1. Introduction
The contemporary world is marked by the increasing role of religion in shaping political, social, and cultural transformations, challenging long-standing assumptions about the inevitable trajectory of secularization. From social and political conflicts in Syria, Israel-Palestine, Turkey, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and Myanmar to the proliferation of extremist organizations such as ISIS, Boko Haram, Hamas, and the Taliban, religion remains at the core of geopolitical crises. Beyond outright violence, the confrontation between religious worldviews and the liberal-democratic order—particularly in disputes over abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, and freedom of speech—demonstrates that the secular state has failed to fully regulate and contain religious discourse. Moreover, the rise of far-right movements across the globe, particularly in Europe and the United States, signals that religion is not merely a force of resistance in non-Western societies but continues to shape identity, governance, and political legitimacy within secular democracies themselves.
Yet, the global resurgence of religion cannot be understood solely in terms of reactionary politics, fundamentalist resistance, or ideological retrenchment. Religion is also a site of reconstruction, reinvention, and transnational reconfiguration. The expansion of faith-based humanitarian organizations, the increasing role of religious networks in refugee assistance, and the growing influence of religious ethical frameworks in economic and political models demonstrate that religious traditions are actively shaping the contours of global governance (
Geoffroy 2004). The post-Cold War period, in particular, has been a turning point for religious globalization, where the classical premises of modernization theory and early secularist assumptions—rooted in the Global North—have been systematically challenged (
Casanova 1994;
Beyer 2006). The global landscape is no longer simply divided between a “secular” West and a “religious” non-West; rather, the contemporary world is shaped by a complex entanglement of the religious, the secular, the national, and the transnational, making it necessary to rethink the theoretical paradigms that have dominated the study of religion and modernity (
Juergensmeyer et al. 2019).
Secularism has never been also a neutral or universal category; rather, as
Talal Asad (
2003) has argued, it is a historically contingent formation of power that disciplines religious life, determines the boundaries of the acceptable and the unacceptable, and constructs religion itself as a category to be governed. This process, in turn, has been deeply intertwined with the nation-state, which has functioned as the primary apparatus through which religion is categorized, constrained, and bureaucratized (
Asad 2003;
Hurd 2008). The emergence of modern secularism in Europe was not merely the separation of church and state; it was a reorganization of power, in which the state retained ultimate authority over religious expression and governance (
Taylor 2007). However, this model—long embedded in Western political thought—is increasingly under strain as global networks, religious transnationalism and nationalism, and shifting political dynamics undermine the state’s monopoly over religious regulation, a transformation that this paper conceptualizes as the post-secular cosmopolitanization of religion.
In response to these transformations, scholars have increasingly sought alternative conceptual frameworks that challenge linear and Eurocentric models of secularization. Approaches such as multiple modernities (
Eisenstadt 2000), the varieties of secularism (
Stepan 2010), entangled modernities (
Wittrock 2000), public religions (
Casanova 1994), and postcolonial critiques of secularism (
Mahmood 2006,
2016;
An-Na‘im 2008;
Chatterjee 1993) have provided alternative frameworks for understanding the complex interplay between religion, modernity, and secularism in the contemporary world. Additionally, concepts such as post-secularism (
Habermas 2006,
2008a,
2008b), which challenges the notion of an inevitable secularization process and emphasizes the continued role of religion in the public sphere; multiple secularities (
Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012), which examine the different ways secularism is shaped by historical and cultural contexts; de-secularization (
P. L. Berger 2017), which critiques the classical secularization thesis by demonstrating the renewed significance of religion in global politics; reflexive secularization (
Beaumont et al. 2020), which highlights how secularization processes themselves generate counter-tendencies that challenge and reconfigure the secular–religious divide in dynamic and often antagonistic ways; and global religious assemblages (
Vásquez 2011), which highlight the fluid, networked, and transnational nature of contemporary religious formations, have further expanded scholarly attempts to conceptualize the shifting boundaries of religion, secularism, nation-states, and modernity. These perspectives underscore a new state of affairs in which modernity has not resulted in the universalization of secular norms but rather in the coexistence and contestation of multiple trajectories of modernization, each shaped by distinct relationships to the religious, the secular, the national, and the state. Such theoretical shifts signal a growing recognition that the interplay between religion, nation-state, and secularism is neither fixed nor unidirectional but historically contingent and deeply embedded in power relations.
This paper argues that we are witnessing not the decline of secularism, but rather a fundamental restructuring of the relationship between religion, secularism, and the nation-state, as well as broader global power configurations—a process best understood through the concept of the post-secular cosmopolitanization of religion. This transformation, in contrast to many of the aforementioned alternative frameworks, does not signify a return to a pre-secular world or a shift from a fixed secular order to a new, consolidated post-secular order; rather, it marks a reconfiguration of religious, national, and secular domains in ways that transcend national, nationalistic, secular, and secularistic epistemic boundaries. The concept of cosmopolitanization, as articulated by
Ulrich Beck (
1992,
1999,
2002a,
2007,
2008,
2016;
Beck and Sznaider 2006), describes how the unintended consequences of modernization have generated a world of unprecedented transnational entanglements and indeterminacy, where identities, traditions, and power structures are increasingly deterritorialized. Rather than representing a transition from one consolidated social order to another, the cosmopolitanization of the world functions through the deconstruction of existing social structures and phenomena, placing them in a state of indeterminacy, transnationality, and interconnectivity (
Jong 2024a,
2024b). In Beck’s terms, the social is caught in a constant state of metamorphosis, undergoing continuous transformation rather than settling into a fixed structure (
Beck 2016a). This ongoing transformation itself signifies a reconfiguration of the global social order, where previous certainties regarding political authority, cultural identities, and institutional boundaries are fundamentally unsettled. Within this framework, the post-secular cosmopolitanization of religion refers to the emergence of new configurations of power, where religious actors, institutions, and discourses increasingly transcend the regulatory structures of the nation-state and challenge the hegemony of secular governance. This transformation manifests across multiple dimensions, raising critical questions about the future of religious authority, political sovereignty, and global governance. This process does not represent a simple reversal, pluralization, or reconstruction of secularization but rather a structural reordering that destabilizes the assumed boundaries between the religious, the national, and the secular, compelling all three to renegotiate their place within an evolving transnational or post-national order (
Habermas 2001;
Levitt 2004).
In this regard, this paper aims to conceptualize the idea of post-secular cosmopolitanization by bringing together Talal Asad’s critical perspective on secularism and modernity, their entanglement with the nation-state (
Asad 1993,
2003), and Ulrich Beck’s notion of cosmopolitanization (
Beck 1992,
1999,
2002a,
2008,
2016a,
2016b;
Beck and Sznaider 2006). It seeks to highlight the various dimensions and implications of post-secular cosmopolitanization. To achieve this, this paper critically examines theoretical discussions on the intertwining of religion, secularism, the nation-state, and globalization, introduces and analyzes the concept of cosmopolitanization, and develops the notion of post-secular cosmopolitanization. It then engages with existing studies and approaches on globalization and religion, as well as emerging religious phenomena on a global scale, to explore the features, dimensions, consequences, and manifestations of religion within the process of post-secular cosmopolitanization.
As this paper elucidates, post-secular cosmopolitanization is restructuring the contours of social, political, and religious formations. Unlike earlier models of secularization that sought to contain religion within a national framework, cosmopolitanization produces a profound indeterminacy in the status of religious authority, the limits of secular governance, the global regime of nation-states, and the very meaning of religious practice in a deterritorialized world. This shift is particularly disruptive to the epistemic and institutional structures of the nation-state, which had historically monopolized the regulation of religious life.
