Intertwined Critical Realms: Caste, Babas, Deras, and Social Capital Formation in Punjab (India)

Abstract

Deras are generally perceived as an alternative socio-religious space frequented mostly by lower castes and economically weaker sections of society. They promise to make a significant difference to the lives of such vulnerable sections of society by lending them much needed spiritual, moral, and social support. Within the sprawling premises of Deras, downtrodden find a welcoming ‘counter-public’ enriched with social capital, which offers them an egalitarian domain free from the afflictions of caste discriminations, social exclusion, and subtle indignities often faced by them within the mainstream religious spheres. The growth of Deras thus may be seen as an index of subaltern socio-cultural and syncretic religious realms generating a rich haul of social capital.

1. Dilemma of Caste in the Panth

Caste is a complex sociological phenomenon, which is particular to the Indian subcontinent with roots extending back many millennia into the mists of time. Prior to the codification of caste in Manusmriti, approximately one millennium before Christ, it was not fossilised in seamless hierarchies. The only reference to what remotely resembles caste in the pre-Manusmriti period can be found in Rig Veda’s 10th Mandala (Purusha Sukta), which refers to Varna—flexible occupation categories (for details, see Majumdar 1965, pp. 388, 391–92; Arvind Sharma 1978, pp. 294–303). Unlike caste, Varna categorisation was not based on Janam (birth embedded in one’s past deeds), but karmas/gunas (accomplishments and other personal characteristics), thereby approximating to the social class system in modern-day western societies, for example. The unfortunate prevalence of caste is to be seen in this historical context and both was, and remains, so embedded in the Indian psyche that even the egalitarian philosophy expounded by the Sikh gurus was unable to expunge this potent social evil. A second reason was that until the trifurcation of the Indian Punjab in the 1960s, Sikhs were always a minority in whichever polity they existed, with a predominant Hindu majority, which despite a skinny hold of the Brahminical Varnavyavastha of four-fold social order in the state, continued to follow some of its discriminatory tenets in one way or the other, and this cultural ecosystem perpetuated age-old conservative norms as well as shielding them from critical scrutiny and progressive ideas. In fact, Sikhs aside, such was the strength of this general social culture that caste also remains pervasive among South Asian Muslims, despite the absence of such types of discriminatory social structures within Islam (Davis 1951, p. 164). Descended from converted Hindus, Muslims of northwestern India continued to follow some caste taboos from their erstwhile social living. According to 1911 census, 85 percent of Muslims of Punjab were of native stock. Therefore, it is somewhat natural, claims Kingsley Davis,

[T]hat the caste system should permeate Muslim society. The mere switch of religious allegiance, often as a result of compulsion, ulterior profit, or fortuitous circumstance, would hardly incur a complete change of social life.

(Davis 1951, p. 164)

Extending the same logic further into Sikh society, Davis was of the opinion that though “there is still a recognition that Sikhism is somehow opposed to caste”, it is “as caste-ridden as Islam” (Davis 1951, p. 164).

In the case of the pre-Partition Punjab and subsequently the post-Partition Punjabs—both in Pakistan and India—the Jat’s (irrespective of whether Muslim, Sikh, or Hindu) domination of the political economy of this region led to a remarkable reinvention of the millennia-old caste system by placing this agrarian class at the apex of the local caste hierarchy, but the lowest service castes remained as oppressed as ever. However, growing awareness in the twentieth century about this perpetuated exclusion and belittlement created a centrifugal force towards the creation of a nascent Dera1 culture as well as caste-based Gurdwaras. Deras are oases of calm and fraternity, which offer an interregnum, however brief, from the callous vicissitudes of life outside them. The large, even huge, numbers of Dera adherents—who are often browbeaten by general society—afford these institutions significant, and multi-faceted, influence over the societies in which they are ensconced. Initially sanctuaries of self-dignity for the lowest castes, Deras grew gradually and inexorably in both their number and followings, being propelled by their tremendous self-generated social capital. It is now commonplace to observe the co-existence of Hindu Mandirs, caste-based Sikh Gurdwaras, and Deras in the villages and towns of (Indian) Punjab.

