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Article

Wang Fuzhi on the Problem of Heaven and Human in the Religious Tradition of Confucianism

1
Institute of Modern Chinese Thought & Culture, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China
2
Ma Yifu Academy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Religions 2025, 16(3), 393; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030393
Submission received: 13 February 2025 / Revised: 14 March 2025 / Accepted: 14 March 2025 / Published: 20 March 2025

Abstract

:
Although Wang Fuzhi is considered an important summarizer of Song–Ming Neo-Confucianism, his criticism of the traditional relationship between Heaven and human (tian ren guan xi 天人关系), especially the ensuing religious implications, has not been thoroughly examined. This essay aims to illustrate his reconstruction of Confucianism’s Heaven–human relationship and its ideal this-worldly religious way of life. He believed that Confucianism’s theory of human nature was based on the vision of man and that it was wrong to establish a static theory of human nature with the perspective of Heaven. The Heaven–human relationship is similar to that between father and son, which is different in form and separate in essence (xing yi zhi li 形异质离) and can only be balanced in a dynamic relationship. In addition, he pointed out that the traditional static relationship would lead to hypocrisy and asserted that this tendency might destroy this-worldly life of Confucianism. He attempted to integrate the different degrees of understanding of the Heaven–human relationship into a holistic and historical way of life through the Confucian classics. This-worldly life is continually aware of its own ephemerality through the feeling of the Heaven–human relationship as well as the transmission of experience. The historical life of a particular this-worldly religion is thus established.

1. Introduction

Although Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619 CE–1692 CE) has been recognized as one of the most important summarizers of Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism, his reconstruction of the Confucian relationship between Heaven and human (tianren 天人), especially his religious intentions, has received little attention in the many existing studies. Almost all studies of Wang Fuzhi note his emphasis on human (ren 人). Xiao Jiefu 萧萐父 pointed out that Wang Fuzhi’s concept of Heaven (tian 天) has five meanings and has historical–philosophical significance (Xiao and Xu 2002, pp. 265–75). Zeng Zhaoxu 曾昭旭 also noticed that Wang Fuzhi’s discussion of Heaven was always in the context of the relationship between human (ren 人) and things (wu 物) (Zeng 2008, pp. 354–61). However, these studies usually focus only on conceptual relationships, ignoring the fact that Wang Fuzhi’s elaboration was intended to re-establish a Confucian order of life after the fall of the Ming dynasty.
This essay aims to understand Wang Fuzhi’s views in the context of the development of the relationship between Heaven and human in Neo-Confucianism, and in particular the source of his position: a critique of the views of the Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130 CE–1200 CE) school. Max Weber had the static view that “Confucianism exclusively represented an innerworldly morality of laymen” (Weber 1951, p. 152), and that all aspects of it “remained of a this-worldly turn of mind” (Weber 1951, p. 144). This view may not be entirely consistent, but it is largely an impression of Neo-Confucianism, especially Zhu Xi’s school, which is usually regarded as having a naturalistic type of continuous relationship between Heaven and human. Wang Fuzhi criticized the radical transformation of Confucianism into a religion of this-world. The multilayered distinction of Heaven guarantees the possibility that Heaven and human, who are in the same world, will remain in conflict in a dynamic and interactive relationship. He tried to re-establish a kind of reverence for the orderliness of Heaven, and on this basis returned to the ethical this-worldly life of Confucianism. It is only from a historical perspective that Confucianism, as a this-worldly religion, can establish this kind of relationship with a clear boundary.

