An Empirical Investigation of Foreign Financial Assistance Inflows and Its Fungibility Analyses: Evidence from Bangladesh
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- Does external financing attribute to the crowding out of public expenditure in Bangladesh?
- (2)
- Does the composition of FFA affect the government expenditure movements in Bangladesh?
- (3)
- Is there any sectoral variation in public expenditure responses to incoming FFA? Are the FFA inflows fungible?
- (4)
- Do the FFA inflows affect the government’s tax efforts, revenue generation policies, and domestic public borrowing?
2. An Overview of the FFA and Fiscal Trends in Bangladesh
3. Review of Literature
3.1. Theoretical Framework
3.2. Empirical Findings
4. Empirical Models and Data Specification
5. Methodology
5.1. Unit Root and Cointegration Analyses
5.2. Vector Error-Correction Model Approach
6. Results
7. Conclusions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Appendix B
Study | Estimation Method | Period | Countries | Results |
---|---|---|---|---|
Pack and Pack (1993) | Seemingly unrelated regression estimator | 1968–1986 | Dominican Republic | Foreign assistances intended for development expenditure are displaced to fiscal-deficit reduction and debt servicing. |
Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) | Non-linear three-stage least squares estimator | 1956–1995 | Pakistan | Only about 50% of total aid inflows have augmented total government consumption in Pakistan. An increase in foreign aid inflow is associated with a positive impact on government expenditure and a negative impact on the tax revenues. |
Mavrotas (2002) | Non-linear three-stage least squares estimator | 1973–1992 | India (1973–1990) Kenya (1973–1992) | Project aids flowing into India are found to be less fungible compared to program aids. Similarly, the fungibility of aid inflows to Kenya depends on the type of the aid. |
Osei et al. (2005) | VAR, VECM, and impulse response functions | 1966–1988 | Ghana | No direct impact of foreign aid inflows on public expenditure in the short run. The inflows are found to affect domestic public borrowing and tax revenues negatively and positively, respectively. |
McGillivray and Ouattara (2005) | ARDL cointegration approach, non-linear three-stage least squares estimator | 1975–1999 | Cote d’Ivoire | Government expenditure does not increase following inward flows of foreign aids. Most of the aid is utilized for debt servicing, and foreign aid inflows attribute to rising public debts. |
Bhattarai (2007) | Johansen cointegration and generalized impulse response analyses | 1975–2002 | Nepal | Foreign aid positively affects both development and non-development expenditure. Development aid is found to be fungible due to it being displaced to the non-development expenditure of the government. |
Martins (2007) | Non-linear three-stage leastsquares estimator | 1964–2005 | Ethiopia | Foreign aid positively affects government investment. Foreign loans have a stronger impact on public expenditure than grants. Foreign aid reduces domestic public borrowing and displaces public revenues. |
