1. Introduction
The essence of human spirituality, dealing with the transcendental, cannot be fully understood or controlled by the mind, social institutions, or political practices. Hence, it is not subject to the excessive structural regulation of personal moral experience but harmoniously completes an individual’s spiritual life internally. Despite the ongoing secularization of society and culture, religion maintains a regulatory control that fosters violence. Political activities, socio-economic regulations, bureaucratic directives, and media influence individuals and are designed to establish social coercion. Thus, both religion and the state have the tendency to bring some aspect of violence to people. Currently, there is a trend to dissolve unique personality traits, de-institutionalize the state, and atomize society, replacing sacred and spiritual culture. Thus, we can conceive violence in the two ways: “in terms of an act of force, or in terms of a violation” (
Bufacchi 2005, p. 193) of a human life.
This article explores how the Eastern Church Fathers’ philosophical and anthropological views can influence individuals and societies, promoting a worldview free from conflict, violence, and terrorism. The Church Fathers’ teachings are examined from a philosophical standpoint, metaphysically, emphasizing their universal ideas and moral values. In this regard, historical periodization and particular countries do not play a significant role.
The Church Fathers, in addition to their theological reasoning and development of religious doctrine, were also involved in philosophy and their perspectives display philosophical rationality (
Meyendorff 1974). By and large, they possessed a deep understanding of ancient philosophy and incorporated its conceptual and categorical apparatus, especially that of Plato and the Neoplatonists. Many Byzantine Greek Fathers also made use of thought formulas like Plotinus’s triad of the One, the Intellect, and the Soul, and even modeled their own style of philosophizing after them. The Eastern Fathers were able to pose the anthropological and epistemological issues of Christianity since the human being’s relations with God were at the center of their theological discussions.
The Fathers advocated for humanistic principles that encouraged individuals to pursue self-discovery, personal growth, and the attainment of sacred knowledge and a relationship with God. They established moral and spiritual frameworks intended to benefit both individuals and society as a whole. In my view, their anthropological concepts and perspectives remain profoundly rational and applicable to contemporary society. Furthermore, the philosophical outlook of the Church Fathers tends to emphasize secularism alongside spirituality, as their teachings extend beyond solely divine matters to encompass the moral nature of humanity.
The goal of this article is to argue that appealing to the Church Fathers’ ideas can partially prevent various forms of violence. In pursuit of this objective, my paper offers diverse viewpoints on social violence from modern philosophers. By purposefully introducing authors from different disciplines within humanitarian knowledge, their specific perspectives on social and political violence are highlighted. The standpoints of these thinkers are different, but they are linked by two main criteria—first, an intention to analyze the causes of social violence, the origin of religions, and social religiosity; and, second, the consideration of interpersonal relations based on social mythology and religious beliefs.
Many philosophers note the emergence of religiosity on the basis of myths produced in society (Taylor, Bouchard, and Girard). Some authors emphasize the intersubjective relations of command and subordination (Arendt). Despite their diverse perspectives, all of their views are rooted in the belief that human beings are connected to sacred values and strive for spiritual enlightenment. These ideas align with the Byzantine Greek Church Fathers and enable a comparison between modern philosophy and Christian Patristics. Despite centuries of separation and different discourses, there is a shared foundation in the works of modern thinkers and theologians of Early Christianity—the individual’s relationship with God and the world.
It is worth noting that the notion of religion does not pertain to any specific church but rather refers to a “social phenomenon” in a philosophical context. Our focus is on religion as a social institution, a real and meaningful concept for countless individuals. For thousands of people, their lives are connected with religious faith, organizations, charitable structures, etc. Even in the secular era, the importance of religious communities for believers and the charitable efforts of religious organizations in modern societies cannot be denied
1. Hence, I believe that it is appropriate to talk about the relevance of religion per se in social and personal aspects. Moreover, religion’s significance and the moral values it upholds can contribute greatly to solving some of the humanitarian issues of our time.
Since the second part of the article deals with the teachings of Eastern (mostly Byzantine) Fathers, the ideological discourse is set in terms of the Christological theology of Byzantine Greek Patristics.
More specifically, the first part of this paper takes up the issue of making religion a contributor to overcoming violence, analyzing the problem of violence from a variety of philosophical perspectives. It expands the views of such thinkers as Bertrand de Jouvenel, James Mill, Max Weber, Carl von Clausewitz, and Hanna Arendt to clarify the diverse dimensions of the phenomenon of violence, particularly in terms of its connection with the notion of power. It also deals with the return of reason to social, cultural, and religious life as the means of overcoming violence in society.
