Superstition, Faith, and Scripture: Sakaino Kōyō and the Politics of Buddhism in Meiji Japan

Abstract

As described in several recent studies, the appropriation of the concept “religion 宗教” in modern Japan made “Buddhism 仏教” enter a transformation process that led, ultimately, to the reimagining of its very content; according to historian of religions Isomae Junichi, one of these elements was, for instance, an emphasis on “belief” to the detriment of “practice”. However, in terms of Buddhism’s reframing into the category of “religion”, we should also pay attention to the construction of the idea of “superstition 迷信”, which appears during this time as a concept relative to “belief” or “faith”. Often considered the epitome of this belief-centered version of the dharma, the so-called New Buddhism movement (shinbukkyō undō 新仏教運動) that occurred in the turn of the 20th century played a fundamental role in establishing the concept of “superstition”. This paper focuses on Sakaino Kōyō (境野黄洋 1871–1933), a pioneer of Chinese Buddhist studies in modern Japan and one of the main leaders of the movement. In order to explore the intellectual context that gave birth to such reformist efforts, I explore his ideas during the later 1890s, a period in which he was dedicated to differentiating “belief” from “superstition”. During this time, he emphasized the eradication of “superstition”, arguing that it constituted an unsound element both socially and intellectually. Sakaino offered the idea of “poetical Buddhism” (shiteki bukkyō 詩的仏教), a method for interpreting scripture in general, and segments thereof contemporarily regarded as “superstitious” specifically. This paper situates Sakaino’s contributions to Buddhist reform—analyzed through historical and hermeneutical methods and influenced by liberal Christian theology—within the global discourse on religion and science, while critically examining how his reinterpretations navigated tensions between modern rationality and the preservation of Buddhist truth in Meiji Japan.

1. Introduction

Scholars often point out that the introduction of science and other forms of universalistic academic knowledge from the Western world upset and forced the reorganization of the Japanese archipelago’s indigenous religious worldview (Okada 2010, pp. 127–38; Godart and Godāru 2020, pp. 9–28). As science permeated Japanese society from the Meiji period (1868–1912) onward, Buddhism worked to actively negotiate with such forms of knowledge while resisting Christianity. As the newly established government sought to renegotiate treaties and gain recognition, pressure mounted for religious tolerance. In 1873, the official signpost prohibiting Christianity was removed, allowing for open missionary work and practice without persecution. The Buddhists felt a great threat from this change and criticized Christianity from the point of view of doctrinal principles, harmonization with modern science, and consistency with the Japanese state. In this process, Buddhists felt compelled to eliminate or reinterpret parts of Buddhism deemed to lack rationality. This has been shown in many previous studies (Thelle 1987, pp. 46–60; Hoshino 2012, pp. 112–30).

At the same time, during the “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika 文明開化) Meiji period, national and local government agencies sought to oversee and reform the realm of local customs and folk traditions, often viewed as backward or uncivilized. For example, this effort included issuing policies to regulate people’s manners and customs (Yasumaru 1979, pp. 162–80; 1992, pp. 65–97).1 Also, religious studies scholar Seki Kazutoshi 関一敏 posits that it was precisely these anti-folk and anti-superstition projects, for which the modern Japanese government and nation united, that created a clear contrast between the world of folk life, as a collection of “practices”, and the world of internal “belief”, as a symbol of civilization. This significantly influenced how religion is talked about in Japan today, leading to the perception that the concept of “religion” can only be understood in terms of a Christian-centric notion of faith and is inadequate to describe the system of beliefs and practices in Japan (Seki 1997, pp. 33–36). The tension between modernity and traditional practices/beliefs such as talismans, fortune telling, and magico-religious invocations, highlights a significant conflict. While this realm of “folk beliefs” (zokushin 俗信) was often dismissed as “superstition” (meishin 迷信), it remained deeply embedded in the “lives of the common people” (Hagino 2012, pp. 202–19).

In this way, meishin/superstition, which was constructed while being excluded from modern academic knowledge, was an important issue in the formation of the nation-state. One key to examining this is the series of discourses on shinkō 信仰/faith and superstition, core elements of the concept of religion since the Meiji period. During that time, Buddhism was often identified as superstition by domestic public opinions and Christians, but Buddhists, taking in this criticism, not only tried to coexist with modern academic knowledge but also emphasized the role of Buddhism in edifying/indoctrinating the nation. In other words, Buddhists spoke of the sphere of superstition as a kind of foreign body that must be eliminated to make “Buddhism” a true “religion”, and it was out of this attitude that “religion”, as well as the realm of “faith” at its core, was formed.2

Talal Asad has critically examined the modern concept of religion and the unequal power structures between Western societies and non-Western societies embedded within it (Asad 1993, pp. 27–54). Based on Asad’s arguments, “Protestant Buddhism” is often employed as an analytical concept to illustrate the transformative processes of Buddhism shaped through negotiations with Protestant countries in the West3. For example, Isomae Junichi 磯前順一 emphasizes the decline of “practice” (non-verbal customary actions such as ritual practices) and the corresponding prioritization of “belief” (verbalized systems of doctrine) in the religious history of modern Japan (Isomae 2003, p. 35). Jolyon Thomas points out that to eliminate the superstitions associated with traditional Buddhist practices—often criticized as irrational or outdated—the new discourse of “free inquiry” (jiyū tōkyū 自由討究) was used by the young Buddhists in the lineage running from the Keiikai 経緯会 (Warp and Woof Society) to the New Buddhism movement (shinbukkyō undo 新仏教運動) (Thomas 2015, pp. 34–35). “Free inquiry” was a new way of both describing and refining religious traditions. By refusing to be bound by dogmatic doctrines, this new method granted lay Buddhists and young monks aspiring for Buddhist reform the power to reinterpret Buddhism in the language of academia. “Free inquiry” was advocated by Unitarians, a liberal Christian denomination, and influenced the young Buddhist lineage spanning from the Keiikai to the New Buddhism movement. According to Thomas, it is through these attempts that the domain of “religion” was defined, and the suppression of peripheral “superstitious” movements became possible (Thomas 2015, pp. 32–36).