Bwire et al. (2013) | Cointegrated VAR analysis | 1972–2008 | Uganda | Foreign aids increase government expenditure and raise the tax efforts as well. |
Thamae and Kolobe (2016) | Johansen cointegration analysis and Granger causality tests | 1982–2010 | Lesotho | A rise in the inflow of foreign aids results in adverse impacts on recurrent expenditure while increasing the capital expenditure of the government. Thus, foreign aid inflows are referred to be non-fungible in nature. A unidirectional long-run causal association stemming from foreign aid to recurrent public expenditure is found. |
Bwire et al. (2017) | Cointegrated VAR analysis | 1990Q1–2015Q4 | Rwanda | Foreign aid inflows increase public expenditure and tax revenues while reducing public borrowings from domestic sources |
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Null Hypothesis: Variable Has a Unit Root | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | t-Statistic | Variable | t-Statistic | Variable | t-Statistic | Variable | t-Statistic |
Δ ln GRE | 1.067 *** | Δ ln CC | −4.304 * | Δ ln INF | −5.986 * | Δ ln DEBT | −4.079 * |
Δ ln FFA | −5.978 * | Δ ln PRI | −2.103 ** | Δ ln GHE | −5.007 * | ||
Δ ln BFFA | −3.157 * | Δ ln UP | −2.231 ** | Δ ln GEE | −4.065 | Δ ln GDPG | −5.147 * |
Δ ln MFFA | −7.389 * | Δ ln PGR | −2.135 ** | Δ ln TAX | −5.882 * | Δ ln TAD | −5.118 * |
Δ ln GRN | −6.044 * | Δ ln HAD | −4.701 * | Δ ln M2 | −3.028 * | Δ ln DBOR | −6.559 * |
Δ ln LOAN | −4.703 * | Δ ln EAD | −4.089 * | Δ ln GNI | −2.001 ** | Δ ln REV | −2.054 ** |
Eqn. | Null Hypo. | Alt. Hypo. | Max. Eigen Stat. | 95% Crit. Val. | Decision |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | r ≤ 1 | r = 2 | 46.905 | 33.46 | 2 cointegrating equations |
(2) | r ≤ 3 | r = 4 | 94.985 | 94.150 | 4 cointegrating equations |
(3) | r ≤ 4 | r = 5 | 69.582 | 68.52 | 5 cointegrating equations |
(4) | r = 0 | r = 1 | 72.087 | 68.520 | 1 cointegrating equation |
(5) | r ≤ 1 | r = 2 | 15.987 | 15.667 | 2 cointegrating equations |
(6) | r = 0 | r = 1 | 19.998 | 18.296 | 1 cointegrating equation |
(7) | r ≤ 2 | r = 3 | 96.505 | 94.15 | 3 cointegrating equations |
(8) | r ≤ 6 | r = 7 | 15.345 | 14.070 | 7 cointegrating equations |
(9) | r ≤ 4 | r = 5 | 67.867 | 66.360 | 5 cointegrating equations |
(10) | r = 0 | r = 1 | 80.189 | 68.52 | 1 cointegrating equation |
Dependent Variable | ln GREt | ln GREt | ln GREt | ln GREt | ln GREt |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Equation | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
Long-Run Analysis | |||||
Regressors | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient |
ln FFAt | −5.507 (2.010) * | --- | --- | --- | --- |
ln BFFAt | --- | −0.268 (0.063) * | --- | --- | --- |
ln MFFAt | --- | --- | 0.048 (0.024) ** | --- | --- |
ln GRAt | --- | --- | --- | −0.003 (0.090) | --- |
ln LOANt | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.646 (0.081) * |