Further, there is a clarification of the social and anthropological dimensions of social violence by means of the mimetic theory proposed by René Girard. The French philosopher considers that “mimesis”, or “imitation”, is the basic mechanism through which violence and aggression emerge in “archaic” religions. Violence does not exist in religion per se but comes from the followers of a religion. In the “primitive religions”, sacrifice means that the community’s troubles are transferred to the victim of sacrifice that becomes a scapegoat (
Girard 1996a). According to Girard, the spirit of aggression in the victimization process in pre-Bible religions resembles the spirit of violence in contemporary societies (
Girard 2003).
Then, an original vision of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor on modern secular society and the displacement of divinity and religiousness from the public sphere is discussed in the paper. He refers to the social imagination that creates social myths which, however, can also be justified in rational categories. In this context, religion and the idea of God are still central to the personal identities of individuals. Thus, Ch. Taylor writes about religious and secular life peaceful coexisting, concluding that this viewpoint opens the space for religions in the contemporary secular world (
Taylor 2004, p. 193).
This paper explores the purpose of religion and its impact on human development, a concept well articulated in the writings of the Early Eastern Church Fathers. I share the viewpoint of some theologians that the Church Fathers’ philosophical and anthropological doctrines on the human–God relationships are still fundamental and fresh for the present day’s societies (see, for example,
Karamanolis 2021). The article considers some relevant anthropological and epistemological ideas of Athanasius of Alexandria, Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nazianzus, and John of Damascus as beneficial and useful for violence resistance.
The conclusion suggests that in order to address different types of violence and maintain peace, religion should be clarified in the context of modern social life with humanistic and rational justifications. To fully grasp the issue of violence, one must take into account philosophical and anthropological viewpoints.
2. The Phenomenon of Violence: Philosophical Contexts
It is important to highlight how the concept of violence was recognized in the development of socio-philosophical thought. Generally, “violence” in philosophy means to powerfully enforce something over oneself or others. The philosophical principles that address violence assume the existence of the “other”, whether it is an individual, community, or society as a whole. Jean Paul Sartre writes that a human being re-creates oneself by exercising violence over the self. Bertrand de Jouvenel, a French thinker, believes that individuals reinforce their sense of humanity by asserting dominance over others and treating them as mere means to an end. Voltaire sees power inherent in making the other do what one wants. However, he relies on reason and enlightenment in reducing violence in human relations and social affairs. James Mill points out the presence of two inclinations in human nature: the desire to dominate others and the desire to exercise power over oneself. From this, he draws the correlation between the “will-to-power” and the “will-to-submission”. The reverse is also possible: a strict reluctance to obey and conform is often accompanied by a strong antipathy towards the one who dominates and commands. Mill substantiates the concept of violence as the means to protect people and to create a social order. His understanding of violence is affected by the utilitarian, highly rational, principles of his philosophy. For Max Weber, power is a chance to proclaim one’s own will despite resistance from others. Carl von Clausewitz understands war as an act of violence to compel the enemy to do what is desirable to an enforced subject. Clausewitz is known for his view that war is “the continuation of politics with other means” (
Clausewitz 2007).
However, the “war–politics” or “violence–power” ratio is invalid for the modern world as new weapon technologies are capable of destroying an entire nation in minutes. For this reason, Hannah Arendt intertwines American political and religious spheres in her book
On Revolution (
Arendt 1985). She argues that religion should play a key role when the
spiritual revolution strikes. The core principles of this revolution include restoring spirituality, increasing social spending, showing compassion for the needy, and considering human factors. Analyzing the role of religion in historical periods, she stresses that in pre-modern societies, religious beliefs were inseparable from social groups and their leaders. They represented a system of certain natural values and customs. Being deeply rooted in the communities, they maintained cultural traditions and stability in the groups of people. In the modern era, religion and religious authority were displaced by secular organizations, which has brought some political changes, revolts, and upheavals. Consequently, these shocks can trigger spiritual revolutions that demand an elevation of morality and religious values within people’s personal lives. Thus, according to Arendt, the state needs to turn to religion at these crisis periods (
Arendt 1985, p. 85). Arendt stresses that deliverance from suffering and spiritual completeness could be achieved through political actions and setting religious goals.
Any theoretical study of the phenomenon of violence requires a monosemantic concept. Violence is often defined as “the rule of man over man”. Arendt provides an insightful analysis of the relation between the concepts of
power and
violence. In the essay
Reflection on Violence, she argues that violence always needs to be implemented. Therefore, war is a representation of violence, and modern warfare is based on the latest revolutionary implementation of violence—technology (
Arendt 2002, p. 19). For Arendt, the notion of violence understood by Clausewitz and Mao Zedong’s as “power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (
Arendt 2002, p. 21) is rather obsolete, hence the need for a different analysis of violence and of the means attached to its implementation. After all, Arendt is mainly interested in a concept of violence that maintains a relationship to the notions of non-violence and power.
