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Article

An Exploration of Fate in Plato’s Theology: Focusing on the Interpretation of the Timaeus’ Cosmology

Department of Philosophy, School of Marxism, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China
Religions 2025, 16(4), 495; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040495
Submission received: 24 February 2025 / Revised: 20 March 2025 / Accepted: 8 April 2025 / Published: 10 April 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fate in Ancient Greek Philosophy and Religion)

Abstract

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In the Timaeus, Plato explores the topic of cosmology. The demiurge creates a perfect cosmos by imitating the eternal being and using necessity as an auxiliary cause. The unique cosmos not only contains immortal gods, but also mortal living beings. Concerning the academic research on cosmology in Plato’s Timaeus, scholars have explored it through reason, good, and necessity, and they have conducted in-depth analyses of multiple dimensions, such as human organs and diseases. Nonetheless, we should acknowledge the significance of fate, a hidden thread that runs through all of Plato’s cosmology. Whether it is the immortal cosmos created by the demiurge or the mortal humans created by the lesser gods, both demonstrate the significance of fate. This article takes the horizon of divine providence and uses eikos logos as the argument pattern to explore characteristics of determinism contained in the hidden concept of fate in the Timaeus. We cannot ignore the crucial significance of freedom in the thought of fate. Without freedom, the demiurge cannot achieve the overall goodness of the cosmos.

1. Introduction

The thought of fate is momentous in Plato’s thoughts1, especially in the Timaeus. Although humans are determined by fate, freedom cannot be ignored besides the perspective of determinism, for humans are free to choose their destiny. The dilemma concerning fate lies in how to demonstrate fate’s dimensions in Plato’s Timaeus2, that is, determinism, and freedom within the horizon of divine providence and laws. Moreover, what are the causes of human morality having a significant impact on fate? The exploration of human fate should ultimately be categorized as cosmology from a theological dimension. If fate is bestowed solely on imitating eidos, then the bestowal of human fate will lack efficient and final causes. Supposing that the reincarnation of the soul is not in the dimension of cosmology, then this principle will lack an essential theoretical foundation. Whether from the horizon of determinism or freedom, humans’ fate cannot be separated from Timaeus’ cosmotheology. Even if fate is only a hidden concept in the Timaeus, this concept runs through the demiurge’s creation activities, so the analysis of the cosmological dimension of human fate cannot ignore the significance of the Timaeus. Even though we uncover the thought of fate in the Timaeus, we should acknowledge the speculative and uncertain nature of this argument and not consider it as a definitive conclusion.
Scholars have analyzed Plato’s cosmology in the Timaeus in-depth from multiple dimensions. There is controversy in academia concerning the authenticity of the demiurge’s creation story. Scholars represented by Owen (1953, pp. 79–95), Morrow (1950, pp. 147–63), Griffin (2005, pp. 312–27), and Broadie (2008, pp. 1–17) hold a literalist interpretation, maintaining that the demiurge’s role as a creator cannot be denied. The demiurge creates the cosmos literally by imitating eternal beings. According to the literalist interpretation, the theological and religious role of the demiurge cannot be ignored; Plato describes the demiurge as good and without jealousy, which supports this interpretation. Scholars represented by Alexander (1918, pp. 1–24) and Charbit and Virmani (2002, pp. 207–35) further deepen the literalist interpretation, holding that Plato’s Timaeus is not simply explained from literalist interpretation but should also be elucidated from religion or theology. However, scholars represented by Cornford (1935, pp. 170–76), Cherniss (1957, pp. 225–66), Tarán (1971, pp. 372–407), and Kahn (1987, pp. 77–103) hold a metaphorist interpretation. According to these scholars, there is no actual creator in Plato’s Timaeus who engages in creation activities. The act of the demiurge creating the cosmic soul and cosmic body by imitating eternal forms is just a metaphorical expression by Plato, and there are no actual activities of the demiurge creating the cosmos. Accordingly, the role of the demiurge is only a metaphor. Some scholars explore principles of constructing the cosmic soul and cosmic body, the transformation of the four elements, and the role of proportion in the generation of the cosmos, such as Patterson (1981, pp. 105–19), Gill (1987, pp. 34–53), Robinson (1990, pp. 113–10), and Glenn (2011, pp. 11–27). In addition, scholars represented by Krell (1975, pp. 400–21), Mohr (1985, pp. 131–44), Ilievski (2013, pp. 31–54), and Pears (2015, pp. 93–113) explore the significance of necessity in Platonic cosmology, the sources of evil in the cosmos, the definition of khôra, and khôra’s metaphors of the female. Scholars represented by Steel (2001, pp. 105–28), Brisson (2021, pp. 70–91), Prince (2014, pp. 908–28), and Wolfsdorf (2014, pp. 120–35) explore how logos combines with anankê and the consequences resulting from this combination, such as sense-organs pleasure and bodily disease3.
Academia has conducted an in-depth analysis of Platonic Timaeus’ cosmology from both macro and micro dimensions, and has keenly noted the essential relationship between these two dimensions. Nonetheless, scholars’ research has to some extent overlooked the crucial clue of ”fate”. Firstly, concerning the debate between literalist interpretation and metaphorist interpretation4, the attitude we should harbor is that metaphorist interpretation is a misinterpretation of Plato’s cosmology. Supposing that the creation of the demiurge is only a metaphor, it cannot expound the efficient and final causes of the generation of the cosmos. The Timaeus’ entire dialogue becomes almost worthless, so Plato’s cosmology will no longer be a theology. Scholars mistakenly hold metaphorist interpretations because they ignore the concept of fatum, as fate indicates the divinity of the demiurge. Even if we oppose metaphorism, it does not mean we should fully endorse literalist interpretation, as some literalist interpreters overlook the “rationality” of fate. The literalist interpretation does not imply that the demiurge’s creation is purely mythological but rather based on the principle of eikos logos. Eikos logos is momentous for fate; only through this principle can we indicate that fate is not something that has already happened but a “possible” or “reasonable” event. Although the concept of fate is not explicitly mentioned in Plato’s Timaeus, this hidden concept runs through the creation activities of the demiurge. Supposing there is a lack of clarification on fate, it is impossible to demonstrate determinism and freedom.
Secondly, imitating forms by the cosmos requires the demiurge’s techne, and the demiurge’s principle of creation should be regarded as fate, so it is impossible to interpret the demiurge’s activities without fate. Furthermore, necessity does not mean complete detachment from reason but instead has the possibility of being persuaded by reason. Consequently, necessity is a pivotal standard of whether the demiurge can construct the cosmos. Finally, whether it is human perception or disease, they are the combinations of reason and necessity, and these combinations should be understood from fate. Even if some scholars have realized that Plato’s cosmology should contain fate, such as Gregory (2008, p. xxvii), Carone (2005, p. 21), and Rosen (1979, pp. 59–85), they lack a systematic sorting of fate. Therefore, the hidden thought of fate in the Timaeus provides a new perspective for researching the Timaeus and deepens the ideological implications of Plato’s cosmology.
This article takes the perspective of divine providence. It uses eikos logos as the argumentation pattern to conduct an in-depth analysis of the hidden fate in the Timaeus. By clarifying the definition and essence of the concept of fate, scholars studying the Timaeus can pay attention to the hidden fate and unify all of the Timaeus’ texts on this crucial concept. Moreover, this article takes the concept of fate as a clue, which clarifies misunderstandings in Plato’s Timaeus. This article first starts from the essential relationship between eikos logos and eikos muthos, argues for Plato’s proposal of the concept of hidden fate, as well as discusses fate’s origins from a textual perspective. The fate of Plato’s cosmology comes from divine providence, emphasizing the theistic characteristics of fate. Secondly, from the perspective of the demiurge’s creation of a macroscopic cosmos, this paper explores how fate is applied to the demiurge’s process of creating the cosmic soul and body, as well as the manifestation of fate in celestial bodies, emphasizing determinism. Finally, although human destiny contains the dimension of determinism, the crucial dimension of freedom in fate cannot be ignored. Without freedom, the demiurge cannot achieve “the overall goodness” of the cosmos. Consequently, in Plato’s cosmology, fate possesses the dual essence of determinism and freedom.

