3.1. Issues with Understanding the Nature and Fundamental Aspects of Maqāsid
The maqāsid theory constitutes an advanced aspect of usūl al-fiqh, requiring a profound understanding of fiqh, usūl al-fiqh, and proficiency in Arabic, the language of essential literature. The translation of some fundamental texts has been undertaken; however, numerous works remain exclusively available in the original Arabic. This underscores the necessity for proficiency in the Arabic language to access and comprehend these essential works.
It is noticeable that authors with backgrounds in economics, finance, and related disciplines, when exploring this subject, may occasionally lack the requisite foundation. This, in turn, can result in evaluations and inferences that are flawed or inconsequential due to their limited depth of knowledge.
Without a proper understanding of the purpose and function of maqāsid theory, its sound implementation is unattainable, leading to potential setbacks, as observed in the current context. Therefore, under the heading, we will delve into maqāsid’s functions for mujtahids and its role in ijtihād and explore the macro and micro objectives of Sharia, particularly in economic transactions. The investigation extends to the broader application of maqāsid, encompassing political economy and governance. Additionally, we will address criticisms directed at fiqh scholars in these areas, emphasizing the shared responsibility for fostering justice within the parameters of Islamic law, extending beyond Muslim jurists.
To initiate our exploration into the first topic at hand, we delve into the foundational aspects of the
maqāsid theory. This theory was formulated to illustrate that sharia provisions are not isolated regulations but are intricately interconnected, forming a cohesive whole in alignment with Allah’s intent. The primary function of
maqāsid for a
mujtahid is to comprehend the purpose behind rulings, consider
maqāsid in decision making, and maintain overall consistency among rulings. This framework guides
ijtihād and serves as a foundation for issuing rulings, provided that certain conditions are met. In this manner,
maqāsid ensure the integrity, consistency, and conformity of provisions and rulings with higher goals of the Sharia, rather than serving as an independent method for generating new provisions (
Shātibī 1997).
In conjunction with this, the IIFA has highlighted essential functions and benefits of considering
maqāsid in
ijtihād: These encompass the ability to conduct a comprehensive examination of sharia texts and provisions, while also recognizing the significance of maqāsid in sharia when addressing differences among jurists. Additionally, they allow for gaining deeper insights into the consequences of individuals’ actions and the application of Islamic rulings to their situations (
Islamic Fiqh Academy 2007).
Ahmet Yaman, a prominent Turkish scholar renowned for his studies on maqāsid, further observes that
maqāsid can provide guidance to the mujtahid on four specific issues when certain conditions and rules are met. These areas where
maqāsid are utilized in the process of
ijtihād include the interpretation of
nas (the Qur’ān and Sunna), determination of the effective attribute (i.e., the cause, ‘
illah) in analogical reasoning (
qiyās), resolution of apparent conflicts (
taārud) among the evidence, and determination of the fiqh ruling for newly encountered issues and problems (
Yaman 2018).
An often-overlooked dimension within the realm of maqāsid involves the distinction between micro and macro maqāsid. In delving into this nuanced distinction, one encounters the pioneering work of the Tunisian Islamic scholar and jurist Ibn Āshūr (d. 1973). In the third and final section of his groundbreaking work “Maqāsid al-sharī‘a al-Islāmiyya” (first published in 1945), he systematically applies the general theory of maqāsid to various branches of transactions (muāmalāt). He is the first scholar to address the maqāsid of specific fields, including family matters, financial transactions, judgeship, testimony, and penalties, to some extent. These objectives, specific to a particular branch of law or legal institution, are termed micro maqāsid to distinguish them from the broader universal maqāsid (also termed macro maqāsid). In this context, the chapter on ‘financial transactions’ sheds light on the objectives of sharia pertaining to economic wealth. (Despite this work’s translation into English in 2006, it is noteworthy that the majority of Islamic finance studies pertaining to maqāsid still approach the subject superficially, neglecting a deeper exploration of the micro maqāsid related to contracts and financial transactions).