The erosion of nation-state-centered governance has fundamentally redefined the role of religious practices, institutions, rituals, doctrines, and traditions, shifting their primary locus from national frameworks and epistemic structures to post-national and transnational engagements. This paper argues that this transformation produces three major consequences that have significant effects on and have been impacted by existing global configurations of power. First, it disrupts the regulatory authority of the secular state, compelling both national governments and global institutions to renegotiate their interactions with religious actors and institutions. The historical paradigm in which the state exercised a monopoly over the legal and political management of religion is increasingly unsustainable, as transnational religious movements and faith-based organizations establish alternative sites of influence that states can neither fully control nor ignore (
Haynes 2013;
Hurd 2004,
2008,
2015;
Kuru 2009). Rather than imposing regulation, secular governance is now forced into negotiation with religious entities as autonomous and influential actors in global affairs. Second, it reconfigures religious authority, as the traditional centers of religious knowledge and governance—previously anchored in territorially bound institutions—face growing contestation from transnational and post-national religious flows. The expansion of diaspora communities, transnational religious institutions and movements, digital religious networks, and global theological debates has unsettled the previous monopolies of clerical establishments and religious seminaries, fostering a decentralized and competitive religious landscape where authority is increasingly fluid and deterritorialized (
Eickelman and Piscatori 2004;
Turner 2011;
Bouma 2007;
James 2018;
Arweck 2007;
Cameron 2014). Third, it destabilizes the conventional boundaries between religious and secular governance, forcing a reconsideration of how religious ethics, legal norms, and political engagement operate at both national and global levels. The longstanding assumption that religion belongs strictly to the private or cultural sphere, while secular institutions govern law, politics, and economics, is no longer tenable (
Casanova 1994). Religious actors now operate as key players in shaping global governance, influencing international legal and political frameworks, financial regulations, and diplomatic negotiations (
Banchoff and Wuthnow 2011;
Haynes 2021;
Geoffroy 2004). This shift does not merely weaken secularism but instead reconfigures the very distinction between religious and secular governance, necessitating new theoretical models to account for the evolving entanglements of power, law, and religious authority in a post-secular cosmopolitan order.
By reviewing existing studies on religions at a global scale, as well as recent representations of religious transformations, this paper demonstrates that the manifestations of post-secular cosmopolitanization of religion can be traced at three analytically interrelated levels, each reshaping the relationship between religion, secularism, and governance. At the micro-level, the transformation of religious practices illustrates how individuals navigate their religious subjectivities in cosmopolitan contexts shaped by individualization and heightened self-reflexivity, emerging from the globalization of risks and threats that have destabilized old certainties (
Heelas and Woodhead 2005;
Turner 2010;
Beck 1992,
1999). Rather than leading to the mere privatization of faith or the emergence of more non-institutionalized and spiritualized forms of religiosity and ritual, these pressures have given rise to hybridized religious identities and new forms of engagement that transcend national, traditional, and doctrinal boundaries (
Knott 2010;
Levitt 2004;
Turner 2010). At the meso-level, religious institutions are increasingly operating beyond the nation-state, as evidenced by the rise of transnational faith-based organizations, various forms of religious nationalism that extend beyond their nation-state boundaries and influence international politics, religious NGOs, and diaspora religious movements (
Haynes 2001,
2013,
2021;
Hurd 2015;
Clarke and Jennings 2008;
Lehmann 2016;
Levitt 2004). These networks challenge the authority of state-sponsored religious regulation, allowing religious actors to organize, mobilize, and assert influence across multiple jurisdictions. Even longstanding organizations of classical religions undergo reconfiguration and reorganization, primarily at the transnational level, to ensure their survival (
Banchoff and Wuthnow 2011). Finally, at the macro-level, religious actors and discourses are shaping global governance structures, contesting the presumed universality of secular legal and political frameworks. Religious institutions now intervene in international law and politics, economic regulations, and diplomatic affairs, demonstrating that secularism is not retreating but being restructured in negotiation with transnational religious forces (
Kuru 2009;
Mandair 2015). These three levels together illustrate that religion is not merely resurgent but is being fundamentally reconfigured within an evolving post-secular global order.
This paper is structured as follows: The second section critically engages with Talal Asad’s critique of secularism, tracing the historical emergence of secular power as a mode of disciplining and regulating religion while examining its entanglement with the nation-state. The third section conceptualizes cosmopolitanization as a process that deconstructs rigid national, secular, and religious boundaries, demonstrating how it generates indeterminate and transnational forms of social, political, and religious configurations. The fourth section develops the notion of post-secular cosmopolitanization, positioning it as a structural transformation that reconfigures religious and secular authority beyond territorial boundaries. The fifth section explores the manifestations of this transformation at three interrelated levels: (1) the micro-level, where religious subjectivities and practices are reshaped through heightened individualization, digitalization, and transnational flows; (2) the meso-level, where religious organizations operate beyond nation-state control, engaging in transnational governance structures and global networks; and (3) the macro-level, where religious actors play an increasingly influential role in shaping global governance, contesting the presumed universality of secular legal and political frameworks. By demonstrating how post-secular cosmopolitanization operates across these levels, this paper argues that religion is not merely experiencing a resurgence but is undergoing a fundamental restructuring within an evolving global order.
2. Secularism, Power/Knowledge, and the Nation-State
Secularism, in its broadest sense, refers to the historically contingent reconfiguration of the relationship between religion, politics, and the state, fundamentally reshaping its authority over public life (
Casanova 1994;
Habermas 2006;
Taylor 2007;
Asad 1993,
2003). Emerging as a central epistemic category in modern political thought, secularism played an integral role in the formation of nation-states, modern institutions, and disciplinary structures in Western Christian Europe. However, secularism is not merely a principle of separation between religion and state; rather, as
Asad (
2003) has argued, it operates as a regime of power/knowledge that actively defines what counts as religion, how it is to be regulated, and in what forms it can legitimately appear within political and social orders.
In
Asad’s (
2003) formulation, secularism is neither a neutral nor a universal doctrine but a historically produced configuration of power that organizes religious and political life in specific ways. Within this conceptual framework, Asad differentiates between three interrelated but distinct concepts: the secular, secularity, and secularism. The secular refers to a category that is discursively and legally produced through historical struggles over power, rather than being a self-evident or naturally occurring domain. Secularity, in turn, denotes the embodied and affective dispositions cultivated under secular modernity—the ways in which subjects are trained to perceive, experience, and engage with religious and non-religious categories. Secularism, then, is a prescriptive political doctrine that organizes the conditions under which religion may exist within the modern state and public life.
Marramao (
2009) further clarifies that secularization and secularism, though often conflated, must be understood as distinct but interrelated processes. Secularization refers to the historical differentiation of social spheres, whereby religion gradually loses its overarching authority over political and legal structures, whereas secularism represents an ideological and political project that actively regulates and demarcates the boundaries between religious and secular domains. This distinction is crucial, as it challenges the assumption that secularism is simply the result of an inevitable religious decline; rather, it highlights secularism as a historically produced mode of governance that remains subject to contestation, negotiation, and reconfiguration across diverse socio-political contexts.
Asad (
2003) underscores that secularism did not emerge in isolation but was deeply intertwined with the formation of the modern nation-state, a process that was not only political but also epistemic. The consolidation of secularism was bound to the state’s imperative to discipline subjects, regulate religious institutions, and construct national identities through legal and bureaucratic mechanisms.
Marramao (
2009) reinforces this argument by demonstrating that secularization was not merely the differentiation of social spheres but rather an essential restructuring of political sovereignty itself—one in which the state redefined religious authority not simply to diminish its influence but to incorporate, regulate, and instrumentalize it within state structures. In this sense, both
Asad (
2003) and
Marramao (
2009) reveal that secularism, rather than being a neutral or passive separation of religion from politics, operates as a historically contingent project of modernity in which the state actively manages, subordinates, and reconfigures religious authority to sustain its own legitimacy. The epistemic and institutional entanglement of secularism and the nation-state thus represents not a withdrawal of religion from public life, but its transformation into a mode of governance that continues to shape national and transnational power relations.