2. The Timaeus’ Literary Form and Character Analysis in Dialogue

2.1. The Timaeus’ Literary Form: Dialogue and Monologue Forms

It is essential to clarify Plato’s Timaeus’ literary form. The structure of Plato’s dialogues is very complex. According to McCoy’s viewpoint, Plato’s dialogues have four levels, namely the thoughts expressed by the characters in the dialogues, the known “dramatic information”, the unknown “dramatic information”, and the comparison between Plato’s dialogues and those of other philosophers (McCoy 2017, pp. 51–2). The status of the characters in the dialogue is equal. In Plato’s dialogues, truth is presented in the discussion of various characters in the dialogue. Because not all the ideas in Plato’s dialogues refer to his theories, we cannot confuse the views of the characters in the dialogues with Plato’s perspective, as there are fundamental differences between the two. Supposing that the viewpoints expressed by each character in Plato’s dialogues are not distinguished will cause complete confusion in the theory we are arguing about. McCoy also points out that Plato’s dialogues have a “multivocal” characteristic; that is, Socrates is only one of the characters in the dialogue, so other characters’ opinions should be valued (McCoy 2017, pp. 51–52). This assertion is a profound insight into Plato’s dialogue form. According to Matskiv’s perspective, some scholars in the past have overlooked the crucial significance of the literary form of dialogues for Platonic philosophy, such as Cornford (Matskiv 2021, pp. 140–51). Based on the criticism of Cornford, Matskiv asserts that the form of dialogues is related to the essence of Plato’s philosophical thought. Literary forms make Plato’s role in his works not a narrator of truth but rather a seeker of truth (Matskiv 2021, pp. 140–51).
As for the Timaeus’ literary form, Plato uses a combination of dialogue and monologue forms. The similarity between the Timaeus and other works of Plato lies in using dialogue forms, mainly reflected in the Timaeus 17a1–27d4’s introductory conversation. Introductory conversation uses dialogue form for the following reasons: Firstly, it is because Plato in the Timaeus is committed to introducing three characters in the dialogue, namely Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates. In addition, the absent fourth person is Alcibiades. Secondly, the dialogue form in the Timaeus can better introduce the theme of cosmology as the Timaeus deepens the problem domain of the Republic, that is, exploring what an ideal city-state is. Since the Republic belongs to the dialogue form, the introductory conversation in the Timaeus should also be a dialogue form to ensure consistency in argumentation between the two works.
Thirdly, in the Timaeus’ introductory conversation, Timaeus is also one of the characters in the dialogue. Through dialogue, it is possible to effectively demonstrate how Timaeus proposes cosmology in debates with other interlocutors and the fundamental reasons behind Timaeus’ construction of a cosmological framework. The Timaeus uses monologue form to describe the mode of cosmic generation for the following reasons: Firstly, the various stages of cosmic generation are coherent. From the demiurge imitating eternal beings to create the cosmos to the unity of the cosmic soul and the cosmic body to the celestial and sublunar worlds, they are all in a consistent causal chain. If dialogue form is used, it will disrupt the coherence of the cosmic generation process in the Timaeus. Secondly, for Plato, the creation of the cosmos is a scientific topic that involves rigorously proven mathematical, astronomical, and medical theories, and these sciences are systematic and complete. Consequently, Plato’s description of the cosmos takes the monologue form to facilitate our understanding of science. From a scientific perspective, cosmology requires systematic argumentation, and if the dialogue form is adopted, it will not be easy to clarify which scientific system is Plato’s true stance. Thirdly, in the Timaeus’ introductory conversation, Socrates is not the leader of the dialogue but should be regarded as the guide. The other characters, including the present Critias and Hermocrates and the absent Alcibiades, possess the identities of politicians and philosophers. Among all the characters involved in the conversation, only Timaeus is a scientist. Timaeus discusses cosmology in a monologue way, while other characters can only serve as listeners. Accordingly, the Timaeus’ scientific characteristics determine that its literary form must be a monologue.

2.2. Character Analysis in the Timaeus’ Introductory Conversation

Based on the above discussion of the Timaeus’ literary form, we further analyze the philosophical connotations of characters in the Timaeus’ introductory conversation in order to avoid confusion about the opinions in the Timaeus. At the beginning of the conversation, Socrates, as the guide, discusses the previous day’s speech and further explores the theme of the Republic, mainly about the organizational structure of the ideal city-state, but does not discuss other aspects of the Republic. Socrates is Plato’s teacher, and the views of Socrates in the dialogue represent Plato’s thoughts. Socrates analyzes the various classes in the ideal city-state in the introductory conversation, and he particularly values the importance of the guardians. The guardian is an independent class separated from other classes, characterized by kindness towards the citizen but extreme cruelty towards the enemy. Guardians possess unique skills that do not create products but result in good outcomes. The guardian class has passion and reason, and it can enhance human morality. Socrates also emphasizes the cultivation of women and offspring in the city-state. Compared to the Republic, the Timaeus emphasizes the dynamics of the city-state more. Socrates’ most crucial role in the Timaeus is as a guide, helping other characters to engage in dialogue. Socrates mocks himself as incompetent and belittles the status of poets and sophists. The poet’s capacity is limited to imitation, and the sophists think they are wise, but in reality, they are ignorant. What is truly needed in the Timaeus is someone who is proficient in philosophy and politics, so Socrates acts as a guide to have the three characters present in the introductory conversation (Timaeus, 17c–20c). Hermocrates only spoke once in the Timaeus 20c–d, the least spoken in introductory conversation. In accordance with Lampert and Planeaux, Hermocrates plays a transition role in the Timaeus (Lampert and Planeaux 1998, pp. 101–7). This transformation is crucial; Socrates’ speech is a continuation of the theme of the Republic, while the story of the war between Athens and Atlantis follows the principle of the eikos logo. The purpose is to illustrate how justice can overcome injustice, thus leading to cosmology in the Timaeus, as cosmology also conforms to the fundamental principles of eikos logos.
The main speaker in the introductory conversation is Critias, an Athenian whose story concerning Atlantis comes from Solon. There is doubt about the identity of Critias in the Timaeus’ introductory conversation (Lampert and Planeaux 1998, pp. 87–125). Someone holds that Critias is one of the thirty tyrants of Athens. Some hold that “Critias” in the dialogue is not one of the Thirty Tyrants but rather Critias’ grandfather, whom we can call the “old Critias.” According to Lampert and Planeaux’s inference, the character in the conversation should be the old Critias. This is because the story of Athens defeating Atlantis is a great honor, and it is impossible to entrust such a glorious war to young Critias to tell, for he is one of the thirty tyrants. In contrast, Critias’ grandfather is a respected elder, so it is most appropriate for him to tell this story (Lampert and Planeaux 1998, pp. 95–100). Nonetheless, we can find opposition to Lampert and Planeaux’s assertion in the text. In the Timaeus 20e–21a, Plato explicitly maintains that young Critias tells the story of Atlantis rather than his grandfather because young Critias hears the story from his grandfather, old Critias. Furthermore, even if the story of Athens defeating Atlantis is told by one of the thirty tyrants, it will not destroy the glorious status of this story.
In the introductory conversation, Critias praises Solon because Solon has rationality and imitative ability. Critias tells the story of Solon’s travels to various city-states and explores the catastrophe humanity has faced in history. Compared to the city-states Solon traveled, Critias emphasizes Athens’ prestige, and Atlantis is a representative of ambitious city-states. The ultimate victory of Athens over Atlantis is a just triumph (Timaeus, 20c–27d). This story is not a historical fact, and its authenticity should be regarded as “rationality”, which is the essential definition of eikos logos. According to Lampert and Planeaux, Timaeus of Locri is rarely mentioned in any other dialogues of Plato. We only know that Timaeus is a scientist and politician. Timaeus lives in a city-state dominated by the Pythagorean school, so it can be inferred from Lampert and Planeaux’s assertion that the Pythagorean school profoundly influences Plato and, therefore, focuses on mathematics in his cosmology (Lampert and Planeaux 1998, pp. 91–95). Unlike other dialogues, Plato in the Timaeus tells the story of the demiurge creating the cosmos by imitating eternal beings. The constituent parts of the cosmos include the upper lunar realm, composed of immortal celestial bodies, and the sublunar realm, composed of mortal living beings and lifeless natural entities. Therefore, the Timaeus theory is Plato’s development of his theory of eidos. As for the fourth person absent from the conversation, it is generally believed to be Alcibiades.
The perspectives of Socrates and Timaeus belong to Plato’s theory. Socrates’ viewpoint in the Timaeus’ introductory conversation is a continuation of the Republic, while Timaeus’ cosmology conforms to Plato’s later thought and the transformation and innovation of middle thought. Taking a step back, even though there is indeed a person named Timaeus who proposes cosmology, at least Plato agrees with this theory and integrates it into his theoretical system. For the story of Atlantis told by Critias, we need to emphasize that it is not a story told by Plato himself, as Plato has never heard of this story from Critias’ grandfather. The Timaeus’ story about Atlantis, told through Critias, draws on the methodology of eikos logos and uses eikos logos to explore Plato’s mode of cosmic creation. Hermocrates’ speech is not Plato’s theory. A few speeches by Hermocrates only play a transition role in the introductory conversation. This role in the dialogue cannot be regarded as Plato’s. The philosophical significance of the absent fourth person does not refer to Plato. Although, both Alcibiades and Plato are committed to achieving the glory of Athens. However, the absence of Alcibiades in the dialogue indicates that he abandons cosmology, and Plato accepts the cosmology principles described by Timaeus. The inspiration comes from Lampert and Planeaux (1998, pp. 87–125).

