A European perspective, in particular the German tradition of confessional theology, could help comparative theology strike a balance between the temptation of (supra-denominational) global theology and a postliberal language game approach. Three challenges remain at the core of comparative theology:
3.2. The Challenge of the Orientation towards Problems and Needs
My second point is related to the question of the selection of examples within the concentration on particular case studies in comparative theology. It seems important in this respect that comparative theology succeeds in giving orientation to actual, posed questions and that it remains—in the words of the Second Vatican Council—concerned with the ‘the joys and the hopes, the grief and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted’ [
11].
Although comparative theology unites and contrasts, the selection of cases is not arbitrary. It must instead be geared to anthropological and theological problems. And it must engage questions about sense, salvation and truth, as well as critical challenges. Without the careful selection of cases, comparative theology could become a playground for detail-loving eccentrics who meticulously compare irrelevant subjects. Just as comparing random linguistic details is not analytic philosophy, comparing religious traditions is not automatically comparative theology. As time is finite and as not all problems can be solved, it is also important to reflect on which questions should be first on the agenda of comparative theology. Thus, theologians of different religions have to decide together on the problems on which their work should focus.
In comparative theology as in other branches of theology, it is important that intellectual questions are addressed from different viewpoints of religious and non-religious traditions. The critique of religion is meaningful in this discipline. Of course, there does not exist as a uniform canon of questions to be universally addressed by all comparative theologies in the world. And yet through concrete research, one should identify shared problems as both belonging to—and perhaps existing beyond—a certain cultural context.
Thus, I am not sure whether, in comparative theology, it is really sufficient just to ‘go forward by intuitive leaps, according to instinct’ [
12]. Perhaps this appearance of arbitrariness is one of the reasons why comparative theology is still regarded suspiciously by mainstream theology in Europe [
13]. Instead of following one’s own intuition it may be useful to build on current theoretical strands and to try to get fresh insights through comparative work. This is already occurring in the field of comparative theology—for example, in an article by Jim Fredericks, which deals with the doctrine of trinity in the context of Buddhism [
14]. However, even in Fredericks’s expansive work, his insights could be connected more closely to recent discussions in the different areas of theology. On the one hand, the aim should be to struggle with the main challenges of theology as a whole through comparative theology. On the other hand, work should be carried out on current social problems, as well as religious conflicts—including the potential of violence between religions [
15].
As some younger scholars in comparative theology have pointed out, comparative theology has much to learn from theological movements like liberation theology or feminist theology. Such theological movements can help comparative work demonstrate and address the distress of the marginalized and become aware of hidden consequences of their own reasoning [
16]. When focusing on classical texts arising out of different theological traditions, for example, it is important to keep in mind what these texts mean not just for insiders, but also for outsiders—and the marginalized, in particular. Feminist theology could provide guidance in this area [
17]. Clooney is right in emphasizing our need for a mutual process of critique at this point; in other words, feminist theology also has to seriously engage interreligious and intercultural strands of intellectual thought, which could be accomplished through dialogue with comparative theology [
18]. Nonetheless, the key point here is that comparative theology needs an ideologically critical process in determining both its research areas and methods. The systematic development of a large variety of methods and theological approaches in the different sub-disciplines within theology can help to better pinpoint necessary areas of study, and thereby help to initiate emancipatory processes [
19].
The orientation of theology towards the problems and needs, the grief and anxieties of humans, does not mean that the micrological method or the attention to detail in comparative work must be relinquished. Comparative theology must consist of a large variety of case studies, rather than be engaged as a meta-theory. These case studies are not independent from human needs, but instead have to care for them. They are not value-free, but rather engaged for the sake of humankind. Comparative theology—from my perspective—wants to empower people to orientate their lives and to set them free. In order to participate in such liberating processes, it has to begin from a certain creedal perspective or a certain worldview; and it has to become increasingly sensitive to the needs and the possibilities of world development. The aim of theology should not be a competition among different theological approaches, in order to determine which account or which religion is best at solving a problem. The aim should rather be to solve problems together and to encourage people to solve them. Ecology is the best example of a pan-human problem beyond the range of any one or even two religions to solve. It needs everyone, religious and non-religious as well. If religions can understand that they have certain tasks to fulfill in and for the world, they can find a way out of an orientation, which seeks for the weaknesses of the other. Instead of showing the strength of one’s own religion against others, it is important to empower the strengths of the other religion to solve our common problems [
20].
The Muslim scholar Farid Esack, for example, explains in a moving way how the shared commitment of Christians, Muslims and atheists against the apartheid regime led to a new appreciation of others [
21]. In a similar vein, Dietrich Bonhoeffer realized that non-Christians, e.g., communists, were some of his most important combatants against the terror of the Nazis [
22]. Obviously, there are commonalities between different worldviews, which at times reflect religious commonalities and which can be both understood and enacted through united actions. Sometimes on a deeper level of understanding, that Wittgenstein calls the level of depth grammar (PI 664), reconciliation and existential understanding across religious borders becomes possible. This too can be reflected in comparative theology. In order to achieve such a constructive, common attitude beyond the borders of different worldviews, a lot of work has to be done in comparative theology; many theoretical problems seem to impede such an engagement. Perhaps the most important step in this context is the insight in the above-mentioned regulative and expressive dimension of worldviews and of religious beliefs [
8] and the willingness to give up any essentialist understanding of religion. This general attitude can only be a first step. The decisive points are detailed case studies showing new possibilities of relating religious worldviews and revealing their common challenges.