Sikh Caste Hierarchy

Caste within the Sikh society, however, can be distinguished from its counterpart in the Hindu social setup in the sense that within the purview of the former, it is more of material than cultural in content (Jasjit Singh 1989, p. 293; Jodhka 2000, pp. 381–403). It does not equate with the mainstream social hierarchy prevalent within the Brahminical Varnavyavastha. The grammar of caste hierarchy within the Sikh society provided upward social mobility to some of the former lower castes, designated as they were within the Hindu social order before their entry into Sikh fold, to achieve a dignified social status supported by its doctrinal egalitarian world view (I. P. Singh 1977, pp. 69–70; Jasjit Singh 2017, p. 578; Singh and Tatla 2006, p. 28). Jats, a widespread peasant community throughout northwestern India, who were assigned a lower caste status in the Varnavyavastha social order, elevated to what Srinivas called ‘dominant caste’ after their coming into the doctrinal domain of egalitarian Sikh fold; wherein they came to be called Jat Sikhs (Srinivas 1956, pp. 481–96). However, prior to the establishment of the Khalsa Raj, Jats, the tillers of land, were confined to the Shudra category of the Brahminical four-fold social order in northwestern India. Until then, they were not the owners of land, which belonged to rulers of the land—first courts of Delhi Sultanate and Mughal Empire and then the Delhi Durbar.2 They began asserting land ownership rights for the first time, after the seizure of Sirhind3 by Baba Banda Singh Bahadur and his Khalsa fauj, and secondly, after the establishment of Sikh kingdom under the command of Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799–1839).4

Similarly, sweepers and leather-workers, the erstwhile lowest castes of the Hindu social order, also acquired some kind of upward social mobility after their conversion into Sikh faith. Among sweepers, those who embraced Sikhism came to be known as Mazhabis/Ranghretas. While defining Mazhabi Sikhs, Denzil Ibbetson writes

Of course a Mazbi will often have been returned as Chuhra by caste and Sikh by religion … Mazbi means nothing more than a member of the scavenger class converted to Sikhism.

(Ibbetson [1883] 1970, p. 294)

Among Scheduled Castes (SCs) of Punjab, Mazhabi Sikhs considered themselves at the top of caste hierarchy. Their upward social mobility dates back to the period of ninth and tenth gurus. Guru Gobind Singh bestowed the title of Ranghreta Guru Ka Beta on Bhai Jaita—a young low caste Rangreta who brought to Anandpur Sahib the severed head of the ninth guru after his martyrdom in Delhi. The tenth guru also renamed him Jivan Singh and declared him as his panjwan sahibzada (fifth son). And among Chamars, usually Julahas (weavers), those who converted to Sikhism during the time of the fourth guru (Guru Ram Das) of the Sikh faith came to be popularly called Ramdassia Sikhs. They considered themselves superior to their counterparts in Hindu religion partly because of their occupation of weaving as against the so-called lower status profession of other SCs, like sweepers and cobblers, and partly because of their adoption of the Sikh religion. Ramdassias Sikhs built their separate Deras/gurdwaras in the Doaba region of Punjab. Their Deras at villages Johlans in Jalandhar and Thakarwal at Hoshiarpur are among the most popular Ramdassia Sikh Deras in Punjab (Ram 2017, p. 55). It is important to mention here that Mazhabi and Ramdassia Sikhs were provided with reserved seats in the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) in 1925, much before the provision of the official reservation for the Scheduled Castes (Bhai and Charan 2011, pp. 42–43). However, despite the fact of their upward social mobility vis-à-vis their counterparts in the Hindu society, Mazhabi/Rangreta and Ramdassia Sikhs remained ensconced within the lowest rung of the new caste hierarchy in Punjab that emerged within the Panth after social revolutionary phase of Khalsa tradition ceased to exist in the beginning of the eighteenth century (Jasjit Singh 1982; also see, Webster 2007a, pp. 132–54).

The present study primarily seeks to critically analyse intersectionality of caste, babas, Deras, and social capital formation in Indian Punjab. In the first part, the dilemma of caste within Sikh Panth is critically analysed. The second part contextualises babas, dalits, and Deras in northwestern India. ‘Social capital’ formation process within Deras is explicated in the third part. The last, fourth part, briefly summarises the main arguments of the study.

2. Babas, Dalits, and Deras

Spiritual heads of Deras, popularly called gurus, babas, peers, or murshids, are believed to have large constituencies of followers among socially deprived and economically insecure sections of society whom they often lure by motivated charity and preying on their insecurities by offering hope for a better future in contrast to a bleak reality of discriminatory social structures and a withered, minimal welfare state. Moreover, in the wake of the rise of a faceless globalisation, the neo-liberal market regimes ‘created their own antidote in foregrounding visible interpersonal interactions’, which ‘made the formlessness of God less appealing. God in flesh and blood, argues Ajay Gudavarthy, feels more enticing.’ He further argued that ‘[t]he euphoric appeal of babas becomes even starker when it’s understood in the context of the fading stardom in Bollywood, the irreverence of politicians and public representatives and the normalisation of the heroics of cricketers and other sportsmen’ (Gudavarthy 2024). The overall negation of champions of eminent domains emboldened babas of all hues to fill this void by projecting themselves as saviours of the victims of the withdrawal of the state and the invisible onslaught mounted by a neo-market economy by assuming roles that helped to overcome the economic hardships of those who had been beneficiaries of the hitherto welfare political setup. ‘Gone are the days of babas, Santosh Singh articulates cogently, who were hermits, renunciants and ascetics’ (S. K. Singh 2024). They dress themselves fabulously and equip their Deras (abodes) with state-of-the-art gadgets and facilities.