2.3. The Purpose of Plato’s Writing of the Timaeus and the Establishment of Corresponding Theories

Compared to the descriptions of the cosmos in Homer’s epic and Hesiod’s Theogony, Plato’s cosmology achieves a transition from mythology to science, which reflects the fundamental purpose of Plato’s creation of the Timaeus. The essential difference between the two is that the cosmos in the mythological context cannot be proven, while Plato’s cosmology belongs to a verifiable scientific theory. For the cosmos in the dimension of mythology, the appearances and behaviors of gods such as Zeus or Hera cannot be judged as true or false. Once we enter the mythology context, we must hold that these appearances and behaviors are reasonable. Otherwise, we are not in the same problem domain as mythology, and thus, cosmology from the perspective of mythology cannot be confirmed. On the contrary, the cosmology in the Timaeus is constructed based on mathematical patterns. It has a strict rational order, so Plato’s cosmology should not be understood as myth but instead as science. Consequently, Plato’s cosmology aims to construct a scientific cosmos model. Regarding corresponding theories, Plato’s cosmology has scientific characteristics. It cannot be denied that there are theological characteristics in Plato’s cosmology, as we must acknowledge the role of the demiurge in creating the cosmos.
Plato’s cosmology is a change in the perspective of the “purposeless” or “natural purpose” of cosmology, thus creating a unique “divine teleology.” For the “purposeless” interpretation, generating all things in the cosmos is occasional or random, without a clear purpose. For natural teleology, although this position maintains that the creation of all things in the cosmos has a purpose, this is based on its nature. In contrast, Plato’s cosmology belongs to divine teleology. The divine teleology should be clarified from the following two aspects. The generation of all things in the cosmos is purposeful, that is, to achieve goodness. For example, for humans, the purpose of muscles is to protect bones, and the purpose of bones is to protect marrow (Timaeus, 74e–75d). Neither of these purposes is a natural purpose but a divine purpose because the purpose of protection comes from god’s divine providence. Consequently, all human purposes have religious characteristics, reflecting the fate humanity cannot escape. Regarding the corresponding theory, Plato constructs cosmology based on divine teleology.
Plato’s Timaeus is a further advancement of the theory of eidos in the Republic and other mid-term dialogues. Plato does not provide a clear explanation in the Republic regarding the efficient cause behind this imitation. In the Timaeus, Plato proposes the concept of the demiurge, who is good and without jealousy, and the demiurge creates the cosmos by imitating eidos. Another innovation of Plato’s creation of the Timaeus is that, due to the limitations of the demiurge, the Timaeus proposes the necessity of the third kind in creating the cosmos. Therefore, in terms of the corresponding theory, Plato achieves a transition from a binary structure to a ternary structure. For Plato’s purpose in writing the Timaeus, the most suitable literary form should be monologue rather than conversation. Plato uses dialogue form in the Timaeus 17a1–27d4 because it is suitable for telling the story of Atlantis. However, cosmology is a scientific system that has undergone rational argumentation, and dialogue forms undermine the unity and integrity of scientific argumentation. For teleology, the same applies. Divine teleology runs through the Timaeus, and if Plato talks about cosmology in dialogue form, it causes complete confusion. In addition, the arguments for the demiurge and “the third kind” are parts of scientific cosmology, so they are also suitable to argue in monologue form.

3. The Hidden Fate in Plato’s Cosmological Theology and the Methodology of “Eikos Logos”

3.1. The Definition of Fate in Plato’s Cosmology

Fate is momentous in Plato’s cosmology. Without fate, it is impossible to understand the dimension of the divine teleology of cosmology. Indeed, some scholars maintain that there is no discussion of fate in Plato’s cosmology, but this doubt is a misinterpretation of Plato. From the demiurge’s creation of immortal celestial bodies and the fate of reincarnation for humanity, it can be seen that fate is crucial for elucidating Plato’s cosmology. The entry point for the concept of fate is determinism, where both heavenly races of gods and mortal humans cannot do anything without limitations and are determined by fate. Even if humans can choose their fate, their choices are governed by divine providence and cannot be entirely determined by themselves. Fate is not based on natural teleology but on divine teleology. This is the fundamental criterion for establishing Plato’s cosmology as divine rather than natural teleology. It is precisely because humans accept the fate bestowed upon them by the demiurge that they cannot change the rules of reincarnation. Only through divine providence can one return to the divine celestial bodies.
It is worth emphasizing that even though determinism is crucial to fate, the importance of freedom in Platonic cosmology cannot be ignored. Compared with other mortal living beings, humans are the noblest mortals in the cosmos because the lesser gods personally create them and receive the divine fate bestowed by the demiurge. Humans are different from animals, such as beasts, because they can choose freely. For example, humans can choose to return to divine stars or choose to fall into the beasts. Therefore, from the determinism perspective, humans still have limited freedom. Moreover, the demiurge’s creation of the cosmos requires divine providence and extends it to the following aspects. The bestowal of divine providence on fate is mainly reflected in the divine laws by god, such as the laws that god establishes for human reincarnation, which humans must abide by. In addition, fate is also reflected in the techne of god’s creation of the cosmos and humanity. So, the problem we are required to deal with now is why the concept of fate holds a crucial position in Plato’s Timaeus. What dilemmas can clarifying the concept of fate solve for Plato’s cosmology? Plato’s cosmology can fully reflect the above provisions on fate.
The demiurge creates a cosmos that belongs to the generation category, and necessity should be regarded as an auxiliary cause. The cosmos is perfect because the demiurge who creates the cosmos is good and without jealousy (Timaeus, 29d7–30c1). Consequently, for the divine purpose, he must create a perfect cosmos and cannot intentionally create an imperfect one. Gkatzaras argues that goodness is an independent concept, meaning that the essence of the demiurge does not contain goodness (Gkatzaras 2018, pp. 71–83). This is a mistaken viewpoint; if a divine craftsman does not have goodness, he cannot be the demiurge, and thus, the definition of the demiurge should contain goodness. The importance of fate is not only reflected in the demiurge’s process of creating the cosmic soul and cosmic body but also in the process of the lesser gods creating mortal humans. Plato mainly defines the hidden fate in the Timaeus through the demiurge’s “divine providence” and “foreordained”, he says,
He put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and so he constructed the cosmos. He wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine providence brought our world into being as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence.
διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ᾽ ἐν σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν
(Timaeus, 30b3-c1)5.
Plato’s divine providence here embodies the determinism of fate, and the fate of divine providence is not based on Aristotelian “natural teleology”, but on “divine teleology”. According to Plato’s perspective in the Timaeus, models can be divided into eternal beings and generated beings. The demiurge can choose either eternal beings or generated beings as the model. If the former is chosen, a perfect cosmos will be generated; if the latter is chosen, the cosmos will be imperfect. From the perspective of the generated perfect cosmos, the demiurge must choose an eternal being as the model. Otherwise, it is impossible to create a perfect cosmos (Johansen 2014, pp. 297–320), which is the unchangeable fate of the cosmos. More importantly, a perfect cosmos is not created by chance, but by logos, because the demiurge is good and without jealousy, and his divine purpose gives his creation behaviors rational characteristics, enabling him to achieve the perfection of the cosmos. In terms of divine teleology, the generated cosmos is the demiurge’s mixture of soul and body through divine providence, and the becoming of the mixture is the fate of the cosmos. Fate belongs to the principle that the demiurge declares to gods (Timaeus, 41b–c), which indicates that fate is based on the divine providence of the demiurge. Those who can issue commands must belong to a “deity” rather than a natural god. We should agree with Cornford’s viewpoint that the demiurge is a god with religious connotations rather than a natural god (Cornford 1935, p. 138). The cosmos can be created because of the divine fate bestowed upon it by the demiurge. For the demiurge’s creation in the Timaeus, fate has a duality, which not only indicates why the perfection of the generated cosmos is not as good as the eternal form, but also effectively clarifies the cosmological dimension of ethics. The hidden fate in the Timaeus is not only reflected in the demiurge’s creation of the immortal cosmos but also in the lesser gods’ creation of mortal humans and their souls:
He divided the mixture into a number of souls equal to the number of the stars and assigned each soul to a star. He mounted each soul in a carriage, as it were, and showed it the nature of the cosmos. He described to them the laws that had been foreordained: They would all be assigned one and the same initial birth, so that none would be less well treated by him than any other.
συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις, ἔνειμέν θ᾽ ἑκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, νόμους τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, ὅτι γένεσις πρώτη μὲν ἔσοιτο τεταγμένη μία πᾶσιν, ἵνα μήτις ἐλαττοῖτο ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, δέοι δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάσταις ἕκαστα ὄργανα χρόνων
(Timaeus, 41d4–e3).
The perfect cosmos is created by the demiurge, and this is in terms of the fate of the “macroscopic cosmos”. In addition, we cannot ignore the fate of mortal humans; this reflects fate’s divine providence and laws. In terms of the dimension of divine teleology contained in fate, only humans among all living beings can attain the fate bestowed by gods, and other living beings cannot attain the divine fate. Human beings do not exist in isolation in the cosmos but are a part of it. The cosmos’ fate actually includes humanity’s fate, and the two kinds of fates maintain essential consistency. We should delve into the analysis of divine theology and explore the fate of humanity. Mortal humans are not omnipotent but should follow the cosmos’ laws and accept the demiurge’s divine providence, which is the fate of mortal humans. The demiurge is only responsible for creating the macroscopic cosmos and “heavenly race of gods”(Timaeus, 40a1–3), but does not create mortal humans except the immortal soul. Provided that the demiurge was to create humans, it would contradict his divine nature, so the demiurge entrusts the task of creating humans and other mortal living beings to the lesser gods. The fate of humanity can be divided into the fate of the soul and the fate of humans, which is in line with the demiurge’s divine providence. Consequently, divine providence represents fate in the dimension of determinism.
For the fate of the human soul, we cannot consider it as a unified and undifferentiated “whole” but rather as composed of immortal and mortal parts. The immortal part of the human soul is made by the demiurge, while the lesser gods make the mortal part. The immortality of the human soul differs from the immortality of forms. The latter is based on its own eternity, while the former can only be obtained through the guarantee of the demiurge (Timaeus, 41a3–b1), thus only in an analogical sense of immortality. As for the generation of the human soul, its method follows the principle of the cosmic soul, and its components are the remaining matter used to create the cosmic soul, namely, “being”, “same”, and “different”, and follows the dual principles of “divisible” and “indivisible” (Timaeus, 34b–36d). The demiurge creates celestial bodies, which we can call the “heavenly race of gods” in a mythological sense. The demiurge assigns a unique celestial body to each human soul, indicating that the demiurge has set the possibility for mortal humans to return to the divine stars, which is a positive regulation of human fate. After configuring celestial bodies for the human soul, the demiurge sets two principles for the fate of the human soul: first, the demiurge’s creation of the immortal part of the human soul is not constrained by time because time is created by the demiurge, and he cannot be limited by the time he has created himself. There is no chronological order for every immortal part of the human soul, and every human soul possesses an equally noble and prioritized fate. Secondly, the demiurge’s goodness and lack of jealousy determine that he cannot create any individual human soul. Otherwise, it will contradict his nature. The demiurge entrusts this task to the lesser gods, who are immortal and good. Any human soul is the perfect soul among “possible human souls”, and the becoming of the human soul contains the dimension of divine providence, which guarantees the perfection of the human soul.
After analyzing the fate of the human soul, we should further explore the fate of humanity itself. The exploration of the human soul is a preparatory step in analyzing the fate of humanity. Human beings are composed of soul and body, and the demiurge does not create humans, but entrusts this task to the lesser gods. The demiurge, out of his goodness and lack of jealousy, does not personally create mortals, but we cannot ignore the demiurge’s divine providence on the fate of humanity. Because the demiurge is only responsible for formulating the laws of fate, he is not accountable for the evil in the cosmos. The demiurge sets the fate of human reincarnation, the lesser gods create sensations and emotions for humans, and these irrational activities disturb the human soul. Suppose humans can overcome the disturbance of sensation and emotion with reason and restore peace to their souls. In that case, humans will return to their exclusive celestial stars and obtain the fate of divine goodness. If a man cannot restrain his emotions and sensations by reason but succumbs to his desires, he will be reincarnated as a woman. If a woman cannot restrain her irrational capacities with reason, she will be reincarnated as a beast (Timaeus, 42a-d).
Concerning the fate of human reincarnation, we should not only pay attention to the possibility of human fate’s fall but also distinguish Timaeus’ divine teleology of cosmos’ fate from Aristotle’s natural teleology. For Aristotle, the motion of all things in the cosmos is caused by their nature, and no divine reason leads to the creation of a perfect cosmos. Although fate is determined by the final cause, this purpose is not based on natural teleology but on divine teleology with religious or theological features; therefore, human fate should be regarded as a divine destiny. Only when reincarnation is based on divine teleology can humans revere the demiurge and obey his divine providence, and thus Plato’s cosmology is a theology that cannot be simply understood from a scientific perspective. Fate is the cosmological law promulgated by the demiurge for humanity, we can clarify it from Johansen’s distinction between aitia and aitios (Johansen 2014, pp. 297–320). On the one hand, the demiurge formulates the laws of human destiny, indicating that the demiurge is the efficient and final cause of human generation. On the other hand, the demiurge is not the cause (Johansen 2014, pp. 297–320), as he is only responsible for formulating the laws of fate and does not create humans. The evil of mortal living beings is caused by the lesser gods and mortal living beings, so the demiurge is not responsible for any evil in the cosmos. The demiurge regards goodness as its divine purpose in creating the cosmos. Evil should be regarded as imperfection. Even if imperfect beings exist in the cosmos, the lesser gods should still be responsible for them.