A genealogical analysis of various concepts of secularism reveals different configurations of power. Certain historical moments have been considered pivotal in shaping the distinction between the religious and the secular in Christian Europe, as they emerged through these distinct power structures (
Smith 2003). For instance,
Brent Nongbri (
2013) traces the origins of this division to the late Christian Middle Ages, where the term religious was used to refer specifically to monastic clergy, whereas saecularis referred to clergy who operated outside monastic orders (
Nongbri 2013). This early division, while emerging within Christian institutional structures, laid the foundation for later political reconfigurations of the religious/secular binary, which became institutionalized in European legal and political systems.
A major turning point in the articulation of secularism in European Christianity was the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the European religious wars and fundamentally restructured the relationship between religion and politics in Christian Europe (
Mahmood 2006;
Cavanaugh 2009). The treaty formalized a shift in sovereignty and authority, transferring lands, legal powers, and governing rights from religious institutions (such as bishops and monastic orders) to local rulers. This marked the gradual transition from church-dominated political rule to the consolidation of territorial state power, effectively subordinating religious authority to emerging state structures. This reconfiguration led to the decline of Rome’s overarching influence and the rise of nationalized religious authorities, foreshadowing the formation of the modern nation-state as the dominant political unit in Europe (
Sheedy 2021;
B. Anderson 1991).
The French Revolution played a defining role in solidifying the dominant understanding of secularism in modernity. It was during this period that secularism became equated with the radical separation of the religious and the secular, constructing an ideological binary where the secular was assigned to the state, reason, and progress, while religion was relegated to the realm of private belief (
Taylor 1998). This binary became the basis for the French concept of laïcité, which was exported and adapted in various forms across Europe and beyond. The consolidation of the modern nation-state further institutionalized the principles of secularism, requiring the differentiation and redefinition of religion within legal, social, and political structures (
Copson 2019). In this model, the nation-state sought to construct a universal identity that transcended religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences, reconfiguring individual subjectivity and social relations in accordance with the universal ideals of modernity and rationality (
Asad 2003).
The entanglement of secularism and the nation-state is a mutually constitutive formation, in which each shaped and reinforced the epistemic and institutional structures of the other. Secularism did not emerge as a detached, abstract principle advocating for the separation of religion and politics; rather, it was embedded in the very project of nation-state formation, serving as an instrument for the consolidation of national identity, sovereignty, and governance (
Asad 2003;
Hurd 2008). Modern secularism was not simply about the management of religious difference—it was a project of disciplining and restructuring religious authority in ways that were aligned with the imperatives of state formation and national consolidation (
Mahmood 2005,
2006). The modern state did not passively tolerate religious diversity but actively redefined, categorized, and regulated religion, integrating it into the administrative and ideological structures of national governance (
Van der Veer 1994;
Fox 2021). This meant that while nationalism is often framed as a secular ideology, it did not eliminate religion but rather reconfigured and subordinated it within national frameworks, instrumentalizing it for state-building and political legitimacy (
B. Anderson 1991). The emergence of nationalism in 19th-century Europe coincided with the rise of secular legal codification, bureaucratic rationalization, and the centralization of political authority, all of which sought to construct a uniform national subjectivity through the rationalization of political, religious, and social life (
Chatterjee 2020). As
Talal Asad (
2003) argues, secularism is not merely a doctrine of religious neutrality; it is a historically contingent mode of governance that actively disciplines religious life, aligns it with state power, and integrates it into the project of nation-state consolidation.
Historically, the three interrelated concepts of the secular, secularity, and secularism became deeply enmeshed with the national, nationality, and nationalism in modern Europe. The secular, as an epistemic category, did not simply denote the absence of religion but functioned as a framework for legitimizing the state’s claim to absolute sovereignty, marking the nation-state as the sole entity capable of organizing public and political life (
Asad 2003;
Taylor 2007). This transition was not simply an organic evolution but a strategic reordering of authority, in which the modern state claimed jurisdiction over all aspects of life, including those previously governed by religious structures (
Mahmood 2005,
2006,
2012). Secularity, in turn, was cultivated through legal institutions, educational systems, and public discourse, producing national subjects trained to internalize secular norms—wherein religion was increasingly framed as a privatized, voluntary, and personal belief rather than an intrinsic dimension of collective political identity (
Hirschkind 2013). Meanwhile, secularism became a political project of the state itself, structuring legal frameworks, bureaucratic regulations, and national identity formation, wherein the nation-state assumed the authority to define, manage, and control religious expression (
Van der Veer 1994). The French Revolution, for example, demonstrated how the formation of a secular republic was inseparable from the construction of modern national identity, as the clergy was stripped of its political influence and subordinated to the state (
Copson 2019). Likewise, in the post-Westphalian order, the nation-state gradually displaced transnational religious authorities (such as the Papacy and other church hierarchies), replacing them with nationalized religious institutions that served the objectives of state-building rather than independent religious governance (
Cavanaugh 2009;
Sheedy 2021). Thus, secularism and nationalism did not develop as separate or parallel trajectories; rather, they co-evolved, reinforcing one another as integral components of modern governance, shaping the fundamental reorganization of political sovereignty, collective identity, and religious authority.
As the nation-state model expanded beyond Europe, secularism was not merely an internal European development but became a hegemonic global paradigm, imposed through colonialism, nationalist movements, and modernization projects (
Chatterjee 1993;
Asad 2003). Colonialism functioned as a primary mechanism for the dissemination of the secular–nationalist framework, reordering societies through legal codification, administrative control, and epistemic restructuring (
Hurd 2004;
Chatterjee 2020). The colonial state was not simply an extension of European governance abroad—it was an experimental site for new modes of rule, where secular legal structures were introduced not to separate religion and politics per se but to subordinate and instrumentalize religious authority in service of colonial governance (
Asad 1993;
Mahmood 2006,
2012,
2016). European colonial administrations engaged in a dual process: on the one hand, they reorganized indigenous religious institutions—turning them into bureaucratically regulated entities that operated under state surveillance—while, on the other, they invoked religious divisions as a strategy of rule, manipulating sectarian and communal identities to sustain imperial control (
Van der Veer 1994). This paradox—the simultaneous regulation and instrumentalization of religion—became a defining feature of colonial secularism, whereby secular law was not applied as a neutral principle but as a strategy of domination (
Cavanaugh 2009;
Hurd 2008).
In postcolonial states, the legacy of colonial secularism persisted, as newly formed nation-states inherited and reconfigured the legal, bureaucratic, and epistemic frameworks imposed under colonial rule. The postcolonial period did not witness the rejection of the secular–nationalist model; rather, it saw its indigenization and adaptation, as new regimes sought to assert their sovereignty by nationalizing and regulating religion in ways similar to their colonial predecessors (
Chatterjee 1993;
Thomas 2005). Even anti-colonial struggles—whether nationalist, Marxist, or religious—did not fully escape the hegemonic structures of secularism and the nation-state, as they remained embedded within the legal, political, and epistemic assumptions that had been universalized through imperial rule (
Hashemi 2009). The process of decolonization did not entail the dismantling of secular power but its rearticulation, where postcolonial elites restructured religious institutions through the frameworks of national sovereignty, modern law, and developmentalist state policies (
Asad 2003;
Mahmood 2012,
2016). Thus, the entanglement of secularism and nationalism did not dissolve with the end of colonial rule; instead, it was reinforced through the global diffusion of the nation-state model, ensuring that secularism remained central to postcolonial governance, religious regulation, and state legitimacy (
Hurd 2012;
Chatterjee 2020).
In dominant social science literature, secularization has often been framed through three distinct paradigms: the decline of religious belief, the privatization of religion, and the differentiation of secular spheres such as law, politics, and economics (
Casanova 2007;
Bruce 2002;
Asad 2003;
Stark 1999;
Pollack 2015). However, these models assume a linear trajectory of religious decline rather than recognizing secularization itself as a historically contingent mode of political organization (
Hurd 2008;
Mahmood 2005,
2006). Secularism, as demonstrated, does not operate as a passive background condition but functions as an active project of governance that continuously reconfigures religion’s place within political and epistemic structures. In this line of thought, as
Hurd (
2008) argues, secularism is best understood not as the absence of religion but as a historically produced settlement of power relations, imposing specific ways of distinguishing, managing, and integrating religious life into political frameworks. This process is neither uniform nor uncontested; rather, it has manifested through multiple secular epistemes, each embedded in particular historical formations of state and global governance (
Mahmood 2005,
2006,
2012;
Asad 2003).