Bertrand de Jouvenel and his book
Power (
Jouvenel 1952) had a great influence on Arendt. As an analytical category, power is here understood as a tool for the government to subordinate and deliver rules and commands. It tends to explain its own emergence and existence by the domination instinct. In other words, power is an activity exercised and implemented by the domination instinct over the other so that “to command and to be obeyed” are essential for the existence of power. No other attributes or properties are required. Arendt writes ironically: “If the essence of power is the effectiveness of command, then there is no greater power than that which grows out of the barrel of a gun. Should Bertrand de Jouvenel and Mao Zedong agree on so basic a point in political philosophy as the nature of power?” (
Arendt 2002, p. 26). Though this definition of power has its roots in Greek antiquity, it is still prevalent in contemporary political thought. The definition of power as the “rule of man over man” is based on the exercise of power as a command–obedience relationship. As Arendt says, “Today we ought to add … the latest and perhaps most formidable form of such dominion, bureaucracy or the rule by an intricate system of bureaux in which no men, neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held responsible and which could be properly called the rule by Nobody. (…Rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done”) (
Arendt 2002, p. 26).
Arendt considers that violence and power are opposite to each other. Indeed, violence never appears as an inevitability associated with the exercise of power. In other words, the differences between violence and power are immense. Power is determined by the needs of people and the self-organization of their own lives. Violence emerges when power is actually destroyed or forsaken. Violence as a special, private, self-contained phenomenon can “manage” without people and without the government itself. This is what Montesquieu means when he says that tyranny is the most violent yet the least imperious among the polities. What, then, is the difference between power and violence? Is there a place for non-violence? According to Arendt, power does not need justification because it is an integral part of the political structure. However, “what it does need is legitimacy” (
Arendt 2002, p. 31). The use of violence can be justified but “it never will be legitimate” (
Arendt 2002, p. 32) in the eyes of people. Though power and violence constitute two different phenomena, they tend to appear together in social and political arenas. For sure, power can lead to the emergence of violence; it always expresses the essence of what government means, a quality that cannot be attributed to violence. In other words, violence is instrumental by nature; it always comes from the need for absolute and total control and from the need for self-justification
2.
A legitimate question would be: How does violence realize itself when it replaces power in governmental structures? Arendt argues that violence establishes itself and provides its activities based on the “super-organization” of power. Even despotism relies on this concept. For violence to emerge, long-established social and political institutions have to be destroyed. The collapse of unmanageable political and social institutions renders methods insignificant, highlighting the importance of organizational structure.
The result of violence is the disappearance of power, as when violence rules absolutely, real power is no more. Arendt, however, claims that it is incorrect to understand non-violence in opposition to violence. Indeed, violence can destroy power, and yet cannot be derived from it (
Arendt 2002, p. 34). People seek power as an alternative to violence, which arises when power is depleted or no longer exists. The implementation of violence is always anti-human. For this reason, in order to understand violence, we need to be aware of its nature and the means taken in its implementation. Human inventions, particularly advanced technologies, are the foundation of violence, as demonstrated in modern warfare.
Humanistic ideals and anthropological ideas leveling the relationship between violence and power, the negative effects of spiritual crises associated with the displacement of religion from social and political life, will be explored in the section on Eastern Patristics.
3. Mimetic Theory of Religion and Religion as Compensation
To further clarify the social dimension of violence, the “Mimetic Theory of Religions”, proposed by René Girard, may be helpful. The French-American philosopher explains not only the emergence of archaic religions but also shows the nature of violence manifested at social and anthropological levels. According to the theory, “mimesis” (“imitation”) constitutes a basic mechanism through which violence and aggression emerge in religions. For Girard, the cause of violence is not religion itself but its worshippers and adherents. By nature, religions are neither peaceful nor warmongering. Indeed, the issue of religious violence remains primarily a social and anthropological issue rather than a religious one (
Girard 2003, p. 8).
Girard underlines that violence originates in the mimetic rivalry process. Violence emerges when two or more rivals try to get ahead of each other in attaining an object they strive for. Violence, thus, represents a form of aggression that finds expression in irrational and instinctive behavior. At the root of violence and aggression is “imitation” or “mimicry” found both in humans and animals. It is worth noting that he stresses an effect of competition rather than extreme forms of behavior in the emergence of violence. As Wolfgang Palaver contends, Girard “preferred competition to aggression as the key concept to understand human violence” (
Palaver 2021). Girard sees that competing, rivalry, and desire lie at the essence of people. For the French philosopher, violence is a “conflict based primarily on appropriative mimicry” (
Girard 1996a, p. 10). According to him, pre-Christian religions, nurtured by mythology, are unable to conceive rationally. Hence, many rituals originate in universal sacrificial offerings. Thus, sacrificial actions represent a “collective action of the entire community, which purifies itself of its own disorder through the unanimous immolation of a victim, but this can happen only at the paroxysm of the ritual crisis” (
Girard 1996a, p. 11). Girard emphasizes that sacrifices occur based on the irrational mimetic process and unite the community for some time.