In this process, an important point of contention was the interpretation of Buddhist scriptures (kyōten 経典) that provide the doctrinal basis for correct faith. The question was not only how to decipher the scriptures correctly from a philological point of view but also how to justify the Buddha’s teachings therein that could be regarded as superstition. Although the formation of the concept of superstition was closely related to the transformation of scriptural interpretation, few studies have focused on this issue, and the relationship between the two has not always been clear.4 This is probably due to the attention paid to the relationship between superstition and non-scriptural indigenous traditions, as exemplified by the research on yōkai 妖怪 (mysterious phenomena, beings, etc.) by the Buddhist philosopher and educator Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1858–1919). As will be discussed below, contemporaneous liberal theology, characterized by historical criticism of the Christian Bible, played a role in the development of Buddhists’ scriptural reinterpretations.5 At the same time, under the influence of history as a modern academic discipline, Buddhist reformers and scholars, such as those associated with the Keiikai and the New Buddhism movement, opened up new dimensions in research on Buddhism while taking on a sectarian character. This was exemplified by the 1894 launch of Bukkyō shirin 仏教史林 (Grove of Buddhist History), the first modern Japanese journal dedicated to the study of Buddhist history (Fukushima 2012, pp. 124–25).

This article, focusing on the historian of Buddhism Sakaino Kōyō 境野黄洋 (1871–1933), examines scriptural reinterpretation against the backdrop of the formation of the concept of superstition. While doing so, it takes into account the social and ideological context of the late Meiji period. Known as a pioneer in the study of Chinese Buddhist history, Sakaino was one of the standard-bearers of the New Buddhism movement launched by young Buddhist lay believers in February 1899, as well as an early advocate and practitioner of historical research on Buddhism. During the infancy of Buddhist academia, which departed from traditional sectarian studies, the New Buddhism movement spearheaded an effort to eradicate superstition while using “free inquiry”. Its platform was “sound faith” (kenzen naru shinkō 健全なる信仰) and “the complete abolition of all superstition” (issai meishin no sōsetsu 一切迷信の勦絶) (Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai 1900, p. 5). However, in the 1890s, Sakaino had already participated in the Keiikai, the predecessor of the Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai 新仏教徒同志会 (Fellowship of New Buddhists), and showed great interest in the issue of superstition and scriptural interpretation. This paper analyzes the method of scriptural interpretation he presented in the 1890s and examines how he conceived of Buddhism while dealing with the concepts of superstition and faith.

2. Superstition, Yōkai, and Religious Truth in the Meiji Era

2.1. Sakaino Kōyō: The Person

Sakaino was born in 1871 in the Natori 名取 district of Sendai prefecture (now Miyagi prefecture).6 Like many Buddhist intellectuals of his generation, he received a Chinese classics education as a child. Also, his mother, younger brother, and younger sister were Christians, and he attended a Catholic school and became familiar with Christianity.

When he was seventeen or eighteen years old, Sakaino became devoted to Buddhism after attending a lecture on the Deathbed Injunction Sutra (Bussui hannehan ryakusetsu kyōkai kyō 仏垂般涅槃略説教誡経) at a branch school of the Sōtō 曹洞 sect in Sendai (Sōtōshū Senmon Shikō 曹洞宗専門支校; the predecessor of Tohoku Fukushi University). In 1889, he enrolled at the Philosophy Academy (Tetsugakukan 哲学館; founded by Inoue Enryō) and, at the same time, lived as a student at Shinjōji 真浄寺, a temple of the Ōtani 大谷 branch of Shin Buddhism in the Komagome 駒込 area of Tokyo’s Hongō ward 本郷. The Philosophy Academy faculty during this period included Murakami Senshō 村上専精 (1851–1929), a pioneer in the study of Buddhist history. Murakami was in charge of courses related to Buddhism. Sakaino graduated from the Philosophy Academy in 1892 and became an Ōtani branch priest in the same year.

In 1894, Sakaino, together with Murakami, Washio Junkei 鷲尾順敬 (1868–1941), and others, launched Bukkyō shirin and began to advocate and engage in historical research on Buddhism. In 1897, he published The History of Japanese Buddhism (Dai Nihon Bukkyōshi 大日本仏教史), co-authored with Murakami and Washio, through Sokengutsu. In December 1894, he enrolled at Tokyo Imperial University’s College of Letters in the selected track (senka 選科), and at the invitation of Furukawa Isamu 古河勇 (Rōsen 老川, 1871–1899), who was leading a Buddhist reform movement of mid-Meiji young Buddhists, formed the Keiikai, the purpose of which was “free inquiry”. In January 1896, Sakaino became the chief editor of the group’s organ, Bukkyō 仏教 (Buddhism). However, during the Buddhist Public Recognition movement (Bukkyō kōninkyō undō 仏教公認教運動), which gained momentum from the 1890s to the early 1900s, internal conflicts arose within the Keiikai, ultimately leading to its dissolution.

After the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution of 1889, prominent Buddhist figures such as Inoue Enryō and Ōuchi Seiran 大内青巒 (1845–1918) proposed that Buddhism should be Japan’s sole “officially recognized religion”, emphasizing the usefulness of Buddhism to the nation. Based on this rationale, the movement to recognize Buddhism as a state-approved religion continued to develop into the Meiji 30s. It gained increasing urgency with the treaty revisions decided during the second Itō Hirobumi cabinet and the subsequent issue of mixed residence (naichi zakkyo 内地雑居) with foreigners beginning in 1899. The Buddhist community submitted their opinions on the proposed legislation to the government, but the bill ultimately failed to pass (Akamatsu 1998, pp. 279–88; Ōtani 2013, pp. 147–79). A key point of the contention in Keiikai regarding this movement was whether Buddhism should become a publicly recognized religion and seek state protection. The debate split opinions between proponents, represented by Chikazumi Jōkan (近角常観 1870–1941) and opponents, including Sakaino7. In February 1899, as an extension of the same association, Sakaino formed the Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai 仏教清徒同志会 (Fellowship of Puritan Buddhists; renamed the Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai 新仏教徒同志会 in 1903) together with Takashima Beihō (高島米峰 1875–1949) and the others. The New Buddhism movement led by the Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai lasted from 1899 to 1915. The six general principles were presented as follows.

(1)

We take sound faith in Buddhism as our fundamental principle.

(2)

We strive for fundamental reform of society through the arousal and spread of sound faith, knowledge, and morals.

(3)

We advocate for free inquiry into Buddhism and other religions.

(4)

We anticipate the utter extermination of all superstitions.

(5)

We do not acknowledge the necessity of preserving existing religious systems or ceremonies.