3.2. Eikos Logos: The Divine Laws of Fate in Cosmology

Concerning the key question about Plato and the Timaeus’ cosmology, since the demiurge is good and without jealousy, why does he not make the cosmos as perfect as the eternal form but only create the cosmos that belongs to the category of “generation”? Why not make human beings like the cosmos but mortal beings? Does this mean that Plato’s cosmology is contradictory? Or does it indicate that the Timaeus has a lower status in Plato’s dialogues? This is because the Timaeus focuses on the cosmos that belongs to the generation category rather than eternal forms. Furthermore, the demiurge endows the immortal cosmos and the mortal humans with fate. Can this fate only be understood from a negative perspective? The principle of eikos logos can resolve this dilemma. For instance, human vision is not independent but necessarily has its astronomical purpose, which embodies the principle of eikos logos. Plato’s description of vision follows the principle of “like knows like” of pre-Socratic philosophers. According to Plato, humans have vision because the internal fire of the eyes can maintain consistency with the external fire. External fire enters the eyes and transmits it to the human soul, thus enabling humans to possess vision. Since vision is generated by the consistency between the internal and external fire of the eye, once the external fire disappears, humans’ vision will cease (Timaeus, 45b–46a).
Eikos logos is necessary for Plato’s cosmology because Plato not only distinguishes between eternal and generated beings from an ontological perspective but also distinguishes between “account of eternal beings” and “account of generated beings.” As mentioned in the introduction, there is a debate in academia between literalist and metaphorist interpretations concerning the demiurge’s creation of the cosmos. Both schemes have key flaws to some extent, and the fundamental reason lies in the misinterpretation of the relationship between eikos logos and eikos muthos in the Timaeus. Metaphorist interpreters only focus on eikos logos but ignore eikos muthos, leading to their inability to insist on the essential eikos logos. Although the literalist interpretation scheme is correct, some literalists only focus on eikos muthos and ignore eikos logos, which also results in the inability of literalists to insist eikos muthos because it is neither a historical fact nor hearsay. Vlastos believes mythology should be regarded as a scientific hypothesis (Vlastos 1965, pp. 401–19). The revelation for us is that the essence of mythology lies in rationality and should be understood as “another kind of truth”, that is, authenticity does not lie in the past but in the future. In Plato’s cosmology, eikos logos is not purely inferential or argumentative but contains the meaning of eikos muthos. Eikos muthos is not commonly referred to as a myth but rather a reasonable story (Burnyeat 2005, pp. 143–65). If eikos muthos is separated from eikos logos, then Plato’s cosmology cannot be regarded as a theology, which is a misinterpretation of Plato. The eikos logos in the Timaeus should be demonstrated from the following three aspects:
Firstly, the immortal cosmos is created by the demiurge, while the lesser gods create mortal humans. From the perspective of eikos logos, both the cosmos and humanity are determined by a “similar” fate, which is the first meaning of eikos logos. In Timaeus’ cosmology, denying the similarity between the imitation and the model is impossible. The cosmos is created by the demiurge, imitating eternal beings, so there is a similarity between the cosmos and eidos. Mortal humans are created by imitating the cosmos, so there are similarities between humans and the cosmos. Fronterotta points out that not only is the sensible world alive, but also the intelligible world is alive, whereas there are fundamental differences in the “alive” way (Fronterotta 2021, pp. 49–69). His insight is that similarity can only be defined in an analogical sense due to the fundamental rupture between eternal and generated things. For instance, the forms and the cosmos have uniqueness, but the forms are unique because they belong to the self-prediction structure (Patterson 1981, pp. 105–19). Although the cosmos has the characteristic of uniqueness, this is because it is vast and all-encompassing. Even if both forms and the cosmos have eternity, the eternity of forms is within the essential horizon, while the eternity of the cosmos is only relative. The cosmos belongs to the category of generated beings, and its eternity is guaranteed by the demiurge. For humans, the reason why the four elements can be interconnected is because they are combined with rivets (Timaeus, 43a1–5). Even though the definition of eikos logos is not simply the similarity, we cannot deny the significance of the similarity standard of eikos logos.
Secondly, according to the principle of eikos logos, the cosmos’ fate in Plato’s Timaeus cannot be clarified from similarity simply but should be regarded as rationality. In Timaeus, the principle of eikos logos regarding the fate of the cosmos comes from the war between Athens and Atlantis6 in the Timaeus’ introductory conversation. Athens is a typical glorious city-state, representing moderation; Atlantis is a typical ambitious city-state, representing greed. According to Critias’ description, the winner of this war is Athens, indicating that reason will triumph over irrationality and justice will ultimately triumph over injustice (Timaeus, 20c4–27d4). Lampert and Planeaux regard the absence of the fourth person at the beginning of the Timaeus as an expression of the role of cosmology, which indicates the Timaeus’ commitment to expressing truth rather than historical facts (Lampert and Planeaux 1998, pp. 87–125). Therefore, the war between Athens and Atlantis is not a true story but a “reasonable story.” The “reasonable” does not require occurring in actuality but only requires conforming to humans’ reason. The hidden fate in the Timaeus contains the principle of eikos logos from a rational perspective. On the one hand, whether it is for the macroscopic cosmos or the mortal human body, the conception of fate does not belong to pure rational reasoning, but contains eikos muthos in its definition. On the other hand, even if fate is endowed by divine demiurge, we cannot understand fate as a myth of hearsay but rather as another actuality. From the mythology perspective, fate already contains eikos logos in its definition. Whether it is the demiurge creating the cosmos or the lesser gods creating humanity, these activities should have rationality and cannot be regarded as actual historical events. Therefore, the Timaeus holds a significant position in Plato’s dialogues due to the unique “rationality” of cosmology. Fate is a concept with rationality, a positive stance on the definition of fate.
Thirdly, according to eikos logos, the fate in Platonic cosmology should be innovative. In Plato’s cosmology, although the demiurge endows the cosmos with an immortal fate and the lesser gods endow humanity with a mortal and reincarnated fate, this does not mean that the cosmos can only be considered a simple deficiency compared to eternal beings. Similarly, we cannot assume that humans belong to living beings with simple deficiencies compared to the cosmos. The fundamental reason we make such an assertion is that whether the creator is the demiurge or the lesser god, their imitation of the corresponding models is not simply for aesthetic purposes but more for the perspective of divine teleology that focuses on the imitation of the function of the model. The demiurge creates the cosmos without absolutely replicating forms; otherwise, not only would no cosmos belong to the realm of generation, but it would also lead to the cosmos being imperfect and negative, as this pure imitation lacks the dimension of functionality. the demiurge imitates forms to create the cosmos, which is not a simple replication activity but an innovation based on forms. Similarly, in creating mortal humans by the lesser gods, the human head imitates the spherical shape of the cosmos because it is the most perfect of all shapes. Nonetheless, humans do not simply replicate the spherical shape of the cosmos but create limbs for the spherical head to support it (Timaeus, 44e–45a).
Consequently, fate is crucial in the Timaeus’ cosmology. Although the Timaeus does not explicitly mention fate, the hidden thought of fate is a link between the demiurge and the cosmos and between the lesser gods and humanity in a dual dimension. The fate in Plato’s cosmology cannot be attributed to Aristotelian natural teleology but divine teleology with religious characteristics. According to the relationship between eikos logos and eikos muthos, even if we should acknowledge that fate leads to a lack of completeness between the cosmos and humanity, we cannot ignore the positive dimension of fate, which still contains rationality and innovativeness.