Hurd (
2008) identifies two dominant models of secular governance—laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism—that gained prominence in global politics, particularly during the final years leading up to the Cold War and its aftermath. However, rather than being fixed or monolithic categories, even these models reflect historically situated configurations of power that continue to evolve. Laicism, particularly in the French republican model and Kemalist Turkey, has often been associated with a strict separation of religion and politics, wherein religion is expected to be confined to the private sphere and subjected to state regulation to ensure conformity with national legal and institutional frameworks (
Taylor 1998;
Copson 2019). However, contrary to Hurd’s somewhat reductionist conception of laicism, as
Baubérot (
2000) demonstrates, laïcité is not a singular or uniform concept but rather a plural term encompassing multiple historical and contemporary variations with diverse configurations. He identifies at least seven distinct forms of laïcité, ranging from strict state-centered regulation to more flexible models of accommodation, many of which depart from the rigid separationist framework often attributed to classical laicism. Additionally, laïcité is far from dominant across Europe, where “twin tolerations” and negotiated settlements between religious and secular institutions are far more prevalent than strict separationist policies.
Judeo-Christian secularism, by contrast, operates through a conditional recognition of religion, in which religious traditions that align with Western liberal political and moral frameworks are integrated into national and global governance, while others—particularly Islam—have often been positioned as requiring special regulatory oversight (
Hurd 2008;
Asad 2003;
Mahmood 2006,
2012,
2016). However, it is crucial to clarify that this dynamic does not necessarily represent an inherent feature of “Judeo-Christian secularism” itself but rather a historically contingent mode of governance in which certain Western states, at specific periods, have selectively engaged with religious traditions through legal and diplomatic frameworks. The civilizational framing of secularism, therefore, not only structures domestic politics but also influences international law, global security discourses, and diplomatic engagements, where certain religious actors are designated as legitimate partners of the secular state while others are positioned as challenges to public order (
Van der Veer 1994;
Cavanaugh 2009). These configurations of secularism, however, should not be treated as static or universal; rather, they have been subject to contestation and transformation across different socio-political contexts, as seen in the increasing institutional recognition of religious diversity in many secular states (
Baubérot 2017). In this sense, secular governance does not merely define the relationship between religion and politics at the national level but is actively implicated in broader transnational and international networks of governance, surveillance, and intervention (
Thomas 2005;
Hurd 2012;
Wuthnow and Offutt 2008).
3. Cosmopolitanization and the Transition Beyond the Secular–National Order
In the present era, the universal and meta-historical rationality of the Enlightenment is confronted with profound and irreversible transformations on multiple ontological, epistemological, and normative levels. These shifts, rather than being mere aberrations or reactions to modernity, signal a deeper restructuring of the foundational premises upon which secularism and the nation-state were built. The rise of transnational movements, the dissolution of territorial certainties, and the increasing complexity of global interdependencies pose fundamental challenges to the sovereignty of nation-states, while the cosmopolitanization of the world restructures the conditions under which power, authority, and identity are constituted (
Bauman 2000;
Beck 1999;
Beck and Sznaider 2006;
Giddens 1990,
2002;
Jong 2022). These transformations, however, are not external to modernity but are instead the unintended consequences of its rationalization, expansion, and contradictions—manifesting as crises that undermine the very structures they once reinforced (
Beck 1992). Religion, which was systematically disciplined, instrumentalized, or marginalized by secular nation-states and rational institutions over the past two centuries, has resurfaced with renewed intensity, asserting itself not simply as a residual phenomenon of the past but as a vital force shaping the trajectories of the present (
Hofstee and van der Kooij 2013;
Labuschagne 2013). The resurgence of religious actors, institutions, and discourses must thus be understood within the broader context of the radical indeterminacy defining the contemporary global condition (
Jong 2023b).
Cosmopolitanization has emerged as the defining force of late modernity, marking the transition beyond the rigid dichotomies that characterized the first wave of modernization. Unlike earlier forms of globalization, which were primarily extensions of national frameworks onto a broader world stage, cosmopolitanization operates as an internal transformation—a structural shift that erodes established distinctions, reconfigures relationships, and generates new configurations of power.
Beck (
2008,
2016b),
Beck and Sznaider (
2006) conceptualizes this transformation as the emergence of the “second modernity”, a phase in which the contradictions, reflexivities, and side effects of the first modernity give rise to a new global condition. This condition is not simply about the increasing interconnectedness of societies but involves a fundamental restructuring of political, economic, and cultural life on a planetary scale. Cosmopolitanization, in this sense, is not a choice but an immanent force—an unavoidable reality in which social actors, institutions, and identities are progressively embedded in transnational networks and interdependencies (
Jong 2024b;
Beck 2008,
2016b).
At the core of cosmopolitanization lies its deconstructive and reconstructive duality. On one hand, it functions as a disruptive force that dissolves national boundaries, dislodges fixed identities, and undermines the centrality of the nation-state. On the other hand, it operates as a constructive force, forging new configurations of governance, solidarity, and belonging that transcend the limitations of national and secular orders. This dual process signifies that cosmopolitanization is neither a linear progression nor a transition toward a predetermined order; rather, it is an emergent condition characterized by profound indeterminacy, transnationality, and global interconnectedness (
Jong 2024a). Indeterminacy captures the erosion of established distinctions—between the local and the global, the internal and the external, the national and non-national, the rational and irrational, the religious and the secular, and so on—resulting in a fluid, contingent reality where identities, institutions, and systems are continuously reconstituted (
Beck 2002b,
2007;
Jong 2022,
2023a). Transnationality signifies the increasing entanglement of political, economic, and cultural actors across multiple territorial scales, creating hybrid spaces that exceed the sovereignty of nation-states (
Beck 1999;
Beck and Sznaider 2006;
Jong 2024b). Finally, global interconnectedness reflects the deep interdependencies produced by systemic global crises—climate change, financial volatility, digital surveillance, terrorism, and pandemics—rendering the traditional logics of national governance increasingly obsolete (
Beck 1999,
2002a,
2007).
The most consequential impact of cosmopolitanization lies in its challenge to the secular–national order, the foundational regime that has structured political and epistemic authority for the past two centuries. The modern nation-state, historically positioned as the primary arbiter of political sovereignty, religious regulation, and legal order, is now increasingly challenged in containing the forces reshaping global governance. Secularism, which was deeply embedded in the logic of nation-state formation, no longer functions as an unquestioned principle of political legitimacy but has become a contested and fragmented field of negotiation (
Mahmood 2012,
2016;
Hurd 2008). The decline of absolute state sovereignty does not imply the disappearance of states; rather, it signals a redistribution of power, where non-state, non-national, post-national, and transnational actors—ranging from global corporations and international organizations to religious movements and digital networks—assume roles that were once monopolized by national governments (
Appadurai 1996;
Harvey 1998;
Negri and Hardt 2000).
This transformation is exemplified by the rise of post-national and transnational structures that challenge traditional state-centric mechanisms of governance. The increasing prominence of supranational organizations, such as the BRICS alliance and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), underscores a global shift away from the dominance of the Westphalian nation-state model. Simultaneously, the proliferation of transnational social movements demonstrates the increasing deterritorialization of political agency (
Haynes 2001,
2012;
Nederveen Pieterse 2017). These movements bypass national political structures, leveraging decentralized mobilization strategies, blockchain-based financial networks, and social media platforms to exert influence at regional and global levels.