2.1. Neo-Liberal Market, Babas, and Deras

Close spiritual ties between babas and their ardent followers, on the one hand, and between babas, politicians, and bureaucrats, on the other, at a time when the erstwhile welfare state has been deeply eclipsed by neo-liberal market regimes, have not only enlarged the personal aura of babas but also hugely expanded the social, political, and cultural reach of Deras. Instead of resolving the contradictions between caste and class, neo-liberal market reforms, however, have further deepened it. Neo-liberal market reforms have undermined the capacity of the state to resolve discrimination of lower castes and weaker sections of society by reducing inequality in social and economic domains. As most of India’s population (about 65 per cent) live in rural areas, land ownership can be a critical factor in rampant inequality. The neo-liberal reconfiguration of the state has not allowed government to take steps to bridle inequality, either through the introduction of land reforms and/or distribution of the surplus land of the villages to landless lower caste cultivators or agricultural labourers. Thus, the induction of neo-liberal economic reforms in India further complicates the existing contradictions between caste and class and Savarnas and Avarnas (upper and lower castes, respectively). Though the neo-liberal economic reforms were adopted to counteract the ever-increasing menace of fiscal crisis and to help India get rid of its chronic poverty, it continued to be a herculean task. Chronic poverty seems to be not merely an economic issue (Khilnani 1999). It has equally been rooted rather more deeply in the asymmetrical social structures of the Indian hierarchical social order (Alam 2004, p. XVII), which finds its natural ally in the fast-expanding sphere of neo-liberal market economy in the country that strengthens the already rich class in the country vis-à-vis the economically weaker and socially excluded sections of society, which in turn provide fertile ground to various babas to expand the following of their respective Deras (for details, see Jenkins 1999; Kumar 2000, pp. 803–12; Nayyar 2007, pp. 361–96; Thorat et al. 2023; and Thorat and Newman 2010).

Massive following of Deras also facilitated them to earn significant space within the democratic–electoral sphere of the civil society as well, which in turn gets babas, politicians, and bureaucrats closer to each other in a mutually beneficial equation—win–win situation. Babas’ kinship with politicians and bureaucrats helps them in obtaining various kinds of favours for themselves as well as their followers in day-to-day routine jobs/tasks in government offices, which further gives impetus to mushrooming following of their Deras, on the one hand, and facilitates politicians and bureaucrats to strengthen their grips on electoral constituencies and administrative domains, respectively, on the other. For instance, the alleged closeness of the head of Dera Sacha Sauda—Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh Insan (henceforth Gurmeet Ram Rahim)—with senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders helped him acquire repeated paroles/furloughs from his twenty-year imprisonment in the Rothak district’s Sunaria jail.

In a 2002 rape case of two of his sadhvis (female disciples), Gurmeet Ram Rahim was sentenced to 20 years in jail on 28 August 2017. He was also sentenced to life imprisonment for his involvement in two murder cases, first on 17 January 2019, in the murder of Ram Chander Chhatrapati, editor of Poora Sach, a local daily vernacular for publishing the letter of the rape victims, and secondly, on 18 October 2021, along with four others, for the murder of Ranjit Singh, former Dera manager and brother of one of the women who was raped. However, on 28 May 2024, the Punjab and Haryana High Court acquitted him and the others involved in the murder of Ranjit Singh. Gurmeet Ram Rahim also challenged his convictions in the rape and murder case of journalist Ram Chander Chhatrapati (Ashutosh Sharma 2024). Given the robust political clout of Gurmeet Ram Rahim, Anshul Chhatrapti, son of the slain journalist Ram Chander Chhatrapati, was apprehensive of his acquittal in the other two cases. He was of the opinion that

Despite a huge pendency of criminal cases in the High Court, the case was fast-tracked, and Ram Rahim was acquitted in May 2024. In the other two cases too, the CBI hasn’t appointed senior legal counsel. On one side, there is a man with a powerful empire and an army of senior lawyers. On the other side are his helpless victims with limited resources. How can we compete against such might?