4. The Divine Providence of Fate in the Timaeus: Based on the Macroscopic Dimension of the Cosmos

4.1. Divine Providence and Reason: The Laws of the Fate

Since humans’ fate requires a necessary cosmological foundation, it is essential to analyze the cosmos’ fate from a macro perspective, which is a prerequisite for exploring the fate of mortal humans. Concerning the crucial dilemma we require to resolve, why is perfection the fate of the cosmos? According to the demiurge’s laws of fate bestowed upon the cosmos, this cosmos is generated by divine providence. The divine purpose of the demiurge creating the cosmos is to achieve the cosmos’ perfection and strive to actualize goodness. The cosmos we live in is perfect, and the demiurge should choose eternal beings as models to create the cosmos rather than generating beings as models7. Multiple causes exist for creating the cosmos, and the demiurge may not be the only cause for its perfection (Johansen 2014, pp. 297–320). However, only the demiurge can guarantee the perfection of the cosmos. The demiurge can create the perfect cosmos because he is good and not jealous, so the cosmos he creates is also good. Otherwise, it will contradict the demiurge’s nature of goodness. Secondly, the demiurge uses divine reason to ensure the necessity of the perfection of the cosmos. Unlike irrational factors, divine reason is the essential cause for specific characteristics to persist. Fate, from a rational perspective, endows the cosmos with the nature of goodness, and this nature is necessary; that is, the fate of the cosmos is not limited to any external conditions but can occur at any time.
According to Plato, the cosmos is created by the demiurge according to his divine providence, and this principle contains the demiurge’s reason. Therefore, this reflects the demiurge’s law of fate in creating the cosmos, where he uses rational techne to create a perfect cosmos. The fate of the cosmos is reflected in its perfection, so the status of the cosmos is not low because the demiurge’s rationality endows the necessary occurrence of perfection in the cosmos and transforms it from disordered chaos to ordered state. Plato believes in the Timaeus that the creation of the cosmos is based on the demiurge’s providence because this creation belongs to divine theology. Unlike natural teleology, the Timaeus’ teleology embodies the divine fate. Plato believes in the Timaeus that in the demiurge’s creation activity, the cosmos is similar to the perfect particular (Timaeus, 30c2–31a1). This assertion is a metaphor because the cosmos is the most perfect particular. Supposing that there exists a more perfect particular besides the cosmos, then it contradicts the uniqueness of the cosmos. There is a fundamental difference between the uniqueness of the cosmos and the uniqueness of forms because the uniqueness of the cosmos does not come from self-prediction but from the “all-encompassing” of the cosmos. From this, the macro perspective of the cosmos reflects similarity, rationality, and innovativeness and embodies the cosmological dimension that human ethics should possess.
The proportional method conforms to the divine purpose of the demiurge; therefore, “conforming to proportion” should be regarded as the cosmos’ fate from a macro perspective. Why does Plato’s cosmology require proportion? Why is proportion the fate of the cosmos? The proportional method is important to Plato’s cosmology because it conforms to the divine purpose of the demiurge. According to Glenn, provided that the parts of the cosmos are even and identical, motion cannot occur because the cosmos lacks the efficient cause to move. If all parts of the cosmos are entirely different, then motion cannot occur because the different parts mutually destroy each other and thus cannot cause motion. The proportional method appropriately solves the problem of cosmic motion. If the various parts of the cosmos conform to proportion, then each part can maintain independence while keeping balance, thus not being entirely even and identical. If the various parts of the cosmos are in proportion and strictly located in their respective regions, they will not mutually destroy each other. Only by introducing proportions into the cosmos can the demiurge generate four complete elements (Glenn 2011, pp. 11–27). Therefore, the proportional method is the best solution to solve cosmic motion’s difficulties; thus, the proportion is also the fate bestowed upon the cosmos by the demiurge. The cosmic soul and body should follow the proportion method in creating the cosmos.

4.2. The Demiurge’s Divine Laws and Techne of Creating the Cosmos: The Fate of the Cosmic Soul and the Cosmic Body

If the cosmic body should be material, then the demiurge should rely on the elements of earth and fire to construct the cosmic body, because the earth ensures that the cosmic body is touchable. Fire ensures that the cosmic body is visible. Although earth and fire are necessary for forming the cosmic body, the cosmos cannot be formed solely by these two elements. Earth and fire are entirely different elements in nature and cannot be directly combined. Consequently, concerning the formation of the cosmic body, the elements of earth and fire must be mediated by water and air. Only through water and air can earth and fire essentially bond. The two “extreme terms”, earth and fire, require two “middle terms”, water and air. Only through two middle terms can the three-dimensional solid of the cosmic body be established (Timaeus, 31b–32c). The combination of the four elements belongs to the “generated beings” category, and these elements cannot be classified as the world of forms. Consequently, the combination of the four elements does not possess essential eternality. Nonetheless, this combination is still immortal because the demiurge’s goodness and lack of jealousy ensure that the four elements can never be decomposed. Although the demiurge has the “free will” to decompose the four elements, due to his rational goodness, the capacity of freedom can never be transformed into actuality, thus ensuring the fate of the four elements that cannot be decomposed. Furthermore, the fate bestowed upon the cosmic body is the uniqueness of “all-encompassing”, so the demiurge exhausts all components in creating the cosmic body. The cosmos is only perfect in an analogical sense; therefore, the cosmos is the only world that the demiurge can create; he cannot create another “perfect particular” besides the cosmos. In order to give the cosmic body the fate intertwined with the cosmic soul, the demiurge makes the cosmic body into the most perfect spherical. Though the human head is also spherical, the cosmic body is different from humans’ body. The cosmos is spherical, so it has no sense organs and does not possess limbs (Timaeus, 34a–b).
After the demiurge sets the fate for the cosmic body, he further sets the fate for the cosmic soul. The cosmic soul is important in Plato’s cosmology because it determines the essence of the cosmos, and it is the source of humans’ fate. Accordingly, exploring the cosmic soul is necessary to clarify the clues of Plato’s cosmology. The reason why the cosmic soul is discussed after the cosmic body cannot be attributed to the body being more honorable than the soul, which is a misinterpretation of the relationship between the soul and the body. The cosmic soul plays a dominant role, but only by first exploring the cosmic body can the prerequisites be provided for the combination of soul and body (Timaeus, 34b-35a). The combination of the cosmic soul and the cosmic body should be regarded as fate because the demiurge creates living bodies through divine providence. Consequently, concerning the construction of the cosmos, the cosmic body takes precedence over the cosmic soul in terms of discourse order. In contrast, the cosmic soul precedes the cosmic body in terms of ontology and ethics. Plato in the Timaeus states that according to the demiurge’s divine providence, the ensouled entity is the first generated being. The demiurge’s creation of the cosmic soul holds a crucial position in the fate of the cosmos from the perspective of divine teleology (Timaeus, 30e1–2). Components of the soul in the cosmos are “Being”, “Same”, and “Different.” The demiurge combines these three components in a dual way of “separable” and “inseparable” to form a unified entity and divides this single mixture into multiple parts, each of which is a mixture of the three components of “Being”, “Same”, and “Different” in a “separable” and “inseparable” manner (Timaeus, 35b–c). The cosmic soul can generate movement because the demiurge creates the cosmic soul for a divine purpose, so Plato’s cosmology is not purely scientific knowledge but should be regarded as cosmology. The cosmos comprises the cosmic soul and body, which is the fate the cosmos has accepted from the demiurge.
The fate of the cosmos in the Timaeus’ macro perspective follows the eikos logos that begins with “introductory conversation”, which is in line with the demiurge’s divine providence of goodness and nonjealousy. The demiurge imitates eternity to create the cosmos, and this perfect cosmos also possesses eternity. Nevertheless, the cosmos cannot possess essential eternity, as it is a product of the demiurge’s creation, and its eternity can only be understood in an analogical sense. According to the Timaeus’ divine teleology, time is the eternal cosmos’ motion in an analogical sense; scholars represented by McHugh have fully affirmed the role of time in cosmology (McHugh 2019, pp. 167–84). According to the fundamental principle of eikos logos, this is the “similar” fate the cosmos must accept. The eternity of cosmic time conforms to the fundamental principle of eikos logos because the eternity of eidos is defined as a “moving image of eternity.” In contrast, the eternity of time is the image “moving according to number” (Timaeus, 37d–e). The demiurge sets days, nights, months, and years, providing a measurable scale for the cosmos and allowing for better time observation (Timaeus, 38e3–40d5). Time is created by imitating the eternal model, and the demiurge creates planets to make time measurable. Planets are in continuous motion, and each planet is placed in its designated orbits, with different directions of motion for different planets. Since the “same” circle is the origin of soul cognition, and the “different” circle is the origin of soul movement, the moving planets are placed in different orbits, and cognition is not the task of the demiurge-creating planets.