(6)

We reject all sorts of political protection and interference. (Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai 1900, p. 5)

By emphasizing these six principles, the new Buddhists rejected established Buddhism as “Old Buddhism” (kyū bukkyō 旧仏教) and advocated for its reform from a trans-denominational, lay-centered standpoint. It is worth mentioning that while advocating for “sound faith”, the New Buddhists distinguished “superstition” from genuine faith. According to an article titled “On Superstition” (Meishin ron 迷信論) published in their journal Shin Bukkyō, typical examples of superstition included “common Buddhist beliefs of visions of hell and paradise”, prayers to deities such as Fudō Myōō 不動明王 and Inari 稲荷, faith in the miraculous healing and protective powers of gods or buddhas, and belief in the miracles of Jesus. They emphasized that the standard for differentiating “sound faith” from superstition is “common sense” (jōshiki 常識), defined as “the most advanced intellectual knowledge of the time” (Shinbukkyō shi 1900, p. 171). Although “On Superstition” is attributed to the New Buddhists, it reflects the perspective of Sakaino, a key theorist of the New Buddhism movement, on the concept of “superstition”.

The critique towards “Old Buddhism” and unsound faith extended even beyond the rituals and doctrines of conventional Buddhism to encompass various interpretations of “faith” (shinkō 信仰) that they considered problematic. In this regard, they dismissed not only institutional Buddhist beliefs but also the faith-based perspectives of influential figures such as Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903), a pioneering philosopher of religion, and Takayama Chogyū 高山樗牛 (1871–1902), a star of the literary world. This tendency is evident in the early articles published in their journal Shin bukkyō, where members of the Shinbukkyōto Dōshikai seemed to be critical towards these other claims of “faith”.

For example, Kiyozawa Manshi’s introspective approach to “faith”, which emphasized personal religious experience and inner realization, was criticized as overly subjective and detached from societal engagement (Sakaino 1902, pp. 65–66+68–70). The Seishin-shugi (精神主義 Spiritualism) movement led by Kiyozawa and the Kōkōdō 浩々洞 circle, which sought to establish a new foundation for Buddhist faith by focusing on the individual’s relationship with the absolute, was also regarded by the New Buddhists as excessively internalized and lacking practical value. Similarly, Takayama Chogyū’s Nietzschean reinterpretation of faith, which promoted a form of aesthetic and life-affirming religiosity, was also seen as an elitist and unsustainable philosophy that failed to provide a stable foundation for a modern religious community (Sakaino 1902, pp. 66+69–70). Sakaino played a central role in articulating the New Buddhists’ position in this endeavor. His concept of “sound faith” was constructed in direct opposition to these alternative models of faith, which he categorized as either “old faith” (kyū shinkō 旧信仰) or “diseased faith” (byōteki shinkō 病的信仰). It was through this process that the New Buddhists gradually constructed their opinions about faith as articulated by Sakaino, one that was not only rational and in harmony with contemporary scientific and philosophical knowledge but also socially engaged and adaptable to the needs of modern society (Sakaino 1905a, pp. 742–54). That is to say, the formation of “sound faith” is self-defined in relation to “others”.

Although this controversy has been considered as a “conflict” between modern and pre-modern opinions (Yoshida 1959, pp. 355–58; Liang 2021, pp. 50–79), recent scholarship suggests that it should instead be seen as a product of the increasing centrality of “faith” within modern Japanese religious discourse (Wu 2020, pp. 41–43). The New Buddhists’ critique of “old faith” and “diseased faith” emerged not in opposition to “faith” itself but as a response to competing definitions of “faith” in an era when religious identity and practice were undergoing significant transformation.

2.2. A New Approach to Scripture: From the Study of Yōkai to “New Buddhism”

To examine the significance of Sakaino’s discourse on “superstition”, it is necessary to mention the establishment of Yōkai Studies by the renowned philosopher, educator, and Buddhist Inoue Enryō. It is not a coincidence that the younger generation, who advocated the idea of “new Buddhism” in Keiikai and other associations, was deeply influenced by Enryō’s stance. Scholars have regarded Inoue Enryō’s yōkai studies as part of a modern rationalistic trend. His scholarship attempted to explain yōkai based on the latest academic knowledge of the time, including physics, zoology, and psychology.8 Inoue held that yōkai had something in common with superstition, declaring, “In the end, superstition and mysteries are not different in meaning” (Inoue 1999, p. 228). Inoue’s yōkai studies can therefore be regarded as part of his project to eliminate superstition, but the purpose of the field was to then discover religious truth or, in his own words, “dispel the provisional mysteries (kakai 仮怪) and reveal the true mystery (shinkai 真怪)” (Inoue 1999, p. 238). According to Inoue, superstition emerges because people are confused about the truth of life and death, lacking a true understanding of the causes of good and bad fortune. Thus, it is necessary to promote both education and religious enlightenment to free people from the grip of superstition.

However, science was not Enryo’s only criterion when judging whether something was superstition. While he labeled tengu 天狗 (a human–monkey–avian considered a yōkai) and foxes with paranormal abilities as superstitions and tried to eliminate them, he demonstrated an ambiguous attitude towards the buddhas, bodhisattvas, and goddesses in Buddhist scriptures, never declaring them to be such (Josephson 2006, p. 156). In this way, Enryō attempted to delineate the boundary between superstition and “Buddhism”, by distinguishing between the material, tangible world (yūkei sekai 有形世界) and the intangible world (mukei sekai 無形世界) or spiritual world (seishin sekai 精神世界) depicted in scriptures. Enryō’s theory of superstition, therefore, focused on the need to separate those elements of religious belief that were grounded in the observable material world from those that were part of the spiritual or metaphysical realm, which he considered integral to Buddhism.9 In this regard, he critiqued literal interpretations of scriptures and unqualified belief in their miraculous events and supernatural elements. Through this approach, Enryō sought to preserve the essence of Buddhism while eliminating what he saw as superstitious elements that could not be reconciled with modern scientific knowledge (Inoue 1999, pp. 20–27). Inoue presented the above theory of superstition in the religious studies volume of his yōkai studies lectures, of which Sakaino was in charge of transcribing. It is clear that the young Sakaino, who studied under Inoue at the Philosophy Academy and was involved in the publication of that book, was influenced in no small measure by Inoue, who at the time was the leading authority in superstition research.

Sakaino’s position was also formed within the discursive space of the Keiikai. In its journal, Bukkyō, members criticized traditional Buddhist institutions and, seeing Buddhism as “truth”, attempted to rescue it from anti-Buddhist polemics that held it to be superstition and pessimistically world-weary (enseiteki 厭世的). In addition, the Keiikai, aiming to eliminate superstitious elements from Buddhism, promoted “free inquiry” into Buddhist scriptures and tried to seek the truth inherent in religion.

