond returns. |
Authors | Significant Variables |
---|---|
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) | Interest coverage, the long-term debt to total assets ratio, the long-term debt to net worth ratio, the net income to total assets ratio, the coefficient of variation of total assets, the coefficient of variation of net income, and total assets. |
Ederington (1985) | Interest coverage, the long term debt to capital ratio, and total assets. |
Blume et al. (1998) | Pre-tax interest coverage, operating income to sales, long term debt to assets, total debt to assets, and total assets |
Bouzouita and Young (1998) | Profitability, growth in surplus, leverage, line mix, liquidity, size, and organizational form. |
Kamstra et al. (2001) | Net income plus interest expenses divided by interest expenses to represent interest coverage, a debt ratio measured by total debt divided by total assets, profitability captured by the net income total assets ratio, and firm size measured as book value of firm assets. |
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) | Institutional ownership, the proportion of the board consisting of outsiders, concentrated ownership, debt/equity, profit margin, total assets, the market value of common equity/book of common equity. |
Kim and Gu (2004) | Debt service coverage, profitability, and size. |
Roje (2005) | ROA, ROE, profit, the market value of equity, tangible book value/assets, leverage, long-term Debt/total assets, projected benefit obligation-pension plan assets/total assets, volatility of earnings. |
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) | The number of outside blockholders, quality accruals, timeliness of firms’ earnings, independence of the board, CEO power, percentage of shares held by officers or directors, board expertise, leverage, ROA, net income before extraordinary items, size, subordinated debt, and interest coverage |
Gray et al. (2006) | Interest coverage, leverage, profitability, and industry concentration. |
Sih (2006) | Industry, cash, and market value. |
Bone (2010) | Interest coverage and short-term debt/total debt. |
Moody’s Long-Term Issuer Rating | Fitch Long-Term Issuer Rating | ||
---|---|---|---|
Rating | Code | Rating | Code |
Aaa | 100 | AAA | 100 |
Aa1 | 95 | AA+ | 94.4 |
Aa2 | 90 | AA | 89.47 |
Aa3 | 85 | AA− | 84.21 |
A1 | 80 | A+ | 78.95 |
A2 | 75 | A | 73.68 |
A3 | 70 | A− | 68.42 |
Baa1 | 65 | BBB+ | 63.16 |
Baa2 | 60 | BBB | 57.89 |
Baa3 | 55 | BBB− | 52.63 |
Ba1 | 50 | BB+ | 47.37 |
Ba2 | 45 | BB | 42.11 |
Ba3 | 40 | BB− | 36.84 |
B1 | 35 | B+ | 31.58 |
B2 | 30 | B | 26.32 |
B3 | 25 | B− | 21.05 |
Caa1 | 20 | CCC | 15.79 |
Caa2 | 15 | CC | 10.53 |
Caa3 | 10 | C | 5.26 |
Caa | 5 | RD | −5 |
C | 0 | D | −5 |
WR | −5 | WD | −5 |
NULL | 0 |
Variable Name | Description | Abbreviation |
---|---|---|