5. The Fate of Humanity in the Dimension of Determinism: The Combination of Reason and Necessity

5.1. Examining the Essential Relationship Between Humans and the Cosmos: Based on the Divine Laws of Eikos Logos

Broadie maintains that we cannot equate Plato’s cosmology with Abrahamic theological tradition (Broadie 2012, p. 11). Broadie’s viewpoint provides important inspiration for our understanding of the demiurge, which cannot be equated with the Christian God. The Christian God is ”perfect” and “omnipotent.” God can create from nothing without any auxiliary cause. Even though the demiurge is a rational god who is good and without jealousy, he is not omnipotent because while the demiurge uses reason as the “main reason” for creating the cosmos, he also uses necessity as an “auxiliary reason” (Timaeus, 46c-e). Consequently, the creation of the cosmos cannot be accomplished solely by the demiurge but should be a combination of reason and necessity. Necessity should be regarded as the limitation under which reason can function. Although the demiurge imitates forms to create the cosmos, this creation activity relies on fundamental elements such as fire, earth, water, and air. The elements that belong to necessity are not complete bodies but only “traces”8 of the elements. These element traces do not have a stable nature, and we cannot call them “this” but rather “this such” (Timaeus, 49e1–4). The complete elements can be formed only through rational persuasion and setting the geometric structure for element traces. There is no similarity between element traces and elements regarding “appearance.” In addition, space is “the third kind” besides eternal beings and generated beings (Timaeus, 48e2–3). Necessity is closely related to space, as space is the “receptacle” of the movement of elements and their traces. If there is no space, then the generation of the cosmos will lack ontological premise. Space and element traces are inseparable; both are constantly in “mutual shaking”, and both belong to the category of necessity (Timaeus, 52e2–4). In terms of the fate of the cosmos, reason and necessity are in an essential tension. On the one hand, reason is committed to persuading necessity. On the other hand, necessity resists reason’s persuasion, so not all things with necessity can be persuaded by reason. Accordingly, necessity serves as an auxiliary cause in the creation of the demiurge and as a limitation on the cosmic creation process.
The clarification of the concept of fate should be placed within the horizon of eikos logos, which is not only reflected in the demiurge’s bestowal of the fate of the cosmos from a macro perspective but also in the demiurge and the lesser gods’ bestowal of humans’ fate, as humans are the most exemplary case of the combination of reason and necessity. Plato divides the living bodies in the cosmos into four kinds: the “heavenly race of gods”, “the kind that has wings and travels through the air”, “the kind that lives in water”, and “the kind that has feet and lives on land” (Timaeus, 40a1–3). The first type should be considered the lesser gods, while the latter three belong to mortal living beings. Although the heavenly race of gods is immortal, they are not immortal on their own but through the guarantee of the demiurge. The demiurge is good; he cannot allow the heavenly race of gods to be decayed. The difference between the two is that the immortality of eidos is obtained on its own, while the immortality of the heavenly race of gods is obtained through the demiurge. In the mortal living bodies, humans occupy the most prestigious position and belong to the highest level in the reincarnation of the mortal living beings. Plato only mentions a few words for other living beings and does not discuss them as a pivotal issue (Timaeus, 90e1–3). The fate of humanity is jointly bestowed by the demiurge and the lesser gods. The demiurge is responsible for creating the immortal parts of the human soul. The lesser gods are responsible for creating the mortal parts of the human soul and combining the soul with the body to create a mortal human being. The demiurge promulgates the laws of fate for humanity, especially in revealing the nature of the cosmos and humans (Timaeus, 41e1–2), showing that the ethical world of human life should be built in the cosmological dimension. Based on the principle of eikos logos, humans’ imitation of the cosmos’ fate is an active process that cannot be elucidated in a one-sided passive sense. Plato regards humanity as composed of soul and body and regards the soul as the master of humanity. Nonetheless, due to the standard of “similarity” of eikos logos, humans are not as perfect as the cosmos or the heavenly race of gods.
According to the demiurge’s divine providence, both the soul and humanity are endowed with fate, and the discussion of the soul is a prerequisite for interpreting the living body. The human soul is destined to be impure. According to the principle of eikos logos, the human soul imitates the cosmic soul, thus endowing human fate with the necessary cosmological dimension. We still need to recognize that the perfection of the human soul is inferior to that of the cosmic soul, and the essential reason for this is that the cosmic soul is pure, while the human soul is impure. The human and cosmic souls are created using the same method; that is, they are the mixtures of “divisible” and “indivisible” beings, same and different. The difference between the two is that the cosmic soul is composed of pure components. The human soul is composed of the remaining impure components of the demiurge making cosmic soul, and therefore does not have absolute purity (Timaeus, 41d4–e5). Regarding the fate bestowed by the demiurge and the lesser gods, the human soul is composed of immortal and mortal parts, whereas the demiurge crafts the immortal part, and the mortal soul is created by the lesser gods. Even though the demiurge establishes the principles of the human soul, and creates the immortal parts of the human soul, the human soul in the overall9 perspective is immortal. The difference between the human and cosmic souls is not simply the standard of purity, but instead a difference in essence. Although the human soul is destined to be imperfect, the demiurge places it in a positive dimension and does not allow it to continue declining. The demiurge assigns an exclusive celestial star to each human soul so that any human soul can return to the divine star and fulfill human fate’s goodness. Due to the immortal part of the soul being created by the demiurge, the human soul can embody the demiurge’s goodness and lack of jealousy. It is precisely because of the existence of the immortal part in the soul that there is no distinction between different human souls, and this activity manifests the divine purpose of the demiurge.

5.2. The Fate of Human Reincarnation: The Dimension of Determinism

After endowing the cosmic souls with impurity and fate to return to celestial bodies, the demiurge does not create humans and other mortal beings but entrusts this task to the lesser gods. As the demiurge is only responsible for issuing divine laws and creating immortal parts of the human soul, he is not accountable for cosmic evil. The reason why the demiurge is not responsible for evil is not only due to his goodness and lack of jealousy but also because he provides humanity with “free will”, and, more importantly, because this is the essential way to achieve the “overall goodness” of the cosmos; this assertion of overall goodness originates from Johansen (2021, pp. 86–108). Even though the lesser gods accomplish the task of creating humans, the demiurge sets the fate of reincarnation for humanity. From the perspective of humans’ activity in the cosmos, the lesser gods create sensation and desire for humans. Plato explains these two activities from a negative perspective, as they would disrupt human reason. If a man can overcome the disturbance of sensation and desire with reason, he will return to the celestial body and live a life of happiness. If a man cannot overcome this disturbance, he will be reborn as a woman in the next life. If a woman cannot rationally restrain disturbance, she will be reborn as a beast in the next life (Timaeus, 42a1–d2). The demiurge not only sets the fate of corruption for humanity but also sets the fate of leading to divinity for humanity, and this dual dimension of fate is not static but in a dynamic transformation. From the fate of human reincarnation, cosmology and ethics are interdependent. On the one hand, the fate of human reincarnation is a part of cosmology, indicating that human ethics is based on cosmology. On the other hand, the creator of the cosmos is the demiurge, and the demiurge’s nature should be elucidated from an ethical perspective: goodness and nonjealousy. Plato’s cosmology is not a purely natural scientific theory but should be elucidated from ethics. The reason why humans are reincarnated and mortal humans do not possess the perfection is because the demiurge creates the cosmos with the divine purpose of “overall goodness”, which reflects the dual dimension of cosmology and ethics in Plato’s cosmology.
Similar to the macro perspective of the cosmos, the fate of humanity also follows the principle of eikos logos. As for the “similarity” standard of eikos logos, the cosmic and human bodies are constructed by the demiurge through four elements. From the perspective of the mutual influence between the soul and the body, the fate of humanity and the cosmos is similar. In terms of the “innovation” standard of eikos logos, the innovation of mortal humans compared to the cosmos is reflected in this aspect: the human body is different from the cosmic body, and the two are only similar in an analogical sense because the lesser gods make the human body, using rivets to combine the four elements (Timaeus, 43a2–5). Due to humans’ four limbs, the human body does not rotate like the cosmic body but moves in six irrational ways: forward and backward, up and down, and left and right (Timaeus, 43b1–3).
The demiurge is different from the Christian God because he cannot create the cosmos out of nothing. Although reason is the leading cause for the demiurge’s creation, the role of necessity as an auxiliary cause in creating the cosmos cannot be ignored. Humanity is a prime example of the combination of reason and necessity, and this is also the fate of mortal humans in the cosmos. Out of the divine purpose of the demiurge for the overall goodness of the cosmos, only when there are imperfect and mortal beings in the overall cosmos, is the cosmos essentially perfect. If humans and beasts are as perfect as the heavenly race of gods, then the cosmos cannot reflect hierarchical differences. A cosmos without hierarchical differences is imperfect, so there is an inherent contradiction between the perfection of parts and the whole. Due to the demiurge’s goodness and lack of jealousy, he cannot intentionally create evil in the cosmos, and evil cannot be equated with imperfection. According to the demiurge’s regulations on the fate of the cosmos, he allows imperfect things to exist in the cosmos, which does not violate his goodness. According to eikos logos, forms are eternal beings, while the cosmos is a generated being. According to the “similarity standard”, the cosmos is imperfect compared to forms. Similarly, humans are more imperfect than the cosmos, as the cosmos is immortal while humans are mortal. The imperfect elements in the cosmos are caused by the divine providence of “overall goodness”, and evil cannot be the result of divine providence.
Imperfection is a fate humans cannot escape in the cosmos; human reason is located in the brain, which is protected by the human skull. The skull is protected by muscles and tendons, forming a complete set of brain tissue. There is an irreconcilable contradiction regarding the human brain: the thicker the skull and muscles, the longer humans live, but they become more foolish. On the contrary, the thinner the skull and muscles, the shorter the lifespan of humans, but they become smarter (Timaeus, 75a–c). The contradiction between reason and the body demonstrates that human fate will never achieve absolute perfection. Longevity leads to stupidity, while intelligence or goodness leads to a short lifespan. Out of the divine purpose, the lesser gods choose short lifespans and more goodness and intelligence as the best choice for human soul. In order to maximize human goodness and intelligence, they make the human skull and muscles as thin as possible (Timaeus, 75c1–2). Due to the purpose of the overall goodness, the demiurge sets sensation and desire for humanity, which disrupts the human soul. According to Plato, Even though sensation and desire disrupt the human soul, they also allow the soul to restore reason, thus achieving the overall goodness. The diseases of the human soul and body reflect the imperfect fate of humanity, and this is a necessary way to achieve the overall goodness. The reason why humans suffer from diseases is due to the excess and lack of the four elements. Element traces belong to the category of necessity, and there is no reason in these traces that persuades necessity. Plato uses the proportional method from a mathematical perspective, and employs triangles to construct a complete set of elements from elemental traces, thus exhibiting rational characteristics within the four elements. By comparing the elements and their traces, the imperfection of the human body is precisely due to the divine purpose of achieving overall goodness rather than being caused by the aimless cause.” Although humans may suffer from diseases, they possess the fate of returning to health. According to the principle of the combination of reason and necessity, the way for humans to achieve health is for the soul and body to achieve proportional harmony. In the relationship between the soul and the body, any substance that is too powerful can lead to human diseases.

