4.2.1. The Nonlinear Nexus Between ESG Performance and Financial Performance
This subsection presents the results of the curvilinear nexus between ESG performance and company performance in the MENAT region. The different results are represented in
Table 5 below. Results for two models suggest that GMM is an appropriate estimator for this study since the J-Hansen statistic confirms that the instruments are significantly different from each other. Furthermore, the results of AR (1) and AR (2) also support the null hypothesis of first and second order correlation. Model (1) shows the linear relationship between ESG performance and ROA, while model (2) presents the curvilinear or nonlinear relationship between these two variables.
Specifically, from the results, it is revealed that the coefficient of the ROA performance lagging variable, i.e., ROAt-1, is positively and significantly accepted in both models at a 1% significance level, hence indicating an increase in the ROA of the assuring company in the current year by the previous year’s accounting return. From the economic point of view, the positive influence of the previous year’s ROA on the present one in insurance companies reflects the inertia effect of good asset management, continuity of income derived from successfully placed investments, and growing customer and investor confidence. Past good performance favors organic growth through reinvestment of profits and operational efficiency, strengthening the future results. This effect is, however, bounded by exogenous factors or unexpected disruptions.
Regarding ESG, the estimates from model 1 show that ESG performance has a positive and significant impact on ROA. Economically, it means that ESG performance increases the ROA of insurance companies because it reduces their financial risks and optimizes the cost of operations, making the companies more attractive for customers and investors. It decreases the costs resulting from disruption or disputes, enlarges margins thanks to sustainability and secures advantageously priced financing. Also, good ESG performance provides increased reputation and fosters customer loyalty to create a predictable revenue flow in a self-sustaining, virtuous cycle that assures above-average, sustained profitability and general efficiency.
This result best explains the U-shaped relationship that exists between ESG performance and ROA, which is examined here using
Franco et al. (
2020) and
Attia et al. (
2023). I further apply the test of the U-shaped relationship proposed by
Lind and Mehlum (
2010). From
Table 5, model 2, it appears that the association between ESG and ROA is curvilinear—the inflection point in ESG performance is estimated at 0.312, which is U-shaped and hence confirms hypothesis 1.
This result is economically significant since it suggests that investment in ESG initiatives could generate a potential conflict between management and shareholders. Such examples of early-stage costs that are usually thought to divert funds from short-term profitability goals include regulatory compliance, the implementation of clean technologies, and special training. In such a scenario, these short-run non-productive expenditures can reduce ROA—a negative consequence of ESG performance. However, where ESG performance improves, and overshoots a threshold value (estimated at 0.312), the principles of the stakeholder theory win out. Indeed, by satisfying the expectations of main stakeholders, namely customers, investors, regulators, and employees, companies strengthen their reputation, attractiveness, and trust relations with these contributors. This comprises benefits in terms of improved risk management, scale economies via more sustainable processes, better customer and employee loyalty, and preferential access to green finance at a lower cost. All these cumulative effects enable ESG performance to have a positive impact on ROA in the long term. Therefore, such nonlinearities exist in ESG and ROA because there has been a dynamic equilibrium between initial costs related to agency theory and the long-term benefit supported by the stakeholder theory; this will eventually explain the impact changing from negative to positive whenever high levels in ESG performance are reached.
Turning now to the control variables, it should be seen from Model 1 that, on average, the coefficient for the variable of Size is positive and significant at 1%, thus implying that larger insurance firms, with their economies of scale in operation, may improve the ROA positively. Large companies have economies of scale, which lower the average cost per unit of business; they are also diversified to bear risks due to larger and more varied insurance portfolios. They also have better access to finance on advantageous terms, boosting their capacity for investment and growth. Noticeably, their prestige and dominant positions in the marketplace attract more clients and shareholders, swelling revenues, hence favorably impacting utilization of assets through better efficiency drives that realize higher ROA.
In model 1, the coefficient of the debt variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, thus showing that the positive influence of debt on ROA for insurance companies in the MENAT region can be justified by well-managed financial leverage. This is made possible by the debt financing of their activities, which expands the ability to invest in profitable opportunities such as diversified asset portfolios or growth projects. So long as the debt cost is less than the return on these investments, the profitability of the underlying assets will rise. Besides, debt can discipline better management of resources as inefficient practices are reduced and operations performance is at an optimum, hence increasing ROA.