In his book, Ibn Āshūr identifies five micro objectives of sharia related to economic wealth: marketability (fair wealth circulation;
rawāj), transparency (clear financial transactions;
wudūh), preservation (safeguarding assets from harm or misuse;
hifd), durability (encouraging sustainable economic activities;
thabāt), and equity (a commitment to fairness and justice in wealth distribution;
‘adl) (
Ibn Āshūr 2006;
Al-Khelaifi 2004).
His work laid the foundation for subsequent studies in this area, many of which followed a similar pattern. For instance, the IIFA mentions the same objectives as Ibn Āshūr, as illustrative examples in financial transactions, with the understanding that they are not necessarily conclusive (
Islamic Fiqh Academy 2023). Similarly, in one of the few English articles on this subject, Kamali introduced ‘development’ (
tanmiyah) as a separate objective of financial transactions, despite its inclusion within Ibn Āshūr’s broader category of circulation/
rawāj. Kamali argued that development merits its own category because it crucially contributes to various objectives endorsed by the shari’ah (
Kamali 2017).
However,
Ibn Āshūr’s (
2006) framework is not comprehensive or final, and ongoing efforts are needed to further refine and improve it. Therefore, it is necessary to identify and define these issues through an inductive method. A more suitable approach would involve a collective effort, perhaps through the formation of a committee led by the IIFA, to undertake this task. However, as of now, no tangible progress has been made in this regard.
Another crucial aspect to address under this heading involves the thorough exploration of maqāsid principles beyond the conventional scope of contracts and financial transactions. This section aims to delve into diverse dimensions of maqāsid, broadening our perspective to encompass Islamic economics, governance, and societal well-being. The aim is to clarify the evolution of maqāsid thinking and bring attention to the modern challenges it faces.
Today, the theory of
maqāsid is regarded as a guiding principle that encompasses all facets of life. Notably, the IIFA has underscored the importance of exploring the diverse dimensions of sharia’s objectives, encompassing social, economic, educational, political, and other domains (
Islamic Fiqh Academy 2007). However, it is essential to emphasize another often-overlooked aspect in this discourse. As evident from the preceding discussion,
maqāsid al-sharī‘a have primarily been explored by Islamic jurists, with a predominant focus on Islamic law, particularly within the realm of financial transactions, which is our subject matter. This prompts us to question the applicability of
maqāsid principles to broader areas of Islamic economics, including economic theory, fiscal policy, governance, and more. It is essential to note that these issues are not entirely separate from fiqh; rather, they are inherently part of
al-siyāsah al-shar’iyya, which is a subfield of fiqh dedicated to addressing matters related to governance, politics, and broader societal concerns (
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1955). However, they possess distinct characteristics compared to financial transactions.
First and foremost, it is essential to recognize that each century presents unique challenges, and the Qur’ān and Sunna inherently have limitations in directly addressing all aspects of life, including political economy and governance issues. To bridge these gaps, the process of
ijtihād, which involves independent legal reasoning while considering
maqāsid al-sharī‘a, comes into play (
Boynukalin 2003). When there is no direct ruling from the Qur’ān or Sunna available, Islamic jurists rely on the
‘istislāh’ method and the concept of
maslaha (as explained earlier in this article) to address governance issues.
One pivotal maxim resulting from this approach is enshrined in Article 58 of the Mecelle, a prominent Ottoman civil code. Crafted between 1868 and 1876 in the Ottoman Empire, the Mecelle primarily explores legal principles and direct legal regulations related to debts, contracts, property, and legal procedures. This article specifically asserts that “
The exercise of control over subjects is contingent upon maslaha (i.e., the public welfare)”. As a consequence,
maslaha has evolved into a vital guiding principle for determining the legitimate scope of action for Islamic rulers, ensuring their choices are in the best interest of society, and preventing the abuse of power (
Dönmez 2003).
