Martin Buber and Social Justice
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Add footnote to the first sentence. Buber addressed issues of social justice in his ramified political essays. See Martin Buber Werkausgabe. Schriften zur politischen Philosophie und zur Sozialphilosophie. Vol. 11.1. Edited with commentary by Stefanon Franchini; introduction by Francesco Ferrari (Güterslohr: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2019). Vol. 11.2, edited with commentary by Massimiliano De Villa; introduced by Francesco Ferrari (Güterslohr: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2019). Also see Samuel Hayim Brody, Martin Buber’s Theopolitics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019).
Change “realm of the personal” to the “realm of the interpersonal”
Update the reference to the translation by Walter Kaufmann to I and Thou. 100th Anniversary Reissue with a New Introduction and annotations by Paul Mendes-Flohr (New York: Free Press, 2023).
Please adjust footnotes in accord with the guidelines stipulated by Religions.
Author Response
I will proceed to make the required editorial corrections, namely annotations and references.
I noted the advice to change "realm of personal" to "realm of the interpersonal"
As I understand the underlying subject of the requested article, it is not a review of Buber's political philosophy. I do make many references to his "Paths in Utopia" and related material. However, the question posed to the authors of these articles refers specifically to "Social Justice," and in this case "Martin Buber and Social Justice." In the article I did make references to Buber's general political thought and activity and connected this to the essence of his dialogical philosophy.
In terms of Mysticism and Dialogue I argue that there are general similarities between Buber's philosophy of dialogue and the philosophies of thinkers such as Heschel, Merton, King and others, but those are similarities without an equivalence. In Buber's philosophy, the relationship of I-Thou is not a mystical encounter between two persons or with God, nor it is a relationship that requires the participants to rise to a spiritual or emotional level akin to a "ubermensch." As Buber understood the concept of mysticism, the entire foundation of Buber's philosophy stands on the rejection of mysticism as a non-dialogical religious experience. Buber wrote “What has to be given up is not the I, as most mystics suppose: this I is indispensable for any relationship, including the highest, which always presupposes an I and Thou.” As argued in my article, Buber's dialogical philosophy represents his distancing from his previous mystical stands. Buber himself described his departure from mysticism in these terms: "What good is the ecstasy of a religious experience if it caused me to miss a chance to save a desperate fellow human at my door?” Buber’s dialogical perspective rejected the basic mystical assumption of "subsuming" the self into an all encompassing unity with the divine. The :between of I and Thou” is not a mystical space of union or absorption of the self into the other, but it is precisely the space where both components of the dyad meet each other in the full expression of their whole being. In this regard, the work of Paul Mendes Flohr extensively explains Buber's transformation from an adherent to mystical concepts and practices, to a person devoted to the concepts and practices of dialogue. I have also explained this in greater detail in my latest book. I-Thou dialogue is not a holy sacrament, it is a deed we do, and in this sense it can be likened to what in Zen is called an “ordinary mind,” that is, a simple spirituality emptied from the accruals of extraneous theological hindrances. The principal hindrances to a dialogical life are the social constructs that prevent us from putting into practice the quotidian deeds of I-Thou dialogue. It is in this sense that Buber’s philosophy intersects with political ideas and programs. In other words, dialogue should not be understood solely as a relationship between two participants, as that could be construed as a “monologue of two.” Dialogue, in its essence, is a social project. In order to be able to practice I-Thou relationships we must create a society within which dialogue can be made manifest. I-Thou dialogue requires the building of a social structure within which the hindrances to its actualization could be minimized, a structure Buber identified as “Religious Socialism.” As Buber reminded us, I-Thou is a relationship each person does in accordance to his abilities and circumstances, insisting, as he did, that there are no formulas or codes to proscribe the forms and contents of a dialogical relationship for this would amount to adopting an I-It approach to the practice of relationships. Dialogical deeds can be recognized not by recourse to mystical experiences, transcendental divine entities or exalted emotional contents, but only in the deeds themselves. In this regard, we can say that since we cannot describe what I-Thou is, we can try to describe what it is not. That is to say, every time we reduce the scope and reach of I-It, we are creating the space and time of I-Thou. In my analysis, this emptying of Itness is what in Zen is known as the creation of “The Pure Land of the Buddha in the human realm.” Nothing in dialogical relationships is transcendental or mystical, it is simply a mindful renewal of genuine human community.