(as quoted in Ashutosh Sharma 2024)

Though often equated with gurdwaras, temples, sects5, and cults6, Deras are nonetheless distinguishable from the former in terms of their structures and practices. For instance, gurdwaras are religious places wherein only Sri Guru Granth Sahib (hereafter SGGS)—the central holy scripture of the Sikh faith—is revered as eternal guru, and no other religious scriptures whatsoever are recited (Ram 2012). Worship of idol and human gurus—both of which are common practices in temples, sects, and cults—has no place in gurdwaras. In contrast to gurdwaras and temples, a motley of sacred scriptures—which often include verses from SGGS—are recited in Deras. They also differ from sects and cults insofar as the former are derivatives of mainstream religions with their own distinct belief, ceremonies, traditions, and practices. However, in some respects, Deras are closer to cults, which are quasi-religious groups headed by human gurus (charismatic, mostly male, persons) with distinct and unorthodox ideologies, rituals, and practices, who either directly, or indirectly through their authorised representatives, reveal ‘holy-naam’ (allegedly spiritually charged words or phrases) to their followers during initiation ceremonies. They provide what Nancy Fraser called ‘subaltern counter public’ to socially excluded, poor, and marginalised sections of society (Fraser 1990, pp. 56–80; Kampourakis 2016; Sandhu 2007, pp. 63–78), who repose greater faith in the compassion and healing power of babas of Dera after their bitter experience of rejection by the mainstream religious centres and institutions of the state (Pramod 2017). The immense penchant among lower castes and poorer sections of society to take refuge in Deras made the latter highly sought after among them.

2.2. Historical Context of Deras

Ravidass Deras, which began appearing in the 1920s—particularly during the emergence of the Ad Dharm movement in undivided Punjab—while championing a completely new philosophy and outlook, were nonetheless only the latest manifestation of a Dera tradition in northwestern India. Interestingly, the idea of Deras, if defined solely as centres of religious or spiritual teachings, was not alien to (undivided) Punjab, but had first appeared in the 10th century CE, a full millennium earlier, with the advent of the Nath Sampradaya—a confluence of various ascetic and spiritual knowledge traditions including Vedantic, Shaivites, Buddhism, and yoga tradition, which also flourished in reaction to caste-based social exclusion. Founded by yogi Matsyendranath, the Nath Sampradaya expanded into twelve different panths of yogis across the Indian subcontinent, under the spiritual stewardship of yogi Gorakhnath, who was one of the most illustrious disciples of yogi Matsyendranath. Though various Nath branches were distinct in their respective identities, nevertheless, all of them acknowledged their lineage from the original Nath Sampradaya of yogi Matsyendranath and deferred to it (Briggs [1938] 1982, pp. 2–3; Chandra [1997] 2011, pp. 253–54; Dwivedi 1950; Ghurye 1953, pp. 154–55; Grewal and Goswamy 1967; Kalyani 1954, p. 11; Mallinson 2011, pp. 1–2; McLeod 1978, pp. 287–95; M. Singh 1937, p. 21). These institutions gave rise to a nomenclature of their own, being variously known as tillas, maths, akharas, and gufas, and had a further commonality insofar as their doors were open to all irrespective of caste or social status and offered food pro bono to visitors. It is widely held that the founder of Sikhism, Baba Nanak, had visited one such prominent institution known as ‘Tilla Yogian’ in district Jhelum of undivided Punjab.

There were two further genres of Deras in northwestern India that appeared between those spawned by the Nath Sampradaya and those appearing in the 20th century. Firstly, during the Sultanate period came Sufi Deras, popularly known as khanqahs and Jama’at Khanas, and categorised into 12 silsilas/tariqahs (schools/orders), pioneered by the Chishtiyyah Silsila, which was founded by the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti of Sistan in eastern Iran (Chandra [1997] 2011, p. 241). The second genre was that of the Sikh Deras, and these consisted of three distinct subcategories—two of these were those established by unsuccessful and disgruntled claimants to the Sikh guruship, i.e., Udasis, Prithias, Dhirmallias, and Ram Raiyas (for details, see Archer 1946, pp. 221–26; Bingley 1970, pp. 85–93; Chaturvedi 1951, pp. 360–69; Elsberg 2017, pp. 403–10; Grewal 1996; Juergensmeyer 2017, pp. 39–46, 386–93; Mann 2017, pp. 326–31; Marenco 1976, pp. 28–30; Nesbitt 2017, pp. 380–85; Robinson 2017, pp. 397–402; Joginder Singh 2017, pp. 359–67; Sulakhan Singh 1982, pp. 383–87; Takhar 2017, pp. 394–96; Takhar 2014, pp. 350–56; Tatla 2017, pp. 368–79; and Webster 2017b, pp. 351–58) and those which transmuted into Deras from ‘manjis’ (outreach religious centres), which were managed by Sikhs selected for their piety and known as ‘masands’. Guru Amardas, the third Sikh guru, established ‘manjis’ (Mann 2017, pp. 331–32). The third category consisted of Deras in which the SGGS played a central role, but which were not of either of the two prior categories. This multifarious category includes the Nihangs, Nirankaris, Radhasoamis, Divya Jyoti Jagarti Sansthan Noormahal, Sacha Sauda Sirsa, and many more (Chaturvedi 1951, pp. 361–69; Copeman 2012, pp. 156–80; Judge 2014, pp. 372–81; Juergensmeyer 1991; Mann 2017, pp. 333–40; McLeod 1984, pp. 121–33; Oberoi 1994, p. 24; R. N. Singh 2002, p. 78). However, as far as Nihangs7, Nirankaris8, Nirmalas9, and other similar categories of Deras are concerned, they can be distinguished from the Sikh Deras to the extent that in the former, Sikh rahit maryada (Sikh religious code of conduct) is not strictly followed.