Despite the theory of maqāsid not primarily addressing economic questions, such as the fundamental issues of ‘what to produce, how, and for whom’, a Muslim economist can derive insights based on the three layers of maqāsid and the ‘five necessities’. It is essential to understand this distinction when utilizing the concept. In addition to considering general maqāsid, decision-makers should always take into account the specific (micro) maqāsid principles relevant to their field. Decision-makers should always be open to leveraging new developments and existing experience. If necessary, additional principles and objectives should be incorporated to address specific challenges and circumstances. Moreover, it is crucial to avoid attributing divine significance to the conclusions and evaluations derived from the theory of maqāsid, especially when applying it to matters of al-siyāsah al-shar’iyya and political economy. In these areas, where there may be no direct nas or analogical reasoning (qiyās) available, drawing connections to divine intent should be avoided.
As mentioned earlier,
maqāsid al-sharī‘a in the classical era predominantly center around Islamic law and was developed by Muslim jurists, who engaged in its discussion and refinement. Neglecting this fundamental aspect can occasionally result in misinterpretations. To illustrate this point, let us provide some examples. Mehmet Asutay, who is a prominent name with his critical approach to the subject, suggests abolishing the three categories of
maqāsid and treating all as equal categories (
Asutay and Yilmaz 2018). However, this suggestion, even if plausible in the field of political economy, appears to overlook the fundamental purpose of this hierarchy in
fiqh: to establish priorities for the
mujtahid, thereby aiding in decision making when faced with conflicts between pieces of sharia evidence or differing
maslahas or other contested rulings. Similar reservations can be raised about the body of literature on the
maqāsid index, with Asutay and Yilmaz having previously presented valuable criticisms (
Asutay and Yilmaz 2018). Another noteworthy example is
Tag el-Din (
2013) and his book, ‘
Maqāsid Foundations of Market Economics’, which earned him the IDB Prize in Islamic Economics in 2015. In this work, he formulates his perspective on resource allocation within Islamic economics, basing it on the hierarchy of
maqāsid (
Tag el-Din 2013). However, as previously mentioned, the primary objective of the
maqāsid theory lies within the realm of jurisprudence. Conversely, it is reasonable to allocate limited resources wisely based on priorities without the need for religious endorsement. Nonetheless, discretion should always be exercised when employing
maqāsid in contexts beyond the directly legal sphere such as financial contracts. Perhaps the development of distinct
maqāsid measures (or
micro maqāsid) for such specialized areas could be considered as a solution in this regard.
A crucial criticism of the current maqāsid theory, highlighted by
Asutay and Yilmaz (
2018), centers on its societal shortcomings and lack of proactivity. They argue that the existing framework leans predominantly toward a market-oriented interpretation and lacks the capacity to effectively foster development (
Asutay and Yilmaz 2018). However, while this criticism has its merits, it overlooks certain crucial points. It is essential to recognize the inherent characteristics and limitations of fiqh within these domains and avoid placing the sole responsibility for establishing a just and socially equitable society on Islamic law and Muslim jurists alone. Instead, we want to emphasize the vital role of state institutions, administrators of relevant economic and financial organizations, economic management authorities, regulatory bodies, municipalities, and all other administrative or regulatory entities.
In the context of Islamic public law, certain provisions allow for the temporary restriction of certain
mubāh (permissible actions) by public authorities, particularly when it is deemed to serve the public interest or to prevent potential harm. Notable examples of such restrictions include the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) prohibition of storing and hoarding the meat from sacrifices to ensure that the nomadic poor in Medina could benefit from it. Similarly, the prohibition imposed by the Caliph ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) on buying meat two consecutive days a week during a period of meat scarcity can be understood within the same framework. This illustrates that, based on the same rationale, some actions classified as
mubāh can, under specific circumstances, be made obligatory by public authorities (
al-Araby 2018).
In the realm of Islamic jurisprudence, it is imperative to recognize that a jurist’s scope of authority does not extend to deeming permissible and legitimate matters as impermissible. At most, a jurist may issue an advisory ruling, such as makrūh, signifying an action as less favorable or discouraged. Reasonably, Islamic jurists and sharia advisory boards should not be expected to assume the role of administrators tasked with making judgments on broader societal matters beyond their primary domain of financial transactions. To cite an example, it becomes inappropriate to question why a sharia committee has sanctioned the financing of a high-rise building by an Islamic financial institution, even if such an endeavor may alter the city skyline.