ESG Combined Score | Refinitiv ESG Combined Score is an overall company score based on the reported information in the environmental, social, and corporate governance pillars (ESG Score) with an ESG Controversies overlay. | ESGC |
ESG Score | Refinitiv ESG Score is an overall company score based on the self-reported information in the environmental, social, and corporate governance pillars. | ESG |
Environmental Pillar Score | The environmental pillar measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in order to generate long-term shareholder value. | ENV |
Social Pillar Score | The social pillar measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers, and society, through its use of best management practices. It is a reflection of the company’s reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability to generate long-term shareholder value. | SOC |
Corporate Governance Pillar Score | The corporate governance pillar measures how well a company’s systems and processes ensure that its board members and executives act in the best interests of its long-term shareholders. It reflects a company’s capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances, in order to generate long-term shareholder value. | GOV |
ESG Controversies Score | The ESG controversies category score measures a company’s exposure to environmental, social, and governance controversies and negative events reflected in global media. | CONT |
Variable Name | Opinion and Previous Studies | Direction |
---|---|---|
Profitability | ||
Gross Margin | The higher is the gross margin, the higher credit ratings are (Jiang and Packer 2017; Gray et al. 2006; Murcial et al. 2014; Poon and Chan 2008; Fink et al. 2010; Altman 1968; Altman and Rijken 2004; Logue and Merville 1972; Adams et al. 2003; Daniels et al. 2009; Galil 2003). | + |
Effective Tax Rate | On the one hand, a higher value of the tax rate decreases profits and increases the business costs; on the other hand, higher taxes are connected with higher profits (Jiang and Packer 2017; Murcial et al. 2014; Fink et al. 2010). | +/− |
Earning Power | ||
Asset Turnover | The higher the asset turnover, the higher credit ratings are (Matousek and Stewart 2009; Kumar and Bhattacharya 2006; Kim and Gu 2004). | + |
Pretax ROA | The higher the pretax ROA, the higher credit ratings are (Matousek and Stewart 2009; Kim and Gu 2004; Frey 2013). | + |
Earnings Retention | The retention ratio is the portion of earnings kept back in a firm to grow the business. It helps investors determine how much money a company is keeping to reinvest in the company’s operations. Growing companies typically have high retention ratios as they are investing earnings back into the company to grow rapidly. The higher is the earnings retention rate, the higher credit ratings are (Kim and Sohn 2008). | + |