3. Deras and Social Capital

Some of the Deras in Punjab/Haryana—mainly Dera Sacha Sauda (DSS), Sirsa, Dera Radhasoami, Beas, and Dera Sach Khand, Ballan—have been generating social capital for the empowerment of historically disadvantaged sections of society, what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called a “durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986, p. 248). Social capital emanates from varied socio-religious and cultural networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that exist in the relations among persons (Putnam 2000, p. 16; Fukuyama 2000). It is not located either in the actors themselves (like less tangible human capital, which is embodied in the skills and knowledge acquired by an individual) or in the physical implements of production (as is the case of physical capital, wholly tangible, being embodied in observable material form). Nonetheless, though less tangible in comparison to both physical and human capital, social capital enhances the capacity of adherents of Deras to excel in their chosen sphere of life by honing their interpersonal relations (Coleman 1988, p. S98; Fukuyama 2000). American sociologist James Samuel Coleman further defined it ‘by its function’, which manifests itself through different forms within the ambit of ‘some aspect of social structures’—embedded, as mentioned earlier, with extensive trustworthiness and mutual trust (Coleman 1988, pp. S98–S101; see also: Fukuyama 2000, p. 3).

An amalgamation of both ‘bonding (exclusive)’ and ‘bridging (inclusive)’ social capital networks (Putnam 2000, p. 20), some Deras established their own hospitals, educational institutions, technical training centres, provision stores, local transport systems, weekly magazines, and libraries (Ram 2008, pp. 1347–57). The widespread institutional setup of such Deras fosters further networks of dense reciprocal social and religious relations among their followers. Daily routine darshan (face-to-face interactions) between the heads of Deras and their devotees—an exercise that develops norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness in the relations among followers of Deras on the one hand and their baba/guru in the Dera on the other—are organised in many Deras. In addition, many Deras regularly organise monthly/annual samagams (religious congregations), especially on the birth/death anniversaries of their sants/babas, which are attended by large numbers of their followers as well as notable political figures. It is during such routine gatherings that their devotees—comprised of all societal strata—generate significant volume of social capital by providing Deras with a unique socio-religious and cultural status as well as elements of reciprocity and trustworthiness among themselves vis-à-vis the phenomenon of mainstream religious orders. Though most of such relationships are formed among the marginalised and historically deprived sections of the society, their sheer number, measured in terms of electoral arithmetic, generates a rich haul of ‘bonding social capital’ that works like “a kind of sociological superglue”, argued American political scientist Robert Putnam (Putnam 2000, p. 21).

Deras have gained unique profiles over the course of time with the adoption of distinct identity markers, iconography, and attire of babas, what Devine and Deneulin called ‘the moral code’ of an emerging alternative socio-religious samaj (society), which together with mammoth physical infrastructure form a viable agency of upward social mobility for socially discriminated and economically poor sections of society (Devine and Deneulin 2011, p. 74). These informal sets of norms and values (Coleman 1987), which seamlessly bind together followers of Deras, were chiselled over extensive periods of time within the compounds of Deras wherein congregations were, and are, perennially regaled by announcements against drug abuse, female foeticide, dowry malice, and communal vilifications before the main spiritual discourses are delivered.10 This has resulted in believers gradually internalising a common code of ethics, which congealed them further still with the Dera culture, eventually leading to, what American political scientist Francis Fukuyama cogently argued, ‘constituting social capital itself’. In Deras’ socially charged spiritual discourses, devotees find ways to realise their maximal potential (Devine and Deneulin 2011, p. 74)—an outcome of social capital of Deras.