It is crucial to emphasize that all authorized units, including state and municipal boards and authorities, as well as senior administrators within Islamic financial institutions, should incorporate the principle of maslaha (public interest) into their decision-making processes and exercise their legal authority accordingly. Some among them possess the capacity to enact regulations and directives based on the prevailing circumstances, and it is a religious duty for them to wield their authority for the well-being and welfare of the people.
3.2. Navigating Subjectivity: Challenges and Solutions
There is no dispute among Islamic scholars that the primary objective of Islamic rulings is to promote the well-being of people by achieving beneficial outcomes and mitigating harmful ones (
Alkhamees 2017). In an Islamic jurisprudential system that seeks alignment with Allah’s will, the risks of endowing human reason with complete authority in determining
maslaha (benefit) and
mafsada (harm) become evident in the absence of clearly defined boundaries and guidelines for establishing religiously valid interests and harms (
Opwis 2010).
The foremost advocates of the concept of
maqāsid during the classical period consistently emphasized this potential danger. According to Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), not everything aligned with societal good and benefit can be deemed just and virtuous. Conversely, everything that aligns with justice is inherently good, beneficial, rational, and acceptable (
Ghazālī 1993). While justice is an absolute ideal, it assumes relative aspects when materializing within specific historical and social contexts, taking form in entities like the state and society. Ultimately, a transcendent wisdom exists beyond the realms of history and society—the Supreme Creator, who determines what is just and advantageous (
Yaman 2018).
Shātibī (d. 790/1388) also underscores that religion is not intended to cater to the desires and whims of individuals or align with their immediate interests. From an Islamic standpoint, the purpose of seeking benefits and avoiding harm is to secure the necessities of life in this world as a means of preparing for the hereafter. This purpose does not revolve around securing the mere sensual benefits or eliminating individual sensual harms. Shātibī further posits that even if the necessity of safeguarding religion, life, progeny, property, and intellect is indisputable, it remains insufficient to evaluate matters of unknown rulings based solely on these principles. A comprehensive examination of the detailed evidence delineated in the
usūl al-fiqh is imperative. Otherwise, the literal interpretations of Quranic verses risk complete nullification. Reason alone cannot precisely ascertain the aspects of safeguarding these essential interests. Even if it attempts to do so, such determinations are limited to specific issues and particular temporal and spatial conditions. On the contrary, in matters relating to
darūrī (essential),
hājī (complementary), and
tahsīnī (embellishing) benefits, the sharia has delineated advantages that the intellect alone cannot grasp without reference to the
nas (
Shātibī 1997).
In contrast to the well-established methods in fiqh jurisprudence, which have matured over centuries and maintain clear boundaries, ijtihād based on maqāsid presents a unique set of challenges. Two primary subjective areas come to the forefront:
(a) Subjectivity in determining the macro and micro maqāsid;
(b) Subjectivity in establishing the principles and methodology of ijtihād based on maqāsid (ijtihād maqāsidī).
An illustrative example of the first subjective area is the triadic grouping of
darūriyyāt,
hājiyyāt, and
tahsīniyyāt, as well as the identification of rulings within each category—all of this involving a significant element of
ijtihād. Currently, the absence of precise criteria definitively demarcating the boundaries between these groups is notable. Even if certain criteria or definitions achieve consensus, it remains clear that consensus cannot be expected regarding which jurisprudential rulings appropriately fall within a specific category (
Dönmez 2003).