Reinvestment Rate | The reinvestment rate is the return an investor expects to make after reinvesting the cash flows earned from a previous investment. It can be negatively affected by interest rate risk, which is the potential for investment losses resulting from changes in interest rates and the reinvestment risk, which is the potential the investor will be unable to reinvest cash flows at a rate comparable to their current rate of return (Kim and Sohn 2008; Alp 2013). | +/− |
Liquidity | ||
Current Ratio | The current ratio from the one side measures a company’s ability to pay short-term obligations. On the other hand, the high value of this factor can suggest that management may not be using its assets efficiently (Matousek and Stewart 2009; Opler et al. 1999; Baum et al. 2008; Baum et al. 2009; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Nevitt and Fabozzi 2000). | +/− |
Time Interest Earned | The higher value of the time interest earned, the higher credit ratings are (Matousek and Stewart 2009; Kim and Gu 2004; Tanthanongsakkun and Treepongkaruna 2008; Frey 2013; Alp 2013). | + |
Leverage | ||
Debt/Equity | The higher value of the debt to equity ratio, the lower credit ratings are (Anand et al. 2016; Gray et al. 2006; Kumar and Bhattacharya 2006; Kim and Gu 2004; Elayan et al. 2003; Alp 2013; Cantor and Packer 1997; Pottier and Sommer 1999; Adams et al. 2003; Poon 2003). | − |
LT Debt/Capital | The higher value of the long-term debt to capital ratio, the lower the credit ratings are (Gray et al. 2006; Kumar and Bhattacharya 2006; Elayan et al. 2003; Tanthanongsakkun and Treepongkaruna 2008; Alp 2013; Cantor and Packer 1997; Pottier and Sommer 1999). | − |
(Total Debt-Cash)/EBITDA | The higher value of the total debt reduced by cash to EBITDA ratio, the lower credit ratings are (Gray et al. 2006; Kumar and Bhattacharya 2006; Elayan et al. 2003; Frey 2013; Alp 2013) | − |
Operating | ||
A/R Turnover | The higher value of the A/R Turnover ratio, the higher the credit ratings are (Kumar and Bhattacharya 2006; Elayan et al. 2003). | + |
Inv Turnover | The higher value of the inventory turnover ratio, the lower the credit ratings are (Kumar and Bhattacharya 2006). | − |
Fixed Assets Turnover | The higher value of the fixed assets turnover ratio, the higher the credit ratings are (Kumar and Bhattacharya 2006). | + |
WC/Sales Growth | The higher value of the working capital to sales growth ratio, the higher the credit ratings are (Frey 2013). | + |
Rating | Moody’s LT | Fitch LT | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | |
ENV | −0.0144 | 0.0000 | −0.0377 | 0.0000 | ||||||||
SOC | −0.0051 | 0.1010 | −0.0260 | 0.0000 | ||||||||
GOV | 0.0052 | 0.0480 | 0.0053 | 0.2330 | ||||||||
CONT | 0.0062 | 0.0010 | 0.0068 | 0.0020 | ||||||||
ESG | −0.0019 | 0.5200 | −0.0279 | 0.0000 | ||||||||
/cut1 | −2.00 | 0.00 | −5.68 | 0.00 | −6.14 | 0.00 | −2.11 | 0.00 | 1.54 | 0.00 | −0.50 | 0.05 |