This concept of “free inquiry” was the premise that allowed Sakaino, as a young Buddhist, to put forward his insights on the interpretation of scriptures. It is worth noting that the historical significance of “free inquiry” is also expressed in Kiyozawa Manshi’s article “Discussing the Kanrenkai” (Kanrenkai o ronzu 貫練会を論ず) in 1897, which represented traditional sectarian studies and regarded itself as orthodox10. According to Kiyozawa, the Kanrenkai held that “there are those who aim to tamper with the sectarian principles”, and considered “sectarian studies interpretations” should be in accord with “the so-called track of the predecessors (senpai no kitetsu 先輩の軌轍)” (Kiyozawa 1975, p. 651).11 However, Kiyozawa argued that there is a fundamental distinction between the sectarian principles (shūgi 宗義) and sectarian studies (shūgaku 宗学): while the former were established by the sect founder, the latter are the inquiries of Buddhist scholars. Therefore, while the sectarian principles remain immutable, sectarian studies can develop under the change in society (Kiyozawa 1975, pp. 651–52). More importantly, Kiyozawa employed the term “free inquiry” to emphasize that, in an era when Western science, philosophy, ethics, and law had reshaped Japan’s national structure and the mindset of people, Buddhism also had to change in order to respond to the various criticisms towards it. However, Kiyozawa also emphasized that “free inquiry” is not absolute but relative. It is the freedom of inquiry within the scope of the Broad Book’s (Kyōgyōshinshō 教行信証) statements (Kiyozawa 1975, p. 656). The concept of “free inquiry” thus signifies an approach to Buddhist studies that rejects the rigid adherence to inherited interpretations. It encourages individual engagement with Buddhist scriptures but also makes clear that the interpretations should remain grounded in the foundational principles in the core texts of Buddhism. This recognition was also evident in the case of the Keiikai12. Let us consider an example of scriptural interpretation being discussed in the Keiikai discursive space within the novel framework of “New Buddhism”. In 1895, Sugimura Sojinkan 杉村楚人冠 (Jūō 縦横 1872–1945), one of the founders of the Keiikai and later a central figure in the Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai, wrote an article on New Buddhists’ “practical direction” for Bukkyō. Sugimura criticizes Buddhists’ usual clinging to scripture and argues as follows.

Clinging to scripture is an old and common fault of Buddhists. They regard the scriptures as all-powerful and sacred, and therefore, in one respect, they are content with what is recorded in the scriptures and do not think of proving it factually (jijitsuteki ni shōmei 事実的に証明), and in another respect, they cannot evade responsibility for all the weaknesses inherent in the scriptures themselves.

(Sugimura 1895, p. 49)

In this way, Sugimura not only insisted on factual demonstration but also held that scriptures have “weaknesses” and advocated critically reexamining their content. He also called for the reform of Buddhism through scriptural reinterpretation, stating, “We must not hesitate to change the old ways and take up new good things as the times demand” (Sugimura 1895, p. 49). As can be seen from Sugimura’s assertions, in the Keiikai during the mid-1890s, “Old Buddhists” were opponents who rigidly adhered to scriptures, and members advocated “New Buddhist” discursive practice—viewing scripture from a critical perspective through free inquiry.

As we saw in this section, the issue of the scriptures was not only discussed in the context of Inoue Enryo’s yōkai studies but also, out of their own concerns, by young Buddhists like Sakaino in the Keiikai and other groups. Both endeavors identified problems with existing Buddhism and advocated for its reform. However, Inoue’s addressed the issue of the scriptures while focusing on how to draw a line between Buddhism, which contains religious truth, and superstition. In contrast, the discussions that unfolded at the Keiikai were tied to “free inquiry”-based scriptural reinterpretation and advocacy for “New Buddhism”. The next section examines how Sakaino, influenced by Inoue’s yōkai studies and participating in the Keiikai in the mid-1890s, dealt with the issues of superstition and scripture during this period.

3. The Idea of “Poetical Buddhism”: Scriptures as a Point of Contention

At the same time as Bukkyō shirin’s launch, Sakaino worked with Murakami and Washio on researching the history of Buddhism. Their project introduced a historical perspective into research on Buddhism and marked a major shift in Buddhist studies from philosophical research in the Meiji 20s (Ejima 2010, p. 1). Sakaino’s career as a historian of Buddhism also began here, and he would later become known as a pioneer in the study of Chinese Buddhist history.13

Sakaino, who joined the Keiikai in 1894 and engaged in trans-denominational work through the journal Bukkyō, tackled the problem of scriptural interpretation while being trained as a historian of Buddhism at the Philosophy Academy. Sakaino distinguished Buddhism from superstition and presented his own way of interpreting scripture under the heading of “poetical Buddhism” (shiteki bukkyō 詩的仏教). In the opening of his eponymously titled article published in Bukkyō (no. 112) in February 1896, Sakaino begins with the general explanation that “the entity of Buddhism can be broken down into three essential qualities: (1) religion, (2) philosophy, and (3) poetry” (Sakaino 1896c, p. 70). In addition to describing these qualities and their relationships, he argues that while Buddhism was constructed as a “religion with blood, flesh, and flavor” based on the theoretical foundation of “philosophy”, “the expedient means of the written word” (moji no hōben 文字の方便) was necessary, which inevitably gave birth to the “poetical essence” of Buddhism that is expressed in the form of scripture (Sakaino 1896c, p. 70).

To understand this statement of Buddhism, it is necessary to contextualize it within the historical background of discussions on Buddhism. According to Sakaino, the publication of Inoue Enryō’s Bukkyō Katsuron 仏教活論 sparked a trend among young Buddhists at the time to regard the Bukkyō Katsuron text as the supreme Buddhist classic. This phenomenon led many Buddhists to isolate Buddhism’s philosophical element, even claiming that Buddhism is not a religion but rather a philosophy (Sakaino 1896c, p. 71). In (Inoue 1887a), Inoue published his renowned book Bukkyō Katsuron joron 仏教活論序論, in which he reframed Buddhism as philosophy (tetsugaku 哲学), a new concept translated and introduced to Japan by the Enlightenment thinker Nishi Amane 西周 (1829–1897). As an intellectual well versed in Western philosophy, Inoue saw Buddhist teachings as structured systems of logic, comparable to Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, and reinterpreted Buddhist ideas such as shinnyo 真如 (suchness) and engi 縁起 (dependent arising) in ways that aligned with modern metaphysics (Schulzer 2019, pp. 250–51, 267). As a student of Inoue and one of the young Buddhists influenced by him, Sakaino did not deny the presence of these philosophical aspects of Buddhism. However, he maintained that philosophy constituted only one part of Buddhism. As for the element of religion, Sakaino did not elaborate much on this aspect, likely because he assumed that recognition of Buddhism as a religion was widely accepted. Yet, as he depicted the debate over Buddhism as a philosophy or not, his labeling the “Old Buddhism” composed of conservative elder monks as the “religious” school may suggest that, in his view, the religious elements of Buddhism encompassed the traditions upheld by established Buddhism (Sakaino 1896c, pp. 70–72). The often-neglected “poetical” element, as Sakaino emphasized, was precisely the vast scriptural canon of Buddhism itself. He argued that his proposed concept of “poetical Buddhism” essentially represented the textual aspect of Buddhism. The term “poetical” here does not refer to poetic verses or rhymed texts within Buddhism but rather to the scriptures that give written form to the philosophy of Buddhism (Sakaino 1896c, p. 74).