The diverse followings of Deras propel people of different caste, class, creed, gender, status, and region not only to bond together (in the form of a bonding/exclusive social capital networks) on the premises of Deras on special occasions but also cultivate long-term inter-community relationships (bridging/inclusive social capital networks) within their neighbourhoods for feasible mutual empowerment (Putnam 2000, p. 20). All activities within Deras, including cleaning work, administration, security arrangements, managing traffic flow on both public and Dera roads during Dera events, and langar (which is free food offered to visitors irrespective of their caste, class, and creed) preparation and distribution are all managed by sewadars (volunteer workers drawn from Dera members), who thereby become de facto ambassadors of Deras’ social capital. Dispatching such work is no mean feat since at times the number of visitors comes close to a million, especially during annual bhandaras (yearly religious congregations to pay obeisance on the anniversaries of the founders of the faith).11

The aforementioned institutional infrastructure together with the diverse bonding social networks of Deras and their emphasis on social values—such as leading a truthful life based on hard labour, respecting mainstream religions, non-discriminatory behaviour, and egality—are what generate the immense tangible and intangible social capital, also called ‘sacred surpluses’ (Chidester 2005, p. 117; see also: Fukuyama 1997, pp. 378–79), which further boosts mass appeal of Deras through a progressive social spiral. However, there is an attendant downside—social capital—cautioned Putnam. It “may also create strong out-group antagonism” (Putnam 2000, p. 21; and also see Putnam et al. 2003) that eventually may snowball into outright conflict formation.

Taking a clue from Coleman’s explication of social capital as discussed above, it can be safely argued that Deras represent ‘some aspect of social structures’, which precipitate behavioural changes among their followers, thus facilitating the performance of various functions, including mass manual labour that, in turn, inculcates what Putnam called ‘norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness’, mutual respect, and truthful behaviour, eventually leading to the creation of a significant mass of social capital (Putnam 2000, p. 16; also see: Hanifan 1916, pp. 130–38). Other than Dera-based social structures promoting such virtues as trustworthiness and mutual respect within the tangible physical boundaries of such Deras (bonding social capital), they also influence the formation of social, community, and family ties between followers in the form of marriage alliances and other close social associations across caste, class, and creed divides (bridging social capital). Coleman further explicates that social capital makes ‘possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible’ (Coleman 1988, p. S98). It is in this crucial context that Deras are distinguishable from other social constructs such as cooperative societies, sports clubs, ethnic groups, literary associations, self-help groups, cultural bodies, environment protection organisations, and varied social reforms organisations. It is in the aforementioned context that the phenomenon of Deras needs to be studied from the perspective of their contribution towards the generation of social capital—and the emancipation and empowerment of lower castes and middle class people in particular—and the unfortunate but seemingly inevitable formation of social conflicts as an outcome of the political economy of religion.

In the face of insidious and ever-creeping structures of social and economic discrimination, especially since the onset of a neo-liberal regime in the early 1990s, the poor and lower castes became increasingly disempowered in the competition for private sector well-paid jobs. Deprived of due representation in the corporate sector on the one hand, and with dwindling job opportunities in the public sector on the other, these socially and economically isolated sections of the society turned en masse towards Deras, which administered a balm by way of the egalitarianism, health, and education facilities provided by them, i.e., the tangible social capital. Therefore, a major attribute of Deras is their capacity to provide succour to those tossed aside by the mainstream, providing in some form what in more developed countries would be offered by such professional services as marriage counsellors, psychologists, and caregivers. Indeed, to draw an unorthodox parallel, the social capital alchemised by Deras likely achieves a far stronger bonding, and among far more people, than what corporates aim to achieve with their team-building excursions and exercises.

The social and material support structures generated by Deras can be illustrated by a triangular matrix consisting of followers from everyday walks of life, politicians, and both the babas of Deras and their managerial staff. Different categories of people visit Deras for the fulfilment of respective socio-religious and psychological traumas created in the majority of cases by economic deprivation and social discrimination. The ever-increasing strength of Dera followers makes the cultivation of Deras a compulsion for the second component of triangular matrix, i.e., politicians (Ashraf 2016). The babas of Deras and their managerial staff, the third node of this triangular matrix, play a crucial role in keeping their following intact among the populace and politicians by projecting their enhanced prestige and importance within corridors of political and administrative power circles. The modus operandi to build up the popularity of Deras is based on intertwining myths about the unlimited spiritual powers of such babas with their proximity to centres of power within the civil, business, and administrative domains to create a ‘power-halo’ effect. All three aspects of this triangle—babas, followers, and politicians—therefore mutually reinforce each other with political parties practicing outright hard-headed realpolitik by viewing massive Dera followings as potential vote banks and, therefore, a good investment in terms of political patronage.12 This proximity to political power and perceptions of individual Deras’ political affiliations in turn play a significant role in raising their profiles and hence followings. Thus, a paradigm of mutual reinforcement becomes operative. In the following sub-section, an attempt has been made to explicate the paradigm of mutual reinforcement through the case of DSS.