/cut2 | −1.90 | 0.00 | −5.23 | 0.00 | −5.70 | 0.00 | −1.93 | 0.00 | 1.65 | 0.00 | −0.38 | 0.12 |
/cut3 | −1.90 | 0.00 | −4.04 | 0.00 | −4.56 | 0.00 | −1.91 | 0.00 | 1.66 | 0.00 | −0.37 | 0.13 |
/cut4 | −1.88 | 0.00 | −3.13 | 0.00 | −3.70 | 0.00 | −1.88 | 0.00 | 1.68 | 0.00 | −0.35 | 0.15 |
/cut5 | −1.84 | 0.00 | −2.88 | 0.00 | −3.46 | 0.00 | −1.86 | 0.00 | 1.69 | 0.00 | −0.34 | 0.17 |
/cut6 | −1.82 | 0.00 | −2.70 | 0.00 | −3.28 | 0.00 | −1.84 | 0.00 | 1.70 | 0.00 | −0.33 | 0.18 |
/cut7 | −1.80 | 0.00 | −2.48 | 0.00 | −3.08 | 0.00 | −1.78 | 0.00 | 1.74 | 0.00 | −0.29 | 0.24 |
/cut8 | −1.76 | 0.00 | −0.72 | 0.01 | −1.35 | 0.00 | −1.61 | 0.00 | 1.84 | 0.00 | −0.18 | 0.46 |
/cut9 | −1.01 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.82 | −1.49 | 0.00 | 1.92 | 0.00 | −0.10 | 0.68 |
/cut10 | 0.05 | 0.85 | 1.47 | 0.00 | 0.82 | 0.01 | −1.19 | 0.00 | 2.11 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.69 |
/cut11 | 0.68 | 0.02 | 2.60 | 0.00 | 1.93 | 0.00 | −1.06 | 0.01 | 2.19 | 0.00 | 0.18 | 0.45 |
/cut12 | 1.61 | 0.00 | 3.79 | 0.00 | 3.11 | 0.00 | −0.69 | 0.06 | 2.43 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.08 |
/cut13 | 2.62 | 0.00 | 5.22 | 0.00 | 4.54 | 0.00 | −0.41 | 0.27 | 2.62 | 0.00 | 0.64 | 0.01 |
/cut14 | 4.08 | 0.00 | 5.58 | 0.00 | 4.89 | 0.00 | −0.10 | 0.79 | 2.84 | 0.00 | 0.88 | 0.00 |
/cut15 | 4.46 | 0.00 | 6.10 | 0.00 | 5.40 | 0.00 | 0.72 | 0.10 | 3.42 | 0.00 | 1.49 | 0.00 |
/cut16 | 5.00 | 0.00 | ||||||||||
no. obs | 1088 | 754 | 754 | 809 | 809 | 809 | ||||||
no. gr | 118 | 101 | 101 | 73 | 73 | 73 | ||||||
Wald | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Rating | Fitch LT | |||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3001 | 3002 | 3003 | 3004 | 3005 | 3006 | 3007 | 3008 | |||||||||
Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | |
ENV | −0.0625 | 0.00 | −0.0537 | 0.02 | −0.0526 | 0.01 | −0.0026 | 0.80 | 0.0094 | 0.66 | −0.0202 | 0.30 | −0.0564 | 0.00 | −0.0551 | 0.00 |
SOC | −0.0104 | 0.35 | −0.0246 | 0.20 | −0.0198 | 0.39 | −0.0505 | 0.00 | −0.0912 | 0.01 | −0.0670 | 0.00 | −0.0402 | 0.03 | −0.0220 | 0.50 |
GOV | 0.0278 | 0.01 | −0.0432 | 0.03 | 0.0053 | 0.81 | −0.0024 | 0.85 | 0.0277 | 0.26 | 0.0139 | 0.40 | 0.0324 | 0.05 | 0.0025 | 0.87 |
/cut1 | −1.4377 | 0.10 | −5.0291 | 0.01 | −2.1334 | 0.09 | −2.3585 | 0.01 | −2.8269 | 0.11 | −4.6134 | 0.01 | −1.2290 | 0.42 | −3.1897 | 0.08 |
/cut2 | −0.7488 | 0.37 | −4.8353 | 0.02 | −1.7996 | 0.15 | −1.6915 | 0.04 | −2.7115 | 0.12 | −4.2409 | 0.01 | −1.1681 | 0.44 | −2.9865 | 0.10 |
/cut3 | −0.6808 | 0.41 | −4.7386 | 0.02 | −1.4271 | 0.24 | −0.8428 | 0.30 | −2.5848 | 0.14 | −4.1232 | 0.01 | −1.0377 | 0.49 | −0.9449 | 0.57 |
/cut4 | −0.6106 | 0.46 | −4.2896 | 0.03 | −0.8765 | 0.46 | −0.1787 | 0.84 | −2.0731 | 0.23 | −3.6650 | 0.02 | −0.9690 | 0.52 | ||