ln TADt | 7.321 (2.624) * | 0.739 (0.096) * | −0.222 (0.019) * | 0.175 (0.075) ** | --- |
ln DEBTt | −3.804 (1.844) ** | −0.090 (0.079) | 0.096 (0.012) * | −0.210 (0.085) * | −3.829 (0.863) * |
ln GDPGt | −15.128 (4.960) * | 2.400 (0.251) * | 1.411 (0.028) * | 1.296 (0.192) * | −7.373 (1.838) * |
ln INFt | 2.504 (0.512) * | −0.271 (0.039) * | −0.254 (0.002) * | 0.000 (0.020) | 0.050 (0.196) |
ln UPt | 72.452 (10.441) * | −8.771 (0.835) * | −3.083 (0.061) * | −2.420 (0.587) * | 6.514 (5.120) |
ln PGRt | 8.822 (2.389) * | −0.859 (0.181) * | 0.053 (0.027) ** | −0.501 (0.093) * | 0.585 (1.082) |
ln CCt | 6.187 (1.720) * | 1.162 (0.104) * | 0.537 (0.010) * | −0.447 (0.062) * | 1.677 (0.641) * |
ln PRIt | −25.197 (2.745) * | 1.680 (0.266) * | 0.064 (0.018) * | −0.447 (0.186) ** | −4.741 (0.846) * |
Constant | 984.264 (25.887) * | 120.101 (28.92) * | 39.736 (19.112) * | 34.379 (12.222) * | −48.187 (18.110) * |
R2 | 0.985 | 0.968 | 0.971 | 0.897 | 0.841 |
Short-Run Analysis | |||||
Δ ln GRE | −0.318 (0.205) | 0.779 (0.647) | 4.159 (2.148) *** | 0.045 (0.641) | −0.149 (0.275) |
Δ ln FFAt | −0.457 (0.271) ** | --- | --- | --- | --- |
Δ ln BFASt | --- | −0.594 (0.35) *** | --- | --- | --- |
Δ ln MFASt | --- | --- | 2.767 (1.370) ** | --- | --- |
Δ ln GRAt | --- | --- | --- | −0.152 (0.131) | --- |
Δ ln LOANt | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.494 (0.145) * |
Δ ln TADt | 0.509 (0.230) ** | 0.304 (0.138) *** | −3.426 (1.81) *** | 0.184 (0.160) | 0.207 (0.091) *** |
Δ ln DEBTt | −0.398 (0.259) | −0.072 (0.316) | 1.494 (0.962) | −0.623 (0.555) | −0.458 (2.887) |
Δ ln GDPGt | 0.409 (0.360) | 1.915 (0.891) *** | 7.961 (3.912) ** | 0.234 (0.873) | 0.183 (0.612) |
Δ ln INFt | −0.183 (0.093) ** | −0.314 (0.170) ** | 0.003 (0.056) | −0.039 (0.073) | −0.075 (0.086) |
Δ ln UPt | −5.405 (3.924) | −14.626 (9.459) | −46.51 (22.92) ** | −1.038 (5.801) | −0.157 (3.416) |
Δ ln PGRt | 1.261 (0.572) ** | −0.933 (0.703) | −16.190 (7.57) ** | −2.541 (0.89) *** | −0.556 (0.689) |
Δ ln CCt | −0.232 (0.218) | −1.020 (0.658) | 2.935 (1.458) ** | −0.116 (0.350) | 0.084 (0.001) * |
Δ lnPRIt | 1.105 (0.556) ** | 1.519 (0.854) *** | 0.458 (0.343) | −0.147 (0.356) | 0.169 (0.021) * |
Constant | 0.137 (0.081) * | 0.065 (0.065) | −0.092 (0.078) | 0.060 (0.107) | −0.054 (0.079) |
ECTt−1 | −0.070 (0.031) * | −1.341 (0.723) ** | −1.173 (0.324) * | −0.895 (0.31) | 0.107 (0.128) |
R2 | 0.830 | 0.812 | 0.728 | 0.597 | 0.592 |
Dependent Variable: | ln GHEt | ln GEEt |
---|---|---|
Column | (6) | (7) |
Long-Run Analysis | ||
Regressors | Coefficient | Coefficient |
ln FFAt | −0.896 (0.134) * | 1.253 (0.037) * |
ln HADt | −0.381 (0.071) * | --- |
ln EADt | --- | 1.960 (0.041) * |
ln DEBTt | −1.092 (0.238) * | −5.304 (0.108) * |
ln GDPGt | 0.054 (0.256) | 7.983 (0.178) * |
ln INFt | 0.004 (0.048) | −0.028 (0.601) |
ln UPt | −0.417 (0.863) | −21.163 (0.460) * |
ln PGRt | −0.557 (0.162) * | 1.602 (0.041) * |
ln CCt | 0.236 (0.083) ** | 1.981 (0.044) * |
lnPRIt | 1.650 (0.416) * | 8.850 (0.197) * |
