Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance—Empirical Evidence
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review
2.1. Theoretical Background
2.2. Literature Review
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data Collection
3.2. Methodology
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Correlation Coefficient Matrix Analysis
4.3. Regression Results
4.4. Discussions
4.4.1. For the Characteristic of Board of Directors
4.4.2. Other Factors
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable | Description | Measurement | Source |
---|---|---|---|
PRO | Firm performance | ROA, ROE, or EPS | Financial statements |
BOARD0 | Size of the Board of Directors | It is calculated by the number of members of the Board of Directors | Annual report |
BOARD1 | Independent member rate | Number of independent BOD members/Total number of BOD members | Annual report |
BOARD2 | Percentage of female members | Calculated by the number of female members divided by the total number of BOD members | Annual report |
BOARD3 | Frequency of board meetings | Number of meetings | Annual report |
BOARD4 | Concurrently holding the title | Number of members of the Board of Directors with concurrent titles | Annual report |
BOARD5 | Academic level | Calculated by the number of members of the Board of Directors holding a master’s degree or higher | Annual report |
LEV | Leverage | Total debt/total assets | Financial statements |
SIZE | The size of firm | log (total assets) | Financial statements |
LIQ | Liquidity | Total current assets/total current liabilities | Financial statements |
FIXED | Fixed assets | Total fixed assets/total assets | Financial statements |
Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROA | 780 | 3.0876 | 5.9755 | −28.0502 | 83.9056 |
ROE | 780 | 7.1092 | 22.0474 | −175.5021 | 149.0710 |
EPS | 780 | 1424.666 | 3229.818 | −19,937 | 46,762.66 |
BOARD0 | 780 | 5.1448 | 0.7503 | 3 | 9 |
BOARD1 | 780 | 1.0269 | 1.0940 | 0 | 5 |
BOARD2 | 780 | 0.3974 | 0.6767 | 0 | 5 |
BOARD3 | 780 | 6.1589 | 4.1376 | 3 | 24 |
BOARD4 | 780 | 2.1717 | 1.0215 | 0 | 5 |
BOARD5 | 780 | 0.9320 | 1.0380 | 0 | 5 |
SIZE | 780 | 11.8073 | 0.5370 | 9.1129 | 13.5008 |
LIQ | 780 | 1.0182 | 1.2710 | 0.01 | 10.9516 |
FIXED | 780 | 10.5614 | 0.8250 | 6.4291 | 12.9551 |
LEV | 780 | 0.6634 | 0.1661 | 0.1155 | 1 |
Variable | SIZE | BOARD0 | BOARD1 | BOARD2 | BOARD3 | BOARD4 | BOARD5 | LIQ | FIXED | LEV |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SIZE | 1.0000 | |||||||||
BOARD0 | 0.2210 | 1.0000 | ||||||||
BOARD1 | −0.0006 | 0.3205 | 1.0000 | |||||||
BOARD2 | −0.0103 | 0.3086 | 0.1294 | 1.0000 | ||||||
BOARD3 | 0.1575 | 0.0174 | 0.1108 | 0.1333 | 1.0000 | |||||
BOARD4 | −0.0436 | 0.1852 | −0.0788 | −0.1360 | −0.0420 | 1.0000 | ||||
BOARD5 | 0.1843 | 0.2796 | 0.0728 | 0.0440 | 0.1038 | −0.0338 | 1.0000 | |||
LIQ | 0.0495 | 0.1812 | 0.1631 | 0.1070 | 0.0364 | 0.0266 | 0.1341 | 1.0000 | ||
FIXED | 0.6423 | 0.1680 | 0.0058 | −0.0773 | −0.0620 | 0.1244 | 0.1053 | −0.0038 | 1.0000 | |
LEV | 0.0147 | −0.0723 | −0.1821 | −0.2021 | −0.2432 | 0.1791 | −0.0569 | −0.2888 | 0.1375 | 1.0000 |
Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
---|---|---|
SIZE | 1.98 | 0.503792 |
BOARD0 | 1.88 | 0.531135 |
LEV | 1.54 | 0.649021 |
BOARD2 | 1.25 | 0.799303 |
BOARD1 | 1.22 | 0.819605 |
BOARD4 | 1.20 | 0.832605 |
LIQ | 1.20 | 0.833647 |
BOARD5 | 1.17 | 0.851752 |
BOARD3 | 1.15 | 0.871754 |
FIXED | 1.13 | 0.881208 |
Mean VIF | 1.37 |