If comparative theology really concerns the recent problems of people, however, and intends to deal with current theological questions, there is always the danger of projection. Some of the greatest problems of humankind have been caused by people who wanted to solve the problems of the world. There is always the danger of imposing an individual perspective on the other. Furthermore, even if comparative theology is developed in dialogue with other positions and worldviews, there is always a third position that is not taken into account.
3.3. The Challenge of the Third Position
In Europe, theology is very much accustomed to developing its theories in dialogue with secular, agnostic and atheistic people [
23]. Every argument is examined from ideologically critical perspectives, but for many years Christian theologians did not adequately take the contributions of non-Christian theologians into account. Thus, the perspective of non-Christian or non-Western-theologies did not contribute to the initial development of theology on the continent. However, European theology informed by atheism can help remind comparative theology not to forget the importance of secular questions and ideas. As it is not possible to integrate all perspectives, we always have to reflect which perspective is ignored in the setting of a research project. The instance of a third position can help us to avoid blind spots in theology. The integration of such third positions therefore presents the third great challenge for comparative theology.
Mutual-including processes of understanding fundamental to comparative theology bear the threat of making reciprocal arrangements and agreements in order to disguise certain problems. If two confessional inner-perspectives focus on a particular problem, there exists an increased risk of trivializing the problem on the basis of shared convictions. As Franz Kafka puts it, those that engage in this process run the risk of becoming a „community of scoundrels“. For instance, conservative Muslims and conservative Christians can easily agree on condemning sexual relationships of gays, and it is very important that they take into consideration the perspective of aggrieved parties in their judgements.
Modern theology tends to underestimate this threat with reference to autonomous philosophical reason and the attempt to develop religion-external criteriology. However, since the linguistic turn, this endeavour has been challenged. Metaphysical and transcendental-philosophical oriented attempts to develop such a criteriology are often considered rather unhelpful, with the whole idea of religion-external criteriology highly disputed. Nonetheless, I recommend that such a criteriology can and needs to be developed on a formal level. At least to some extent, the instance of a third position could be established by the position of a philosophically autonomous, critical, external perspective.
Unfortunately, two opposing problems appear in attempting to engage the third perspective or third way. On the one hand, this criteriology is necessarily too pluralistic, since it cannot answer orientation problems and must comprehend contradicting truth claims as equally rational. On the other, this criteriology is not pluralistic enough, since it is based on a reasonable understanding within a certain philosophical tradition and therefore rejects religious positions from a philosophical point of view.
The third position cannot therefore simply be an abstract philosophy or criteriology, but must instead be concrete and be able to observe and control, the dialogue of the other two positions in play. To avoid an ‘expanded community of scoundrels’, it seems essential that the third position holds a continuing moment of critique on the processed problems. This third position could thus be atheistic or agnostic. Depending on the dialogue context, a follower of a third religious tradition can also (or instead) be consulted if: (1) the religion espouses a sufficiently different basic idea of the question at hand, and (2) the follower is able to confront the issue with respectively critical, skilled arguments. For example, it can be a decisive progress for Christian-Muslim dialogue if the Jewish perspective is taken into account on certain issues [
24].
If theologians of two religious traditions manage to find a common grammar or a common set of assumptions, they always have to remain open to the perspectives of theologians from other religious traditions, because otherwise the new commonality can produce injustice towards others. In all comparative work—not only in theology—it is important to look for a third point of reference to avoid any kind of one-sidedness or bias [
25]. This third point of reference does not hint at a privileged point of view from a sort of supervisor of comparative processes, which could be adopted by a highly critical philosopher. Rather, the aim of the third position to consult scientific processes external to the movement of dialogue and mutual exchange. This position can help to illuminate the blind spots of reasoning and critically review all results.
At this point, Robert C. Neville is speaking of a ‘great cloud of witnesses’ that can consist of very different approaches [
26]. Only all witnesses together can fulfill the task of creating a critical comparative theology. Neville admits that it is not possible to satisfy or even to hear all witnesses at the same time, but he insists, quite convincingly, on the necessity of always being prepared to answer to a witness. As I explained above I am not convinced that comparative theology can be formulated in a way to integrate all questions of such third positions. Nonetheless I think that it is decisive to take into account at least a concrete third position in the comparative movements.
Finally, the third position also has to integrate the diversity not only between, but also within religions. Comparative theology has to be an ecumenical endeavor with different insiders from each denomination, if it wants to achieve representative results [
27]. Only the participation of different actors of various denominations can show at the same time the possibility of reconciliation among religions and the vulnerability of all achieved results. As the possibility of direct participation cannot be given to everybody, it is very important that in different countries and different universities the idea of the third position is fulfilled in varying ways, which will effectively stimulate and strengthen this field.