Real Earnings Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Korean Market
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. FV and REM
2.2. FV and CG
2.3. FV, REM, and CG
3. Empirical Design
3.1. Detecting REM
3.2. CG Metrics
3.3. Research Model
3.3.1. FV and REM
3.3.2. REM, CG, and Size
3.3.3. FV and CG
3.3.4. FV, REM, and CG
3.4. Sample
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Correlation Analysis
4.3. Regression Analysis
4.3.1. Relationship between FV and REM
4.3.2. Relationship between FV and CG
4.3.3. Relationship between FV, REM, and CG with Interaction Effect
4.3.4. Robustness Tests
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variables | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Lower Quartile (Q1) | Median | Upper Quartile (Q3) | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dependent variables | |||||||
Tobin’s Q | 0.028 | 0.095 | −0.915 | 0.008 | 0.036 | 0.068 | 0.657 |
Independent variables | |||||||
ABN_REM | 0.017 | 0.376 | −2.775 | −0.150 | 0.006 | 0.244 | 1.305 |
ABN_CFO | 0.001 | 0.095 | −0.617 | −0.049 | 0.002 | 0.047 | 0.948 |
ABN_SG&A | 0.003 | 0.129 | −0.912 | −0.022 | 0.004 | 0.0.75 | 0.258 |
ABN_PROD | 0.017 | 0.262 | −3.132 | −0.113 | 0.040 | 0.177 | 0.983 |
CGS | 1.990 | 0.116 | 1.580 | 1.764 | 1.996 | 1.919 | 2.415 |
CG1 | 1.661 | 0.087 | 1.301 | 1.429 | 1.672 | 1.724 | 1.857 |
CG2 | 1.167 | 0.273 | 0.000 | 1.041 | 1.230 | 1.522 | 1.903 |
CG3 | 1.194 | 0.196 | 0.477 | 0.804 | 1.204 | 1.421 | 1.724 |
CG4 | 1.143 | 0.316 | 0.000 | 0.954 | 1.176 | 1.337 | 1.699 |
CG5 | 0.545 | 0.243 | 0.000 | 0.238 | 0.477 | 0.699 | 1.000 |
Control variables | |||||||
Lev | 0.454 | 0.190 | 0.045 | 0.312 | 0.453 | 0.587 | 1.181 |
Tang | 0.349 | 0.174 | 0.001 | 0.227 | 0.340 | 0.465 | 0.923 |
Size | 26.325 | 1.442 | 22.591 | 25.331 | 26.068 | 26.981 | 32.182 |
Liq | 1.811 | 1.485 | 0.146 | 0.971 | 1.382 | 2.089 | 14.751 |
NetIntPay | 0.149 | 0.133 | 0.000 | 0.048 | 0.122 | 0.214 | 0.963 |
Variables | Tobin’s Q | ABN_REM | ABN_CFO | ABN_SG&A | ABN_PROD | CGS | CG1 | CG2 | CG3 | CG4 | CG5 | Lev | Tang | Size | Liq | NetIntPay |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tobin’s Q | 1 | |||||||||||||||
ABN_REM | 0.031 *** | 1 | ||||||||||||||
ABN_CFO | 0.086 *** | 0.334 *** | 1 | |||||||||||||
ABN_SG&A | 0.131 *** | 0.685 *** | −0.069 *** | 1 | ||||||||||||
ABN_PROD | 0.010 | 0.523 *** | 0.071 *** | 0.597 *** | 1 | |||||||||||
CGS | 0.026 *** | −0.064 *** | −0.012 | −0.090 *** | −0.024 | 1 | ||||||||||
CG1 | −0.112 *** | −0.112 *** | −0.008 | −0.153 *** | −0.071 *** | 0.631 *** | 1 | |||||||||
CG2 | 0.067 *** | 0.014 | 0.035 ** | −0.017 | 0.024 | 0.588 *** | 0.318 *** | 1 | ||||||||