Reviewer 2 Report
-In the abstract and in the article itself (Par. 3), the author contrasts dialogue with mysticism. However, there exists a mysticism that is dialogical. The author needs to explain the relationship between mysticism and dialogue in a less generalizing and more nuanced way.
-Many quotations lack a reference to the source.
-I doubt if Buber in his dialogical philosophy would equate God with the relationship itself (Par. 4 and Par. 7).
-More secondary literature has to be used. For instance, for the extension of the principle of I-Thou to the social and political realm: E. Meir, “Reading Buber’s ‘I and You’ as a Guide to Conflict Management and Social Trans-formation”, Ben Mollov (ed.), The Legacy of the German-Jewish Religious and Cultural Heritage: A Basis for German-Israeli Dialogue?, Jerusalem: Yuval Press 2006, 119-131. For Buber’s anarchist thinking: Samuel Brody, Martin Buber's Theopolitics (New Jewish Philosophy and Thought), 2018.
-One may compare Buber with Buddhist humanists (see also Sallie King) and with other liberation theologians. Yet, the comparison with other liberation theologians is too much an enumeration of names, without going in depth.
Author Response
I will proceed to make the required editorial corrections, namely annotations and references.
I will expand on the comparison between Buber and some exponents of Liberation Theology.
As I understand the underlying subject of the requested article, it is not a review of Buber's political philosophy. I do make many references to his "Paths in Utopia" and related material. However, the question posed to the authors of these articles refers specifically to "Social Justice," and in this case "Martin Buber and Social Justice." In the article I did make references to Buber's general political thought and activity and connected this to the essence of his dialogical philosophy.
Since for Buber there is no distinction between the relationship of I-Thou and the presence of God, I argue that it is warranted to interpret Buber by arguing that the between of I and Thou is itself the realm of the divine.
In terms of Mysticism and Dialogue I argue that there are general similarities between Buber's philosophy of dialogue and the philosophies of thinkers such as Heschel, Merton, King and others, but those are similarities without an equivalence. In Buber's philosophy, the relationship of I-Thou is not a mystical encounter between two persons or with God, nor it is a relationship that requires the participants to rise to a spiritual or emotional level akin to a "ubermensch." As Buber understood the concept of mysticism, the entire foundation of Buber's philosophy stands on the rejection of mysticism as a non-dialogical religious experience. Buber wrote “What has to be given up is not the I, as most mystics suppose: this I is indispensable for any relationship, including the highest, which always presupposes an I and Thou.” As argued in my article, Buber's dialogical philosophy represents his distancing from his previous mystical stands. Buber himself described his departure from mysticism in these terms: "What good is the ecstasy of a religious experience if it caused me to miss a chance to save a desperate fellow human at my door?” Buber’s dialogical perspective rejected the basic mystical assumption of "subsuming" the self into an all encompassing unity with the divine. The :between of I and Thou” is not a mystical space of union or absorption of the self into the other, but it is precisely the space where both components of the dyad meet each other in the full expression of their whole being. In this regard, the work of Paul Mendes Flohr extensively explains Buber's transformation from an adherent to mystical concepts and practices, to a person devoted to the concepts and practices of dialogue. I have also explained this in greater detail in my latest book. I-Thou dialogue is not a holy sacrament, it is a deed we do, and in this sense it can be likened to what in Zen is called an “ordinary mind,” that is, a simple spirituality emptied from the accruals of extraneous theological hindrances. The principal hindrances to a dialogical life are the social constructs that prevent us from putting into practice the quotidian deeds of I-Thou dialogue. It is in this sense that Buber’s philosophy intersects with political ideas and programs. In other words, dialogue should not be understood solely as a relationship between two participants, as that could be construed as a “monologue of two.” Dialogue, in its essence, is a social project. In order