6. The Freedom Dimension of Fate: Breaking Free from Determinism

6.1. The Demiurge’s Freedom: A Critical Dimension of Cosmic Fate

In Plato’s cosmology, there is no one-sided eikos logos; it should contain eikos muthos in its definition. Otherwise, Plato’s cosmology would lack a theological dimension, leading to a misunderstanding of metaphorist interpretation. According to the principle of eikos logos, determinism is a fundamental characteristic of Platonic fate, and neither the cosmos nor humanity can escape fate. The thought of fate in this perspective is manifested in the fact that both the immortal cosmos and the mortal humans are determined by fate, which can be demonstrated from both positive and negative dimensions. Even if acknowledging the importance of determinism in Platonic cosmology, we cannot ignore the role of freedom10. Consequently, the hidden concept of fate in Plato’s Timaeus contains dimensions of determinism and freedom. Some scholars assert that the necessity of human freedom should be acknowledged, such as Morrow (1950, p. 150), Pearson (1986, p. 354), and Pears (2015, p. 93). Freedom is indispensable in the cosmos and a crux of fate. If there is no freedom in the cosmos, then it is impossible to manifest the demiurge’s goodness and lack of jealousy, nor can it achieve the overall goodness. Provided that there exists a cosmos lacking freedom, it means that the demiurge intentionally commits evil, which is contradictory to his nature of goodness. Only through freedom can humans establish their noble status among mortal beings, actively believe in gods, and obey the divine providence. Otherwise, humans will be no different from other mortal living bodies. It is necessary to clarify the free will to explore whether humans can break away from determinism.
According to the principle of eikos logos and eikos muthos, humans are immortal beings formed by imitating the cosmos, which reflects the similarity standard of eikos logos and embodies the significance of divine fate. Since the human generation should be placed in the dimension of cosmology, human freedom is also derived through the demiurge’s imitation of the cosmos. Even though the lesser gods create humans, the origin of cosmology still requires to be sought for human freedom. The primary dilemma we should address is how the demiurge embodies the importance of freedom in creating the cosmos. The cosmos is created by the demiurge; there are two candidates for the model used to create the cosmos, the eternal being and the generated being (Timaeus, 27d5–28b2). Because the demiurge has divine providence for the cosmos, he can choose a model for creating the cosmos. The demiurge can use the eternal being or the generated being as a model, we can even consider this as the demiurge’s free will. Although not as omnipotent as the Christian God, the demiurge still has the ability to choose the model. The pivotal difference between the demiurge and God is whether necessity is required as an auxiliary cause. The cosmos is the demiurge’s product; whether it is perfect or imperfect, it is the result of the demiurge’s free choice, and hence, he is responsible for the result of his choice. Nonetheless, it is imperative to emphasize that even though the demiurge can choose which model to use in creating the cosmos, he cannot make an actual choice (Johansen 2005, p. 73). The demiurge has the capacity to choose which model to use, but this capacity is never indeed applied in actuality. Although the demiurge can choose eternal beings or generated beings as models, he must choose eternal beings and cannot choose generated beings. The demiurge has “free will” but does not make real choices because the demiurge is good and without jealousy. His actions in creating the cosmos are all for a divine purpose, so he cannot deliberately create an imperfect cosmos based on the model of the generated beings; otherwise, it will contradict his goodness. Therefore, the demiurge must choose eternal beings as models and create the most perfect cosmos among all possible situations.

6.2. Potentiality and Actuality: The Free Dimension of Human Fate in the Cosmos

Although the mortal living bodies in the cosmos contain humans, beasts, and plants, Plato emphasizes that we should focus on humans, so he briefly mentions other mortal living bodies (Timaeus, 90e1–3). According to the principle of eikos logos, mortal humans imitate the structure of the cosmos and the free will11 of the demiurge to create the cosmos. The active imitation of the demiurge’s process of creating the cosmos reflects the freedom in human fate, as humans can choose to imitate the demiurge’s creation behavior. The demiurge promulgates the laws of fate for humanity, the most crucial of which is to set the fate of reincarnation for humanity:
If a person lived a good life throughout his time, he would return to his dwelling place in his companion star to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character. However, if he failed, he would be born a second time as a woman. Moreover, even if he still could not refrain from wickedness, he would be changed again, this time into some wild animal resembling the wicked character he had acquired.
ὧν εἰ μὲν κρατήσοιεν, δίκῃ βιώσοιντο, κρατηθέντες δὲ ἀδικίᾳ. καὶ ὁ μὲν εὖ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ συνήθη ἕξοι, σφαλεὶς δὲ τούτων εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ. δευτέρᾳ γενέσει μεταβαλοῖ: μὴ παυόμενός τε ἐν τούτοις ἔτι κακίας, τρόπον ὃν κακύνοιτο, κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως εἴς τινα τοιαύτην ἀεὶ μεταβαλοῖ θήρειον φύσιν, ἀλλάττων τε οὐ πρότερον πόνων λήξοι
(Timaeus, 42b2-c3).
According to the demiurge’s arrangement for human reincarnation, if a man cannot overcome the disturbance of sensation and emotion through reason, he will be reincarnated as a woman in the next life. If a woman cannot overcome her physical desires with reason, she will be reborn as a beast in the next life. For this process of human reincarnation, it exhibits the characteristic of determinism endowed to humans by the demiurge because the hierarchical structures from man to woman, from woman to beast, have been determined, so we cannot change the order of reincarnation. This reincarnation process is only a law of fate bestowed by the demiurge and does not necessarily mean the fall of humanity in actuality. The demiurge and the lesser gods only offer the possibility of corruption in human reincarnation. This indicates that in Plato’s cosmology, human freedom is possible and necessary. According to the demiurge’s arrangement of human reincarnation fate, we should acknowledge that besides determinism, there is a possibility for human freedom. Humans can choose to use reason to restrain the disturbance of sensation and emotion, and thus return to the divine celestial body to live a life of happiness. Human beings can also choose to let their sensation and emotion disturb their souls, becoming the slaves of desire, leading to an endless outcome of depraved reincarnation. Plato’s exposition on human learning also proves the necessary fate (Timaeus, 90b–d). If humans are always addicted to their desires and competitiveness, it will be a great disaster for humanity. Humans have the freedom to do so, but it will lead to their tragic fate. For Plato, if humans choose to learn wisdom, they will obtain divine providence bestowed by the demiurge, which is the proper realization of free choice. Therefore, whether humans are driven by their desires or actively learn wisdom depends on their freedom.
Although we recognize that humans can make free choices in their fate bestowed by the cosmos, human freedom can only be determined within the scope of potential capacities, while in actuality, human beings never make real choices. Otherwise, it would be a departure from the cosmological premise. In creating the cosmos, the demiurge can choose eternal or generated beings as models. The demiurge’s freedom, however, does not contain actual choice because the demiurge’s goodness and lack of jealousy indicate that he will choose eternal beings as models; otherwise, it will contradict his goodness. Supposing that we use the generated being as a model, we cannot obtain the divine providence, let alone create a perfect cosmos. Following the fundamental principles of eikos logos, although human destiny contains freedom, humans have no real choice. Plato follows the fundamental position of Socratic ethics, believing that no one would intentionally do evil. Humans do not take the initiative to do evil, because they imitate the laws of the cosmos’ motion. Thus, humans regard goodness as their essential purpose. There is no such thing as actively doing evil for humans, for any evil behavior stems from ignorance (Timaeus, 86d1–3). For example, if choosing option A leads to good outcomes and option B leads to evil outcomes, then even if a person has the freedom to choose, they will choose the first option because human nature is good. If humans intentionally do evil, human ethics will be disconnected from Plato’s cosmology. Although humans can choose in the cosmos, knowledgeable individuals do not make real choices. Freedom is an essential human capacity, but it is never genuinely actualized.

7. Conclusions

In the Timaeus’ cosmology, Plato outlines a pattern of creation of the cosmos. Plato’s cosmology is crucial in ancient Greek astronomy and has a profound impact on the Stoic school (Boys-Stones 2017, pp. 141–61). The demiurge creates a perfect cosmos by using eidos as a model and necessity as an auxiliary cause. From a macro perspective, the cosmos is composed of a cosmic soul and a cosmic body, and in order to imitate the eternity of forms, the demiurge creates time for the cosmos. The demiurge does not create mortal humans but entrusts this task to the lesser gods. Humanity is a perfect example of the combination of reason and necessity. Although sensation and emotion can disturb the soul, reason will ultimately restrain these irrational capacities and ultimately achieve true happiness. Regarding Plato’s cosmology, we cannot ignore the hidden concept of fate, which embodies the crucial significance of fate in both the demiurge’s creation of the cosmos and the lesser gods’ creation of mortal humans. According to the principle of eikos logos in the Timaeus, fate is also an important link between cosmology and human ethics. Hence, the Timaeus’ hidden fate runs through the entire Platonic cosmology. However, even if we uncover the thought of fate in the Timaeus, we must acknowledge this argument’s speculative and uncertain nature and not consider it a definitive conclusion. The fate in the Timaeus is not based on Aristotelian natural teleology but on the divine teleology of deity, so fate has theological and religious characteristics. Concerning the essence of Plato’s cosmology of fate, we should recognize not only its characteristic of determinism but also that free will is the crucial essence of fate.