Consider, for instance, Ibn Āshūr’s exploration of the ‘methods of determining the aims of rulings’, a crucial undertaking in understanding
maqāsid (
Ibn Āshūr 2006). Although he addresses this topic as a distinct category, it is challenging to claim that he successfully established sound criteria for determining
maqāsid. Moreover, several of the examples he provides appear inconsistent with his strong efforts to establish precise or nearly precise principles. Similar to his predecessors from the classical period such as Shātibī, Najm al-dīn Tūfī, and Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), Ibn ‘Āshūr approached the issue primarily through certain principles, critiquing literalist interpretations and offering general determinations and categorical statements about
maqāsid. However, when he delves into detail and provides exemplifications of these principles, his focus shifts towards classical doctrines and institutions of fiqh, offering limited explanations within the context of contemporary issues. The absence of comprehensive exemplifications of these principles and the lack of effective examples to illustrate them make it challenging to argue that Ibn ‘Āshūr integrated principles in a manner that would serve as a definitive standard for determining both macro and micro
maqāsid and their application.
The determination of
maqāsid involves employing specific principles and rules when interpreting the
nas and identifying the intended purpose of the
nas, as well as the
maslaha it aims to achieve. While scholars like Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), Ghazālī, and Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām have referenced the method of induction in determining
maqāsid, it can be attributed to Shātibī as the first author to extensively examine this approach (
Raysūnī 2005).
Building on the insights of Shātibī and Ibn ‘Āshūr, the primary methods proposed for ascertaining
maqāsid encompass several key approaches and principles:
Maqāsid determinations should stem from clear, definite, or nearly definite texts found in the Qur’ān and the Sunna. Identification of texts explicitly stating a purpose is required, or alternatively, deduction of common points of convergence of reasons (
‘illah) and other evidence through induction must be performed. It is crucial to subordinate secondary objectives to primary objectives. Additionally, conducting meticulous analysis of situations not explicitly addressed by the Sharia and making efforts to discern their purpose is essential (
Ibn Āshūr 2006;
Boynukalin 2003).
The methods for determining
maqāsid have been broadly outlined at the principle level. However, a more in-depth exploration is needed, which includes identifying overarching (macro)
maqāsid and specific (micro)
maqāsid for distinct realms, such as legal and social areas, as well as various fields of transactions and contracts. The necessity for a unified guideline that can offer standardized direction for incorporating
maqāsid, both macro and micro, into all facets of life is evident. Such a guideline would ensure adherence to Islamic law and mitigate the risk of potential manipulation or conflicts (
Shinkafi and Ali 2017). Regrettably, significant progress toward this objective has not been discernible thus far. Even the IIFA, in its 2023 decision, only included points that were generally accepted in previous literature but did not establish a comprehensive guide for jurists in their
ijtihād efforts (
Islamic Fiqh Academy 2023). This point is particularly significant because many contemporary jurists recognize the requirement of expertise in
maqāsid as a prerequisite for
ijtihād.
Building on our previous discussion, which illustrated the inherent subjectivity in human attempts to discern God’s intention and objectives in each norm, it is prudent to propose solutions to tackle this challenge. In this context, it is recommended to delegate the identification of macro and micro
maqāsid to a joint committee consisting of scholars deeply knowledgeable in the procedures, principles, and intricacies of Islamic jurisprudence. Such a committee can significantly reduce the element of relativity. While achieving consensus at all times and on all issues may not be feasible, directing efforts in this direction will still serve as a more reliable source of information than individual preferences on
maqāsid, as it will mirror the collective wisdom of the Muslim community. While there is no explicit evidence advocating the adoption of such a method in matters of
maqāsid, the divine praise for the ummah in the Qur’an (al-Baqara 2:143; Āl ʿImrān 3:110), alongside Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) affirmation of the infallibility of the Muslim community’s consensus (Sunan Ibn Mājah, Kitāb al-Fitan, 8), fortifies the basis for collective action and a cohesive approach (
Yaman 2018).
The second significant issue requiring comprehensive examination due to its subjective nature is associated with the ijtihād process. This involves delving into the intricate question of how, and to what extent, maqāsid should be integrated. Given its complexity, this matter necessitates thorough analysis to establish precise guidelines for incorporating maqāsid principles into the practice. Such an examination is crucial in providing a well-defined framework for making juristic decisions in accordance with Islamic law.