/cut5 | −0.5394 | 0.51 | −3.6753 | 0.06 | −0.2347 | 0.85 | −0.8075 | 0.64 | −2.9959 | 0.04 | −0.8308 | 0.58 | ||||
/cut6 | −0.4653 | 0.57 | −0.7575 | 0.61 | ||||||||||||
/cut7 | −0.3892 | 0.64 | 0.2174 | 0.88 | ||||||||||||
/cut8 | −0.1466 | 0.86 | 0.9288 | 0.52 | ||||||||||||
/cut9 | 0.3282 | 0.70 | ||||||||||||||
no. obs | 125 | 110 | 77 | 89 | 43 | 71 | 180 | 93 | ||||||||
no. gr | 12 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 17 | 10 | ||||||||
Wald | 0 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Rating | Moody’s LT | |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3001 | 3002 | 3003 | 3004 | 3005 | 3008 | |||||||
Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | |
ENV | −0.0210 | 0.06 | −0.0012 | 0.92 | −0.0046 | 0.45 | −0.0106 | 0.42 | −0.0015 | 0.94 | −0.0363 | 0.00 |
SOC | −0.0054 | 0.57 | −0.0146 | 0.21 | 0.0261 | 0.00 | −0.0028 | 0.83 | −0.0190 | 0.37 | −0.0036 | 0.85 |
GOV | −0.0062 | 0.51 | 0.0208 | 0.04 | −0.0115 | 0.12 | −0.0149 | 0.29 | −0.0023 | 0.86 | 0.0060 | 0.47 |
/cut1 | −9.5754 | 0.00 | −4.0064 | 0.01 | −2.4038 | 0.00 | −6.4775 | 0.00 | −6.5816 | 0.00 | −5.4969 | 0.00 |
/cut2 | −8.5974 | 0.00 | 1.0574 | 0.26 | −1.5443 | 0.01 | −4.5045 | 0.01 | −6.2563 | 0.00 | −3.9008 | 0.00 |
/cut3 | −2.6045 | 0.06 | 3.9152 | 0.00 | −1.3350 | 0.02 | −2.2005 | 0.15 | −4.7362 | 0.01 | −2.6018 | 0.02 |
/cut4 | −1.3874 | 0.31 | 4.3816 | 0.00 | −1.1811 | 0.03 | 0.8677 | 0.61 | −3.5788 | 0.03 | −1.9864 | 0.07 |
/cut5 | 0.0445 | 0.97 | 6.8515 | 0.00 | −0.4890 | 0.37 | 4.5025 | 0.02 | −2.4200 | 0.13 | −1.4476 | 0.19 |
/cut6 | 2.7706 | 0.07 | 0.5663 | 0.30 | 5.0930 | 0.01 | −1.5117 | 0.34 | 0.7723 | 0.47 | ||
/cut7 | 4.6153 | 0.00 | 1.0931 | 0.05 | −1.2648 | 0.42 | 1.2642 | 0.24 | ||||
/cut8 | 5.0001 | 0.00 | 2.0341 | 0.00 | 3.0926 | 0.10 | ||||||
/cut9 | 5.2008 | 0.00 | 2.8868 | 0.00 | ||||||||
/cut10 | 5.6548 | 0.00 | ||||||||||
no. obs | 118 | 85 | 131 | 73 | 59 | 85 | ||||||
no. group | 16 | 15 | 13 | 9 | 8 | 12 | ||||||
Wald | 0 | 0 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.33 | 0 |
Rating | Fitch LT | |||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3001 | 3002 | 3003 | 3004 | 3005 | 3006 | 3007 | 3008 | |||||||||
Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | |
CONT | 0.0120 | 0.02 | 0.0046 | 0.56 | 0.0128 | 0.09 | 0.0219 | 0.04 | −0.0045 | 0.51 | 0.0054 | 0.31 | 0.0126 | 0.02 | 0.0068 | 0.35 |
/cut1 | 1.7429 | 0.00 | 1.5817 | 0.03 | 2.0904 | 0.00 | 2.7623 | 0.01 | 0.3664 | 0.45 | 1.1807 | 0.00 | 2.1538 | 0.00 | 1.6959 | 0.01 |
/cut2 | 2.1112 | 0.00 | 1.6804 | 0.02 | 2.2755 | 0.00 | 3.1445 | 0.00 | 0.4397 | 0.37 | 1.3557 | 0.00 | 2.1816 | 0.00 | 1.8026 | 0.01 |
/cut3 | 2.1490 | 0.00 | 1.7344 | 0.02 | 2.5150 | 0.00 | 3.7012 | 0.00 | 0.5175 | 0.29 | 1.4203 | 0.00 | 2.2405 | 0.00 | 2.9645 | 0.00 |
/cut4 | 2.1885 | 0.00 | 2.0043 | 0.01 | 2.8836 | 0.00 | 4.1285 | 0.00 | 0.7946 | 0.11 | 1.6510 | 0.00 | 2.2717 | 0.00 | ||