Girard’s ideas are relevant in explaining the behavior of the masses and crowds united by some mythical idea, a feeling of hate, or thirst for the sacrifice of an appointed victim. According to Girard, communities mimetically transfer their feuds and troubles to one particular victim, because they believe that reconciliation comes from the immolation of the victim. For this reason, the structured society turns into an undifferentiated crowd. Gradually unanimous mimetic infection turns the destructive violence of all against all into the salutary violence of all against one—the victim. The community reconciles through a single victim’s sacrifice (
Girard 2003). The blind faith in deliverance from all troubles and misfortunes through the sacrifice of someone or something makes both modern societies and archaic communities comparable. Crowd actions are irrational in both cases. The importance of sacrifice is that the mimetic crisis and the ritual mimicry lead to a ritually collective murder, or expulsion of the victim.
Girard describes the ritual mimicry mechanism in two concepts: the “scapegoat as ritual”, and the “scapegoat as effect” (
Girard 1996a, p. 12) and the surrogate victim (
Girard 1996a, p. 20). The “scapegoat” becomes an object of aggression and violence in communities that show a surprising unity. The consequences of “scapegoat” persecution are clear and effective in the case of mobs. The victim’s destruction can make a crowd unmanageable but also bring order and tranquility to the community. According to Girard, a collective belief in the result of sacrifice is absurd. However, mobs really tend to believe in a happy outcome if the scapegoat is destroyed. Thus, violence is born inside the crowd’s mimetic chase after the scapegoat (
Girard 1996a, p. 12). This is a “homeland” of violence and aggressive behavior. The scapegoat mimetic model generates mimetic rivalry, in which every participant in the process
becomes the imitator of his own imitator, just as the latter becomes the model of his own model… Violence is thus generated… Violence is mimetic rivalry itself becoming violent as the antagonist who desire the same object, keep thwarting each other and desiring the object all the more. Violence is supremely mimetic.
The crowd is being formed under the effect of “mimetic rivalry”. The “surrogate victim” principle is akin to the “scapegoat” ritual and its consequences. The scapegoat’s place is taken by a victim selected by the crowd. Girard’s “surrogate victim” concept focuses on a victim. The community transfers guilt and sufferings to some other person who will bear guilt and sufferings for them. Girard compares this to a savage mind that transfers troubles, problems, and pain to another person’s shoulders whenever possible. According to Girard, the situation repeats itself and the concept of the “surrogate victim” is consistent with contemporary society. As a matter of fact, it is a basic principle of contemporary society (
Girard 1996b).
Hence, the philosopher should integrate contemporary knowledge to recognize this truth. Similar to Girard’s stance, Gerard Bouchard, a Canadian sociologist and historian, offers a contemporary scholarly viewpoint on the mechanisms of victimization and scapegoating. He notes out that victimization and scapegoating are directly connected with the social imaginary and the process of creating myths. In this process, “…we are in the domain of denial, misrepresentation, and taboo, through which a society seeks to mask its faults, denials, and failures, often by placing the blame on others—as happens with the mechanisms of victimization and scapegoating” (
Bouchard 2017, p. 26). In Bouchard’s book, we can find more details on the interpretation of the mimetic theory from the position of discerning the dynamics of modern social life and the elucidation of producing social myths.
Girard also applies mimetic theory to the analysis of Biblical religion. He argues that the Biblical tradition demystifies the myth inherent in archaic religions and stops supporting the “mimetic infection against a single victim” as just and sacred. However, “the biblical interpreters” resist this infection and rehabilitate the victim as actually innocent. The Biblical resistance to the mimetic infection allows us to see the deceitfulness of archaic religions and the prevailed violent inclinations of crowds. According to Girard, the Bible reveals the causes of violence concealed by myth and irrational crowd behavior.