At the same time, global economic and security architectures—such as AI-driven financial markets, multinational corporations leveraging digital offshore networks, transnational cybercriminal syndicates, and the expansion of surveillance capitalism—operate through deterritorialized logics that circumvent state-based regulatory frameworks (
Zuboff 2019;
Deibert 2023). The emergence of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) in China, Nigeria, and the EU, alongside the rise of decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms (
Auer et al. 2023), illustrates how economic and technological forces are reshaping global governance beyond the traditional purview of nation-states. Similarly, the increasing integration of private security firms and autonomous warfare technologies—such as AI-powered drones in Ukraine and Gaza (
Scharre 2023)—reflects the ways in which power is shifting from state actors to transnational and corporate entities. These developments indicate the emergence of a post-national political order in which sovereignty is no longer confined within territorial borders but instead operates through complex assemblages of actors, institutions, and networks spanning multiple levels of governance (
Negri and Hardt 2000;
Jong 2023b).
The reconfiguration and resurgence of religious movements, institutions, and ideologies must be understood within this broader framework of cosmopolitanization. Since the late 20th century, religion has not only persisted but has restructured itself beyond the constraints imposed by the secular nation-state. The Iranian Revolution, the Solidarity movement in Poland, the liberation theology movements in Latin America, the global expansion of Evangelical Christianity, the Islamization project in Pakistan, and the institutional transformation of Catholicism in the final decades of the twentieth century all reflect the ways in which religious actors have reconstituted themselves as transnational and post-national forces. These developments did not signify a “return” of religion in a pre-modern sense but rather the cosmopolitanization of religion, where religious traditions adapt, hybridize, and operate within global networks that transcend national and secular constraints (
Possamai 2017;
P. L. Berger 2017;
Beyer 1994,
2007;
Beck 2010;
Casanova 1994;
Habermas 2008b). Now, the geography of religious authority is no longer confined to national institutions but is instead embedded in global circulations of capital, migration, digital communication, and political mobilization.
Post-secular cosmopolitanization thus entails a fundamental reordering of the religious–secular relationship, where neither the state nor secular institutions can unilaterally determine the place of religion in public life. This transformation does not imply the collapse of secular governance but rather its fragmentation and recomposition in ways that necessitate new theoretical and political frameworks. As religious and secular actors alike navigate the uncertainties of a deterritorialized world, the boundaries between politics, faith, and governance become increasingly fluid, requiring constant negotiation and adaptation.
Cosmopolitanization, then, is not merely a force that destabilizes the modern order—it is a process that generates new configurations of power, solidarity, and conflict, driven by the interplay of global risks, transnational movements, and the deterritorialization of religious and political identities. In this light, the post-secular era is not a return to the past, nor is it a linear movement toward a singular future; rather, it is an ongoing metamorphosis in which the categories of modernity—secularism, nation-state, sovereignty, and religion—are reconfigured, unsettled, and reimagined.
4. Post-Secular Cosmopolitanization: The Restructuring of Religious and Secular Orders in a Globalized World
Post-secularism has been widely employed to describe the persistence and resurgence of religion within societies that were once thought to be undergoing secularization (
Habermas 2003;
Casanova 1994;
Asad 2003;
Crockett 2018). As a theoretical framework, it critiques the limitations of secular modernity by recognizing that religion continues to shape public life, political discourse, and identity formation (
Beaumont 2018;
Ratti 2018;
Kaltsas 2019). However, dominant conceptualizations of post-secularism have largely remained confined to Western Christian (liberal) democracies, assuming the continued primacy of secular institutions while merely acknowledging the renewed visibility of religion. This framing limits the scope of post-secularism to a dialectical interaction between religion and secularism, wherein religion is tolerated within the broader epistemic dominance of secular rationality.
However, scholars such as
Peter Beyer (
2006),
Manuel Vásquez (
2011), and
A. Anderson (
2013) have demonstrated that the resurgence of religion must be understood beyond the constraints of Western political secularism. They argue that religious movements are increasingly asserting themselves as global ideological forces rather than merely reactive responses to secular modernity.
A. Anderson (
2013), for instance, illustrates how the rapid expansion of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements has fundamentally transformed global Christianity. These movements do not simply negotiate within secular–liberal democracies but actively transcend national boundaries, creating alternative networks of authority that function independently from both nation-states and traditional denominational structures. The dominance of secular–liberal paradigms in much of the post-secular literature has obscured the global dimension of these transformations, reducing post-secularism to a Western political framework rather than a broader reconfiguration of religion’s role in governance and power.
In contrast, post-secular cosmopolitanization does not merely signify the increasing visibility of religion within secular frameworks but marks a profound structural transformation that reconfigures the entire relationship between religion, secularism, and governance on a transnational, post-national, and global scale. This shift underscores how religious movements increasingly mobilize beyond traditional nation-state structures, influencing global governance and challenging the assumption that secularism remains the dominant epistemic framework in the modern world.
A. Anderson (
2013) and
Vásquez (
2011) both highlight how Pentecostal networks operate as post-national religious structures, effectively dissolving the nation-state’s monopoly over religious authority and creating new modes of political and social engagement. These examples suggest that post-secular cosmopolitanization is not merely a theoretical construct but a material transformation in how religious movements engage with governance at multiple scales.
The scholarly discourse on post-secularism has generally sought to address the resilience of religion through multiple theoretical frameworks, including the decline of secularization (
Casanova 1994;
Gräb 2010;
Labuschagne 2013), the resurgence of religion in politics and media (
Habermas 2006,
2008b;
Knott 2010), and the increasing diversity of religious expressions (
Jamal and Neo 2019;
Possamai 2017). However, these perspectives also remain largely constrained within nation-state epistemologies, assuming that religion re-emerges within pre-existing political structures. In contrast, post-secular cosmopolitanization necessitates a rethinking of these categories by recognizing that religion is no longer confined to national, institutional, or even traditional theological boundaries. Instead, it is embedded in post-national and transnational configurations that radically transform its institutional, doctrinal, and social expressions. Unlike classical secularization theories that predicted religion’s gradual retreat into private life, this new paradigm underscores the active role of religion in reshaping global institutions, discourses, and power structures, positioning it as an integral rather than marginal force in contemporary governance.
The evolution of post-secular thought has been shaped by key intellectual contributions.
Andrew Greeley’s (
1966) early engagement with post-secularism suggested that Catholicism’s accommodation of certain secular principles—such as evolution and universalist theological interpretations—was indicative of an internal transformation within Christianity rather than a direct confrontation with secular modernity. Klaus Eder (
Sheedy 2021) later expanded the term to highlight the persistence of religious beliefs despite secularization’s dominance, reinforcing the idea that secularization was neither linear nor irreversible (
Beaumont and Eder 2018).
Jürgen Habermas (
2001,
2003,
2006,
2008a,
2008b), one of the most influential proponents of post-secularism, framed it as a call for reflexive engagement between religious and secular actors in the public sphere, particularly in Western democracies. While these contributions have enriched the understanding of post-secularism, they remain tied to the notion that secular institutions retain epistemic and political primacy. Post-secular cosmopolitanization, by contrast, does not assume a stable secular foundation. Instead, it theorizes an emerging global order in which religious institutions, networks, and subjectivities shape governance and political economies in ways that dissolve national, epistemic, and institutional boundaries.
Post-secular cosmopolitanization fundamentally departs from dominant conceptions of post-secularism in three major ways. First, whereas post-secularism is largely concerned with negotiating the place of religion within secular political orders, post-secular cosmopolitanization reflects a global process that dismantles the hegemony of the secular–national order itself. The modern state is no longer the exclusive regulator of religious authority, as transnational religious movements, global financial institutions, and digital religious networks operate beyond national constraints (
May et al. 2014;
Beyer 1994). Although the project of nation-state formation and secularization, whether in the Christian West or on a global scale, never achieved complete hegemony, their authority and influence were strong enough that religious institutions—like many other non-national actors—despite their relative power and agency, even at a transnational level, were compelled to align themselves with—and even confront—the regulatory frameworks of secular nation-state structures. To ensure their survival and advance their objectives, they had to either establish religious nation-states or strategically influence powerful existing nation-states, a process that inevitably led to their reconfiguration. However, in the current trajectory of post-secular cosmopolitanization, this dominance faces significant new challenges, as non-national and non-secular entities have now acquired the capacity to reconstruct themselves beyond national episteme and institutions. It is precisely this force of indeterminacy—the ability of non-secular and non-national actors to reorganize outside the constraints of the secular nation-state paradigm—that remains largely overlooked in dominant post-secularism theories. Second, while post-secularism is often framed as a reaction to the failures of secularization, post-secular cosmopolitanization, as discussed above, is not reactive but generative. It actively produces new and diverse religious, political, and social configurations that cannot be contained within classical secular frameworks, dissolving the epistemic and institutional boundaries that previously separated religious and secular spheres (
Mahmood 2005,
2006;
Beck 2010;
Jong 2023a). Third, whereas dominant post-secularism assumes the continued relevance of secular institutions in structuring governance, post-secular cosmopolitanization recognizes that the differentiation between religious and secular authority is collapsing as both become embedded in transnational and deterritorialized networks of influence. This process challenges the longstanding assumption that governance must operate within secular rationality and instead positions religion as an integral force in shaping global governance, economic institutions, and social movements.