CG3 | 0.011 | −0.044 ** | −0.043 *** | −0.081 *** | −0.002 | 0.585 *** | 0.112 *** | 0.328 *** | 1 | |||||||
CG4 | 0.067 *** | −0.018 | 0.041 ** | −0.028 | −0.017 | 0.595 *** | 0.351 *** | 0.569 *** | 0.304 *** | 1 | ||||||
CG5 | −0.086 *** | −0.028 | −0.059 *** | 0.013 | −0.024 | 0.001 | 0.001 | −0.085 *** | −0.003 | −0.142 *** | 1 | |||||
Lev | −0.042 ** | 0.202 *** | 0.227 *** | 0.078 *** | 0.168 *** | −0.032 | −0.149 *** | 0.058 *** | 0.029 | 0.040 ** | −0.125 *** | 1 | ||||
Tang | 0.616 *** | 0.063 *** | −0.110 *** | 0.065 *** | 0.098 *** | −0.037 ** | 0.054 *** | −0.047 *** | −0.112 *** | −0.048 *** | −0.002 | 0.083 *** | 1 | |||
Size | 0.243 *** | 0.083 *** | 0.024 | 0.057 *** | 0.078 *** | 0.508 *** | 0.035 ** | 0.414 *** | 0.490 *** | 0.430 *** | −0.116 *** | 0.154 *** | 0.071 *** | 1 | ||
Liq | −0.296 *** | −0.115 *** | −0.081 *** | −0.062 *** | −0.106 *** | −0.011 | 0.135 *** | −0.072 *** | −0.047 *** | −0.070 *** | 0.041 ** | −0.609 *** | −0.247 *** | −0.167 *** | 1 | |
NetIntPay | 0.032 | 0.121 *** | 0.225 *** | 0.070 *** | 0.055 *** | −0.196 *** | −0.200 *** | −0.054 *** | −0.103 *** | −0.099 *** | −0.106 *** | 0.616 *** | 0.094 *** | −0.049 *** | −0.365 *** | 1 |
Variables | Tobin’s Q | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
ABN_REM | −0.014 *** | |||
(−3.037) [1.401] | ||||
ABN_CFO | −0.146 *** | |||
(−9.222) [1.110] | ||||
ABN_SG&A | −0.030 *** | |||
(−2.926) [1.490] | ||||
ABN_PROD | −0.027 *** | |||
(−2.943) [1.270] | ||||
Lev | −0.012 *** | −0.021 ** | −0.031 ** | −0.479 *** |
(−2.810) [1.445] | (−2.494) [1.352] | (−2.228) [1.328] | (−2.613) [1.567] | |
Tang | 0.003 *** | 0.004 *** | 0.007 *** | 0.509 *** |
(3.359) [1.168] | (3.432) [1.191] | (3.741) [1.175] | (3.390) [1.175] | |
Size | 0.012 *** | 0.012 *** | 0.011 *** | 0.026 *** |
(10.739) [1.219] | (10.589) [1.205] | (10.368) [1.209] | (16.089) [1.218] | |
Liq | −0.001 *** | −0.001 *** | −0.001 *** | −0.042 *** |
(−2.720) [1.859] | (−2.927) [1.779] | (−2.637) [1.779] | (−2.757) [1.856] | |
NetIntPay | −0.224 *** | −0.192 *** | −0.206 *** | −0.315 *** |
(−12.316) [1.400] | (−11.562) [1.361] | (−12.365) [1.339] | (−11.969) [1.422] | |
Intercept | −0.235 *** | −0.224 *** | −0.220 *** | −0.076 *** |
(−7.806) | (−7.608) | (−7.353) | (−7.763) | |
Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R2 | 0.585 | 0.507 | 0.568 | 0.524 |
F-Stat. | 33.438 *** | 30.003 *** | 32.005 *** | 30.993 *** |
DW | 1.900 | 1.905 | 1.874 | 1.969 |
Variables | Tobin’s Q | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CGS | 0.240 *** | |||||
(7.846) [1.420] | ||||||
CG1 | 0.350 *** | |||||
(13.550) [1.414] | ||||||