The concept of mimetic violence remains operative, even in contemporary times. Societies no longer depend on violence as sacrifice but recognize its potential through specialized institutions like the military, police, and government agencies. Arms races among countries and vicious forms of terrorism are equally prone to simulation and imitation. Researching Girard, W. Palaver emphasizes that imitation easily triggers violent conflicts. “This, however, is only the beginning of the cycle violence. As soon as violence starts to dominate human relations, it becomes more and more contagious” (
Palaver 2021). Under specific conditions, the crowd imitates and embraces the mimetic ideas of its leader, acting accordingly. In just a few hours, these acts, whether objective or subjective, can transform into a destructive force capable of wiping out everything. The crowd, as a spellbound mass, succumbs to simulation and imitation. There is always a scapegoat in a described mimesis. If there is no scapegoat, at least the crowd will be told “who it is” or “who could be” chosen as a “surrogate victim.” In
Crowds and Power, Elias Canetti notes that the in-depth irrationality of people is caught up in the crowd. Intuition tells people that there is something “hidden”, unattainable, and untold by those responsible for organizing that impersonal mass. As if by some magic spell, people do whatever they are prescribed and commanded by someone else (
Canetti 2000).
The presence of violence may not be immediately apparent. The sophistication of political technologies is on the rise. When the mass is subjected to enforcement or manipulation, they may not recognize the violence exerted upon them, and their collective actions can have unpredictable outcomes. Arendt calls violence “a marginal phenomenon” (
Arendt 2002, p. 33). It is not surprising that philosophical and sociological discourses usually treat the terms
mass and
mass society negatively. The term mass can suggest an amorphous collection of individuals without much individuality (
McQuail 2011, p. 56). When in a crowd, personal identity is lost and vulnerability to manipulation increases. The development of a crowd is similar to that of a mass of people, as they both follow the same principles and phases. Obviously, in periods of social conflict and protest, the crowd tends to become unmanageable and, thus, a menacing source of violence. However, even though religion often fuels violence due to individuals using it for personal gain, its ultimate purpose is to guide humans towards self-improvement and replace violent lifestyles with spiritual ones. We will see it in the examples of some of the Church Fathers’ ideas. It is worth noting that some modern philosophers write on
religion as a
kind of compensation in the secularization process of modern societies. They emphasize the growing tendency to substitute sacred and spiritual culture from social life.
Religion as Compensation. The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor stresses the features of contemporary societies as consequences of the secularization process. He concludes that the term “secularity” reveals a displacement of religion from the public sphere. However, it can be seen as a social myth. He claims that in secular times, belief and unbelief can coexist as alternatives, since even political authority usually references God or the Divine (
Taylor 2004, p. 187). He writes that the current time is the epoch “of the enchanted world and enchanted people” (
Taylor 2004, p. 53), with the domination of “ontic components”, which must be replaced by some strong theories or religious ideas. In his book
Modern social imaginaries, Taylor “opens” a space for religion in the contemporary secular world, emphasizing the function of religion in terms of compensation and healing. He writes:
Just as in personal life, the dissolution of the enchanted world can be compensated by devotion, a strong sense of the involvement of God in my life, so in the public world, the disappearance of an ontic dependence on something higher can be replaced by a strong presence of God in our political identity. In both individual and social life, the sacred is no longer encountered as an object among other objects, in a special place, time, or person. But God’s will can still be very present to us in the design of things, in cosmos, state, and personal life. God can seem the inescapable source for our power to impart order to our lives, both individually and socially.
Therefore, the dissolution of the enchanted world can be compensated by devotion and piety with the essential presence of God both in political identity and in personal life. In my view, from the perspective mentioned by Taylor, religion currently appears to be a positive, even creative, substance. In conditions of deficiency of sacredness and compassion, religion itself can bring something sacral and divine into society and the life of a human being.
And, of cause, religion in its institutionalized integrity can resist the different forms of violence in cooperation with secular organizations. The spiritual principles of religions contradict violence, and as Ch. Selengut rightly contends, “Religion is antithesis of violence and, in many places and times, religion has been a force for peace and social justice… The scriptures and sacred texts talk about the life of faith as a way of love, kindness, and peace” (
Selengut 2017, p. 1). If these principles are rightly used, they are capable of bringing reason to social life and, in doing so, generate peaceful forms of human co-existence.
The rationalization of social life, that allows for religious spirituality, can be seen as a compensation for displaced religious concepts and values. In this context, the Pope Benedict’s address at Regensburg University (2006) remains particularly significant. The topic of the speech was the relationship between
faith and
reason and his call was for a “return to rationality” in the modern world. The Pope emphasized that contemporary “fundamental decisions made about the relationship between faith and the use of human reason are part of faith itself; they are developments consonant with the nature of faith itself” (
Ratzinger 2006). Faith and reason must come together in a new way. Benedict XVI, obviously, tries to highlight the spiritual sphere as an actual object of rational comprehension. He consistently refers to the history of philosophy and theology to point out how medieval scholastics had attempted to give rational proofs for the existence of God. The Pope’s intention was to attract the attention of his contemporaries to the manifestations of the power of reason revealed in the past. Whenever
reason, as a methodological and theological tool and as the basis of modern society, ceases to play a major role and loses its significance, the result is an increment of fear associated with a dissemination of violence. Hence, the importance of theology, including at universities, as part of the wider scientific conversation in the cultures of our time.