/cut5 | 2.2303 | 0.00 | 2.3290 | 0.00 | 3.3736 | 0.00 | 1.4215 | 0.01 | 2.0012 | 0.00 | 2.3378 | 0.00 | ||||
/cut6 | 2.2745 | 0.00 | 2.3730 | 0.00 | ||||||||||||
/cut7 | 2.3215 | 0.00 | 2.8510 | 0.00 | ||||||||||||
/cut8 | 2.4776 | 0.00 | 3.2275 | 0.00 | ||||||||||||
/cut9 | 2.8175 | 0.00 | ||||||||||||||
no. obs | 125 | 110 | 77 | 89 | 43 | 71 | 160 | 93 | ||||||||
no. gr | 12 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 17 | 10 | ||||||||
Wald | 0.02 | 0.56 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.02 | 0.35 |
Rating | Moody’s LT | |||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3001 | 3002 | 3003 | 3004 | 3005 | 3006 | 3007 | 3008 | |||||||||
Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | |
CONT | 0.0124 | 0.01 | 0.0025 | 0.71 | 0.0109 | 0.01 | 0.0047 | 0.47 | −0.0129 | 0.27 | 0.0027 | 0.57 | 0.0119 | 0.04 | −0.0042 | 0.57 |
/cut1 | −6.3375 | 0.01 | −4.0889 | 0.01 | −2.4112 | 0.00 | −4.1953 | 0.00 | −5.8231 | 0.00 | −9.0963 | 0.02 | −7.0615 | 0.00 | −3.2780 | 0.00 |
/cut2 | −5.5467 | 0.02 | 0.8653 | 0.36 | −1.4306 | 0.01 | −2.2960 | 0.08 | −5.4511 | 0.00 | −8.1663 | 0.03 | −5.3700 | 0.01 | −1.8613 | 0.02 |
/cut3 | 0.2981 | 0.81 | 3.6261 | 0.00 | −1.2074 | 0.02 | −0.2694 | 0.84 | −3.8978 | 0.00 | −1.4080 | 0.46 | −4.3576 | 0.02 | −0.7774 | 0.35 |
/cut4 | 1.4994 | 0.22 | 4.0877 | 0.00 | −1.0442 | 0.04 | 2.5835 | 0.10 | −2.8476 | 0.03 | 0.3306 | 0.87 | −1.1021 | 0.43 | −0.2212 | 0.79 |
/cut5 | 2.9402 | 0.02 | 6.5215 | 0.00 | −0.3398 | 0.50 | 5.9070 | 0.00 | −1.8222 | 0.15 | 2.2884 | 0.25 | 2.7018 | 0.06 | 0.2421 | 0.77 |
/cut6 | 5.6855 | 0.00 | 0.7161 | 0.15 | 6.4585 | 0.00 | −1.0298 | 0.42 | 4.4416 | 0.04 | 3.1511 | 0.03 | 2.0065 | 0.02 | ||
/cut7 | 7.5906 | 0.00 | 1.2760 | 0.01 | −0.8099 | 0.53 | 6.8355 | 0.00 | 4.4471 | 0.00 | 2.3645 | 0.01 | ||||
/cut8 | 7.9739 | 0.00 | 2.2738 | 0.00 | 3.2029 | 0.05 | 8.3659 | 0.00 | 6.1020 | 0.00 | ||||||
/cut9 | 8.1569 | 0.00 | 3.1147 | 0.00 | 9.5633 | 0.00 | ||||||||||
/cut10 | 8.5746 | 0.00 | ||||||||||||||
no. obs | 118 | 85 | 131 | 73 | 59 | 95 | 96 | 85 | ||||||||
no. gr | 16 | 15 | 13 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 14 | 12 | ||||||||
Wald | 0 | 0.71 | 0 | 0.47 | 0.27 | 0.57 | 0.04 | 0.58 |
Rating | Fitch LT | Moody’s LT | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | Coef. | P > z | |
GM | −0.1617 | 0.00 | −0.0086 | 0.63 | −0.0185 | 0.42 | −0.0163 | 0.76 | −0.0324 | 0.52 | −0.0218 | 0.67 |
TAX | 0.0671 | 0.00 | 0.0287 | 0.08 | 0.0234 | 0.06 | 0.0008 | 0.82 | −0.0003 | 0.92 | 0.0007 | 0.81 |
ASS | 14.0024 | 0.01 | 7.7373 | 0.08 | 7.3338 | 0.13 | 9.5910 | 0.00 | 9.1720 | 0.00 | 9.3771 | 0.00 |
ROA | 1.6930 | 0.00 | 1.2025 | 0.00 | 1.0581 | 0.00 | 0.1255 | 0.64 | 0.1051 | 0.63 | 0.0877 | 0.71 |
RET | 0.0951 | 0.12 | 0.3019 | 0.44 | 0.0945 | 0.47 | 0.0436 | 0.16 | 0.0365 | 0.09 | 0.0421 | 0.08 |