Funding

This research was funded by National Social Science Fund of China, grant number 24FZXB045.

Data Availability Statement

Data are contained within the article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Notes

1
Plato discusses the concept of fate in multiple works, such as Crito, 43c1–2, 45c–e, and 46b3–5, Phaedo, 84e2–5, 95b1–5, 113e2–5, and 115a2–4, Cratylus, 398a–b, Theaetutus, 188c–d, Philebus, 23a1–5, Symposium, 193b1–2 and 208a1–3, Phaedrus, 248e3–5 and 255b1–2, Alcibiades, 132a–b, Gorgias, 512e3–4 and 525a4–5, Republic, 365a1–2, 379d–e, 387d3–5, 388d1–2, 399b1–2, 574b1–5, 617b–c, and 620e1–2, and Laws, 799b2–3, 807a–b, 870e2–4, 870e1–5, 873c2–3, 903e1, 918e2–3, 958a1–2, 960c–d, and 982c–d.
2
There is controversy in academia regarding the Timaeus’ position in Plato’s dialogues, whether it belongs to the middle or later dialogues. Owen analyzes from the perspectives of rhythm, form, and vocabulary and maintains that the Timaeus should not belong to Plato’s later dialogues but to his middle dialogues (Owen 1953, pp. 79–95). Similarly, scholars represented by Hartmann analyze the Timaeus from a rhetorical perspective (Hartmann 2021, pp. 22–48). Owen also supports his assertion through an ideological analysis of the text. Firstly, the Parmenides criticizes Plato’s concept of “participation” because it leads to infinite regression, so the Timaeus’ creation should be before the Parmenides. The Timaeus still uses the distinction between “eternal being” and “generated being”, but the Theaetetus and the Sophists reject this “two worlds” division, so the Timaeus should be before the Theaetetus and the Sophists. Accordingly, the Timaeus belongs to Plato’s mid-term work, not his later work (Owen 1953, pp. 79–95). Cherniss opposes Owen’s classification method and asserts that the Timaeus cannot be Plato’s mid-term dialogue but must be the later dialogue. Cherniss points out that Owen uses prosody to analyze the Timaeus, which contradicts Plato’s methodology. The concepts of “participation” and “two worlds” cannot serve as criteria for determining the order of Plato’s writings. Therefore, in Cherniss’ perspective, The Parmenides, the Cratylus, and the Theaetetus should be before the Timaeus, and there is no difference in the Timaeus’ later dialogues with Plato (Cherniss 1957, pp. 225–66).
3
With Alexander, Scholars represented by Boodin and Hersbell conduct an in-depth analysis of the philosophical origins of cosmology in the Timaeus. In Alexander’s viewpoint, the mathematical methods in the Timaeus are directly derived from Pythagoras, as Plato created the cosmos based on the pattern of mathematics. In addition, the proportion method used in the Timaeus is the method of the demiurge, creating an immortal cosmos and the lesser gods creating mortal humans, which originated from Heraclitus. Plato’s cosmology should also be elucidated in the ethical dimension, and his concern for morality stems from Socrates (Alexander 1918, pp. 1–24). Boodin acknowledges that Anaxagoras influences the Timaeus’ cosmology. Anaxagoras holds that nous is the origin of the cosmos, which profoundly influences the theoretical construction of Plato’s cosmology, as Plato believes that nous is the crucial link in generating the cosmos. Boodin reminds us, however, that Anaxagoras’ nous cannot be wholly equated with the forms the Timaeus hopes to express, as Anaxagoras reduces nous to purely material elements (Boodin 1929, pp. 489–505). Hersbell analyzes explicitly the relationship between Empedocles and Plato. Although Empedocles’ four elements match the components that make up the cosmos in the Timaeus, there are differences in understanding the essence of the four primary bodies. Moreover, Heraclitus’ viewpoint on love and struggle does not directly influence Plato’s cosmology (Hersbell 1974, pp. 145–66).
4
The debate between literalist and metaphorist interpretations in academia is a key issue in studying Plato’s cosmology. Scholars such as Finkelberg, Dillon, and Carone assert the crucial significance of resolving this controversy to understand Plato’s cosmology. Finkelberg harbors the attitude that the debate between two interpretations has a long history in academia, with Aristotle representing the literalist interpretation and the Academy representing the metaphorical interpretation. Specifically, Finkelberg analyzes Plato’s cosmology using mathematical methods and the differences between temporality and non-temporality (Finkelberg 1996, pp. 391–409). Dillon maintains that there are numerous misinterpretations in the Timaeus’ commentaries, both intentionally and unintentionally, by ancient scholars. Starting from the debate between literalist and metaphorist interpretations, Dillon conducts a detailed textual revision of the Timaeus (Dillon 1989, pp. 50–72). Carone holds that both literalist and metaphorist interpretations are reasonable. Therefore, he proposes a compromise assertion, which explains the process of the demiurge’s creation from a literalist perspective and regards the demiurge’s creation as an ongoing process (Carone 2004, pp. 211–26).
5
The citations of the Timaeus in this article are from Zeyl’s English translation (Plato 2000).
6
Johansen explains the essence of truth from the myth of Atlantis. On the one hand, Johansen agrees that Atlantis is indeed a fabricated story, as it is impossible to verify whether the story of Atlantis has ever occurred in history. On the other hand, the so-called “real story” cannot be demonstrated as simple fiction. It should be understood as “another kind of truth.” The so-called truth aims to demonstrate how the demiurge acts, so it is important for us to clarify the significance of the demiurge’s actions (Johansen 2005, pp. 28, 67).
7
Plato makes two distinctions in the Timaeus, the first between eternal and generated beings. Eternal beings are invisible and intangible, belonging to things that can be attained through reason. Generated beings are visible and tangible and belong to beings that the sense-organs can perceive. The second is the distinction between the different ways of account, that is, the difference between the account of eternal beings and the account of generated beings. The description of eternal beings remains unchanged, while the account of generated beings follows the method of eikos logos (Timaeus, 28b–29b).
8
There is a conflict in the texts of the Timaeus and Theaetetus regarding the complete four elements and the flux of element traces: According to Theaetetus, all things are in the process of flux and, therefore, cannot be spoken of. Although the Timaeus acknowledges the flux state of element traces, Plato believes that element traces can be spoken of through “this such.” Gill criticizes Owen’s viewpoint; Owen holds that on the condition that the Timaeus’ creation time comes first, the contradiction between different texts regarding the conception of flux can be resolved. However, Gill thinks that this is not an appropriate solution (Gill 1987, pp. 34–53).
9
In Plato’s perspective, the standard of cosmos’ perfection requires that there must be mortal living bodies in the cosmos, such as humans, beasts, and plants. However, imperfect mortal beings in the cosmos cannot be created by the demiurge. Otherwise, it will destroy the demiurge’s goodness and lack of jealousy and lead to the equality of mortal humans and immortal gods in the hierarchy. This is unacceptable, as it would undermine the overall goodness of the cosmos, so the lesser gods accept the task given to them by the demiurge to create mortal beings. Once the demiurge entrusts the task of creating mortal beings to the lesser gods, he is not responsible for any evil in the cosmos.
10
Johansen provides a subtle explanation of the demiurge’s free will. According to Johansen’s opinion, in Plato’s cosmology, the demiurge can choose to use either the perfect or imperfect model; the latter belongs to the category of generated beings. From the generated cosmos, it can be inferred that the demiurge should choose the perfect model to create the cosmos, the eternal eidos. The eternal model has the characteristic of beauty, while the generated model lacks beauty compared to the former, so the generated being is created by imitating eidos (Johansen 2014, pp. 297–20).
11
Plato focuses on the discussion of fate and freedom in the Politicus. Although the Politicus and the Timaeus have different contexts, the Politicus still have important reference value for the Timaeus. Please refer to the Politicus 272e: τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης͵ οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος͵ εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη͵ τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία; 273b: τὸν εἰωθότα δρόμον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατακοσμούμενος ᾔει͵ ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ κράτος ἔχων αὐτὸς τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ͵ τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν; 273d: προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ λήθης ἐγγιγνομένης ἐν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον καὶ δυναστεύει τὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἀναρμοστίας πάθος; 273e: ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα πόντον δύῃ; 273e: κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων ἀπεργάζεται.

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Zhao, Q. An Exploration of Fate in Plato’s Theology: Focusing on the Interpretation of the Timaeus’ Cosmology. Religions 2025, 16, 495. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040495

AMA Style

Zhao Q. An Exploration of Fate in Plato’s Theology: Focusing on the Interpretation of the Timaeus’ Cosmology. Religions. 2025; 16(4):495. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040495

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Zhao, Qi. 2025. "An Exploration of Fate in Plato’s Theology: Focusing on the Interpretation of the Timaeus’ Cosmology" Religions 16, no. 4: 495. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040495

APA Style

Zhao, Q. (2025). An Exploration of Fate in Plato’s Theology: Focusing on the Interpretation of the Timaeus’ Cosmology. Religions, 16(4), 495. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040495

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