I believe that the world urgently needs cultures and religions to engage in creative dialog. Various religious organizations and associations can actively participate in social and humanitarian processes within a society. In various aspects, religion fulfills a compensatory role. Growing symptoms of irrationality in society pose a challenge for contemporary culture and the modern world in terms of reason. It is essential that we prioritize preventing violence and promoting peaceful coexistence among peoples, nations, cultures, and religions (
Appleby 2003) worldwide.
4. Peaceful Purpose of Religion and Significance of Byzantine Patristics
The use of religion to perpetrate violence can take many forms—psychological pressure, involving the religious ideas for utilitarian purposes, religiousness as a tool for inciting hatred and ethnic conflict
3, political manipulation of believers to achieve the rulers’ own goals, etc. Unfortunately, all of these have become common practices. Religion now is an epicenter of ideological and political speculations. Religious ideas, misinterpreted in many utilitarian ways, manipulate the public consciousness as well as the individual’s consciousness and subconsciousness. But why is religion so often taken to substantiate and justify violence and conflicts? Professor Ch. Selengut in his book
Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence explains it by the specific nature of religious faith and different styles in its understanding and interpretations by those who apply to religious principles and imperatives. He emphasizes: “The answer lies in the unique nature of religious faith, organization, and leadership. Religious faith is different from other commitments, and the faithful understand the rules and directives of religion to be entirely outside ordinary social rules and interactions. Religious faith and commitment… are based upon sacred and ultimate truth and are, by definition, moral, desirable, and good. For the faithful, religious mandates are self-legitimating; they are true and proper rules… because the emanate from a divine source. Ordinary judgment, canon of logic, and evaluations of behavior simply do not apply to religious activity” (
Selengut 2017, p. 6).
Thus, the problem here is not in religion per se (in a metaphysical sense) but in those who employ religious ideas for their own purposes, justifying the various forms of violence by using religiosity and ethnicity. However, the Church, in its highest sacred meaning, should never be reduced to a political institution. No actions “on behalf of God” should ever be violent, destructive, or of a terrorist nature. Religion is considered a special means of communication by which a great number of people can communicate, interact, and share their moral and spiritual needs and preferences, as it creates major bonds and promotes the comprehending of the meaning of life. One should not underestimate the communicative power of religion, though the readers have to scrutinize its content. Religion deals with people from a holistic perspective, not only in soteriological but also in earthly terms. For this reason, theology is also a subject of rational comprehension (
Chistyakova and Chistyakov 2023). Religion’s anthropological essence, with its tendency to rationalistic principles, must come forth in scientific and theological discourses. How do we regain rationality and the forgotten reverence of the human being found in Medieval and Renaissance philosophical and theological teachings?
History delivers great works that speak to us and question us about how things are at any time. Each true work of art has its own “hidden voice.” The original text has a deep, implicit meaning rather than a surface meaning. J. Derrida urges us to seek that inner and hidden voice. The Patristic heritage of Early Christianity is rich in meaningful values. Exploring the “voice” of Eastern Patristics during the fourth to seventh centuries reveals the valuable anthropological and humanistic aspects of the Church Fathers’ writings. The evaluation of Patristic writings has largely focused on their theological content, leaving their philosophical and anthropological interpretations unexplored and waiting to be unveiled.
These texts are rational in essence, as they show us how to combine social and individual lives in both the secular and theological spheres. Following the discourse of the Eastern Church Fathers, a human person shall create their own existence based on rational self-realization that is close to something Absolute, to the ideas of kindness, peace, happiness, and non-violence. The Early Christian Fathers aimed at disclosing such absolute notions and developed integrity in their works. I think that the absolute values in the Eastern Patristics are the hidden voice of reason and the support for the human being when the latter is lost.
The ideas of the Byzantine Greek Church Fathers in the fourth to seventh centuries have enduring relevance as they foster a culture void of violence and intolerance. Among many others, we find in Patristic thought the idea of the human call to restore a lost likeness with God (
Kelly 1988). Of course, this is a reflection of the Biblical idea of Man as a being created in the
image and
likeness of God. Interpretations and discussions of this idea contributed immensely to the anthropological character of Early Christian theology. “Thus, in the Greek patristic tradition, deification becomes connected with recovering the
Imago Dei by growing in ‘likeness’ to God” (
Haynes 2011, p. 661). Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius of Alexandria, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, and many other Fathers wrote widely on the topic, explaining the Old Testament thesis and suggesting their own original doctrines.
