From Blame to Learning: The Evolution of the London Protocol for Patient Safety
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The London Protocol 2024: Structure and Objectives
3. Practical Implications for Healthcare Systems
4. Strengths and Limitations of the Systemic Approach
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Area | Key Points |
---|---|
Purpose | Structured approach to analyze incidents and clinical pathways, focusing on what they reveal about the healthcare system, not just “root causes”. Aims to promote learning, prevention, and safety improvement |
Core principles | Keep analysis separate from disciplinary procedures; involve patients and families; focus on both negative outcomes and successes; a systemic approach based on human and organizational factors. |
2024 updates | Greater emphasis on patient/family engagement, physical and psychological impacts, long-term timeframe analysis, assessment of consequences and support needs, and more detailed guidance for report writing and recommendation formulation. |
Theoretical framework | Reason’s organizational accident model, extended to include corrective measures and post-event support; use of Problems in care management instead of “error”. |
Contributing factors | Eight levels: (1) patient, (2) individual (staff), (3) tasks/activities, (4) team, (5) work environment, (6) information systems and technology, (7) organizational/managerial/cultural factors, (8) institutional context. |
Preparation | Decision to investigate based on severity, frequency, or learning potential; possibility of thematic/aggregate analyses; need to select the most relevant events. |
Reviewer training | Clinical or safety management background; human factors expertise; practical training; ability to manage difficult conversations and emotions after an incident. |
Leadership and support | Senior management commitment required: just culture, functional governance, reporting and learning systems, adequate resources |
Analysis process | Reconstruct chronology, identify good practices and PGAs, assess defenses/barriers, identify contributing factors, assess organizational culture, use scientific evidence, and draft report. |
Recommendations | Based on a critical review of standards and procedures; clear prioritization; development of actionable and monitorable plans; avoid stereotyped or unfeasible recommendations. |
Applications | Suitable for complex and rapid investigations; for adverse events, near misses, and positive-outcome cases; applicable in hospitals, community care, mental health, prison healthcare, and social healthcare settings. |
Dimension | London Protocol 2004 | London Protocol 2024 |
---|---|---|
Analytical Focus | Primarily focused on investigating adverse events | Expanded to include analysis of positive outcomes and system resilience |
Approach to Causation | Emphasis on root cause analysis and linear models of failure | Adopts a systemic, multilayered approach, including contributing factors at 8 levels |
Stakeholder Involvement | Focused mainly on internal healthcare professionals | Emphasizes active involvement of patients and families as witnesses and co-analysts |
Team Composition | Single or mono-professional investigative teams | Promotes multidisciplinary teams, including clinical, technical, human factors, and managerial experts |
Psychological Safety | Limited attention to the emotional impact on staff | Recognizes healthcare workers as “second victims”, recommending emotional and professional support |
Output of Investigations | Often general recommendations (e.g., “improve communication”) | Requires specific, actionable, and measurable recommendations |
Cultural Orientation | Aligned with “just culture” principles but often applied within blame-prone settings | Strong push toward a learning and non-punitive culture |
Use of Technology | Minimal reference to digital systems or AI | Integrates digital health, EHRs, and AI-based tools as both contributors and supports for analysis |
Application Strategy | Encouraged widespread use across events | Advocates for fewer but deeper investigations, focused on high-impact cases |
Characteristic | London Protocol 2024 | HFACS-Healthcare | WHO Patient Safety Framework |
---|---|---|---|
Primary objective | To conduct a systemic analysis of clinical incidents (with or without harm) in order to identify contributing factors and strengthen safety and organizational culture. | To systematically classify the causes of errors according to hierarchical levels of human and organizational factors. | To provide a strategic framework and operational tools to reduce clinical risk, promote a safety culture, and standardize safe practices. |
Methodological approach | Narrative and factor-based analysis (eight levels of contributing factors), reconstruction of the patient pathway, and active involvement of patients and families. | Taxonomy with four levels (Active Errors, Preconditions, Unsafe Supervision, Organizational Factors), derived from Reason’s model. | Macro-systemic approach based on “Priority Action Areas” (e.g., leadership, data, training) and operational checklists. |
Analytical structure | (1) Identification of good practices and problems in care management; (2) Analysis of defenses/barriers; (3) Identification of contributing factors; (4) Recommendations and action plan | (1) Active Errors; (2) Preconditions for errors; (3) Inadequate supervision; (4) Organizational factors. | (1) Leadership and governance; (2) Safety culture; (3) Reporting and learning systems; (4) Priority clinical interventions (e.g., surgical safety checklist). |
Patient/family involvement | Central: active inclusion in investigations, immediate and long-term support | Not included in the original model, but can be incorporated through local adaptation. | Recommended as a guiding principle, but not structured as part of the analytical process. |
Human factors | Fully integrated in the framework (individual, team, work environment, technology, organization, institutional context). | Primary focus: detailed analysis of errors and latent conditions related to human factors. | Considered broadly (training, workload, communication) but mainly at the policy level. |
Applicability | Broad: hospital, community care, mental health, prison healthcare, home care; adaptable to complex events and near misses. | Clinical events in any setting, particularly useful for complex incidents involving multiple human interactions. | All levels of healthcare, especially for national or large-scale organizational programmes. |
Typical output | Detailed report including chronology, contributing factors, prioritized recommendations, and monitored improvement plan. | Causal mapping and tree diagram, classification into standardized categories, useful for databases and trend analysis. | Guidelines, performance indicators, monitoring and evaluation tools. |
Strengths | Depth of analysis, active stakeholder engagement, adaptability to different contexts and timeframes. | Taxonomic clarity, standardization enabling statistical analysis, and cross-case comparisons. | Global vision, alignment with international standards, strong institutional recognition. |
Limitations | Requires time, advanced training, and strong organizational support to be effective. | May be overly rigid or focused on classification rather than on solution development. | Less operational-analytical detail for individual events, more strategic than investigative in nature. |
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De Micco, F.; Di Palma, G.; Tambone, V.; Scendoni, R. From Blame to Learning: The Evolution of the London Protocol for Patient Safety. Healthcare 2025, 13, 2003. https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare13162003
De Micco F, Di Palma G, Tambone V, Scendoni R. From Blame to Learning: The Evolution of the London Protocol for Patient Safety. Healthcare. 2025; 13(16):2003. https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare13162003
Chicago/Turabian StyleDe Micco, Francesco, Gianmarco Di Palma, Vittoradolfo Tambone, and Roberto Scendoni. 2025. "From Blame to Learning: The Evolution of the London Protocol for Patient Safety" Healthcare 13, no. 16: 2003. https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare13162003
APA StyleDe Micco, F., Di Palma, G., Tambone, V., & Scendoni, R. (2025). From Blame to Learning: The Evolution of the London Protocol for Patient Safety. Healthcare, 13(16), 2003. https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare13162003