In this context, the IIFA has outlined a set of overarching principles concerning the incorporation of
maqāsid in
ijtihād in the context of financial transactions. Key considerations include complying with stronger, legitimate pieces of sharia evidence, especially the Qur’ān and the Sunna. Additionally, it involves the integration of both the overarching universal (macro) objectives of sharia and specific (micro)
maqāsid related to transactional objectives when crafting and interpreting contracts and modern financial transactions. These considerations also encompass recognizing the hierarchy and characteristics of
maqāsid, differentiating between primary and secondary objectives, and preserving a distinct separation between goals (
maqāsid) and means (
wasāil) in transactional rulings. Furthermore, it is essential to weigh the likely consequences (
ma’ālāt) of financial transactions while remaining faithful to
maqāsid (
Islamic Fiqh Academy 2023).
These principles by the IIFA align with the literature and underscore fundamental principles that have come to the forefront (e.g.,
Qaradāghī 2010;
Elmahjub 2019). However, there is not yet an expected standardized set of principles and measures that are elaborated, exemplified, and standardized enough, and more collective work is needed in this regard.
Indeed, the interpretation of
maqāsid without specific criteria can lead to highly subjective outcomes in
ijtihād. An illustrative example of this subjectivity is the ongoing debate concerning organized tawarruq practices in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). Organized tawarruq structures aim to facilitate deferred payments with a fixed return, primarily using the underlying commodity as a means to circumvent the sharīʿah prohibition against usurious loans. Critics of organized tawarruq highlight its potential misalignment with
maqāsid principles, particularly economic equality and justice (e.g.,
Siddiqi 2007;
Alkhamees 2017). Conversely, proponents argue that tawarruq can be compatible with
maqāsid objectives by minimizing harm while fostering growth in Islamic finance, provided there is proper regulation (e.g.,
Haneef 2009). This debate underscores the subjectivity in interpreting
maqāsid and is just one of many examples in Islamic finance that emphasize the need for standardized criteria when evaluating financial practices in line with these objectives.
In conclusion, following the determination of both micro and macro
maqāsid, the practice of
ijtihād should also involve the formation of committees to mitigate the second type of subjectivity regarding
maqāsid. The engagement of jurisprudential committees is crucial, especially in such matters, as the likelihood of error significantly diminishes when multiple
mujtahids collaborate in a collective
ijtihād effort. Their combined wisdom and diverse perspectives serve as a safeguard against individual errors (
Dadaş 2015). This idea has historical precedence, having been collectively implemented by Caliph Omar during his time, and it continues in sharia advisory committees, as well as in international and national fatwa committees today. It seems fitting for this practice to persist in its
maqāsid dimension and be widely disseminated.
3.3. Unintended Consequences: Results Contrary to Purpose
Proponents of maqāsid in the last century emerged with a compelling argument. They contended that traditional ijtihād, which placed heavy emphasis on textual precision and form while relying exclusively on classical fiqh jurisprudence methods, often yielded problematic outcomes. They believed that incorporating maqāsid into the process of ijtihād could offer a solution to these persistent issues, including those stemming from legal devices (hiyal), which may be viewed critically in the context of Islamic principles.
However, as Islamic finance underwent significant developments, a different set of challenges emerged. These developments, marked by the complexities of subjectivity discussed earlier, brought about unforeseen consequences. Ironically, the concept of maqāsid, originally intended to prevent problematic transactions, fraudulent practices, and legal devices (hiyal), has, at times, been used to legitimize such transactions. This has occurred through liberal interpretations that circumvent specific textual evidence on the subject.
This phenomenon, which has faced significant criticism, primarily manifests in two distinct aspects:
The first manifestation becomes apparent in the interpretations of individuals within the modernist approach. Due to their specific perspectives, they do not consider explicit provisions in the nas or consensus of the scholars (ijmā‘) obligatory and see diverging from established norms as unproblematic. Instead, they consider it necessary to supersede the rulings of the nas based on changing circumstances or the personal and societal needs of individuals. While some of these researchers do not explicitly reference the concept of maqāsid in their reasoning, they often arrive at these conclusions through considerations of philosophical concepts like utility, rationality, or historicism. Occasionally, for this purpose, new elements are introduced into the concept of maqāsid beyond the recognized five maslahas, without clear deductive derivation from the Qur’ān and Sunna.