CG2 | 0.028 *** | |||||
(7.811) [1.004] | ||||||
CG3 | 0.021 ** | |||||
(2.046) [1.533] | ||||||
CG4 | 0.012 | |||||
(1.491) [1.184] | ||||||
CG5 | 0.059 *** | |||||
(6.318) [1.095] | ||||||
Lev | −0.430 *** | −0.426 *** | −0.034 *** | −0.429 *** | −0.032 ** | −0.541 *** |
(−23.371) [1.326] | (−23.574) [1.326] | (−2.641) [1.019] | (−23.170) [1.330] | (−2.297) [1.022] | (−22.193) [1.716] | |
Tang | 0.519 *** | 0.542 *** | 0.005 ** | 0.514 *** | 0.006 *** | 0.515 *** |
(43.428) [1.174] | (45.591) [1.203] | (2.439) [1.176] | (42.406) [1.195] | (2.682) [1.174] | (34.767) [1.117] | |
Size | 0.035 *** | 0.026 *** | 0.013 ** | 0.028 *** | 0.013 *** | 0.028 *** |
(18.910) [1.889] | (17.985) [1.205] | (2.545) [1.001] | (16.215) [1.600] | (9.857) [1.098] | (16.025) [1.265] | |
Liq | −0.037 *** | −0.035 *** | 0.007 *** | 0.038 *** | 0.001 *** | 0.046 *** |
(−21.472) [1.780] | (−20.356) [1.804] | (10.392) [1.085] | (21.607) [1.782] | (4.567) [1.077] | (20.955) [1.042] | |
NetIntPay | 0.253 *** | 0.245 *** | 0.214 *** | 0.271 *** | 0.208 *** | 0.375 *** |
(11.339) [1.375] | (11.214) [1.361] | (9.207) [1.030] | (12.170) [1.343] | (12.468) [1.034] | (11.292) [1.325] | |
Intercept | 0.171 *** | 0.489 *** | −0.233 *** | −0.105 *** | −0.234 *** | −0.063 ** |
(3.306) | (8.468) | (−12.848) | (−2.609) | (−7.639) | (−2.328) | |
Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R2 | 0.535 | 0.550 | 0.177 | 0.527 | 0.168 | 0.558 |
F-Stat. | 188.326 *** | 200.112 *** | 35.878 *** | 182.909 *** | 33.878 *** | 143.711 *** |
DW | 1.941 | 1.937 | 1.848 | 1.940 | 1.873 | 2.006 |
Variables | Tobin’s Q | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ABN_REM | −0.377 *** | −0.011 ** | −0.082 *** | −0.137 *** | −0.034 ** | −0.030 *** |
(−3.355) [1.470] | (−2.093) [1.191] | (−2.689) [1.155] | (−3.807) [1.005] | (−2.154) [1.223] | (−1.989) [1.276] | |
CGS | 0.258 *** | |||||
(7.760) [1.565] | ||||||
CG1 | 0.344 *** | |||||
(12.325) [1.230] | ||||||
CG2 | 0.012 *** | |||||
(2.761) [1.881] | ||||||
CG3 | 0.026 ** | |||||
(1.995) [1.471] | ||||||
CG4 | 0.001 | |||||
(0.050) [1.442] | ||||||
CG5 | 0.060 *** | |||||
(5.706) [1.104] | ||||||
ABN_REM*CGS | 0.189 *** | |||||
(3.420) [1.237] | ||||||
ABN_REM*CG1 | 0.011 ** | |||||
(2.158) [1.211] | ||||||
ABN_REM*CG2 | 0.068 *** | |||||
(2.834) [1.743] | ||||||
ABN_REM*CG3 | 0.114 *** | |||||
(3.960) [1.399] | ||||||
ABN_REM*CG4 | 0.488 | |||||
(1.015) [1.557] | ||||||
ABN_REM*CG5 | 0.577 ** | |||||
(2.143) [1.459] | ||||||
Lev | −0.482 *** | −0.477 *** | −0.492 *** | −0.485 *** | −0.030 *** | −0.002 *** |
(−23.009) [1.560] | (−23.078) [1.563] | (−23.188) [1.568] | (−22.982) [1.562] | (−11.274) [1.236] | (−10.066) [1.832] | |