Constant | 14.471 (6.810) * | 254.803 (67.998) * |
R2 | 0.785 | 0.981 |
Short-Run Analysis | ||
Δ ln GHEt | −1.188 * (0.067) | --- |
Δ ln GEEt | --- | 0.502 (0.157) * |
Δ ln FFAt | −0.318 (0.831) | 5.329 (0.000) * |
Δ ln HADt | 0.339 (0.161) *** | --- |
Δ ln EADt | --- | 5.538 (1.356) * |
Δ ln DEBTt | −0.328 (0.837) | −2.770 (0.877) ** |
Δ ln GDPGt | −0.264 (0.291) | 15.901 (3.679) * |
Δ ln INFt | 0.102 (0.078) | −1.322 (0.298) * |
Δ ln UPt | 3.441 (0.156) * | 13.621 (3.881) * |
Δ ln PGRt | −0.065 (4.048) | 9.762 (3.991) * |
Δ ln CCt | 0.201 (0.220) | 0.045 (1.311) |
Δ lnPRIt | 0.196 (0.651) | 24.100 (5.786) * |
Constant | 0.029 (0.008) *** | −0.031 (0.109) |
ECTt−1 | 0.279 (1.137) | −3.597 (0.814) * |
R2 | 0.640 | 0.906 |
Dependent Variable: | ln TAXt | Ln REVt | ln DBORt |
---|---|---|---|
Column | (8) | (9) | (10) |
Long-Run Analysis | |||
Regressors | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient |
ln FFAt | −1.831 (0.434) * | −7.059 (2.230) * | −0.183 (0.309) |
ln GNIt | 12.646 (5.778) ** | −108.795 (29.768) * | --- |
ln M2t | 2.872 (1.249) ** | 40.291 (6.507) * | --- |
ln INFt | −0.075 (0.001) ** | −2.011 (0.908) ** | 3.960 (0.198) * |
ln DEBTt | −1.937 (0.734) * | −15.240* (34.764) * | 2.696 (0.681) * |
ln UPt | 27.755 (6.789) * | −5.240 (2.475) ** | --- |
ln CCt | 1.688 (0.661) ** | −6.080 (4.843) ** | −4.024 (0.226) * |
ln GDPGt | --- | --- | −3.874 (0.757) * |
lnPRIt | 0.581 (0.881) | 6.327 (4.843) | 1.372 (0.989) |
Constant | 153.603 (56.990) * | 234.093 (34.881) * | −32.019 (11.560) * |
R2 | 0.981 | 0.982 | 0.912 |
Short-Run Analysis | |||
Δ ln TAXt | −0.234 (0.227) | --- | --- |
Δ ln REVt | --- | −0.002 (0.218) | |
Δ ln DBORt | --- | --- | −0.520 (0.258) ** |
Δ ln FFAt | −0.207 (0.901) *** | 0.234 (0.002) * | 0.338 (0.503) |
Δ ln GNIt | −1.960 (3.247) | −15.331 (6.216) ** | --- |
Δ ln M2t | 1.936 (0.801) ** | 1.830 (0.647) * | --- |
Δ ln INFt | −0.551 (0.990) * | −0.011 (0.074) | 0.009 (0.350) |
Δ ln DEBTt | −0.210 (0.371) | −1.077 (0.447) ** | 0.894 (0.401) *** |
Δ ln UPt | 2.239 (0.891) ** | 7.762 (3.611) ** | --- |
Δ ln CCt | 1.711 (0.027) * | 0.201 (0.001) * | 0.462 (0.409) |
Δ ln GDPGt | --- | --- | −0.561 (0.250) *** |
Δ ln PRIt | 0.302 (0.4423) | −0.307 (0.427) | 0.248 (1.067) |
Constant | 0.082 (0.496) | 0.096 (0.095) | 0.028 (0.207) |
ECTt−1 | −0.056 (0.776) | −0.055 (0.022) ** | −0.489 (0.978) |
R2 | 0.776 | 0.596 | 0.613 |
Model (1): Variance Decomposition of ln GRE | ||||||||||
Pd. * | ln GRE | ln FFA | ln TAD | ln DEBT | ln GDPG | ln INF | ln UP | ln PGR | ln CC | ln PRI |
1 | 100.00 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
4 | 24.048 | 3.136 | 11.158 | 20.430 | 18.736 | 3.726 | 12.00 | 0.807 | 4.594 | 1.369 |
10 | 17.222 | 4.215 | 13.564 | 15.493 | 13.540 | 2.006 | 20.90 | 4.235 | 3.864 | 1.170 |
Model (2): Variance Decomposition of ln GRE | ||||||||||
Pd. * | ln GRE | ln BFFA | ln TAD | ln DEBT | ln GDPG | ln INF | ln UP | ln PGR | ln CC | ln PRI |
1 | 100.00 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