An example illustrating this erroneous perspective can be found in the views of Arab thinker Jābirī (d. 2010) regarding
ribā (interest). In his perspective, he criticizes Muslim jurists for their emphasis on the language and wording of texts when interpreting the
nas, instead of delving into their underlying purpose. Jābirī contends that they evaluated the ruling solely based on the presence or absence of its cause (‘
illah), failing to connect it to the presence of societal benefit (
maslaha). To illustrate his point, he suggests that the prohibition of interest in the Qur’ān aimed to prevent exploitation. In today’s banking system, however, most transactions benefit individuals and society by facilitating the establishment of businesses and job creation. As a result, interest is no longer a tool for usury and exploitation through banks but has become advantageous for society. Consequently, the original purpose behind prohibiting interest no longer applies, and loans from banks should now be considered permissible (
halāl) (
Jābirī 1992).
The challenge here is that the divine intent behind Allah’s revealed rulings may not always be uniformly and clearly understood by all recipients. As a result, there is a risk that placing the sole responsibility for defining what constitutes
maslaha (utility) and
mafsada (harm) in the hands of individuals may undermine the original legislative intent. In such circumstances, human judgments could result in the jurisprudence being steered by the fleeting whims and preferences of those making these determinations. Consequently, it appears more fitting in contemporary times for
ijtihad to be conducted by larger commissions comprising competent experts of
fiqh (
Yaman 2018).
The viewpoint that Islamic jurisprudence transcends the mere pursuit of absolute benefits or the prevention of harm has also been emphasized by prominent classical figures in
maqāsid theory. Ghazālī highlights that the fundamental objective (
maksūd al-sharī’a) is preserving Allah’s intent (
Ghazālī 1993).
Maslaha cannot justify modifying a ruling established by clear
nas or
ijmā‘. Ghazālī illustrates this with an example involving a king’s violation of fasting rules during Ramadan, in which a jurist prescribes fasting as atonement; he argues that such a modification of a clear legal ruling for perceived benefit is legally invalid and poses a challenge to the universality of the law within Islamic jurisprudence (
Būtī 1973;
Opwis 2010).
Shātibī argues that determining these benefits should not rely solely on personal desires for worldly gains, but also consider life’s purpose for the hereafter, guiding individuals away from selfish desires toward servitude to Allah (
Shātibī 1997). Dahlawī (d. 1176/1762) emphasizes that sharia’s judgments are more reliable than human reasoning (
Dahlawī 2005). As mentioned earlier, modern fiqh academies have clearly accepted the principle that the
maslaha or
maqāsid determined by the
mujtahid should avoid contradiction with stronger sharia evidence.
The second manifestation becomes apparent in the interpretations of researchers who identify with, or are commonly linked to, the ‘balanced approach’. Insufficient understanding of sharia’s fundamental objectives in contemporary financial transactions can lead to misusing
maqāsid to justify contracts that contradict sharia principles. These issues often result from improper or misunderstood use of Islamic jurisprudence tools, including
maqāsid al-sharī‘a and
maslaha (
Dusuki and Abozaid 2007). A contributing factor is a lack of comprehensive fiqh knowledge. While scholars should exercise caution when delving into unfamiliar areas, the academic environment may encourage them to explore confidently. This tendency can result in the development of unfounded interpretations that disproportionately emphasize macro
maqāsid, leading to flawed judgments in various contexts. For instance, macro
maqāsid can at times be employed as a pretext to bypass rules serving micro
maqāsid. Take the prohibition of usury as an example, primarily designed to preserve wealth, ensure equitable distribution, and eliminate social injustice. Yet, it is occasionally evaded by citing the lower-priority objective of ‘reducing hardship’. To tackle these challenges effectively, it is essential to consider both macro and micro
maqāsid related to financial transactions, along with relevant
nas,
ijmā,
usūl al-fiqh principles, and Islamic legal maxims (
al-qawāid al-fikhiyyah) (
Alkhamees 2017).