RINV | 0.3699 | 0.00 | 0.1620 | 0.04 | 0.1817 | 0.01 | −0.0869 | 0.03 | −0.0819 | 0.03 | −0.0887 | 0.02 |
CUR | 1.4142 | 0.32 | −0.0669 | 0.96 | −0.2456 | 0.86 | −1.4372 | 0.24 | −0.8484 | 0.58 | −1.1025 | 0.49 |
IN | −0.1589 | 0.00 | −0.1466 | 0.00 | −0.1174 | 0.00 | −0.0061 | 0.79 | 0.0038 | 0.87 | 0.0014 | 0.95 |
NET | −0.0017 | 0.14 | 0.0013 | 0.14 | 0.0004 | 0.64 | 0.0008 | 0.86 | −0.0019 | 0.72 | 0.0008 | 0.86 |
DEB | −0.0185 | 0.03 | −0.0125 | 0.08 | −0.0112 | 0.10 | −0.0113 | 0.00 | −0.0109 | 0.00 | −0.0104 | 0.00 |
LTD | −0.0989 | 0.01 | 0.0133 | 0.67 | 0.0407 | 0.23 | −0.0064 | 0.79 | 0.0004 | 0.99 | −0.0073 | 0.79 |
AR | −0.0390 | 0.73 | 0.0504 | 0.46 | 0.0389 | 0.61 | 0.1501 | 0.02 | 0.1322 | 0.01 | 0.1537 | 0.01 |
INT | 0.2188 | 0.13 | 0.0648 | 0.62 | 0.0921 | 0.42 | −0.4090 | 0.00 | −0.3700 | 0.00 | −0.4442 | 0.00 |
FIX | −1.7800 | 0.01 | −0.5117 | 0.02 | −0.5980 | 0.01 | 0.2395 | 0.40 | 0.1895 | 0.65 | 0.1929 | 0.58 |
WC | 0.0043 | 0.33 | −0.0012 | 0.63 | −0.0016 | 0.49 | −0.0093 | 0.21 | −0.0105 | 0.35 | −0.0110 | 0.29 |
ENV | 0.0780 | 0.01 | 0.0032 | 0.88 | ||||||||
SOC | −0.0185 | 0.43 | 0.0139 | 0.69 | ||||||||
GOV | 0.0579 | 0.09 | 0.0165 | 0.41 | ||||||||
CONT | 0.0081 | 0.57 | −0.0097 | 0.41 | ||||||||
ESG | −0.0384 | 0.09 | 0.0207 | 0.23 | ||||||||
/cut1 | −3.39 | 0.27 | 0.99 | 0.54 | −1.55 | 0.27 | −9.09 | 0.00 | −11.27 | 0.00 | −9.81 | 0.00 |
/cut2 | −3.25 | 0.29 | 1.06 | 0.51 | −1.47 | 0.30 | −8.73 | 0.00 | −10.98 | 0.00 | −9.49 | 0.00 |
/cut3 | −2.93 | 0.34 | 1.21 | 0.45 | −1.29 | 0.36 | −7.71 | 0.01 | −10.14 | 0.00 | −8.53 | 0.01 |
/cut4 | −2.26 | 0.45 | 1.57 | 0.36 | −0.88 | 0.54 | −5.17 | 0.05 | −7.69 | 0.01 | −5.96 | 0.05 |
/cut5 | −1.21 | 0.68 | 2.15 | 0.19 | −0.31 | 0.81 | −3.36 | 0.16 | −5.90 | 0.04 | −4.12 | 0.15 |
/cut6 | −0.89 | 0.75 | 2.40 | 0.12 | −0.10 | 0.93 | −2.30 | 0.31 | −4.91 | 0.07 | −3.05 | 0.27 |
/cut7 | −1.02 | 0.64 | −3.75 | 0.16 | −1.78 | 0.51 | ||||||
/cut8 | −0.25 | 0.91 | −3.02 | 0.28 | −1.02 | 0.72 | ||||||
/cut9 | 2.45 | 0.30 | −0.32 | 0.90 | 1.61 | 0.55 | ||||||
no. obs | 163 | 88 | ||||||||||
no. group | 22 | 17 | ||||||||||
vce | vce(robust) | vce(robust) |
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Chodnicka-Jaworska, P. ESG as a Measure of Credit Ratings. Risks 2021, 9, 226. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks9120226
Chodnicka-Jaworska P. ESG as a Measure of Credit Ratings. Risks. 2021; 9(12):226. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks9120226
Chicago/Turabian StyleChodnicka-Jaworska, Patrycja. 2021. "ESG as a Measure of Credit Ratings" Risks 9, no. 12: 226. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks9120226
APA StyleChodnicka-Jaworska, P. (2021). ESG as a Measure of Credit Ratings. Risks, 9(12), 226. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks9120226