4.1. The Three Dimensions of Post-Secular Cosmopolitanization
Post-secular cosmopolitanization, therefore, must be understood as a structural reordering of religious and secular authority, producing new dynamics of power that challenge both nation-states and classical secular institutions. This process unfolds through three interrelated features: radical indeterminacy, transnational deterritorialization, and global interconnectedness.
4.1.1. Radical Indeterminacy: The Collapse of Fixed Epistemic and Institutional Boundaries
One of the most defining characteristics of post-secular cosmopolitanization is its ability to destabilize fixed boundaries between the secular and the religious, the national and the transnational, the local and the global. Classical secularism was predicated on a strict separation between religion and state or politics, with religion relegated to the private sphere while the secular state maintained exclusive control over political and legal structures (
Taylor 2007;
Asad 2003). However, post-secular cosmopolitanization renders these distinctions obsolete by producing a fundamental indeterminacy, or what
Beck (
2016a) calls the process of metamorphosis, in how religion and secularism are conceptualized, practiced, and governed.
This indeterminacy is particularly evident in the way global crises have blurred the lines between religious and secular modes of governance (
Beck 1992,
2010;
Beck and Sznaider 2006;
Jong 2024b). Religious actors are no longer confined to theological or spiritual concerns but actively shape international policies, humanitarian aid, and economic systems. Faith-based organizations play a crucial role in refugee assistance, disaster relief, and transnational advocacy, creating new sites of authority that transcend national and secular governance structures (
Beckford 2003;
Beyer 1994,
2006,
2020;
Wuthnow and Offutt 2008). The Vatican, for example, has played a key role in mediating global humanitarian efforts, most notably in its advocacy for refugees and climate action through institutions like Caritas Internationalis (
Diener and Habisch 2022;
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011). Similarly, in the Islamic world, Islamic institutions like Islamic Relief Worldwide operate as transnational humanitarian organizations, providing aid in conflict zones such as Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, often filling gaps left by state institutions (
Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003;
Petersen 2016). Jewish humanitarian organizations, such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), have also significantly contributed to global relief efforts, operating in over 70 countries and engaging in disaster response, refugee resettlement, and economic development initiatives (
Weitzman 2017).
Additionally, transnational faith-based organizations have become influential in international policy discussions, particularly in shaping debates on migration and human rights. The World Council of Churches (WCC) has consistently advocated for ethical migration policies at the United Nations, positioning religious ethics as a foundation for global governance structures (
Robertson 2018;
Haynes 2021). Moreover, religious actors have taken the lead in climate justice movements, with Buddhist, Hindu, and indigenous spiritual organizations integrating religious ecological ethics into global climate negotiations (
Koehrsen et al. 2022;
Jenkins 2017). The increasing role of these transnational religious institutions challenges the assumed neutrality of secular humanitarian governance, demonstrating that post-secular cosmopolitanization extends beyond theological debates and into practical, policy-driven global interventions.
However, this destabilization of traditional secular–religious boundaries is not merely a neutral shift but has also created fertile ground for the rise of religious populism and identity-based mobilizations.
Zúquete (
2017) argues that the resurgence of religious activism must be analyzed alongside the growing influence of populist movements that instrumentalize religion as a core component of political identity and national belonging. In the context of post-secular cosmopolitanization, religious populism operates by appropriating religious symbols, narratives, and moral frameworks to challenge perceived elite-driven secular cosmopolitanism. This has been particularly evident in Europe and the United States, where right-wing populist movements have weaponized Christian identity as a marker of national and civilizational authenticity, presenting it as an embattled force against globalization, multiculturalism, and Islam (
Zúquete 2017). Similarly, in the Global South, populist leaders such as Narendra Modi in India, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey have fused religious nationalism with populist rhetoric, portraying themselves as defenders of religious tradition against liberal secular elites.
This dynamic extends beyond national politics into the transnational sphere, where populist religious movements have leveraged digital platforms and global networks to expand their influence. Digital religious activism, ranging from Evangelical and Pentecostal mobilization to Islamist digital preachers, has facilitated new forms of populist engagement that bypass traditional religious hierarchies and state controls (
Possamai 2017;
Beyer 2006).
Zúquete (
2017) highlights that these movements thrive on a sense of grievance, positioning religion not merely as a matter of faith but as a potent force of cultural and political resistance against secular globalization. These developments suggest that post-secular cosmopolitanization is not simply an expansion of religious participation in global governance but also a battleground where competing visions of modernity, identity, and authority are contested through religious populism.
Furthermore, the rise of digital religious spaces has created new forms of religious authority that operate beyond traditional institutions. Social media platforms allow decentralized religious movements to gain global influence, bypassing state regulation and institutional control (
Possamai 2017;
Beyer 2006). This shift has led to the emergence of online religious influencers—phenomena like “YouTube sheikhs,” “TikTok preachers,” or “Facebook pastors”—who disseminate religious interpretations, issue virtual fatwas, and mobilize transnational audiences (
Campbell and Tsuria 2021;
Grieve 2020). Unlike traditional clerics embedded in institutionalized religious hierarchies, these digital religious figures construct their legitimacy through networked interactions, algorithmic visibility, and participatory engagement with their followers, challenging conventional religious authority structures (
Cheong et al. 2012;
Oosterbaan 2006).
This radical indeterminacy challenges both the epistemic legitimacy of the secular state and the institutional monopoly of religious authorities, forcing all actors to continuously redefine their legitimacy in an evolving global landscape. For instance, in the case of Islam, digital preachers such as Mufti Menk and Yasir Qadhi have amassed millions of followers, transforming social media into a key site for religious discourse, independent of national or theological institutions (
Echchaibi 2011;
Larsson 2019). Similarly, evangelical movements have leveraged digital platforms to expand their global outreach, with churches such as Hillsong and Bethel amassing transnational congregations through online sermons, virtual prayer groups, and interactive digital worship (
Hutchings 2017;
Martí 2017). Additionally, Buddhist and Hindu digital networks have flourished, with global meditation communities and live-streamed ritual practices now offering religious experiences beyond territorial constraints (
Connelly 2010).
Governments and traditional religious institutions have attempted to regulate these new digital religious spaces, often with limited success (
Sousa et al. 2021). Efforts to impose state control over online fatwas and digital religious teachings—such as Saudi Arabia’s official e-fatwa platform and Egypt’s Dar al-Ifta’s social media outreach—reflect attempts to reclaim religious authority in cyberspace. Similarly, the Vatican has sought to monitor and engage with Catholic digital evangelism, recognizing the disruptive potential of online charismatic movements (
Campbell and Tsuria 2021). These cases illustrate how digital platforms have become crucial battlegrounds for religious legitimacy, destabilizing long-standing theological, institutional, and state-controlled religious authorities.