It is important to note that the three elements of Buddhism Sakaino identified do not imply that, in his view, Buddhism can be divided into these three separate components. Instead, they are better understood as three inherent attributes of Buddhism or three distinct lenses through which Buddhism can be interpreted. Thus, these distinctions are largely theoretical. For Sakaino, Buddhism exists as an organic whole, where these three qualities are interconnected dynamically (Sakaino 1896c, p. 72).

According to Sakaino, approaches to Buddhism during his time could be divided into “religious” and “philosophical” schools. The former is the “Old Buddhism” of “foolish women and foolish men” who “still adhere to their customs” and just “worship Buddhism, forming a kind of hereditary nature”, while the latter is the philosophical Buddhism that flourished “during the time of Bukkyō katsuron and later” (Sakaino 1896c, p. 71).14 However, while the two schools attack each other, they both make the same mistake. They try to discern the value of Buddhism while not accurately understanding the “poetical descriptions” (shiteki kijutsu 詩的記述) of the scriptures and instead taking them as “statements of fact” (jijutsu 事述).

Followers of Old Buddhism turn ideas (risō 理想) into delusions (mōsō 妄想) and believe in them. In the scriptures, ideas are not delusions; the scriptures describe these ideas through poetical descriptions, and the reason for Old Buddhism’s error is it confuses these poetical descriptions with statements of fact. However, today’s philosophical school still attacks these old ways and dismisses these scriptures as superstition and delusion. Are not they the same as the followers of Old Buddhism in not having an eye for scripture reading?

(Sakaino 1896c, p. 72)

Here, Sakaino criticizes confusing abstract ideas with physical reality in Buddhist scripture and stresses the importance of correct understanding in this regard. Using the rhetoric that misinterpreting a Buddhist scripture can turn it into “superstition and delusion”, he emphasizes the positionality of the interpreting subject rather than scripture content itself. In this way, by deploying the concept of “poetical” descriptions of ideas that are distinct from delusions, he avoided modern rational knowledge’s essential criticism of the scriptures that arises from the dichotomy between religion and philosophy. Therefore, while criticizing the usual commentary-centered method of study and research (“as preoccupied with words, phrases, and language, undoubtedly inviting much ridicule for being overly roundabout”) he emphasizes that it is the “poetical descriptions” that require commentary (Sakaino 1896c, pp. 70–71).

Furthermore, through scriptural reinterpretation, Sakaino attempts to provide an explanation for the “superstitious” nature of scripture writing that clearly lacks rationality. One of the best examples is the understanding of bodhisattvas found in his above article on poetical Buddhism. As mentioned, Inoue Enryō did not regard bodhisattvas and other superhuman, unrealistic beings in scriptures as superstitions. In this way, the bodhisattva issue had to be dealt with to establish a Buddhism distinct from the realm of superstition. In contrast to Inoue, who tried to avoid the discrepancy by dividing the world into the tangible and spiritual and using speculative methods, Sakaino directly confronted it. Specifically, Sakaino states, “The bodhisattva is an ‘ideal person’ (risō jin 理想人) and, as the ideas discussed in the scriptures differ, accordingly appears in different forms for people” (Sakaino 1896c, p. 74), indicating how the bodhisattva exists in the realm of the “ideal person”.15 Sakaino regarded the bodhisattva as an “ideal person” precisely because he recognized that the existence of bodhisattvas in scriptures was difficult to explain through rationality. Some are said to descend from other worlds, others to appear in midair, and different sutras describe different bodhisattvas. Thus, he argued that bodhisattvas in Buddhism should be less regarded as historical figures in a literal sense than embodiments of Buddhist poetical ideals—with Kannon representing jihi 慈悲 (benevolence) and Monju representing chie 智恵 (wisdom)—which transform abstract and profound philosophical concepts into poetical and symbolic language as expedient means (hōben). At the same time, Sakaino acknowledged that certain bodhisattvas, such as Maitreya and Monju, might have historical evidence suggesting they lived in the same era as Śākyamuni. However, he argued that it should be examined individually, cautioning against conflating historical reality with poetic representation. For Sakaino, rather than treating scriptures as factual records, a more meaningful approach was to interpret them through the lens of poetical expression (Sakaino 1896c, p. 74).

In the next issue of Bukkyō (no. 113, March 1896), a reader named Nishiyama Jūkichi 西山重吉 (dates unknown) raised doubts about Sakaino’s way of understanding bodhisattvas. Nishiyama asks whether “all the buddhas and bodhisattvas of the Mahayana are the manifest virtue Dharma-body and temporary realizations of human virtues” and seeks Sakaino’s opinion on the place of his approach in relation to the traditional view of buddha-bodies, especially on the reality of Amida Buddha (Nishiyama 1896, p. 126). Thus, Sakaino’s ideas about “poetical Buddhism” were forced to answer the sensitive question of the reality of Amida Buddha, an issue that could touch the very core of the Shin sect.

Sakaino’s reply appeared in the same issue as Nishiyama’s questions. He first accepted Nishiyama’s understanding of the nature of bodhisattvas and then discussed Amida Buddha as “not the personification of a certain virtuous quality, but an ideal person of truth, goodness, beauty, and perfection”. According to Sakaino, Amida Buddha is indeed the personification of the Buddhist ideals, but unlike bodhisattvas such as Fugen or Kannon—who are conceived as the personification of a particular virtue—Amida embodies all virtues encompassing truth, goodness, and beauty in one form. Sakaino also argued that Amida signifies the point at which human beings unite with the Absolute. Here, the Absolute refers to the concept of shinnyo, which is the fundamental first principle of Buddhism in Sakaino’s views. As Sakaino described, Amida embodies the doctrine that the myriad expressions of relative difference (shabetsu 差別) and the absolute unity of equality (byōdō 平等), while interconnected, remain distinct (Sakaino 1896a, pp. 126–27).