4 | 15.153 | 3.834 | 7.000 | 28.841 | 14.757 | 3.616 | 15.06 | 0.165 | 10.68 | 0.879 |
10 | 15.494 | 2.096 | 5.806 | 30.954 | 10.582 | 2.815 | 14.87 | 5.059 | 11.16 | 1.154 |
Model (3): Variance Decomposition of ln GRE | ||||||||||
Pd. * | ln GRE | ln MFFA | ln TAD | ln DEBT | ln GDPG | ln INF | ln UP | ln PGR | ln CC | ln PRI |
1 | 100.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
4 | 22.405 | 12.518 | 22.571 | 22.129 | 8.653 | 1.656 | 3.530 | 0.766 | 0.283 | 0.006 |
10 | 15.393 | 8.913 | 11.860 | 19.903 | 10.000 | 0.069 | 14.960 | 3.670 | 0.356 | 0.061 |
Model (4): Variance Decomposition of ln GRE | ||||||||||
Pd. * | ln GRE | ln GRN | ln TAD | ln DEBT | ln GDPG | ln INF | ln UP | ln PGR | ln CC | ln PRI |
1 | 100.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
4 | 26.987 | 9.455 | 0.257 | 18.117 | 21.475 | 3.338 | 12.972 | 0.636 | 6.319 | 0.384 |
10 | 16.706 | 8.488 | 2.977 | 15.675 | 12.859 | 2.429 | 22.834 | 3.273 | 5.459 | 0.307 |
Model (5): Variance Decomposition of ln GRE | ||||||||||
Pd. * | ln GRE | ln LOAN | ln TAD | ln DEBT | ln GDPG | ln INF | ln UP | ln PGR | ln CC | ln PRI |
1 | 100.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
4 | 25.816 | 1.107 | 4.540 | 26.574 | 16.083 | 3.554 | 16.067 | 1.160 | 4.722 | 0.432 |
10 | 17.727 | 7.801 | 2.807 | 21.574 | 12.595 | 1.939 | 25.858 | 4.425 | 4.803 | 0.470 |
Model (6): Variance Decomposition of ln GHE | ||||||||||
Pd. * | ln GHE | ln FFA | ln HAD | ln DEBT | ln GDPG | ln INF | ln UP | ln PGR | ln CC | ln PRI |
1 | 100.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
4 | 61.820 | 2.174 | 15.764 | 7.019 | 1.855 | 0.225 | 15.010 | 0.757 | 0.520 | 0.361 |
10 | 20.561 | 3.333 | 18.710 | 6.134 | 2.287 | 7.159 | 22.027 | 0.703 | 2.245 | 0.270 |
Model (7): Variance Decomposition of ln GEE | ||||||||||
Pd. * | ln GEE | ln FFA | ln EAD | ln DEBT | ln GDPG | ln INF | ln UP | ln PGR | ln CC | ln PRI |
1 | 100.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
4 | 55.761 | 3.152 | 2.056 | 3.632 | 5.464 | 1.659 | 20.079 | 1.161 | 0.919 | 0.057 |
10 | 36.635 | 3.301 | 9.457 | 9.409 | 1.972 | 33.32 | 18.811 | 0.557 | 1.696 | 0.409 |
Model (8): Variance Decomposition of ln TAX | |||||||||||||||
Pd * | ln TAX | ln FFA | ln GNI | ln M2 | ln INF | ln DEBT | ln UP | ln CC | ln PRI | ||||||
1 | 100.00 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||||
4 | 64.745 | 7.610 | 22.470 | 0.786 | 22.647 | 0.357 | 2.017 | 17.368 | 0.854 | ||||||
10 | 45.096 | 7.314 | 22.744 | 5.301 | 31.600 | 0.929 | 14.225 | 22.379 | 3.413 | ||||||
Model (9): Variance Decomposition of ln REV | |||||||||||||||
Pd * | ln REV | ln FFA | ln GNI | ln M2 | ln INF | ln DEBT | ln UP | ln CC | ln PRI | ||||||
1 | 100.00 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 100.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||||
4 | 68.029 | 4.953 | 22.105 | 1.746 | 31.092 | 0.553 | 0.765 | 11.139 | 1.617 | ||||||
10 | 50.653 | 5.089 | 21.985 | 6.018 | 35.510 | 1.135 | 10.731 | 14.289 | 3.560 | ||||||
Model (10): Variance Decomposition of ln DBOR | |||||||||||||||