2. Non-Naturalism: Wang Fuzhi’s Critique of Zhu Xi’s School of the Relationship Between Heaven and Human

Wang Fuzhi’s criticism of the traditional Neo-Confucian relationship between Heaven and human was mainly due to his dissatisfaction with the political situation at the end of the Ming Dynasty. He argues that the fall of the Ming dynasty was directly related to the partisan rivalries of the government. The confrontation of value norms within the bureaucracy did not resort to objective reality or Heaven, and flexible standards made the argument itself an order. Wang Fuzhi believed that this would herald a purely secularized society, which would be not only mark a change of dynasty but also a collapse of the Confucian order of life. The critique of the status quo implied a reconstruction of the understanding of the Heaven in Confucianism, that is, a critique of the school of Zhu Xi as an official ideology.
Generally speaking, the formalization of the status of the Four Books of Confucianism is regarded as a sign of the establishment of Zhu Xi’s doctrines and an important feature of Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism.1 In his interpretation of the first sentence of The Doctrine of Mean (zhongyong 中庸),2 Zhu Xi said:
问:“天命之谓性,此只是从原头说否?”曰:“万物皆只同这一个原头,圣人所以尽己之性,则能尽人之性,由其同一原故也。”
Asking: “What Heaven (tian 天) commands (ming 命) is called natural tendencies(xing 性) (It can also be translated as “Original Nature”). Is this only from the original?” Saying: “All things have this same original. The reason why sages can perfect the natural tendencies of others by perfecting their own natural tendencies is because there is the same original.”
率,非人率之也。伊川解“率”亦只训循。
Drawing out (these natural tendencies) is not drawn out by human beings. Yi Chuan 伊川 (1033 CE–1107 CE) also explained drawing out 率 with following 循.
循万物自然之性之谓道。
Following the natural tendencies of all things is called the proper way (dao 道).
人与物之性皆同,故循人之性则为人之道。循牛马之性,则为牛马之道。若不循其性,令马耕牛驰,则失其性,而非牛马之道。
The natural tendencies of human and things are the same. So, if following human’s natural tendencies, there is the human’s proper way (dao 道). If following oxen and horses’ natural tendencies, there is the oxen and horses’ proper way (dao 道). If not following their natural tendencies, and letting the horses plow (the ground) and the oxen run, losing their natural tendencies is not the oxen and horses’ proper way (dao 道).
性不容修,修是揠苗,道亦是自然之理,圣人于中为之品节以教人耳。
The natural tendencies cannot be improved upon. Improving upon is like pulling the seedling upwards. Dao 道 is also the regularity (li 理) of nature. The sages marked grades in it to educate human beings.
问:”修道之谓教,专就人事上言否?” 曰:”就物上亦有品节……使万物各得其所,亦所谓教也。”
Asking: ”Improving upon Dao道 is called education (jiao 教) which is just talking about human, isn’t it.” Saying: ”Things also have their own grades. To make things each conform to their grade is also education (jiao 教).”
Zhu Xi attempted to distinguish between natural tendencies (xing 性), the proper way (dao 道), and education (jiao 教) as a two-tiered process, where natural tendencies and the proper way are common to all human and things, and education is the understanding and application by the sages. On the one hand, natural tendencies are the content given to all things by the commands from Heaven 天命, and there is no difference between human beings and other things in terms of their origin. “Perfecting the natural tendencies of human, perfecting the natural tendencies of things, the natural tendencies are the same, but human and things are endowed with different qi 气” (尽人性,尽物性,性只一般,人物气禀不同) (Zhu 2002, book 16, p. 2115). The different characteristics exhibited by human and things are only the degree to which qi气 obscures the natural tendencies. Just to follow your natural tendencies and live naturally is the proper way. In this respect, there is also no essential difference between humans and things. The whole process from the commands from Heaven to Dao is a natural condition common to all. That’s why he said, “The commands from Heaven and the proper way drawing out these natural tendencies are both the nature of regularity (li 理) which is same that human and things get from (Heaven)” (盖天命之性,率性之道,皆理之自然,人物之所同得者也) (Zhu 2002, book 6, p. 551).
On the other hand, the establishment of education (jiao 教) requires the sages to have full knowledge of the natural tendencies (xing 性) and the proper way (dao 道), and to use it as a criterion to make the order of human life conform to the requirements of the commands from Heaven. Education (jiao 教) is not a natural process of Heaven but a claim derived from human’s understanding of Heaven and the process of attuning to it, and is therefore a special process belonging to human. In this view, the process of ordering things is also subordinate to human.
His students used to ask him, “drawing out these natural tendencies is called the proper way which is for human and things together. So improving upon this way is called education which is also for human and things together. This suggests that the education of the sages was more than just human ethics, and that delineating hierarchies is valid for things, right?” (率性之谓道,通人、物而言,则修道之谓教,亦通人、物。……此是圣人教化不特在人伦上,品节防范而及于物否?) And he said, “This is also true, and so it is called perfecting the natural tendencies of things. But it is more detailed for human and less for things. More about human than things” (也是如此,所以谓之‘尽物之性’。但于人较详,于物较略。于人较多,于物较少) (Zhu 2002, book 16, p. 2022).
This means that the sages’ establishment is valid not only for human but also for things, except that the focus is on the ethical order of human. Zhu Xi attempted to take Heaven as the common metaphysical origin of human and things, while at the same time dividing the special realm of man with education (jiao 教), thus creating the potential for conflict between Heaven and human nature. However, he also tried to present the sage as a substitute for Heaven, at least in the human realm, where the sage’s ordering of human and things is universal. This led to the symbols of the sage becoming too authoritative. Ren Jiyu 任继愈 had already noted that although Neo-Confucianism did not talk about leaving the world and did not advocate an afterlife kingdom of Heaven, it pursued the subjective spiritual state of the sages as an otherworldly world, which was identical to Zen’s advocacy of attaining Buddhahood in the midst of the earthly world (Ren 1980, p. 68). Although the sages may not be an otherworldly world, when they become the harmonious transition between Heaven and human, the tension between Heaven and human can be completely overcome.