4.1.2. Transnational Deterritorialization: The Disintegration of Nation-State Control over Religion
The second feature of post-secular cosmopolitanization is the deterritorialization of religious authority and governance. The nation-state historically functioned as the primary regulator of religious institutions, defining acceptable religious practices through legal frameworks and bureaucratic oversight (
Mahmood 2005,
2006,
2012;
Hurd 2008). However, under post-secular cosmopolitanization, religious actors and institutions increasingly operate beyond national boundaries, rendering state control ineffective.
This deterritorialization manifests in multiple ways. First, religious movements are increasingly organized through transnational networks rather than national religious institutions (
Wuthnow and Offutt 2008). For instance, the global expansion of Evangelical Christianity, Islamic finance, and Buddhist transnational movements demonstrates that religious authority is no longer rooted in territorial sovereignty but in networked relationships across multiple jurisdictions (
Beyer 1994;
Obadia 2010). The rapid proliferation of Pentecostal megachurches, such as the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) originating in Nigeria but now present in over 190 countries, highlights how evangelical movements are structured beyond national boundaries, establishing themselves as transnational religious corporations (
Gifford 2004;
Freston 2001). Similarly, the spread of Salafi Islam through Gulf-funded religious institutions—such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the Muslim World League—demonstrates how Islamic doctrinal authority is increasingly shaped by transnational networks that circumvent state-controlled religious establishments (
Mandaville 2007;
Bonnefoy 2011). In the case of Buddhism, the transnationalization of Tibetan Buddhist organizations—such as the Dalai Lama’s Global Network of Dharma Centers—illustrates how religious institutions adapt to diaspora conditions, sustaining legitimacy through digital communication, philanthropic activities, and cross-border monastic networks (
McMahan 2008;
Lopes 2015).
Second, legal and political institutions are losing their ability to regulate religious life, as seen in the increasing influence of religious NGOs, diaspora religious communities, and global religious advocacy groups in shaping international law (
Knott 2010;
May et al. 2014;
Lehmann 2016). Organizations such as the United Religions Initiative (URI) and the International Religious Freedom Alliance (IRFA) function as global mediators, lobbying for religious rights, interfaith dialogue, and policy reforms at the United Nations and other international institutions (
Grim and Finke 2011;
Fox 2021). The influence of diaspora religious communities—such as the transnational mobilization of Sikh political movements advocating for Khalistan or the role of the Iranian Shiite diaspora in funding and supporting religious seminaries abroad—further demonstrates how religious authority is detached from national legal frameworks and operates across multiple jurisdictions (
Alfonso et al. 2004;
Vásquez 2008).
Most significantly, deterritorialization has restructured the economic foundations of religious institutions. Islamic banking, Vatican investments, and global philanthropic religious foundations operate through transnational financial markets, circumventing national regulatory systems (
Turner 2010,
2011). The global halal economy exemplifies how religious economic systems function independently of state governance, with transnational certification bodies regulating Islamic dietary, pharmaceutical, and financial markets beyond the oversight of national governments (
Lever and Puig 2018;
Izberk-Bilgin and Nakata 2016). Meanwhile, the Vatican’s financial empire, managed through institutions such as the Institute for the Works of Religion (commonly known as the Vatican Bank), holds significant investments in international real estate, stock markets, and ethical investment portfolios that align with Catholic social teachings (
Posner 2015). Evangelical financial networks—such as Prosperity Gospel megachurches and faith-based investment funds—have similarly developed global economic infrastructures that integrate religious doctrine with capitalist enterprise, generating billions of dollars annually through televangelism, publishing, and digital tithing platforms (
Bowler 2013). These transformations reveal that religious authority is no longer confined to national institutions but embedded in global circulations of capital, migration, and digital communication.
4.1.3. Global Interconnectedness: The Embeddedness of Religion in Global Systems
The third defining feature of post-secular cosmopolitanization is global interconnectedness, which reflects the profound interdependencies between religious and secular actors at a planetary scale. Unlike earlier models of globalization, which framed religion as either a relic of the past or an instrument of political resistance, post-secular cosmopolitanization reveals that religious institutions are structurally embedded in global systems of governance, economy, and security.
This interconnectedness is particularly evident in the ways religious movements and institutions participate in transnational governance structures. For instance, the Catholic Church’s involvement in global climate negotiations—through initiatives like Pope Francis’s Laudato Si’ encyclical, which advocates for environmental sustainability—demonstrates its influence on international policy debates and ecological frameworks (
Francis 2015;
Jenkins 2017). Similarly, Islamic humanitarian organizations such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Qatar Charity have played pivotal roles in refugee crises across the Middle East and Africa, providing extensive aid and rehabilitation services independent of state governance (
Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003;
Petersen 2016). Buddhist networks, such as the Japan-based Soka Gakkai International and the Dalai Lama’s diplomatic engagements, have actively participated in global peace initiatives, human rights campaigns, and interfaith dialogues aimed at fostering reconciliation in conflict zones such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka (
Queen 2000;
McMahan 2008;
Métraux 2013).
Furthermore, religious identities and conflicts are increasingly shaped by transnational influences—extremist movements, interfaith coalitions, and religious diasporas all operate across multiple legal and political frameworks, making it impossible to contain religion within national boundaries (
Haynes 2001,
2012,
2013). The role of social movements like the global Ummah consciousness among Muslims, the expansion of Evangelical Christianity through transnational missionary work, and Hindu nationalist networks among the Indian diaspora highlight how religious identities are mobilized beyond state frameworks (
Van der Veer 1994;
Gorski and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 2013). The Islamic State’s recruitment of foreign fighters, the radicalization of Buddhist nationalist groups like Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar, and the global reach of white Christian nationalist movements in North America and Europe further illustrate how transnational religious networks shape ideological, social, and geopolitical conflicts (
Juergensmeyer 2003,
2009;
Juergensmeyer et al. 2019;
Wiktorowicz 2005;
Wuthnow and Offutt 2008).
Crucially, global interconnectedness does not merely mean that religious actors influence global affairs—it signifies that religion is fundamental to how globalization itself unfolds. Economic globalization has created new markets for religious consumerism and tourism, as seen in the multi-billion-dollar halal industry, the expansion of Christian-themed entertainment and pilgrimage sites, and the increasing commodification of religious artifacts and experiences (
Izberk-Bilgin and Nakata 2016;
Lever and Puig 2018). Technological globalization has enabled new forms of digital spirituality, with faith-based apps, online religious communities, and live-streamed worship services redefining religious engagement beyond physical congregations (
Campbell and Tsuria 2021). Meanwhile, political globalization has forced secular institutions to accommodate religious claims in ways that were previously unimaginable, including legal battles over religious freedom at the European Court of Human Rights, the negotiation of religious autonomy in multicultural societies, and the direct influence of faith-based advocacy groups in shaping policies on bioethics, migration, and education (
Bowen 2007;
Hurd 2015).
4.2. Analyzing the Three Implications of Post-Secular Cosmopolitanization
The post-secular cosmopolitanization of religion has fundamentally restructured the relationship between religion, secular governance, and global power dynamics. As outlined in the introduction, this process manifests in three primary consequences: (1) the disruption of the secular state’s regulatory authority, (2) the reconfiguration of religious authority through transnationalization and digitalization, and (3) the destabilization of the conventional boundaries between religious and secular governance.
4.2.1. The Disruption of the Secular State’s Regulatory Authority over Religion
The regulatory authority of the secular nation-state over religion was historically constructed as a means to consolidate political sovereignty, maintain social order, and delineate the boundaries of public and private religious expression. As mentioned earlier, even powerful transnational religious entities, for their survival or operations, were compelled to adjust themselves in various ways within the coordinates of the (global) regime of the secular nation-state. However, the forces of post-secular cosmopolitanization have severely challenged this model, as transnational religious movements, the post-national reconfiguration of many classical religions, diaspora networks, and digital religious communities bypass state-centered regulatory mechanisms.