Pd * | ln DBOR | ln FFA | ln INF | ln DEBT | ln CC | ln GDPG | ln PRI | ||||||||
1 | 100.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||||||||
4 | 57.880 | 4.887 | 0.278 | 28.205 | 0.772 | 4.204 | 3.778 | ||||||||
10 | 45.304 | 2.989 | 0.946 | 32.153 | 1.424 | 2.657 | 15.528 |
Model | Short-Run Causality | Short-Run Causality | Long-Run Causality |
---|---|---|---|
Null Hypothesis | Wald Statistic | ECTt−1 | |
(1) | ln FFAt does not Granger cause ln GREt | −0.457 *** | −0.070 * |
ln GREt does not Granger cause ln FFAt | −0.289 | 0.958 | |
(2) | ln BFFAt does not Granger cause ln GREt | −0.059 *** | −1.341 ** |
ln GREt does not Granger cause ln BFFAt | 2.002 | −3.273 *** | |
(3) | ln MFFAt does not Granger cause ln GREt | 2.767 ** | −1.173 * |
ln GREt does not Granger cause ln MFFAt | −3.423 | 5.012 | |
(4) | ln GRNt does not Granger cause ln GREt | 0.152 | −0.895 |
ln GREt does not Granger cause ln GRNt | −1.822 | 4.021 | |
(5) | ln LOAN does not Granger cause ln GRE | 0.194 | 0.107 |
ln GRE does not Granger cause ln LOAN | 0.145 | −0.145 | |
(6) | ln FFAt does not Granger cause ln GHEt | −0.317 | 0.279 |
ln GHEt does not Granger cause ln FFAt | 1.447 | −1.634 | |
(7) | ln FFAt does not Granger cause ln GEEt | −5.329 * | −3.597 * |
ln GEEt does not Granger cause ln FFAt | 0.19 | −0.708 |
Equations | Tests | ||
---|---|---|---|
Autocorrelation a Lagrange Multiplier Statistic | Normality b Jarque–Bera Statistic | Homoscedasticity c F-Statistic | |
(1) | 0.274 (0.764) | 17.532 (0.618) | 0.793 (0.628) |
(2) | 0.023 (0.877) | 13.662 (0.847) | 0.713 (0.690) |
(3) | 0.032 (0.869) | 10.053 (0.967) | 0.969 (0.501) |
(4) | 0.142 (0.768) | 24.667 (0.215) | 0.656 (0.735) |
(5) | 1.428 (0.275) | 23.600 (0.260) | 1.164 (0.382) |
(6) | 1.032 (0.384) | 21.910 (0.159) | 0.954 (0.511) |
(7) | 1.688 (0.223) | 22.551 (0.311) | 0.910 (0.541) |
(8) | 0.304 (0.742) | 17.883 (0.601) | 1.478 (0.241) |
(9) | 1.714 (0.217) | 16.556 (0.516) | 1.761 (0.164) |
(10) | 0.319 (0.852) | 24.109 (0.198) | 1.569 (0.213) |
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Murshed, M. An Empirical Investigation of Foreign Financial Assistance Inflows and Its Fungibility Analyses: Evidence from Bangladesh. Economies 2019, 7, 95. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7030095
Murshed M. An Empirical Investigation of Foreign Financial Assistance Inflows and Its Fungibility Analyses: Evidence from Bangladesh. Economies. 2019; 7(3):95. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7030095
Chicago/Turabian StyleMurshed, Muntasir. 2019. "An Empirical Investigation of Foreign Financial Assistance Inflows and Its Fungibility Analyses: Evidence from Bangladesh" Economies 7, no. 3: 95. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7030095
APA StyleMurshed, M. (2019). An Empirical Investigation of Foreign Financial Assistance Inflows and Its Fungibility Analyses: Evidence from Bangladesh. Economies, 7(3), 95. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7030095