The contradiction in Zhu Xi’s views suggested that he was still in a state of indecision. But his school developed a clearer attitude after his death. They shifted their focus from education (jiao 教) to the proper way (dao 道), which in turn led to a naturalistic view of Heaven and human as completely intertwined. Rao Shuangfeng 饶双峰 (1193 CE–1264 CE) said, “Among the natural tendencies (xing 性), the proper way (dao 道) and education (jiao 教), the word Dao is the most important. The book Zhongyong 中庸 is largely intended to explain the Dao” (性道教,道字重。《中庸》一书,大抵说道) (Hu et al. 2009, p. 135). Chen Dong 陈栋 (around 1200 CE) said, “The word Dao 道 includes the natural tendencies (xing 性) upwards and education (jiao 教) downwards, and tracing its origin, it must be returned to commands of Heaven” (‘道’字上包‘性’字,下包‘教’字,推其本原,必归之天命) (Hu et al. 2009, p. 136). The similar view3 focuses on the fact that Dao is the most important part. By emphasising Dao, a continuity can be established from the commands of Heaven to the establishment of education. Education (jiao 教) is seen as a natural unfolding of the Dao of human, which is already contained in natural tendencies. As a result, Heaven and human become an inseparable whole, and there is no order beyond naturalism.
On this basis, Weber’s following assessment of ancient China can be accurate. “Confucianism, we have seen was (in intent) a rational ethic which reduced tension with the world to an absolute minimum. This was true of its religious depreciation as well as its practical rejection. The world was the best of all possible worlds; human nature was disposed to the ethically good” (Weber 1951, p. 227).
Weber’s view outlines the basic image of Confucianism from a religious perspective. However, Puett had already noted that “(Weber thinks) Heaven is the source of ideals that conflict with the mundane happenings of this world”, but he ignores the possibility that “(Heaven) is potentially in conflict with the proper order of man” (Puett 2002, p. 143). However, we may admit that Confucianism “remained of a this-worldly turn of mind. This attitude was far stronger and more principled than is usually the rule” (Weber 1951, p. 144). Tu Weiming also noted that Weber’s “mode of analysis is basically an exclusionary dichotomy based on the development of Jewish and Christian culture, which is very different from the non-exclusionary dichotomy in Chinese culture” (Du 1996, p. 66). In this tradition, the conflict between Heaven and this world may not be strong. As we saw in Zhu Xi’s view, the difference between the Dao and education may delimit a range for the human. He tried to create an artificial distance between Heaven and man to establish differences. So, the real problem is that even as a religion in this world, Confucianism still tries to maintain the conflict between Heaven and human nature, which is not just naturally harmonious.
What Wang Fuzhi tried to reveal was the possibility of Confucianism in the conflict between Heaven and human nature. He argued that, while in terms of the order of the text, “the text went from the commands from Heaven to education, based on the order of regularity (li 理)” (文本字天命说到教,顺理而言之), but the purpose of writing The Doctrine of Mean (zhongyong 中庸) was that “the reasoning from education upward to the Dao and Heaven was used to show that the education of improving upon the proper way relied on the natural tendencies, and the natural tendencies were the commands given to man by Heaven as Heaven. Therefore, the person who try to improving upon the proper way 修道者 must not seek to conform to Dao in things only, but must quietly nurture to realize the unceasing Cheng 诚 of Heaven, and move to examine the mechanism of the operation of Heaven” (则自教推原道天上去,以明修道之教,本以率性,而所率之性,乃天之所以为天而命乎人者,故修道者不可但于事上求合于道,必静存以体天理不息之诚,动察以谨天理流行之机也) (F. Wang 2011, book 6, pp. 124–25).
Although natural tendencies, Dao, and education can all be traced back to Heaven, Heaven is in a state of ceaseless change, and man cannot understand Heaven apart from human commands 命. If from the perspective of Heaven, commands are the way in which Heaven reveals itself, not exclusively to man, but openly and unfinishedly to all beings. However, from the human perspective, traceability can only stop at natural tendencies, and the changes in the transcendent Heaven can only be known to exist in an indirect way, not clearly cognised.
More directly, Wang Fuzhi argued that what The Doctrine of Mean discussed was only the position of man. The original meaning of The Doctrine of Mean is “just talking about human’s natural tendencies, but not talking about the natural tendencies of things. The natural tendencies of things have no five ethical relationships, such as father and son, king and minister, which can be called the birth from Heaven 天生, and cannot be called the commands from Heaven” (止说人性,何曾说到物性上。物之性却无父子君臣等五伦,可谓之天生,不可谓之天命) (F. Wang 2011, book 6, p. 125) The commands from Heaven regulates the ethical order of human beings, while the natural order of things does not belong to the commands. If the birth from Heaven 天生 is the perspective of the natural changes of Heaven, then the command from Heaven 天命 is a realm that belongs entirely to human beings. Perfecting the natural tendencies of things does not mean that things are in their natural state, but is related to the application of things by human beings. It implies that things are utilized to the fullest extent of their capabilities based on human purposes. “Why is it the natural tendencies of oxen and horses to plough or be ridden? This is the behaviour of man, not the commands of heaven” (牛马之性何尝要耕要乘? 此人为也,非天命也) (F. Wang 2011, book 6, pp. 125–26). The ability of the oxen to plow and the horse to be ridden are not innate but are the development and expansion of their talents and the activation of their latent possibilities by human.
Thus, Wang Fuzhi actually believed that the continuity between Heaven and man in Neo-Confucianism was only a feeling based on the perspective of man. The holistic and ever-changing Heaven of Heaven 天之天 consists of the Heaven of human 人之天, which is the root of natural tendencies, Dao, and education (jiao 教), and the Heaven of things 物之天, which is the natural order of things.4 Heaven of Heaven can only be incompletely manifested in both the human and things’ realm, and is the source of the possibilities that allow all things to continually expand their realm. By distinguishing between the different levels of Heaven, Wang Fuzhi was able to expand the single linear relationship between Heaven and human nature in Confucianism. Although both Heaven and man are this-worldly, there is a non-negligible boundary between Heaven and man due to the difference in the Being’s field of vision, which maintains the possibility of conflict between Heaven and man. The next question is how the boundary between Heaven and man is determined and how the boundary has influenced the this-worldly lifestyle of Confucianism.