However, Sakaino also explained that a demonstration of Amida’s reality “is difficult to understand without lining up various bothersome theories, and therefore I will [present them and] ask for your assessment in the next issue [of this journal]” (Sakaino 1896a, pp. 126–27). On the other hand, regarding the existence of this “ideal person” of Amida Buddha, Sakaino declares, “I, for example, believe that Amida Buddha exists objectively”, emphasizing Amida’s existence in the act of “believing”. Thus, while taking a critical attitude toward “superstition and delusion”, Sakaino expresses his belief in the bodhisattvas, Amida Buddha, and others represented in scripture and their actual existence. However, in the next issue of Bukkyō, Saikano did not respond to the important question of how to prove Amida’s existence.

Nevertheless, regarding the nature of Amida’s existence in Sakaino’s idea, we can find in his earlier writings his reasons for considering Amida to be an objective existence. In an article titled “New Shin Buddhism” (Shin shinshū 新真宗), after defining “religion” as “the act of conceiving an infinite being in one’s mind and taking refuge in it for peace of mind”, he distinguished between “subjective religion” (shukanteki shūkyō 主観的宗教) and “objective religion” (kyakkanteki shūkyō 客観的宗教)16. According to Sakaino, Shin Buddhism belongs to the category of “subjective-objective religion”. He argued that, because Buddhism emphasizes the nature of the mind, it should be generally regarded as a “subjective religion” compared to Christianity and other religions. However, while the Holy Path (Shōdōmon 聖道門) encourages one to see the infinite being within one’s own heart and thus is “purely subjective religion”, the distinctive feature of the Pure Land Path (Jōdomon 浄土門) is its objective conception of the infinite being—which is precisely Amida Buddha. Since the Pure Land path presupposes the objective existence of Amida Buddha, taking refuge in Amida is to take refuge in the profound and mysterious Buddhist dharma (Sakaino 1891, pp. 16–17).

Thus, it can be inferred that, in Sakaino’s view, although Amida is portrayed as a poetical expression of the perfect qualities of truth, goodness, and beauty in Buddhism, these qualities are not merely subjective ideals but are understood to have an objective existence. Sakaino suggested that to grasp Buddhist truth, it is essential to conceive of the objective infinite being—not necessarily as a physical entity, but as a real presence within the realm of thought. This conception allows believers to relate to Amida not just as a symbolic representation but as an embodiment of active virtues that manifest in the world and influence those who take refuge in them.

As examined in this section, this series of discussions surrounding the idea of “poetical Buddhism” deserves attention because Sakaino’s intellectual work is an attempt by a modern Buddhist to overcome areas in scriptures that he acknowledged could lead to superstition. In the endeavor, Sakaino faced the task of proving the existence of bodhisattvas and Amida Buddha. While he strategically avoided having to empirically ground the representations of poetical realities and ideal persons by reframing them within the dimension of faith, he sought to present a new understanding. This understanding both drew from and went beyond a mere word-by-word elucidation of the Buddhas’ teachings contained in sutras.

4. Sakaino’s Perspective on Scriptural Interpretation: The Aim of Research on Buddhist History

In May 1896, to further clarify his idea of “poetical Buddhism” and its application, Sakaino published an article titled “Once More on Poetical Buddhism” (Futatabi shiteki bukkyō ni tsukite 再ひ詩的仏教につきて) to discuss criticisms of this idea. It recorded the reviews of Sakaino’s “poetical Buddhism” published in journals such as Tetsugaku Zasshi 哲学雑誌and Nihon Shūkyō 日本宗教, along with Sakaino’s brief responses. Therein, he wrote about the “factual” and “poetical” parts of the sutras, stating that the records of the events of the historical figures of Jesus and the Buddha were for him facts (jijitsu). “What I call poetical Buddhism is”, in contrast, “the imagination constructed in Buddhist scripture, and this imagination is something that personifies Buddhist ideas (risō), or that gives them form as facts” (Sakaino 1896b, p. 220). Here, by explaining them as personifications, emphasizing the concept of “personiby [sic]” (perhaps a typo of “personify”) by especially writing the word in English, Sakaino positions the “poetical” parts of Buddhism as figurative expressions and redefines them in the realm of imagination that is distinct from historical facts.

For example, he cites the Tathāgata’s white tuft of hair between the eyebrows (byakugōsō 白毫相) illuminating “eighteen thousand worlds to the east” in the Lotus Sutra17 as well as the Buddha, in response to sentient beings, appearing out of thin air, releasing “pure light”, and presenting his transformation body in the Srimala Sutra18 (Sakaino 1896b, pp. 222–23). Similarly, Sakaino provided many examples from the scripture that he believed demonstrated his idea of “poetical Buddhism”, showing that the poetical contents constitute a large part of the scripture. According to Sakaino, some examples have a poetical quality in their wording—for instance, in the two cases mentioned above, Sakaino argued that they should be understood as metaphors rather than literal events (although he did not explain what these metaphors mean). Other examples are structured like poetry, characterized by repeated phrases. Sakaino stated that, up until that point, such contents were regarded either as literal truths, as miraculous events attributed to the Buddha’s power or as reflections of the inner mind. However, by emphasizing the “poetical” meanings of these expressions, he sought to present a new way of interpreting scripture. This attempt was made with an awareness of the situation where “today’s people might interpret this as the Buddha being like a magician or a conjurer” (Sakaino 1896b, pp. 223–24). In this sense, Sakaino’s argument should also be understood as a strategic response to the Buddhist criticism of the time. Although his statement may seem like an elitist form of Enlightenment that could not directly solve the problem of Buddha and Buddhism being viewed as superstition, it remains significant because his narrative reflects the shared pursuit of Buddhist intellectuals at the time to establish a new way of interpreting scripture that is in harmony with rationalism and modern science.19

In the above article “Once More on Poetical Buddhism”, the words of a reader named “Tōkō” 東篁 (dates unknown) appear. He expresses agreement with poetical Buddhism from the standpoint of liberal theology and interprets it as follows.

The poetical Buddhism of Sakaino, a man of letters in the Buddhist world today, … explains how to observe literary expressions of Buddhism, and it is right to call this an excellent theory in the Buddhist world at present. It has the same orientation as the use of the term “poetical expression” (Shiikateki hyōshō 詩歌的表彰) by Christian liberal philologists (kōshōgakusha 考証学者) when critiquing the Bible. When Schmiedel, a teacher of the German General Protestant Missionary Association, was living in Japan, I frequently heard his students use this term when speaking.