“The Church Fathers argued for these concepts, showing the specificity of their manifestation in man as the crown of Divine creation and their necessity for individual salvation in the perspective of eternal life after death and the salvation of all humanity… Byzantine theologians stressed that every Christian has a constant and irresistible urge to return to Godlikeness. The possibility of attaining that state was explained by the image of God, which belonged to man from his creation. Such consideration directed everyone to self-improvement and self-knowledge to ascend to a special spiritual state, a sense of unity with God”.
The theologian mentioned earlier interpreted these concepts as an individual’s attempt to restore their resemblance to God by continuously improving themselves spiritually and seeking sacred knowledge and moral values. The path of deification (theosis) involves self-improvement to connect with the Creator and gain insight into God’s presence in the world and within ourselves. Therefore, according to Eastern Patristics, humans can resemble God by behaving virtuously and performing righteous actions.
The Early Christian thinkers (even some Fathers of the apostolic and apologetic periods) wrote about a contradiction or an “abyss” between God and the human person. Although the human being is not God, they are endowed with the capacity to strive for God, that is, to will the potential overcoming of that abyss. According to the Fathers, each individuum could become “God by Divine grace”, for the human being desires to acquire divine qualities in a personal way and the infinite spiritual ascent. Through desire, the human unites both the terrestrial and sensible and the transcendental and divine worlds. This Old Testament thesis signifies the overcoming of the dualistic nature of the person by way of the unity of God with the human nature. Athanasius of Alexandria wrote that “The way to God is not far from the human; it is not out of us, quite the contrary, it is inside us. The start of this way can be possibly found out personally. What is this way? The soul of everyone and the mind inside it because only the mind is able to contemplate and cognize God” (
Athanasius of Alexandria 1994, pp. 165–66). Religious writers developed the concept of a single entity that could eliminate the division between Heaven and Earth and bring harmony to both the spiritual and physical realms. The ultimate goal of humanity is to guide the imperfect world towards harmony and divine approval. For his part, Gregory of Nazianzus defined the human being as the creature who stops the animosity of the spiritual and the corporeal: “Human consists of spirit and body. And a spirit is a ray of endless light-Deity and a body you produce from the dark origin… If I am of one common nature, then hostility is stopped… Not hostile but friendly sources give the whole composition” (
Gregory of Nazianzus 1994, p. 25). The nature of the person is directed to spiritual equality with God and meant for the establishment of absolute harmony in the world of creatures and earthly things.
In explaining the concept of deification, the profound conceptual reflections of the Church Fathers and new theological and philosophical concepts emerged. It is correct that “…deification was also expressed throughout the patristic period by a whole cluster of concepts, such as knowledge, participation, union, light, contemplation and vision” (
Haynes 2011, p. 660). And the most significant among them were the notions of
light and
logos.
The most Christological Church Father, Maximus the Confessor (580–662), left a rich legacy of elaborating and developing these notions which became the key principles of Christian anthropology and theology. He argues that the main predestination of a human being is to contribute to the unity of the earthly world with the
Divine Logos, or God. To fulfill it, a person must perform God’s features in themselves as they are a microcosm, absorbing all elements of the universe (
Maximus the Confessor 1993b, pp. 167–68). He develops the idea of the relatedness of a person and Jesus Christ through
deification (theosis). Maximus, being under the previous Patristic thought, continued to ontologize the concept of deification. The mystery of Christ’s Incarnation is the ontological center for his theology of deification and salvation. “Through Christ’s full condescension in the Incarnation, humanity can be wholly divinized in every aspect of its being” (
Haynes 2011, p. 662).
He emphasizes that in the state of union with God, humans, by the grace of God, possess all that the Creator possesses in his essence. The understanding of deification, or the apprehension of God by grace (but not by essence), and the perception of God’s energies are interrelated in Maximus’s doctrine (
Chistyakova and Chistyakov 2023). The theological concepts of deification, divinization, image, and likeness of the Creator bind man and God invisibly and inseparably and give philosophical and anthropological meaning to his teaching. Meanwhile, the Byzantine Father underlined the force of God’s grace and willingness on the way of theosis. As D. Haynes rightly contends, “God grants the creature a triad of being, well-being, and ever-being through adoption and participation by grace in the divine Being (not in essence). Deification for Maximus is not based upon any work of the human being, though divinization could not be understood without it, but divinization is given to the creature by supernatural power” (
Haynes 2011, p. 662).
Maximus the Confessor elaborated the conception of God’s energies and
logoi which unite God and the human being in a coherent system. Therefore, the divine energies and logoi represent the relationship between God and the creaturely being. Maximus writes in
Chapters on Theology and the Economy:
The Word of God is like a mustard seed, and before it is planted it seems small, but when properly sown it becomes so great that [all] the lofty logoi of sensuous and intelligible creatures, like the birds of [heaven], find rest in His [branches]. For the logoi of all things abide in the Word of God and are contained in Him, but none of the creatures contain Him. Therefore, the Lord said that he who has faith with a mustard seed can move a mountain with a word (Matt. 17:20).