3. Different in Form and Separate in Essence: Separation and Connection of Heaven and Human Nature

Zhu Xi’s school regarded Heaven as the common root of all things. The difference between human beings, things, and Heaven as the root is only the degree of qi 气 endowment. Heaven and human beings are initially homogeneous, but the endowment of qi and the ensuing contamination of various this-worldly activities make human beings different from Heaven. As a religion, therefore, the practice of Neo-Confucianism was concerned with the regulation of secularized life. The organization of ethical life implies the purification of qi, which is also equivalent to the return of man to his natural condition, equal to Heaven.
However, Wang Fuzhi argued that not only are Heaven and man not homogeneous, but they cannot be reduced to a traceable and continuous relationship. He said:
天之化裁人,终古而不测其妙;人之裁成天,终古而不代其工。天降之衷,人修之道:在天有阴阳,在人有仁义;在天有五辰,在人有五官;形异质离,不可强而合焉。所谓肖子者,安能父步亦步,父趋亦趋哉?父与子异形离质,而所继者惟志。天与人异形离质,而所继者惟道也。天之聪明则无极矣,天之明威则无常矣。从其无极而步趋之,是夸父之逐日,徒劳而速敝也。从其无常而步趋之,是刻舷之求剑,惽不知其已移也。
Heaven changes and tailors man, (man) can never comprehend its marvels and man’s tailoring of heaven, (heaven) can never replace its neatness. The Zhong 衷 from heaven is the Dao improved upon by man: the yin and yang 阴阳 of heaven are man’s benevolence and righteousness (renyi 仁义); the five stars (wucheng 五辰) of heaven are man’s five senses (wuguan 五官) which are all different in form and separate in essence 形异质离 and cannot be forced into one. How can a filial child walk in his father’s footprints and trot after him? The Father and the Son are different in form and separate in essence, and the only thing that links them is Will (zhi 志). Heaven and man are different in form and separate in essence, and the only thing that links them is Dao 道. The wisdom of heaven is Infinite 无极, and the power of heaven has no regularity 无常. Walking in footprints by following the Infinite is like Qua Fu chasing the sun 夸父逐日, futile and rapidly withering away. Walking in footprints by following no regularity is like looking for the sword (which has fallen into the water) according to the engraving on the side of the ship, confused and unaware that it has moved.
On the one hand, Heaven and man are two separate realms. The yin and yang of Heaven correspond to benevolence and righteousness of man, and the five stars correspond to the five senses of man. They are not only different in form but also separate in essence and cannot be forcibly integrated together. Heaven and man are like father and son. Although the Son partakes of life from the Father, he is already a separate and heterogeneous individual, an independent new subject. Therefore, the Son’s imitation of the Father cannot be identical. Perfectly consistent imitation not only makes it impossible to reach the realm of the Heavens but also leads man into obsession with that possibility, away from the realm of man’s own realm. Not to mention the fact that Heaven’s limitless wisdom and changes could not be imitated from the beginning.
On the other hand, Heaven and man are linked as a whole in a special way. Father and Son cannot be treated as one subject, but they belong to an ethical community after all. They are connected as a whole by Zhi 志 (the orientation of the heart and mind), just as Heaven and man are connected as a whole by Dao (drawing out natural tendencies). It is not in the imitation of a specific action but in the mutual attunement of the heart and the understanding of ethical relationships that the sense of community is established. Similarly, it is also in the process of drawing out these natural tendencies that the heterogeneous Heaven and man can establish wholeness. The key to eliminating heterogeneity is man’s awareness and expansion of his own natural tendencies, not just imitation of Heaven.
In this view, the return to the state of nature or purification is no longer the Confucian way of life. Drawing out natural tendencies is man’s understanding and application of things, as well as the enrichment of the Heavens. Wang Fuzhi said:
天者自然之化,人者因功、趣,差等而达权者也。既已为人,不得而不人;络马穿牛,不容已则不已之,无不可为也。而不以马之宜络,遂络其牛;牛之须穿,并穿其马;则虽人而不灭天。
Heaven is a natural change; man is a flexible and changing (being) because of different abilities 功 and interests 趣. Since (we) are already human beings, (we) have to live in a human way. Put a halter on a horse and put an iron ring through a oxen’s (nose) 络马穿牛. (Human’s natural tendencies) doesn’t allow it to stop so that it cannot stop and there’s nothing you can’t do. But don’t put halters on oxen just because horses are fit to be haltered, and don’t put iron rings through a horses’ (nose) just because oxen need them through (nose). Although it is human (actions) it does not eliminate heaven.
The natural tendency of man is to stimulate the possibilities that things have in themselves, according to man’s claims. Because horses are good at running, men put halters on them, and because oxen are good at plowing, men put nose rings on them. Wang Fuzhi tried to interpret the drawing out of natural tendencies as man’s transformation and use of things, even though such use is based on the possibilities offered by Heaven. A common criticism is that this seems to be anthropocentrism from a utilitarian perspective (Tan 2017, pp. 49–51). We must recognize that human-centeredness is a fundamental position in the Confucian tradition. This is not substantially different in Wang Fuzhi or in the various schools of Confucianism. The Zhu Xi school believed that man and Heaven were the same in the beginning, so the Mandate of Heaven could be approximated as equivalent to the sage’s understanding of Heaven. In the beginning, natural tendencies were perfectly populated, so the goal was to return to a natural state. However, it is impossible to ask man to act according to an objective or panoramic perspective as Heaven does. In the reality of ethical life, planning according to this model must require a trade-off between Heaven and man. The “return to nature” is practically unrestricted, because human nature is complete from the beginning, and all actions can be interpreted, directly or indirectly, as part of human nature.
But as far as Wang Fuzhi’s point of view is concerned, he seems to accept this position only in a more fundamental sense. That man can only act from his own perspective is not only a constraint but a necessary starting point. Consistency in the original does not mean that man can return to the original state. The process of trying to return is more important than the result of the return. The Heavens, as a background, or the natural tendencies of things, become objective constraints. Thus, human-centered observation is only part of a larger image. The point is that the content of natural tendencies is not already populated, it is just a possibility. “Nature” does not present a state of harmony in which all things do not interfere with each other, but a multitude of possibilities and conflicts. Wang Fuzhi said:
自然者,无必然也。以其必然,强其不然,则违其自然者多矣。或水或陆,或柤棃或橘柚,或颦或笑,或古或今,或周或鲁,各因人、因天、因物,而皆其自然。
Nature is the absence of inevitability. To force (things) to be what they are not because of (their) inevitability is very contrary to (their) natural condition. Some (live in) water, some (live on) land. Some are rutabagas or pears, some are oranges or grapefruit. Some frown, some smile. Some (belong to) ancient times, some to the present. Some (belonged) to the state of Zhou 周 and some to the state of Lu 鲁. Each is (different) because of man or heaven or things, but all are natural to them.