(Sakaino 1896b, p. 219)20

In this way, Tōkō connected the biblical research method of “Christian liberal philologists” to Sakaino’s idea of “poetical Buddhism” and pointed out the similarities between the latter and “poetical expression”. In response to this assessment, Sakaino states, “I can only express my gratitude that he has picked up on my intentions and understood basically all my thoughts completely” and agreed that “poetical Buddhism” has commonalities with “poetical expression” (Sakaino 1896b, p. 219). As can be seen from this, Sakaino’s “poetical Buddhism” attempt was influenced by a trend in the Western world at that time―critically interpreting the Bible within the framework of liberal theology―and introduced this trend into Buddhist studies in Japan. However, after acknowledging the similarity between the two, Sakaino states that “poetical Buddhism” is the “eternal method” of Buddhist sutra interpretation and emphasizes poetical Buddhism’s nature as “a method of research on Buddhism” (Sakaino 1896b, p. 219).

Also noteworthy in this assessment of Tōkō is the name “Schmiedel”. Tōkō states that the students of this person often used the term “poetical expression”. Although it is uncertain whether poetical Buddhism was directly influenced by him, I must touch on Schmiedel to further examine how Sakaino advocated “poetical Buddhism” while negotiating with Western thought and the potential of “poetical Buddhism”.

From Tōkō’s description, we can infer that this refers to Otto Schmiedel (1858–1926), a German General Protestant Missionary Association missionary who was active in Japan from 1887 to 1892 (Auerback 2016, p. 193). Schmiedel is known for his historical Jesus research, and his views were introduced to Japan in Japanese by Minami Hajime 三並良 (1865–1940), a scholar of German philosophy and Christian thought, through two books: Kiseki hyōron 奇蹟詳論 (The Miracle in Its Relation to Religion and Science; 1891) and Insupirēshon hyōron インスピレーション詳論 (Inspiration Criticism; Schmiedel and Shumīderu 1892).21

Of particular interest here is the argument developed in the former. It deals with how to interpret areas in the scriptures that could be considered “superstition”. Furthermore, Schmiedel attempts to extend this hermeneutic to the miracles of religion in general: “I do not wish to discuss the miracles of a single religion, but the miracles of religion in general, using a method that has been in use for some time now” (Schmiedel and Shumīderu 1891, p. 12). In other words, he offered a method of interpretation, not limited to the scope of the Christian Bible, for “miracles”, which he holds are universal elements in religion. Schmiedel’s point was in line with Sakaino’s position as a Buddhist who was trying to learn from historical and hermeneutical research on Christianity, incorporating, for example, Unitarian “free inquiry”.

According to Schmiedel, the “miracles” created to decorate founders’ lives are so far removed from true religion that they need to be eliminated, and the means of doing so is “principle criticism” (genriteki no hyōron 原理的の評論; i.e., science and philosophy) and “historical criticism” (Schmiedel and Shumīderu 1891, pp. 40–59). Specifically, according to Schmiedel, science, as well as “epistemology (philosophy in the narrow sense)” based on the era’s field of psychology, determine whether miracles are “possible”, whereas “historical research” uses “miraculous stories” to offer interpretations regarding, for example, “that era’s trends, faith, worldviews, as well as whether the oral traditions and written transmissions are trustworthy” (Schmiedel and Shumīderu 1891, p. 40).

Here, the work of reinterpreting scripture through historical research and other means is also being emphasized in the framework of liberal theology. From this, as well as Sakaino’s recognition of the similarity between “poetical Buddhism” and “poetical expression”, we can glimpse part of the intellectual negotiation process between Buddhism and liberal Christianity. On the other hand, one distinction between the two lies in the foundational premise of scripture: in liberal Christianity, the Bible’s status as sacred text is universally accepted, whereas in Sakaino’s case, he faced the challenge of navigating an immense and diverse corpus of Buddhist writings. For Sakaino, the very question of what constitutes scripture had to be addressed before reinterpretation could begin. This preliminary task of scriptural demarcation became a distinctive feature of modern Japanese Buddhism.

Only through this task of filtering out what scripture is could the challenge of how to reinterpret elements considered incompatible with modern science be meaningfully addressed. It should be noted that many Buddhist intellectuals, such as Inoue Enryō and Kiyozawa Manshi, also recognized that Buddhist scriptures often contain elements that could be considered superstitious. This shared concern was part of a broader modern endeavor—the reconstruction of the domain of shin 信 (faith) in Buddhism coupled with the need to define the scriptural corpus through critical historiography—in response to challenges posed by scientific rationalism. In this context, Sakaino’s method of distinguishing between correct shin and meishin (the Japanese word that can also be understood as confused belief) exemplifies the effort among modern Buddhists to reinterpret scripture and redefine faith. In other words, Sakaino, a young Buddhist, faced the challenge of discussing and reinterpreting the concept of shin in a Buddhist context, and presented a “poetical Buddhism” that balanced modern rational knowledge and religious faith.

Sakaino’s attempt to interpret scriptures during this period also stemmed from his position that Buddhism can only be understood through historical research. For example, in a Bukkyō shirin article, while referring to the conflict between “Old Buddhism” and “New Buddhism”, Saikano expresses his own understanding of the latter: “At a time when the words ‘Old Buddhism’ and ‘New Buddhism’ are being bandied about, I dare to not say ‘New Buddhism’ or ‘Old Buddhism’ but ‘historical Buddhism’” (Sakaino 1894, p. 503). Although somewhat surprising given his later participation in the New Buddhism movement, Sakaino sees a destructive aspect in the popular term “New Buddhism”. While distancing himself from it, he asserts that “New Buddhism” is precisely regrasping Buddhism through historical research.

It is also worth noting that Sakaino explained the significance of the historical study of Buddhism while citing “critical research” on Christianity. He warns that in light of all of Christianity’s “scriptural delusions” and its “bizarre legends” being increasingly excluded from the “Western intellectual world” (Sakaino 1894, pp. 503–4), Buddhism too will probably encounter such criticisms and have to respond.

In the end, in the not so distant future Buddhism will be unable to avoid encountering the critical research experiment, like that directed towards Christianity … One cannot help but expect that as a result, we will find ourselves in the same rut as the Orthodox Church today, which [in response to liberal Christians’ biblical criticism] says one should not necessarily cling to the words and phrases of the scriptures and that Christianity is based on only the spirit of Christ.