The discussion surrounding
bay‘ al-‘īnah-based products serves as a notable illustration of this. Supporters of controversial Islamic banking practices, such as
bay‘ al-‘īnah-based products, argue that leniency during the early stages of Islamic banks is essential. Citing the permissive stance of Imam Shāfi’ī (d. 204/820), they argue that allowing these practices is crucial for fostering growth and ensuring viability in the face of conventional banking dominance (cf.
Shāfiʻī 1961). Without such flexibility, Islamic banks may face the risk of failure. Consequently, a more permissive approach is deemed necessary when structuring the Islamic financial system and its products and services. Their arguments draw on various sharia concepts, including
al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah,
maqāsid al-sharī‘a,
maslaha, and
darūrah (necessity) (
Dusuki and Abozaid 2007). Engaging in this practice is believed to accelerate the integration of Islamic finance into the global financial system, fostering prosperity and development in Muslim societies (
Asutay and Yilmaz 2018).
However, utilizing products that circumvent the prohibition of
ribā through means like
bay‘ al-‘īnah is fundamentally at odds with the core objective of sharia’s
ribā prohibition. Therefore, those who assert the permissibility of such transactions, under the guise of pursuing
maqāsid al-sharī‘a, are, in fact, contradicting the true essence of
maqāsid. The endorsement of these transactions on the basis of
maqāsid,
al-siyāsah, or
darūrah is regarded as incorrect and ultimately results in more harm than benefit, carrying grave implications (
Dusuki and Abozaid 2007).
In contrast, scholars like Asutay, Yilmaz, Abozaid, and Alkhamees have explored this matter and endeavored to present potential solutions. Asutay, who has challenged this situation with numerous studies and advocated a new approach called ‘Islamic moral economy’, underscores how
maqāsid in Islamic finance have been reduced to symbolic tools, diverging from their original purpose of realizing higher sharia objectives. He critically assesses the prevailing approach within Islamic banking, characterizing it as largely pragmatic, where
maqāsid al-sharī‘a are primarily used for the legitimization of transactions, resulting in an evaporation of
maqāsid’s essence. Additionally, he contends that the prevailing conception of
maqāsid, aligned with self-regulated market economies, hinders development in the field by restricting genuine exploration and limiting its transformative potential within Islamic finance (
Asutay and Yilmaz 2018).
The core issue within the ‘modernist approach’ to maslaha lies in its overemphasis and prioritization of maslaha over textual sharia sources. In essence, when a conflict arises between textual evidence and maslaha, the latter is often presumed to take precedence. This stance raises concerns regarding the potential sway of Islamic jurisprudence by the transient desires and personal inclinations of those in positions of influence.
International bodies have made significant decisions regarding the misuse of
maqāsid for legitimization. For example, the IIFA issued recommendations to exercise caution when considering fatwas that lack a solid legal foundation and fail to substantiate their claims with evidence recognized by the sharia. These fatwas may be grounded in imagined benefits that contradict sharia law, stemming from personal inclinations and being swayed by prevailing circumstances, conditions, and customs that run counter to the fundamental principles, rulings, and objectives of the sharia (
Islamic Fiqh Academy 1998).
Simultaneously, the AAOIFI, in its Sharia Standard on ‘Fatwa Principles and Fatwa Ethics’, explicitly states that scholars should refrain from employing jurisprudentially prohibited tactics to enable interest-free financial institutions to exceed the provisions of fiqh or contravene broader religious objectives (
maqāsid) (
AAOIFI 2015). Furthermore, the IIFA has encouraged the application of
maqāsid to contemporary financial transactions with the aim of achieving distinctiveness in Islamic products, differentiating them from traditional capitalist or conventional forms (
Islamic Fiqh Academy 2007).