Nature is a rejection of the idea of inevitability. Whatever the character of things is, it is not contrary to their nature to play with their possibilities. There is no inevitable correlation being predetermined. Heaven, as a natural change, simply endows all things with their own unique characteristics. In mutual chance contact, different natural tendencies exert different influences, producing all kinds of unpredictable changes. Heaven, as a background, is a collection of infinite possibilities. On the one hand, the application of man to things is also a part of the possibilities from the perspective of Heaven and does not go beyond the realm of Heaven. On the other hand, from the perspective of man, man cannot go against and must rely on the natural tendencies of things for expansion. Man should inspire the speed of the horse and the endurance of the ox, not reverse it. Therefore, the process of drawing out natural tendencies not only requires Heaven as a background but also cannot be beyond the naturalness of things. It is precisely because of the two-way constraint that the anthropocentric stance of Confucianism, from Wang Fuzhi’s point of view, is not unlimited.
More importantly, Wang Fuzhi’s “naturalism” gives a special status to human beings. He said, “Man is the beginning 绪 of heaven. The silk threads 绪 of heaven are hang down and shown to man, waiting for man’s action, so that man’s actions are the changes of heaven” (人者,天之绪也。天之绪显垂于人,待人以行,故人之为,天之化也) (F. Wang 2011, book 3, p. 313). Human action is one of the ways in which the changes of Heaven are presented. The human control of things is also the activation of the possibilities of each, when the human being draws out natural tendencies according to his or her own aspirations, and together they form a part of nature. The true father–son type of relationship constituted by Heaven and man is a similarity in the way of being. The Heavens are a field of infinite possibilities, and there are infinite ways of stimulating these possibilities. The human being has the most special natural tendencies of them all, that is, to be active in stimulating possibilities rather than passive in adapting to them. However, this abililty can only proceed according to human perception and claims, and cannot transcend the realm of man. This is the boundary between Heaven and man.
According to Wang Fuzhi’s understanding, the Confucian relationship between Heaven and man does not set a rule of imitation. Heaven is the infinity that man always tries to reach but is hard to reach, and man is one of the ways of expanding the nature of Heaven. Their relationship cannot be placed in a static framework or even summarized in precise logic. Inevitability is excluded from the beginning from the changes of Heaven, and man is but the most peculiar presentation of the changes. From a dynamic point of view, there is a special rule linking Heaven and man, so that each of them does not exceed its own realm and becomes an organic whole. Confucianism refers to this process as“drawing out natural tendencies”. The Dao is“the proper way“ and the only way to connect Heaven and man. According to Xiao Jiefu, the meaning of Dao for man must be expressed through human social life and can only be grasped by man in accordance with practical needs (Xiao 1993, p. 67). In other words, man’s understanding of the Commands of Heaven (natural tendencies 性) is gradually enriched through the process of drawing out these natural tendencies (Dao 道), which is a dynamic and continuous process.
So Wang Fuzhi could say, “What Heaven commands (ming 命) is called natural tendencies (xing 性), and natural tendencies are received and generated every day” (天命之谓性,性日受则性日生矣) (F. Wang 2011, book 2, p. 301). This view is very different from the basic position of Zhu Xi’s school. They regarded static, perfect Original Nature as the starting point, and all efforts of Confucianism were aimed at purifying the Physical Nature (气质之性) and approaching the original nature. If natural tendencies are always in growth, then the organization of Confucianism, the goals of education, and the resulting social patterns will become different.
Weber summarizes the goal of traditional Confucian education as “to awaken charisma” (Weber 1951, pp. 119–20). The emperor, as the biggest charisma, monopolized the interpretation of Heaven, and this religious model led to the strengthening of secular power and the complete secularization of the order of life. The underlying premise of this view is that human natural tendencies were fully granted in the beginning and that emperors or sages are more similar to Heaven compared to ordinary people. Since the traditional Confucian style of practice is one of purification and imitation, it becomes a natural choice to keep imitating towards a more original state. A gradient of religious imitation was established. At the same time, the pattern of political power was similarly modeled after this pattern. Although nominally there was still Heaven as a constraint, in practice, imitation of authority became the main condition of secular life. With the exception of the emperors, everyone’s imitative relationship with Heaven was indirect. At the local level of society, the authority of Confucianism was the “emperor”. As discussed earlier, although the Zhu Xi school attempted to establish the authority of heavenly order, the static theory of human nature inevitably led to the concentration of interpretive power in the “charisma”. The actual course of history was not consistent with their vision. By the end of the Ming Dynasty, the Neo-Confucian order became dogmatic, and the vertical centralization of power and the confrontation between different power systems put the survival of Confucianism in crisis. The overemphasis on the authority of Heaven instead led to the hiding of Heaven, and man became the center of the image.
However, Wang Fuzhi limited man’s borderless activities through the dynamic structure of Heaven and man. The natural tendencies of man are always in an unfinished state and cannot be equated with Heaven. Not only are Heaven and man similar in nature to the Father and the Son, different in form and separate in essence, but they cannot be made one through retrospection. The Confucian way of life is not to “awaken charisma”, but to practice perpetually with a view to the future. The orderliness of Heaven is not in direct conflict with worldly life but as a latent possibility governing human action.
But since Heaven can no longer serve directly as the source of ideals, it can only impose soft constraints on human action. A stronger threat than anthropocentrism is that indirect constraints are only an idealized scheme that may be worse than the traditional Neo-Confucian relationship between Heaven and human nature. There does not seem to be an exemplary order that can be a clear direction for the development of human nature. Although this relationship allows this-worldly life to still retain a connection to Heaven, how did the potential conflict affect the Confucian way of life? Or what kind of this-worldly life would result from this new structure of the relationship between Heaven and human nature, such that it could harmonize order and reality and give a proper place to the sage or the emperor? Wang Fuzhi offers a new possibility to Confucianism as a religion in this-worldly: a historical vision.