(Sakaino 1894, p. 507)

How could Buddhism avoid the plight of the “Orthodox Church”? Sakaino sees potential in “Unitarian liberal Christianity” (Yuniterian teki jiyū kirisutokyō ユニテリアン的自由基督教). According to Sakaino, although there are questions raised about the “missionary function” of liberal Christianity, he considers that while they may not have the institutional power of a church, their “spirit of freedom” had, once advocated by them, caused significant upheaval in the religious world—or at least was on the verge of doing so (Sakaino 1894, p. 505). He also argues that the Buddhist world should take advantage of this “liberal spirit” to develop Buddhism anew, and that historical research on Buddhism is for seeking Buddhism’s true form in the “life” and “spirit” of Śākyamuni Buddha (Sakaino 1894, p. 510). It should be noted that Sakaino here proposed an interpretive method of understanding the sutras’ descriptions more broadly and focusing on the “spirit” behind them, rather than being obsessed with the written word.

The Unitarian Association in Japan had a significant influence on the young Buddhists during this period. A notable example is Nakanishi Ushirō (中西牛郎 1859–1930), who was one of the first to present a clear vision of “new Buddhism”. He resonated with the Unitarian emphasis on reason and its critical stance toward existing religious authorities. It is worth noting that Furukawa Rōsen, who led the Keiikai, used a three-stage framework of religious development to describe the future of Buddhism: “dogmatism, skeptical criticism, and new dogmatism” (dokudan, kaigihihyō shindokudan 独断—懐疑批評—新独断). He regarded rationality, science, and “free inquiry” as necessary conditions for reaching the second stage of “skeptical criticism”. In Furukawa’s view, the claims of the Japanese Unitarians served as a premise for breaking away from traditional customs and dismantling “old dogmatism”, paving the way for the arrival of the era of “new dogmatism”. According to Furukawa, the “common faith” advocated by Unitarians lacked the characteristics of an “affirmative faith” and instead embodied the nature of a “negative disbelief”. Thus, he argued that Unitarianism could never become the true religion in the era of “new dogmatism”.22 Nevertheless, the Unitarians maintained a close connection with the New Buddhism Movement. In March 1894, the Unitarian community even offered the Unitarian hall, Yuitsukan (located in Shiba Mita, Shikokuchō, Tokyo), as a venue for the meetings and lectures of the Shinbukkyōto Dōshikai.

5. Conclusions

As discussed in this paper, Inoue Enryō’s critical stance toward superstition can be found in Sakaino’s articles on poetical Buddhism in 1896, the same year as Inoue Enryō’s Lectures on Yōkai Studies: Religious Studies Section (Yōkaigaku kōgi: shūkyōgaku bumon 妖怪学講義 宗教学部門) was published. The two had a shared concern around this time. Sakaino, who began his research on Buddhist history in the 1890s, approached the issue of superstition by emphasizing the interpretation of scriptures. His intellectual efforts represented a response to the significant challenge of how to interpret Buddhist scriptures, which were being systematically compiled as part of sectarian summaries from the late 1870s to the turn of the century. In this context, Sakaino’s approach sought to understand scriptures not merely through doctrinal literalism but through a hermeneutics of faith—particularly as their literal descriptions had lost their perceived reality with the establishment of modern science. In this sense, his work can be seen as an attempt to move toward an experiential interpretation of Buddhist texts23. This methodological shift, which emphasized personal engagement with scripture over institutional orthodoxy, resonated with contemporaneous attempts to reimagine religious hermeneutics. Classic examples of the experiential turn in Meiji-era Buddhism include the Seishin-shugi movement of Kiyozawa Manshi and the Kōkōdō circle, as well as the writings of Takayama Chogyū. While Sakaino shared with these intellectuals a commitment to reinterpreting scripture, as demonstrated in this article, his vision of “sound faith” diverged from their approaches. This paradox of methodological alignment and disagreement in conclusions reflects how different Buddhist reformers challenged traditional exegetical frameworks while debating the nature of the reconstructed Buddhist faith.

To consider the context in which Sakaino asserted his “poetical Buddhism” scriptural hermeneutic, I turned to the biblical hermeneutic developed within the contemporaneous framework of liberal theology and explored the significance of scriptural interpretation in the late Meiji period. Drawing on ideas from liberal Christianity, Sakaino reinterpreted scriptures as expressions of the Buddha’s life and spirit. By applying source criticism and modern historical methods, he aimed to uncover Buddhism’s truth, particularly by reinterpreting elements in the scriptures that might be considered as superstitious. His approach, similar to liberal theology’s contemporaneous biblical hermeneutic, developed within the global context of debates about religion and science. In response to the passages in the scriptures that contradict modern science, Sakaino, using the rhetoric of “poetical Buddhism”, reinterpreted them to avoid the criticism that Buddhism was superstition. In other words, Sakaino did not clearly distinguish between religion and superstition but rather recognized areas within scripture that could lead to superstition and then tried to overcome them. This attempt clearly shows how ambiguous the line between religion and superstition itself was for Buddhist intellectuals of the time.

James Shields has pointed out that the New Buddhists held a liberal rather than radical stance, advocating for a reconciliation between modern science, philosophy, and Buddhism while avoiding more fundamental critiques of the social order (Shields 2017, pp. 133–36). This approach is evident in Sakaino’s engagement with scriptural reinterpretation and his criticism of superstition, which were framed as part of a broader effort to modernize Buddhism within an evolving intellectual landscape rather than as a radical departure from its traditional framework. For Sakaino, tackling the problem of superstition was not only required by his own project of Buddhist historical research but was also a means for “New Buddhism” (the replacement for “Old Buddhism”) to establish true “faith”, that is, to realize the truth of Buddhism from the life and spirit of the Buddha.24 While developing Buddhist historical research based on the conventions he had become familiar with in his modern education, the Buddhist Sakaino identified this path toward the Buddhism of a new era. In 1899, Sakaino started to be active as one of the ideologues of the New Buddhism movement, and in explaining, for example, “sound faith”, the first article of the New Buddhism movement’s platform, he distinguished it from superstition and delusion, and called for a faith with not only an intellectual aspect but also “poetical sentiment” (Sakaino 1905a, pp. 743–46). In the sense that he argues for a faith that balances modern rational knowledge and religion by introducing poetical elements, this was an extension of his writings regarding “poetical Buddhism” covered in this paper.

Sakaino’s distinction between true faith and superstition through historical–critical methods reflects his broader ambition to construct a Buddhism that could withstand both the scrutiny of modern academia and the experiential needs of lay practitioners. He would insist on this stance throughout his subsequent career both as one of the leading figures of the New Buddhism movement and as a historian of Buddhism. Furthermore, his idea of “poetical Buddhism” offers a new pathway for understanding how modern Japanese Buddhists grappled with the relationship between religious scripture and modern rationality—a tension that still shapes debates about the role of Buddhism in today’s society.