Tang | 0.505 *** | 0.531 *** | 0.503 *** | 0.499 *** | 0.505 *** | 0.503 *** |
(38.457) [1.176] | (40.561) [1.199] | (37.983) [1.172] | (37.374) [1.195] | (38.123) [1.170] | (30.644) [1.184] | |
Size | 0.036 *** | 0.026 *** | 0.026 *** | 0.029 *** | 0.026 *** | 0.027 *** |
(17.817) [1.924] | (16.525) [1.224] | (13.223) [1.759] | (15.234) [1.620] | (13.954) [1.652] | (14.280319) [1.287] | |
Liq | −0.041 *** | −0.039 *** | −0.042 *** | −0.042 *** | −0.042 *** | −0.050 *** |
(−20.433) [1.868] | (−19.534) [1.893] | (−20.726) [1.869] | (−20.659) [1.868] | (−20.762) [1.862] | (−19.739) [1.154] | |
NetIntPay | 0.303 *** | 0.292 *** | 0.331 *** | 0.322 *** | 0.323 *** | 0.411 *** |
(11.631) [1.431] | (11.373) [1.423] | (12.552) [1.409] | (12.315) [1.406] | (12.335) [1.402] | (10.765) [1.319] | |
Intercept | 0.150 *** | 0.461 *** | −0.076 * | −0.103 ** | −0.081 * | −0.031 ** |
(2.862) | (7.613) | (−1.696) | (−2.349) | (−1.764) | (−2.593) | |
Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R2 | 0.534 | 0.546 | 0.524 | 0.526 | 0.522 | 0.557 |
F-Stat. | 149.978 *** | 157.477 *** | 143.921 *** | 145.338 *** | 143.527 *** | 113.593 *** |
DW | 1.956 | 1.956 | 1.969 | 1.973 | 1.968 | 1.980 |
Variable | Strong CG | Weak CG | Difference | t-Value |
---|---|---|---|---|
Tobin’s Q | 0.031 | 0.018 | 0.014 | 3.740 *** |
ABN_REM | 0.012 | 0.043 | −0.031 | −2.706 *** |
ABN_CFO | 0.001 | 0.006 | −0.005 | −2.836 *** |
ABN_SG&A | 0.003 | 0.009 | −0.006 | −3.371 *** |
ABN_PROD | 0.015 | 0.029 | −0.014 | −3.112 *** |
CGS | 2.041 | 1.840 | 0.201 | 68.734 *** |
CG1 | 1.689 | 1.577 | 0.112 | 40.466 *** |
CG2 | 1.271 | 0.856 | 0.415 | 52.509 *** |
CG3 | 1.227 | 1.099 | 0.128 | 17.698 *** |
CG4 | 1.270 | 0.769 | 0.501 | 57.043 *** |
CG5 | 0.561 | 0.539 | 0.022 | 3.545 *** |
Variables | ABN_REM | ABN_CFO | ABN_SG&A | ABN_PROD |
---|---|---|---|---|
CGS | −0.591 *** | −0.026 *** | −0.178 *** | −0.253 *** |
(−7.290) [0.441] | (−2.643) [0.348] | (−8.339) [0.348] | (−4.439) [0.445] | |
Size | −0.045 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.024 *** |
(−7.879) [0.441] | (−6.062) [0.421] | (−7.191) [0.258] | (−6.028) [0.448] | |
Constant | −0.024 | −0.019 | −0.028 | −0.110 |
(−0.159) | (−0.577) | (−0.651) | (−1.051) | |
Adj. R2 | 0.024 | 0.001 | 0.022 | 0.012 |
F-Stat. | 37.230 *** | 32.364 *** | 40.647 *** | 39.048 *** |
DW | 1.854 | 1.686 | 1.949 | 1.936 |
Variables | Panel A: Weak CG (N = 913) | Panel B: Strong CG (N = 2677) | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tobin’s Q | ||||||||
ABN_REM | −0.033 *** | −0.011 | ||||||
(−4.219) [1.440] | (−0.590) [1.292] | |||||||
ABN_CFO | −0.012 *** | −0.044 | ||||||