4. Historical Living: The This-Worldly Lifestyle of Confucianism

In the traditional Neo-Confucian view, the symbol of the “sages” this-worldly takes the place of Heaven and becomes the standard for all order. The importance of the sages is that they are a model that can be realized. The Confucian way of life is also an attempt to become a sage. In Wang Fuzhi’s position, Heaven and man are forever kept at a distance in the dimension of history. Drawing out natural tendencies is a future-oriented process, and all past experiences are only references. There is no end to this process, and in the continuous endeavor to try, human natural tendencies are constantly expanding and enriching. The sages, as significant experiences of the past, embody the endpoint that this attempt ever reaches. However, since human beings cannot become Heaven, “sages” are only symbols that are valid in the realm of human beings. The ethical orders represented by saints do not have permanent validity. They are only references. Therefore, “becoming a sage” also implies a way of life that is very different from the traditional one. Wang Fuzhi said:
有虞氏之仁义,非今之仁义也。使取有虞氏之命官、诛凶,强在廷在野之臣民而效之,未有不乱者。惟舜以仁义名,而奉其名以为法,有一不肖,则窃窃然忧之,究不知仁义之为何物。
The benevolence (ren 仁) and righteousness (yi 义) of the Yu family5 (youyushi 有虞氏) is not the present benevolence and righteousness. If the (present) officials in the government and the unofficial civilians were forced to follow the Yu’s (rules) of appointing officials and executing murderers, there would surely be chaos. Only Shun 舜, who had made benevolence and righteousness his name (ming 名). Who honored his name (ming 名) as the law, and was privately very worried at the slightest lack of conformity, and ultimately did not know what benevolence and righteousness were.
If the sages became substitutes for Heaven and took possession of the right to interpret the ethical order, such as benevolence and righteousness, the life of Confucianism would become an imitation of the life of the sage. Worry about behavior that does not conform to the standard becomes the center of gravity of life. If the imitation of Heaven is already an unrealizable illusion, the imitation of the sages makes man even more distant from the true “nature”. According to Wang Fuzhi, the sages were only able to present some of the possibilities of Heaven for a certain period of time. Therefore, their ethical standards are only valid for a period of time. Wang Fuzhi examined the relationship between sages and Heaven and placed them in the dimension of history. When the sages return to the realm of man, rather than the realm of Heaven, they can only present the limits of man’s “drawing out natural tendencies” in a period of time. They can neither monopolize the interpretation of Heaven nor are they confined to the dimension of history, which needs to be reinterpreted with a view to the future.
More importantly, the traditional position has brought about a poorly secularized mode of life. The absolutization of sages living in history makes an order that does not fit into the this-worldly life of the present into the ethical standard. There is no match between the reality of this-worldly life and the ideal. The benevolence and righteousness represented by the sages can only become a form of superficial rule. To accommodate this, all people engage in a kind of superficial disguise, as if the order of the sages were still valid. However, the real this-worldly order is not constrained; instead, the disguise turns Confucian life into unorganized chaos. According to Wang Fuzhi, this trend not only misunderstands the significance of saints but also destroys the foundational ethical principles of Confucianism. He said:
天下相师于伪,不但伪以迹也,并其心亦移焉而诚于伪,故小人之诚,不如其无诚也。诚者,虚位也;知、仁、勇,实以行乎虚者也。故善言诚者,必曰诚仁、诚知、诚勇,而不但言诚。
Under the heaven, (people) learn disguise from each other, not only in the traces (of their actions), but even their heart-mind (xin 心) are moved, and they are sincere (cheng 诚) to the disguise. Therefore the sincerity (cheng 诚) of the small-minded person (xiaoren 小人) is worse than no sincerity at all. Creativity (cheng 诚) is hollow and wisdom (zhi 知), benevolence (ren 仁), and bravery (yong 勇) operate in it in fullness. So those who are good at talking about creativity must say that they are creative (cheng 诚) to benevolence, creative to wisdom, and creative to bravery, not just creativity.
伪以迹,而公论自伸于迹露之日;伪以诚,而举天下以如狂,莫有能自信其哀乐喜怒者,于是而天理、民彝澌灭尽矣。
Disguise on traces, and the public discourse will proceed spontaneously when exposed. Disguise on sincerity, so that the whole world seems to be mad, and (people) are not capable of believing for themselves in their own grief (ai 哀), pleasure (le 乐), joy (xi 喜), and anger (nu 怒). Thus heaven’s regularity (li 理) and the ethics of the people (minyi 民彝) are destroyed.
The order of traditional Confucian life is so fragmented that the disguise of all human beings not only occurs in action but also affects the understanding of “sincerity” (cheng 诚)6. Sincerity, as the way the Heavens operate, has no stereotypical conclusion. Therefore, as a collection of possibilities, it has yet to be filled with actual content. From a human perspective, the way of filling sincerity is also the way of human existence, which is knowledge, benevolence, and bravery. This view implied, at the same time, that the transcendence of Heaven, as presented in the human perspective, consists of the subjective and dynamic actions of human beings. However, this did not necessarily diminish the transcendent authority of Heaven. For human action does not change the way Heaven operates. Although the contingencies of history and the actions of many individuals who come together are not the plan of Heaven, when taken as a whole, they constitute the trend of change that Heaven transcends individual understanding. All one can do is to realize that all one’s actions are only adding certain possibilities rather than decisive factors to this trend. The problem is that disguise can reverse this pattern of life, as if the ethical nature of the Heavens could be defined by man’s subjective actions.
The process of exemplifying the symbol of sages of Confucianism is also the process of intensifying the disguised secular life. The disguise of individual action does not change the way one understands Heaven. When the disguise is defeated, the error of this way of life becomes obvious. However, the eternal standardization of the ethical order changes man’s relationship with Heaven. Living according to the order set by the sages becomes the only legitimate life, and the natural and true emotions of the individual are considered wrong. Heaven was confined to a definite ethical order, and man was unable to expand his possibilities in accordance with the requirements of his natural tendencies.
In fact, it is not “the central force of a salvation religion conducive to a methodical way of life was non-existent” (Weber 1951, p. 170), but rather the split between the guiding power of Confucianism and the actual conditions of life that leads to the coexistence of two orders of life. The disguised life imitates the ethics of the saints, and underneath it lurks chaos that is not governed by order. When everyone sincerely believes in the legitimacy of the disguise, the order of the disguise replaces the possibility of Heaven. More than the action of disguise, what is truly destructive is the replacement of reality by disguise, and the Heavens lose their significance when man becomes the Heavens.
However, this does not mean that the sages become completely useless symbols, and it at least shows a case of the opposite application. Wang Fuzhi attempted to reawaken a proper understanding of the sage. The sages are the medium for man’s understanding of Heaven rather than a replacement for it. From the historical perspective, since all experience is only temporarily valid, what really matters is the way the sages dealt with their relationship with the Heavens, not the results of the ethical order they established. That is why it is particularly important to change the way in which the symbols of the sages are understood. He said:
佑之者,天也;承其佑者,人也。于天之佑,可以见天心;于人之承,可以知天德矣。夫宋祖受非常之命,而终以一统天下,厎于大定,垂及百年,世称盛治者,何也?唯其惧也。惧者,恻悱不容自宁之心,勃然而猝兴,怵然而不昧,乃上天不测之神震动于幽隐,莫之喻而不可解者也。
It is heaven that carries out the blessing, and it is man who takes the blessing. In the blessing of heaven the heart-mind (xin 心) of heaven can be discovered. In man’s taking (of the blessing), one can know the virtue (de 德) of Heaven. The first emperor of the Song dynasty (songtaizu 宋太祖, 927 CE–976 CE) received an unusual command (ming 命), and eventually relied on it to unify the world under the heaven (tianxia 天下) and stabilize (the country), extending backward for a hundred years, and praising the prosperity of his rule for generations, why was this so? Fear (ju 惧) is the heart-mind (xin 心) that worries and depresses and does not allow itself to stop, that rises suddenly with excitement, and that does not forget even when it is afraid. It is the unsearchable Shen (shen 神) of heaven vibrating in a dark place, whose description there is no way to know and cannot answer.