3.1. DSS as an Exemplar of Mutual Reinforcement

The involvement of DSS in the electoral politics, one of most politically active Deras in Punjab, began after Gurmeet Ram Rahim took over its headship in 1990. Since then its mingling with political personalities across political spectrums has never been diminished. For the first time, it supported a political party in the 1996 parliamentary election, in which it lent its support to Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal)—henceforth SAD(B). Again in 1997, DSS indirectly supported SAD(B) in a Punjab Assembly election, and in return, the latter helped its followers in their various official works after it was able to form the government in the state. Subsequently, in the 1999 parliamentary election, DSS again lent its support to SAD(B), facilitating it in winning two of the thirteen parliamentary seats in Punjab. Given the massive following of DSS, political leadership across party lines never lost an opportunity to elicit its political support during elections both at the state and national levels. In 2002, a tumultuous year13 indeed for DSS, Gurmeet Ram Rahim shifted its support to the Indian National Congress (henceforth Congress party), which, though failing to form a government in the state, was able to win 37 out of the total 67 assembly seats in the Akali-dominated Malwa region (south of river Sutlej). It was the first time in the electoral history of Punjab that a political party, which otherwise was able to form a government, failed to win majority of seats in the Malwa region (Surinder Singh 2020, p. 192).

In the next two assembly elections in Punjab, 2007 and 2012, DSS kept its support intact in favour of SAD(B), for which the latter had to pay a heavy price in terms of its political rout in the subsequent state assembly and parliamentary elections for its alleged favours to the head of DSS. Sukhbir Singh Badal, President of SAD(B) and Deputy Chief Minister in the SAD(B)-BJP coalition government in Punjab between 2007 and 2017, was accused by some senior rebel SAD(B) leaders of using his ‘influence on the Akal Takht’ to ensure a pardon for the DSS chief, who had been booked in 2007 for allegedly imitating Guru Gobind Singh, and also prevaricated over identifying, and then prosecuting, the miscreants who were involved in incidents of sacrilege at Bargari, Behbal Kalan, and Kotkapura in 2015. The senior rebel Akali leaders in their letter of July 1, 2024, to the Jathedar of Akal Takht also alleged that the SGPC—an elected Sikh religious body dominated by members of SAD(B) and is the appointing authority of the Jathedar at Akal Takht—had acted in tandem with the SAD(B) supremo by spending nearly Rs. 90 lakh on advertisements in newspapers towards this end (Brar 2024a).

Deliberating upon the letter—submitted by the senior dissident Akali leaders on 1 July 2024, and written explanation thereof submitted by him to the Jathedar of Akal Takht—the adjudicating five Sikh high priests14 delivered their verdict on 30 August 2024, declaring him ‘tankhaiya’—guilty of violating the Sikh rehat maryada (religious code of conduct)—and also summoning him to appear before the Akal Takht within 15 days to seek apology for the decisions he took as SAD(B) chief that deeply harmed the image of the ‘Panth’ and caused damage to Sikh interests and pronouncement of the quantum of punishment to be meted out to him by the five Sikh high priests (PTI 2024; Brar 2024b). He would remain a ‘tankhaiya’ until he apologised for his ‘sins’ said the Jathedar of Akal Takht while pronouncing the verdict from the Akal Takht complex (PTI 2024).

DSS forays into electoral politics did not cease to exist even after the imprisonment of its chief in the rape and murder cases. Since the incarceration of the chief of DSS in the Sunaria jail in Rohtak district of Haryana on 28 August 2017, he has been granted multiple paroles/furloughs (short-term temporary release) on various pretexts. So far, he has been granted ten paroles/furloughs since his conviction on 25 August 2017 in the rape case of his two sadhvis and also two murder cases later: twice in 2024 (total 71 days in January and August), thrice in 2023 (total 91 days in January, July, and November), thrice in 2022 (total 91 days in February, June, and October), once in the month of May 2021 (one day), and again once in the month of October 2020 (one day). Besides these, on one occasion, the DSS chief was temporarily released on health grounds too. Thus, after the completion of his latest 21-day furlough on 5 September 2024, which was granted to him on 13 August 2024, he availed a total of 255 days of temporary release in the last four years since his conviction (for details, see Bhatia 2024; Manav 2024; Express News Service 2024; Express News Service 2023; and Sura 2024b).