Variable | Model | BOARD0 | BOARD1 | BOARD2 | BOARD3 | BOARD4 | BOARD5 | SIZE | LIQ | FIXED | LEV | _cons |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROA | Pooled OLS | 0.3946 (0.147) | 0.1658 (0.313) | 0.1385 (0.605) | 0.116 *** (0.007) | −0.3589 ** (0.042) | −0.1763 (0.296) | −1.2038 *** (0.005) | −0.0025 (0.985) | 1.4388 *** (0.000) | −13.4183 *** (0.000) | 8.8916 ** (0.019) |
FEM | 0.2995 (0.366) | −0.0970 (0.642) | 0.1258 (0.762) | 0.0297 (0.543) | −0.2211 (0.239) | −0.8342 *** (0.000) | −0.6334 (0.271) | 0.0057 (0.973) | 0.7293 ** (0.035) | −11.9820 *** (0.000) | 10.3014 * (0.095) | |
REM | 0.3603 (0.237) | −0.0181 (0.925) | 0.1476 (0.679) | 0.0514 (0.262) | −0.2474 (0.169) | −0.6720 *** (0.001) | −0.7018 (0.175) | 0.0117 (0.940) | 0.8952 *** (0.005) | −12.6731 *** (0.000) | 9.1787 * (0.082) | |
ROE | Pooled OLS | 1.6632 *** (0.009) | 0.4120 (0.790) | −0.6938 (0.682) | 0.2854 (0.340) | −0.2802 (0.983) | 0.1812 (0.213) | −5.6430 *** (0.001) | 0.4288 (0.953) | 2.6535 *** (0.002) | −5.9190 *** (0.000) | 41.4411 *** (0.010) |
FEM | 3.9600 *** (0.007) | −1.3796 (0.139) | −0.9822 (0.596) | −0.2744 (0.208) | 0.2224 (0.790) | −2.9139 *** (0.002) | −0.2163 (0.933) | −0.6334 (0.396) | 2.3508 (0.127) | −25.2063 *** (0.000) | −12.5677 (0.648) | |
REM | 3.8213 *** (0.005) | −1.0534 (0.224) | −0.7617 (0.638) | −0.1469 (0.476) | 0.2516 (0.755) | −2.0212 ** (0.022) | −1.9682 (0.399) | −0.4744 (0.500) | 2.5086 * (0.080) | −25.8048 *** (0.000) | 5.2963 (0.825) | |
EPS | Pooled OLS | 208.2431 (0.107) | −65.3466 (0.402) | 251.068 ** (0.049) | 16.9526 (0.406) | 20.0853 (0.810) | 83.8317 (0.295) | −586.87 *** (0.006) | 68.8796 (0.295) | 754.8519 *** (0.000) | −3439.43 *** (0.000) | 956.1596 (0.595) |
FEM | 134.2144 (0.406) | −55.1924 (0.589) | 148.1382 (0.465) | −6.2244 (0.794) | 32.1209 (0.726) | −279.97 *** (0.007) | −9.8080 (0.972) | −135.98 * (0.097) | 496.8157 *** (0.005) | −3776.226 *** (0.000) | −1335.469 (0.657) | |
REM | 167.9448 (0.253) | −54.9466 (0.553) | 202.0571 (0.234) | 0.5210 (0.981) | 39.0633 (0.654) | −165.6807 * (0.078) | −174.0265 (0.483) | −72.2549 (0.338) | 547.5502 *** (0.000) | −3748.865 *** (0.000) | −658.8054 (0.792) |
Item | Test | Model | Statistic | Hypothesis | Results |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROA | Hetetoskedasticity | REM | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 < 5% | Reject hypothesis H0 => Accept hypothesis H1 | Yes |
Autocorrelation | REM | Prob > F = 0.0411 > 5% | Reject hypothesis H1 => Accept hypothesis H0 | No | |
ROE | Hetetoskedasticity | REM | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 < 5% | Reject hypothesis H0 => Accept hypothesis H1 | Yes |
Autocorrelation | REM | Prob > F = 0.1819 > 5% | Reject hypothesis H1 => Accept hypothesis H0 | No | |
EPS | Hetetoskedasticity | REM | Prob > chi2 = 0.0160 > 5% | Reject hypothesis H1 => Accept hypothesis H0 | No |
Autocorrelation | REM | Prob > F = 0.0029 < 5% | Reject hypothesis H0 => Accept hypothesis H1 | Yes |
Variable | Estimated Coefficient and p-Value | ROA | ROE | EPS |
---|---|---|---|---|
SIZE | β1 | −1.0465 *** | −5.6430 *** | −372.2414 *** |
p-value | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.004) | |
BOARD0 | β2 | 0.4272 ** | 1.6632 *** | 101.2888 |
p-value | (0.024) | (0.007) | (0.230) | |
BOARD1 | β3 | 0.0787 | 0.4120 | −5.7937 |
p-value | (0.454) | (0.243) | (0.901) | |
BOARD2 | β4 | 0.3265 ** | −0.6938 | 54.6164 |
p-value | (0.032) | (0.163) | (0.457) | |
BOARD3 | β5 | 0.1012 *** | 0.2854 *** | 15.6150 |
p-value | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.172) | |