Wang Fuzhi chose an important but not exceptional emperor. Although Zhao Kuangyin 赵匡胤 (927 CE–976 CE) put an end to the chaos, he did not have very outstanding abilities compared to other famous ancient Chinese emperors. What is special about this example is that Wang Fuzhi, who also realized this, did not aim to praise Zhao’s abilities or achievements, but rather used him as an example of how to deal with the relationship between Heaven and man. The traditional position seems to be that Zhao is a charisma-type emperor who is innately special. However, here he is first and foremost an ordinary man with nothing special about him and no training or rituals for awakening. He is not bound to Heaven in any way. Instead, he comprehends only a sense of distance between man and Heaven that can never be touched. The command or blessing between him and Heaven is maintained only through his fear. Fear comes from the unknown. The uninterrupted and continuous self-knowledge of always feeling one’s ignorance and striving to try to be in tune with Heaven is what Wang Fuzhi wanted to present through this example. Zhao did not leave behind a specific framework of ethical order, but his experience demonstrates the dynamic structure of Heaven and man. In his fear of Heaven, Zhao maintained the balance between Heaven and man, and made “drawing out natural tendencies” an eternal practice.
As a special historical episode, Zhao demonstrates a way of historical living. It is not the process of living within a certain ethic, but rather the process of“drawing out natural tendencies” that is the right thing to do. However, similar experiences are quite rare and tend to be characterized by individual subjective emotions, such as fear, and are not repeatable. Therefore, when this original experience is transformed into“education” (jiao 教), it requires other forms of expansion of this way of life. In fact, in our previous discussion, we have seen three types of historical ways of living proposed by Wang Fuzhi. The first is to live continuously in the state of the “sage” as an original experience. As in the case of Zhao’s experience, Confucianism promotes the state of always being aware of the distance from Heaven and living with this in mind. However, this experience not only cannot be directly transmitted to others, but also cannot form a large-scale order of life, and is a special experience that belongs to a small number of people. Not to mention that in many periods, it is not even possible to find a single person who possesses this experience. Second, as a universal condition, life is lived within a defined ethical framework. Although it would be absurd to establish an order strictly according to the ethical rules of some sage, for the vast majority of people it is necessary to live in some kind of defined ethical relationship. From the historical perspective, the ethical order represented by the sages is gradually being customized and awaits its next renewal. In the process of solidification into custom and reactivation, the ethical order maintains relative stability and becomes universally applicable. However, it is clear that this way of living only indirectly maintains a connection with Heaven. Third, as a link between the previous two conditions, the record of history and classics becomes an important link in perceiving the way of living of the sages and renewing the customs. Through the recording and interpretation of history, an individual’s original experience is transformed into an enforceable ethical framework, which in turn becomes custom. As in Wang Fuzhi’s interpretation of Zhao, the focus is on the restoration of original experience. At the same time, this work is considered one of the most important functions of Confucianism. Wang Fuzhi said:
夫言治者,皆曰先王矣。而先王者,何世之先王也?孔子曰:“吾从周。”非文、武之道隆于禹、汤也。文、武之法,民所世守而安焉者也。孟子曰:“遵先王之法。”周未亡,王者未作,井田学校所宜遵者,周之旧也。官习于廷,士习于学,民习于野;善者其所夙尚,失者其所可安,利者其所允宜,害者其所能胜;慎求治人而政无不举。孔、孟之言治者,此而已矣。
Those who talk about governance mention the kings of the previous generations 先王. Which generation of kings were the kings of the previous generation? It is not that the Dao 道 of King Wen 文王 and King Wu 武王 of Zhou was better than that of Yu 禹 and Tang 汤. Mencius said, “Obey the laws of the kings of the previous generations.”The Zhou dynasty had not yet fallen, and a (new) king had not yet appeared, and the well-field 井田 and school systems were fit to be observed as the old systems of the Zhou dynasty. The officials were accustomed to be in the government, the Shi 士 to be in the schools, and the people to be in the fields. This is what the kind-hearted have always revered, what those who have lost (their homes) can live in peace, what those who pursue interests can allow to be appropriate, and what those who are harmful can be restrained, and there is no failure in the prudent pursuit of governance and in policy. Confucius and Mencius talked about governance, and that is all.
For Confucius or Mencius, the reverence for the kings of the past is not a quest for a definitive order of a certain period of time. On the contrary, looking to the past for a standard would only lead to the mutual contradiction of the order of different kings. They were simply making the only appropriate choice for a given period of history: to continue the old customs. Their work shows the obligation that Confucianism took on in the transitional phase of the historical order. At a time when an old order was about to collapse and the founders of a new order, who were able to realize the sense of distance between Heaven and man, had not yet appeared, there was a need for someone to prolong as long as possible the condition of the old order and to give hints to the sages or kings who would come after them. In Wang Fuzhi’s view, one should not select some past sages without restraint in the expectation that their ethical experience can be replicated. Rather, one should focus on the current state of custom and draw resources from the closest sages or kings to maintain it. In other words, it is the goal of Confucianism to maintain as stable a custom as possible, waiting for an original experience like Zhao to renew the custom. The classics and historical records of Confucianism assume this function.
Confucianism seems to be constantly reinforcing this-worldly life and repeatedly emphasizing the importance of ethics and morality. However, according to Wang Fuzhi, this endeavor is actually a combination of three historical conditions of living. As sages, they are always aware of the dynamic relationship between Heaven and man, and are thus always in a state of worry and fear about their own behavior. They hold original experiences and construct them into different ethical orders under different historical conditions. As Confucianists, to help the sages to construct a this-worldly order when they exist and prolong the life of the old order when they do not exist. By interpreting the classics, the original experience is expanded into universal this-worldly customs that require continuous renewal. As ordinary people, although living in the customs that were established, through the classics one could know the existence of the original experience and move closer to that experience. The Confucian classics became a bridge where different historical conditions of living could be transformed into each other in the course of history. The original experiences do not benefit from a gift, they are born out of ordinary people. And those who are guided by the classics toward the original experience, as long as they realize the dynamic relationship between Heaven and man, have already unconsciously become part of the interpretation of the classics, and then move closer to the original experience. They are, in fact, different conditions of the same historical living, sharing different responsibilities in the overall relationship of the community.
A truly Confucian way of life is not a facsimile of the experience of a specific sage. Rather, through the experience of the sages, feeling the fear of Heaven, which is the boundary of man, and builds on it in an ongoing practice. For Confucianism, this-worldly life does not just happen in the present but has taken over the past and influenced the future. Heaven is a collection of possibilities outside the realm of man, and the dynamic Heaven–human relationship cannot be completed at a particular historical moment. Thus, the this-worldly life of Confucianism is necessarily historical. The experience of the sages of the past reveals to the present the inaccessibility of Heaven and the limitations of man. The experience of the present in turn becomes sustenance, suggesting to the future that any definite framework of order will cease to exist. Additionally, life in the present is a practice that from the beginning has been inspired by past experiences and seeks to illuminate the future. For Wang Fuzhi, stagnation at any point would lead to a false understanding of the relationship between Heaven and man and a rooted life of hypocrisy. On this basis, the Confucian way of life is both this-worldly, dealing with specific ethical matters, and constrained, limited to history by the dynamic structure of the Heaven–human relationship. As a particular religion of this world, the conflict of order in Confucianism does not take place in the opposition between the this and that sides, but rather in the transmission of experience, established after an eternally unfinished historical living.