(−4.045) [1.133] | (−1.029) [1.084] | |||||||
ABN_SG&A | −0.089 *** | −0.139 | ||||||
(−4.308) [1.568] | (−0.610) [1.367] | |||||||
ABN_PROD | −0.038 *** | 0.003 | ||||||
(−3.832) [1.289] | (0.128) [1.262] | |||||||
Lev | −0.503 *** | −0.509 *** | −0.511 *** | −0.496 *** | −0.328 *** | −0.276 *** | −0.285 *** | −0.415 *** |
(−10.645) [1.700] | (−22.493) [1.629] | (−22.719) [1.599] | (−20.950) [1.709] | (−9.054) [1.288] | (−8.598) [1.028] | (−8.919) [1.035] | (−8.878) [1.325] | |
Tang | 0.525 *** | 0.498 *** | 0.496 *** | 0.504 *** | 0.547 *** | 0.571 *** | 0.566 *** | 0.546 *** |
(33.314) [1.171] | (35.183) [1.188] | (35.418) [1.172] | (34.669) [1.176] | (16.036) [1.281] | (25.033) [1.269] | (25.075) [1.262] | (17.133) [1.300] | |
Size | 0.021 *** | 0.029 *** | 0.029 *** | 0.028 *** | 0.021 *** | 0.023 *** | 0.024 *** | 0.026 *** |
(11.236) [1.229] | (17.456) [1.242] | (17.649) [1.244] | (16.252) [1.229] | (3.811) [1.185] | (6.538) [1.151] | (6.792) [1.156] | (5.133) [1.185] | |
Liq | −0.019 *** | −0.045 *** | −0.045 *** | −0.044 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.025 *** | −0.025 *** | −0.032 *** |
(−8.876) [1.902] | (−20.245) [1.887] | (−20.447) [1.881] | (−19.350) [1.899] | (−3.306) [1.801] | (−9.073) [1.657] | (−9.313) [1.662] | (−7.900) [1.800] | |
NetIntPay | −0.099 *** | 0.367 *** | 0.362 *** | 0.349 *** | −0.133 *** | 0.114 *** | 0.113 *** | 0.170 *** |
(−4.150) [1.491] | (12.382) [1.511] | (12.353) [1.477] | (11.409) [1.505] | (−3.316) [1.259] | (3.405) [1.182] | (3.413) [1.162] | (3.323) [1.326] | |
Intercept | −0.120 ** | −0.138 *** | −0.146 *** | −0.123 *** | −0.079 | −0.121 | −0.140 | −0.072 |
(−2.333) | (−3.044) | (−3.234) | (−2.602) | (−0.558) | (−1.289) | (−1.497) | (−0.554) | |
Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R2 | 0.594 | 0.539 | 0.542 | 0.537 | 0.445 | 0.349 | 0.355 | 0.324 |
F-Stat. | 102.446 *** | 143.356 *** | 145.201 *** | 138.372 *** | 22.513 *** | 51.422 *** | 52.656 *** | 28.991 *** |
DW | 1.989 | 1.944 | 1.946 | 1.966 | 1.874 | 1.902 | 1.908 | 1.859 |
First-Stage Regression Results | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | CGS | CG1 | CG2 | CG3 | CG4 | CG5 |
Tobin’s Q | 0.363 *** | 0.177 ** | 0.367 *** | 0.486 *** | 0.576 *** | 0.821 ** |
−10.876 | −2.26 | −10.037 | −10.62 | −10.265 | −2.113 | |
Intercept | −1.924 *** | −1.656 | −1.047 | −1.080 | −0.984 *** | −0.832 *** |
(−26.058) | (−33.308) | (−32.065) | (−34.161) | (−32.922) | (−36.116) | |
Adj. R2 | 0.032 | 0.015 | 0.027 | 0.03 | 0.028 | 0.01 |
F-Stat. | 18.283 *** | 5.106 ** | 10.746 *** | 12.785 *** | 15.366 *** | 4.463 ** |