BOARD4 | β6 | −0.0643 | −0.2802 | 75.0271 * |
p-value | (0.508) | (0.464) | (0.099) | |
BOARD5 | β7 | −0.1312 | 0.1812 | 62.5824 |
p-value | (0.219) | (0.630) | (0.138) | |
LIQ | β8 | −0.1068 * | 0.4288 | 86.8675 ** |
p-value | (0.061) | (0.131) | (0.031) | |
FIXED | β9 | 0.8990 *** | 2.6535 *** | 511.276 *** |
p-value | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
LEV | β10 | −9.9796 *** | −5.9190 ** | −1997.016 *** |
p-value | (0.000) | (0.016) | (0.000) | |
_cons | N | 10.1108 *** | 41.4411 *** | 753.8619 |
p-value | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.510) |
Instrumental Variable with Respect to Y | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
BOARD0 | BOARD1 | BOARD2 | BOARD3 | BOARD4 | BOARD5 | LEV | SIZE | LIQ | FIXED | |
F-statistic | 0.1356 | 0.0245 | 0.0149 | 9.7215 *** | 1.4808 | 0.0637 | 25.4636 *** | 17.6223 *** | 0.9446 | 0.1530 |
p-value | 0.7128 | 0.8757 | 0.9027 | 0.0019 | 0.2240 | 0.8007 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.3314 | 0.6958 |
F-statistic | 0.4510 | 0.0639 | 0.4389 | 2.8728 * | 0.7677 | 1.36705 | 17.3724 *** | 18.6448 *** | 0.8805 | 1.2084 |
p-value | 0.5021 | 0.8004 | 0.5078 | 0.0905 | 0.3812 | 0.2427 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.3484 | 0.2720 |
F-statistic | 3.4980 * | 0.2650 | 11.5557 *** | 0.4390 | 2.5958 | 3.9910 ** | 7.7134 *** | 11.2084 *** | 0.6006 | 2.0973 |
p-value | 0.0618 | 0.6069 | 0.0007 | 0.5078 | 0.1076 | 0.0461 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.4386 | 0.1480 |
Variable | Estimated Coefficient and p-Value | ROA | ROE | EPS |
---|---|---|---|---|
SIZE | β1 | −1.8690 *** | −8.2496 *** | −659.9617 ** |
p-value | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.035) | |
BOARD0 | β2 | 0.5235 | 3.1679 ** | 213.7972 |
p-value | (0.130) | (0.020) | (0.352) | |
BOARD1 | β3 | −0.0982 | −0.7957 | −198.72 * |
p-value | (0.636) | (0.329 | 0.059 | |
BOARD2 | β4 | 0.2519 | 0.3988 | 626.497 *** |
p-value | (0.452) | (0.762) | (0.001) | |
BOARD3 | β5 | 0.4702 *** | 1.1425 *** | 32.1678 |
p-value | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.225) | |
BOARD4 | β6 | −0.8414 *** | −1.5921 * | −175.1448 |
p-value | (0.000) | (0.071) | (0.120) | |
BOARD5 | β7 | −0.0449 | 1.8349 ** | 303.436 ** |
p-value | (0.832) | (0.027) | (0.011) | |
LIQ | β8 | 0.2768 | 1.0819 | 141.8645 * |
p-value | (0.106) | (0.108) | (0.089) | |
FIXED | β9 | 1.5577 *** | 4.1831 *** | 841.6523 *** |
p-value | (0.000) | (0.004) | (0.000) | |
LEV | β10 | −7.9392 *** | −3.9195 | −2196.264 *** |
p-value | (0.000) | (0.565) | (0.007) | |
_cons | N | 7.9028 | 34.0778 | −326.4184 |
p-value | (0.139) | (0.104) | (0.901) |
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Nguyen, V.C.; Huynh, T.N.T. Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance—Empirical Evidence. Economies 2023, 11, 53. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies11020053
Nguyen VC, Huynh TNT. Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance—Empirical Evidence. Economies. 2023; 11(2):53. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies11020053
Chicago/Turabian StyleNguyen, Van Chien, and Thi Ngoc Thuan Huynh. 2023. "Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance—Empirical Evidence" Economies 11, no. 2: 53. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies11020053
APA StyleNguyen, V. C., & Huynh, T. N. T. (2023). Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance—Empirical Evidence. Economies, 11(2), 53. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies11020053