From a philosophical point of view, this fundamental idea of St. Maximus can be interpreted as justifying the manifestation of the transcendent essence of God, hidden from the limited perception of a human. Yet the uncreated Divine light makes possible the cognition of God and pushes apart the sphere of ignorance of every individual. In the book mentioned, Maximus underlines the point that the mystery of the Divine light illuminates and enlightens the souls and bodies and opens God’s phenomenon for the virtuous people. However, the mystery of the Light reveals mysteries accessible only to the sight of the pure heart (
Maximus the Confessor 1993a, § 70, p. 248).
How are these energies known, and how are their awareness and perception possible? Maximus the Confessor develops his famous doctrine of the logoi of God as an outpouring of His (God’s) energies and the perception of these energies symbolically. The essence of the created world is concealed in the Divine logoi, which pour out of the Deity and reassemble in it. Maximus writes:
To those who have [spiritual] vision, the whole mental world appears mysteriously imprinted in the whole sensual world by employing symbolic images. And the whole sensual world in the spiritual mind appears to be contained in the whole mental world, being known [there] through its logoi. The sensual world exists in the mental world utilizing its logoi, and the mental world in the sensual world through its imprints.
The interpenetration of the two worlds manifests in the human being. The symbolism of comprehending the logoi relates to the understanding of a human as the main symbol of the universe. Thus, the human is at the intersection of the divine and carnal worlds and collects in the inner world all the symbolism of the universe, all the images of spiritual and mortal existence. Therefore, the human’s purpose is to comprehend and explain the created world as a system of divine meanings and symbols, thereby uniting the two worlds. However, to perceive the energies of God and to comprehend His logoi is only possible for a person who leads an absolutely moral way of life. The human being connects the divine and the earthly worlds and assumes responsibility for this unity.
Maximus assigns a sacred significance to the human as the primary symbol of the world, a notion that later shaped Byzantine Christian thought. The symbolic images highlight the elevated status of the person in Maximus the Confessor’s teachings and in the Eastern Christian sacred tradition. Maximus was considered the most Christological and philosophical Father in the Byzantine area of Christianity due to these ideas, hence the greatness of the human purpose in the world, something that should never be misunderstood or abused. From the epistemological perspective of Eastern Patristic anthropology, the idea of self-knowing of the soul and the individual inner world is the first step towards the cognition of God. The process of knowing God is simultaneously the self-cognition and self-development of a human being. The Christian authors show the possible ways of God’s cognition, individual self-knowing, and self-perfection.
From the perspective of Christian epistemology, the process of knowing God is ambiguous and even contradictory. God is both knowable in His phenomena and unknowable in His essence. The Creator gives the human person the opportunity of achieving the knowledge of Him in different ways. For example, the doctrines on the Divine light of Symeon the New Theologian (11th century), or Tabor Light by Gregory Palamas (14th century) represent in Christianity a mystical, personal way of knowing God. It is can be identified with the way of deification. By accepting the Divine light (or God’s light), a human (usually, a monk) achieves the state of knowing God in a righteous, almost absolute, entity. This was a unique way, elaborated by the Byzantine Church Fathers, which unites the human being and God. It was a manifestation of both the way of God-cognition and self-knowing, and represented the conciliar spiritual nature of the human being and God. The Divine light unites a human (monk) and God.
The opportunity to know God in His phenomena can be given to an individual who is self-conscious, ready to reveal their internal existential feelings and qualities, and to discern the rational essence of the world. Knowing God depends largely on the morality and reason of the man. In this context, human freedom is in accordance with the mind, rationality, and activity. A person who consciously “leads his nature” has power over their actions and wishes. John of Damascus notes that “When it is necessary, the freedom of decision is connected to the mind, because either a human person would not be reasonable, or, being reasonable, he will be the master of his actions and independence” (
John of Damascus 1992, p. 109).
The process of personal self-determination is always regarded by the Church Fathers as coinciding with the process of knowing God. It also opens possibilities of self-knowing in theology and has a secular meaning. It nurtures the inner qualities and attributes of an individual, enhances their unique psychological traits, and guides them towards mastering the “art of managing” their multitude of energies, thoughts, and aspirations. Patristic thinkers believe that self-cognition includes self-feeling and the journey to self-discovery. As humans become more perfect, their personal self-consciousness and cognition of the Divine also grow. According to the Church Fathers, one way to achieve individual self-determination is through a creative pursuit of life’s purpose. A great number of sacred texts in Patristic thought acknowledged this essential idea.