Covariance Tobin’s Q | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.008 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.005 |
Second Stage Regression Results | ||||||
Variables | Tobin’s Q | |||||
CGS | 0.094 ** | |||||
−2.725 | ||||||
[1.420] | ||||||
CG1 | 0.014 *** | |||||
−4.058 | ||||||
[1.214] | ||||||
CG2 | 0.035 *** | |||||
−4.058 | ||||||
[1.014] | ||||||
CG3 | 0.060 ** | |||||
−2.15 | ||||||
[1.033] | ||||||
CG4 | 0.070 ** | |||||
−2.491 | ||||||
[1.184] | ||||||
CG5 | 0.017 *** | |||||
−2.685 | ||||||
[1.095] | ||||||
Lev | −0.075 ** | −0.006 ** | −0.143 ** | −0.141 ** | −0.182 ** | −0.042 ** |
(−2.298) | (−2.356) | (−2.359) | (−2.502) | (−2.297) | (−2.520) | |
[1.326] | [1.326] | [1.226] | [1.330] | [1.322] | [1.016] | |
Tang | 0.014 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.021 | 0.035 | 0.109 |
−0.637 | −0.03 | −0.02 | −0.578 | −0.682 | −0.767 | |
[1.174] | [1.203] | [1.003] | [1.195] | [1.174] | [1.177] | |
Size | 0.024 *** | 0.002 *** | 0.051 *** | 0.047 *** | 0.072 *** | 0.023 *** |
−7.359 | −10.553 | −10.683 | −9.129 | −9.857 | −4.972 | |
[1.889] | [1.205] | [1.276] | [1.600] | [1.598] | [1.265] | |
Liq | −0.002 | −0.016 | −0.001 | −0.002 | −0.004 | −0.004 |
(−0.498) | (−0.071) | (−0.171) | (−0.344) | (−0.567) | (−0.702) | |
[1.780] | [1.804] | [1.428] | [1.082] | [1.077] | [1.042] | |
NetIntPay | 0.481 *** | 0.035 *** | 0.876 *** | 0.835 *** | 0.188 *** | 0.985 *** |
−12.108 | −11.979 | −9.791 | −12.303 | −12.468 | −11.144 | |
[1.375] | [1.361] | [1.621] | [1.343] | [1.334] | [1.325] | |
Intercept | 0.293 *** | 0.593 *** | 0.512 *** | 0.184 | 0.349 ** | 0.972 *** |
−4.023 | −3.367 | −2.648 | −1.495 | −1.998 | −7.75 | |
Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R2 | 0.268 | 0.171 | 0.181 | 0.166 | 0.168 | 0.146 |
F-Stat. | 33.896 *** | 34.637 ** | 35.654 *** | 33.430 *** | 33.878 *** | 20.335 *** |
DW | 1.974 | 1.973 | 1.975 | 1.872 | 1.973 | 1.839 |
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Tulcanaza-Prieto, A.B.; Lee, Y. Real Earnings Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Korean Market. Int. J. Financial Stud. 2022, 10, 19. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs10010019
Tulcanaza-Prieto AB, Lee Y. Real Earnings Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Korean Market. International Journal of Financial Studies. 2022; 10(1):19. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs10010019
Chicago/Turabian StyleTulcanaza-Prieto, Ana Belén, and Younghwan Lee. 2022. "Real Earnings Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Korean Market" International Journal of Financial Studies 10, no. 1: 19. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs10010019