James A. Beckford (
2003) notes that globalization has significantly weakened the ability of secular states to control and regulate religious movements, particularly in the face of increasing transnational flows of religious actors, ideologies, and financial resources (
Beckford 2003). The erosion of the Westphalian model of state sovereignty has made it increasingly difficult for governments to impose uniform regulatory policies on religious organizations, especially those operating across multiple jurisdictions. For example, the rise of international faith-based organizations, such as Islamic Relief Worldwide and Caritas Internationalis, challenges the traditional nation-state’s monopoly over social welfare provision, creating parallel governance structures that operate independently of secular state authority (
Beyer 2007;
Beckford 2012).
Moreover,
Lionel Obadia (
2010) highlights how the emergence of transnational religious “markets” has facilitated a shift from state-controlled religious institutions to decentralized, networked religious economies that operate beyond national legal frameworks (
Obadia 2010). The proliferation of independent religious schools, online religious education platforms, and cross-border missionary activities further undermines the regulatory reach of the secular state. This phenomenon is evident in countries such as France, where government policies attempting to regulate Islamic religious schools have faced resistance from transnational funding networks and ideological affiliations that extend far beyond national borders (
Beckford 2003;
Beyer 1994).
Additionally, international legal frameworks increasingly serve as sites where pressures on state authority over religious governance become evident. While transnational legal institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have ruled on significant cases concerning religious freedom, their impact on national policies is complex and context-dependent. In some instances, these institutions have influenced national governance by providing a platform for contesting state decisions on religion; in others, they have upheld national rulings, reinforcing rather than undermining state sovereignty. A notable example is
Lautsi v. Italy (2011), where the ECtHR reviewed Italy’s policy on the display of crucifixes in public schools. While the case was initially seen as a challenge to national authority on religious matters, the final ruling upheld Italy’s stance, demonstrating how such institutions do not always override national legal frameworks but instead reflect the ongoing negotiation between national and transnational legal orders (
Evans 2012;
Kende 2013). This case illustrates that rather than rendering the nation-state obsolete, transnational legal institutions function as arenas where national and international pressures intersect, sometimes reinforcing state authority and at other times challenging it.
4.2.2. The Reconfiguration of Religious Authority: Digitalization and Transnationalization
The second major implication of post-secular cosmopolitanization is the profound reconfiguration of religious authority. Traditional centers of religious knowledge and governance, once territorially bound within national or regional institutions such as seminaries and official religious councils, are increasingly decentralized and contested. Two key processes—digital religious communication and transnational religious flows—are driving this transformation.
The rapid expansion of digital religious platforms has democratized access to religious knowledge, challenging the hierarchical authority of traditional religious elites. As
Beckford (
2003) discusses, the internet has created a highly fragmented religious landscape where anyone with digital access can produce and disseminate religious interpretations (
Beckford 2003). In the case of Islam, for instance, the authority of traditional clerics is increasingly rivaled by independent scholars and social media influencers who use digital platforms to issue religious rulings (fatwas), engage in theological debates, and mobilize global audiences. This phenomenon has been particularly pronounced in the rise of “YouTube sheikhs” and virtual religious communities that operate beyond institutional control (
Bunt 2018,
2022;
Whyte 2022;
Zaid et al. 2022;
Ibrahim 2024).
Transnational religious movements have also destabilized conventional religious hierarchies. The spread of Pentecostalism across Africa, Latin America, and Asia exemplifies this shift, as independent charismatic leaders establish transnational ministries that rival traditional church authorities (
A. Anderson 2013;
Freston 2001;
Robbins 2004;
Dempster et al. 2001). Similarly, Shiite religious authority has undergone significant transformation with the rise of global clerical networks that transcend the traditional centers of Najaf and Qom, fostering a decentralized model of religious leadership that connects diasporic communities in Europe, North America, and the Middle East (
Louër 2012;
Mervin 2010;
Clarke 2014;
Corboz 2016).
This transnationalization of religious authority has further blurred the distinction between religious and secular governance. The Roman Catholic Church, through its global networks of bishops, NGOs, and diplomatic representatives, exerts significant influence on international legal frameworks, migration policies, and humanitarian initiatives (
Casanova 1994;
Philpott 2007;
Lehmann 2016). Similarly, global Islamic finance institutions, such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), operate as powerful regulatory bodies that influence financial markets well beyond the control of national governments (
Warde 2010;
El-Gamal 2006).
4.2.3. The Destabilization of the Religious–Secular Boundary: The Globalization of Religious Influence
The third and most far-reaching implication of post-secular cosmopolitanization is the destabilization of the traditional boundary between religious and secular governance. The historical assumption that religion belongs strictly to the private or cultural sphere, while secular institutions govern law, politics, and economics, is no longer tenable in the contemporary global order.
Peter Beyer (
2007) argues that globalization has enabled religious actors to play a central role in shaping international political and economic structures, thereby dissolving the rigid distinction between religious and secular governance (
Beyer 2007). This is particularly evident in the increasing role of religious institutions in global humanitarian efforts, economic policymaking, and international diplomacy. Faith-based organizations such as the World Council of Churches and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have positioned themselves as major actors in global governance, influencing policies on human rights, refugee assistance, and economic development (
Haynes 2013).
Furthermore, the resurgence of religious nationalism in various parts of the world—such as Hindu nationalism in India, Islamic governance models in Turkey and Iran, and Christian nationalist movements in the United States—demonstrates how religious ideologies are increasingly intertwined with state policies and political discourses. These movements challenge the presumed neutrality of the secular state, asserting that religious values should actively shape legal and political systems (
Jaffrelot 2019;
Tuğal 2009;
Gorski 2017).
At the economic level, religious institutions have gained significant influence over global financial markets. The rapid expansion of Islamic banking, which operates under religious principles that prohibit interest-based transactions, has reshaped economic policies across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and parts of Europe (
El-Gamal 2006). Similarly, the Vatican’s involvement in ethical investment initiatives reflects the growing entanglement of religious values with global economic governance, as seen in the Holy See’s commitment to socially responsible investment and its participation in global financial ethics discussions.
These developments illustrate that the boundary between religious and secular governance is no longer static but fluid, contested, and increasingly shaped by transnational religious actors and institutions.
6. Conclusions
The post-secular cosmopolitanization of religion does not signal a return to pre-secular religiosity nor a simple negotiation within secular modernity. Instead, it marks a reconfiguration of religious and secular domains in ways that transcend national, political, and epistemic boundaries. The assumption that secular institutions hold an uncontested monopoly over governance, legal frameworks, and public life is no longer tenable. Religion is not merely resurgent; it actively constructs new political and institutional realities, reshaping the global order.
The dissolution of the state’s exclusive authority over religious regulation is one of the most significant consequences of this transformation. Transnational religious movements, digital religious actors, and faith-based organizations no longer operate within the constraints of national frameworks but assert influence in global political, economic, and legal spheres. This shift necessitates a reassessment of governance models that have long presumed the universality of secular rationality as the organizing principle of modern political life. The regulatory mechanisms of the nation-state have become increasingly contingent, as deterritorialized religious actors engage in parallel, and at times competing, forms of authority that transcend national jurisdictions.
This restructuring of religious and secular domains is further evident in the contestation of epistemic legitimacy. Traditional religious authorities—once rooted in seminaries, clerical institutions, and centralized theological frameworks—now operate in competition with decentralized, networked, and digital forms of religious engagement. At the same time, secular legal and political structures, historically positioned as neutral arbiters of governance, are themselves challenged by religious frameworks that demand alternative forms of legitimacy beyond the liberal secular order. The entanglement of these forces indicates that neither secular nor religious authority can claim epistemic closure; instead, governance, law, and political engagement are increasingly negotiated through hybrid configurations that disrupt the historical separation of religion and politics.
Rather than reinforcing the classical binary between religious resurgence and secular decline, post-secular cosmopolitanization reveals the dissolution of these distinctions. The modern categories that once defined political and religious life—sovereignty, territoriality, secular governance, and religious authority—are undergoing profound transformations. The conditions under which religion exists within global governance are no longer dictated solely by state institutions but are shaped through transnational and post-national assemblages of power. This shift necessitates new theoretical frameworks that move beyond conventional secularization paradigms and account for the ways in which religious and secular forces co-produce the infrastructures of modernity.