However, in model (2), the coefficient in the revenue variable (REV) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Either poor management of revenues or changes in the mix of revenues can explain the negative effect of revenues on ROA for insurance companies in the MENAT region. Low or unstable revenues could indicate falling demand or poor performance of the insurance portfolios that reduce asset efficiency. Moreover, if the revenues come from low-profitability segments or require high operating costs, this could lead to pressure on profit margins. This leads to suboptimal asset utilization, which in turn lowers ROA.
In addition, it seems that country-specific factors are more influential in determining ROA. The coefficient of the inflation variable (INF) assumes a positive and significant impact at the 1% significance level in model 2. Inflation could favorably contribute to the ROA of insurance companies in MENAT when it results in higher insurance premiums and investment returns. During periods of inflation, insurance companies may increase their premiums to account for the increased cost of covering the risk. In the same vein, inflation may boost investment returns, especially those that are related to real assets, such as property or commodities, which appreciate with a rise in prices. This will enable the company to increase its revenues and better optimize its assets, which can translate into a higher ROA.
Nevertheless, in both models, the signs of the coefficients of the GDP growth variable are negative, with significant effects, though at different degrees of significance. From an economic point of view, the negative impact of the growth of GDP on ROA for insurance companies in the MENAT region could be explained through an overcapitalization phenomenon. In periods of economic growth, companies may invest and build up assets too fast, leveraging market opportunities at the expense of proper resource allocation, which may cause overexpansion. Additionally, during growth, increased competition contributes to insurance premium reduction, which reduces the profit margins, hence pressuring asset profitability. These two factors together constrain asset efficiency and reduce ROA, even with economic growth.
The findings have significant practical recommendations for managers. Executives should develop a comprehensive ESG framework that aligns with the organization’s overall strategy and integrates with business unit strategies, risk management and governance structures. Regular ESG risk assessments are essential to identify and measure the potential impacts of ESG factors, thereby informing decision-making and prioritizing initiatives. Involving key stakeholders, including employees, investors, customers and regulators, in the ESG strategy development process ensures alignment with stakeholder expectations. Finally, implementing a process of continuous ESG performance improvement, which involves regularly reviewing and updating ESG policies, procedures and practices in response to feedback and changing conditions, is essential. These steps provide a structured approach enabling managers to effectively address ESG risks and opportunities in real-life applications.
4.2.2. The Moderating Effect of Institutional Quality
In this subsection, I will discuss the moderating role of institutional quality in the association between ESG and ROA. The evidence is also tabulated in
Table 6, which shows that the direct impact of institutional quality on the performance of a firm is also positive and highly significant at a 5% level in both models 1 and 2.
It is therefore clear that, given its positive framework towards improving performance, institutional quality remains a determinant for improving insurance firms’ performance in the MENAT region. Moreover, better institutional capacity through good governance and a better regulatory framework for business, as well as good investors’ rights, mitigate risks that uncertainty and corruption raise, adding their voice toward confidence for various stakeholders. These conditions promote operational efficiency, facilitate access to finance, and encourage long-term investment. As such, insurance companies enjoy improved profitability, greater stability, and an enhanced ability to attract and retain customers in a competitive environment.
In Model 3, the nonlinear relationship between ESG performance and corporate performance is obvious. The curve has turned into a U-shape, indicating that insurers are risk-averse. We can then ascribe this result to the addition of the institutional quality variable in Model 3.
More precisely, the nonlinear effect of ESG on ROA of insurance companies, taking the form of an inverted U when institutional quality is present, depicts a more complex dynamic. First, ESG initiatives boost financial performance through the effects of enhanced reputation, attraction of responsible investors, and operational efficiency. However, if ESG investments are too excessive, then costs can surpass the expected benefits and bring about a fall in performance. The introduction of institutional quality therefore alters this relationship: strong institutions amplify the efficiency of ESG initiatives by reducing slacking and the risks of overinvestment. This hump-shaped relationship now implies an optimum beyond which ESG becomes counterproductive.
We notice that in the same model, the interaction term between asset profitability and institutional quality, ESG*IQ, exerts a nonlinear effect on business performance. The relationship is U-shaped, reflecting that insurers in the MENAT region are risk-takers. In fact, the nonlinear influence of the interaction between ESG and institutional quality on the financial performance of insurance companies takes a U shape, reflecting a significant transition. Given that there is moderate institutional quality, the initial high costs of implementing ESG initiatives may undermine financial performance due to incomplete adaptation or excessive burdens. All the same, strengthening the efforts concerning ESG²*IQ-points to an improvement in institutional quality which governs and brings about transparency and effectiveness within the ESG policies, and is thus beneficial. This leads to a gradual improvement in financial performance, which would attest that the interaction between ESG and institutional quality is turning into a long-term value creation lever.