5. Conclusions

After experiencing the crisis of the fall of the Ming Dynasty, Wang Fuzhi was deeply aware of the dogmatism of Zhu Xi’s school. Confucianism as a religion was in dire need of a new way to establish a constrained this-worldly life. Criticizing the traditional naturalistic relationship between Heaven and human, he believed that the boundaries of human living must be delineated from a human perspective and a new model of the relationship between Heaven and human nature must be established. By comparing Heaven and man as father and son and redefining the meaning of “nature”, he establishes a dynamic structure of the relationship between Heaven and human that breaks away from the solid understanding of human. On this basis, the different degrees of understanding of the relationship between Heaven and man divide into three different historical ways of life. Wang Fuzhi attempted to integrate and connect the different ways of life through the classics of Confucianism and to address the hypocrisy of the order of reality brought about by Zhu Xi’s school. In the process, he establishes a holistic and historical way of life in which this-worldly life is continually aware of its own ephemerality through the feeling of the relationship between Heaven and man as well as the transmission of experience. He envisions Confucianism as a particular religion of this world, where order and reality combine into a stable Confucian this-worldly life in the interplay of past, present, and future.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, X.X.; methodology, X.X.; formal analysis, X.X.; writing—original draft preparation, X.X.; writing—review and editing, X.X.; supervision, Y.C.; project administration, Y.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with a minor correction to the existing affiliation information. This change does not affect the scientific content of the article.

Notes

1
The rise in status of the Four Books was a long historical event, and Wang Ming 王铭 had already noted that the Song dynasty’s skepticism of the Han dynasty’s classical system, the possibility of a dialog between the Four Books and the Buddhist classics, and the Tang and Song Confucian commentaries on the Four Books made them the new core classics (M. Wang 2003, pp. 121–25). Among them, Zhu Xi’s commentary was the most important.
2
天命之谓性, 率性之谓道, 修道之谓教. What tian 天 commands (ming 命) is called natural tendencies (xing 性); drawing out these natural tendencies is called the proper way (dao 道); improving upon this way is called education (jiao 教) (Ames and Hall 2001, p. 89). Translated by Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall. Typically, this is considered the foundational text for understanding the Confucian relationship between Heaven and human.
3
Among Zhu Xi’s students, it seems to be a common position to connect natural tendencies (xing 性) and education (jiao 教) by highlighting Dao 道 (Hu et al. 2009, pp. 135–36).
4
Xiao Jiefu explained the Heaven of Heaven 天之天 as “the unity of the people in order to realize”, the Heaven of human 人之天 as “which man can know” (人之所知), and the Heaven of things 物之天 as “which things can know” (物之所知) (Xiao and Xu 2002, p. 269). Heaven means the boundaries of knowledge that people and things can reach, and also the dominant power in their respective fields. The Heaven of Heaven is the pure change that comes from the harmonization and unification of human and things, and in this sense, it becomes the basis for the possibility of constructing the natural world and human society.
5
The Yu family (youyushi 有虞氏) is the name of an ancient tribe. Confucianism considers Shun 舜 to have been the leader of the Yu family (youyushi 有虞氏) and one of the most important sages before Confucius. In the Confucian classics, Shun is usually regarded as a synonym for benevolence and righteousness.
6
Sincerity (cheng 诚), in the narrative of The Doctrine of Mean (zhongyong 中庸), is the way in which Heaven operates. It has no clear subjective will and contains infinite possibilities, and thus has the meanings of both sincerity and creativity. The standard mode of human understanding the Heaven is called creating (chengzhi 诚之). The original text is “诚者天之道,诚之者人之道”. Creativity (cheng 诚) is the way of tian (天之道); creating is the proper way of becoming human (人之道) (Ames and Hall 2001, p. 104). Translated by Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall.

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Xu, X.; Chen, Y. Wang Fuzhi on the Problem of Heaven and Human in the Religious Tradition of Confucianism. Religions 2025, 16, 393. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030393

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Xu X, Chen Y. Wang Fuzhi on the Problem of Heaven and Human in the Religious Tradition of Confucianism. Religions. 2025; 16(3):393. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030393

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Xu, Xiaopeng, and Yun Chen. 2025. "Wang Fuzhi on the Problem of Heaven and Human in the Religious Tradition of Confucianism" Religions 16, no. 3: 393. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030393

APA Style

Xu, X., & Chen, Y. (2025). Wang Fuzhi on the Problem of Heaven and Human in the Religious Tradition of Confucianism. Religions, 16(3), 393. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030393

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