There is a general impression that Gurmeet Ram Rahim’s jail reprieves invariably coincided with elections to local bodies, the assembly, or Parliament (Ashutosh Sharma 2024). Curiously, in the last two years, DSS Chief’s parole/furlough periods have coincided with the local/assembly/by-poll elections in the northern states, all of which are DSS strongholds. On 24 October 2020, the one-day temporal release of Dera chief—from sunrise to sunset—to meet his ailing mother at a hospital in Gurgaon coincided with the 3 November 2020 Baroda Assembly by-poll election in Haryana (Sura 2024c). Similarly, in February 2022 (7–28 February), he was temporary released on a 21-day furlough, ahead of Punjab Assembly elections, and again in the same year was granted a 40-day parole (15 October–25 November 2022) ahead of Haryana’s Panchayat elections and the Adampur Assembly by-poll election. In July 2023, the DSS chief was released on a 30-day parole (20 July–20 August), ahead of the Panchayat elections in Haryana, and in the same year, he was granted a 21-day furlough (21 November–13 December 2023), which coincided with Rajasthan Assembly polls (Bhatia 2024; Sehgal 2023). Being a native of Gurusar Modia village of Sri Ganganagar district of Rajasthan state, the Dera chief had substantial following in Haryana’s border areas in Rajasthan (Express News Service 2023). His 50-day parole in January 2024 (19 January–10 March) was also alleged to have been granted keeping in view the model code for the 18th general parliamentary elections as well as the ‘Pran Pratishtha’ (consecration) of the Ram temple in Ayodhya. Immediately upon his release, he issued a video statement asking his followers to celebrate “Ram ji’s festival” like Diwali’ (Express News Service 2024; Manav 2024). His latest 21-day furlough on 13 August 2024 came ahead of the crucial assembly elections in Haryana and by-poll election in Uttar Pradesh due later this year.

3.2. Babas: Ray of Divinity

Babas of Deras are not mere mortals but rays of divinity in the eyes of their followers. During the regular satsangs (sacred congregation for spiritual discourses) on the premises of the Deras, it is repeatedly emphasised that babas/gurus are physical links to a formless God, and it is only through them that devotees can meet God or more readily resolve their worldly woes and realise their aspirations. It is emphasised in sacred texts of the Sant Mat (path of truth/true teachings of the bhakti sants) literature that the spiritual utility of a guru resides in the invisible form of a shabd guru (spiritual sound), which can only be experienced through meditating on the guru’s or baba’s image while silently reciting sacred naam (holy word) shared by the guru at the time of initiation. Thus, in the terrestrial world, the guru or baba is indissolubly intertwined with the shabd guru, which is the physical manifestation of God and God himself (Juergensmeyer 1991, pp. 22–31).

It is in the aforementioned crucial context that the intensity of devotion among the followers of DSS towards their Baba remained intact even after his imprisonment in the rape and murder cases. The enthusiastic gatherings at the satsangs of DSS chief, which he delivered online from his sojourns at a branch of DSS at Banwara, Uttar Pradesh, during his paroles/furloughs from the Sunaria Jail, are a vindication of his undiminished following despite the fact of his absence from headquarters of DSS in Sirsa, Haryana. A closer look at numbers of DSS congregations, as well as anecdotal evidence, reveals a contrary picture; but, the very fact that he used to attract a significant number of followers at his online satsangs during his various reprieves from jail reflects on his solid hold on the followers of DSS who were convinced about his invincibility (Ashutosh Sharma 2024).

Devotees are implicitly groomed to avoid criticism of their babas/gurus since they are cast as causal linkages to God and transcendent of worldly cares and mores. Such deeply instilled sentiments are what motivated thousands of followers of Baba Gurmeet Ram Rahim, to camp in Panchkula Sector 23, turning it into a mini-Malwa of Punjab (Gupta and Dhaliwal 2017) for three days—until the verdict of his decades-old rape case was announced on 25 August 2017. Subsequently, they created a state of anarchy in the area around the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) court in Panchkula once their baba was convicted and taken into Haryana police custody for the announcement of the quantum of punishment. Despite the deployment of a huge posse of police and paramilitary personnel for the maintenance of law and order, mob violence erupted within three hours of the announcement of the verdict, killing and injuring a large number of people (HT Correspondence 2022; P. Sharma 2022; TNN 2019). It is in such precarious contexts that the social capital of Deras can also mutate into what Putnam called “malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like any other form of capital” (Putnam 2000, p. 19; also see Fukuyama 1997, pp. 378–79), which consequently gives rise to conflict formation in society.

4. Conclusions

My key argument in this study is that Deras are not only the custodians of alternative religious realms for those who do not feel comfortable within the organisational domain of mainstream religions but also generate social capital, which augments the spiritual as well as material and socio-cultural profiles of their followers. Furthermore, this social capital, as generated by Deras, does not only serve the interests of their followers but also multiplies their followings and tremendously enhances the prestige and electoral values of the latter that brings them closer to the centres of political power.