to be able to practice I-Thou relationships we must create a society within which dialogue can be made manifest. I-Thou dialogue requires the building of a social structure within which the hindrances to its actualization could be minimized, a structure Buber identified as “Religious Socialism.” As Buber reminded us, I-Thou is a relationship each person does in accordance to his abilities and circumstances, insisting, as he did, that there are no formulas or codes to proscribe the forms and contents of a dialogical relationship for this would amount to adopting an I-It approach to the practice of relationships. Dialogical deeds can be recognized not by recourse to mystical experiences, transcendental divine entities or exalted emotional contents, but only in the deeds themselves. In this regard, we can say that since we cannot describe what I-Thou is, we can try to describe what it is not. That is to say, every time we reduce the scope and reach of I-It, we are creating the space and time of I-Thou. In my analysis, this emptying of Itness is what in Zen is known as the creation of “The Pure Land of the Buddha in the human realm.” Nothing in dialogical relationships is transcendental or mystical, it is simply a mindful renewal of genuine human community.
Reviewer 3 Report
please decide whether it is an academic paper or a sermon. The text entails some important ideas and true assertions but lacks too many basic elements. Quotations are brought without any references (Maimonides, St. Francis, Talmud, Buber himself). Not always is it clear whether a reference is made to Buber himself or an argument is developed "from a Buberian perspective" (see p. 3).
Regarding Buber himself, apart from the opening lines, there's no division between different phases of his long career, which went through some dramatic shifts (WWI, Nazi Germany, Immigration to Palestine, Holocaust, Land of Israel). In the context of a discussion of social theories I would expect a reference to the fact that Buber was deeply engaged in sociology, from his early work on the series "Society" to his appointment as professor for sociology and anthropology at the Hebrew University.
Author Response
I will proceed to make the required editorial corrections, namely annotations and references.
I will seek to clarify the distinctions between quoting Buber directly and ideas and views I regard as emanating from a "Buberain perspective"
As I understand the underlying subject of the requested article, it is not a review of Buber's political philosophy. I do make many references to his "Paths in Utopia" and related material. However, the question posed to the authors of these articles refers specifically to "Social Justice," and in this case "Martin Buber and Social Justice." In the article I did make references to Buber's general political thought and activity and connected this to the essence of his dialogical philosophy.
In terms of Mysticism and Dialogue I argue that there are general similarities between Buber's philosophy of dialogue and the philosophies of thinkers such as Heschel, Merton, King and others, but those are similarities without an equivalence. In Buber's philosophy, the relationship of I-Thou is not a mystical encounter between two persons or with God, nor it is a relationship that requires the participants to rise to a spiritual or emotional level akin to a "ubermensch." As Buber understood the concept of mysticism, the entire foundation of Buber's philosophy stands on the rejection of mysticism as a non-dialogical religious experience. Buber wrote “What has to be given up is not the I, as most mystics suppose: this I is indispensable for any relationship, including the highest, which always presupposes an I and Thou.” As argued in my article, Buber's dialogical philosophy represents his distancing from his previous mystical stands. Buber himself described his departure from mysticism in these terms: "What good is the ecstasy of a religious experience if it caused me to miss a chance to save a desperate fellow human at my door?” Buber’s dialogical perspective rejected the basic mystical assumption of "subsuming" the self into an all encompassing unity with the divine. The :between of I and Thou” is not a mystical space of union or absorption of the self into the other, but it is precisely the space where both components of the dyad meet each other in the full expression of their whole being. In this regard, the work of Paul Mendes Flohr extensively explains Buber's transformation from an adherent to mystical concepts and practices, to a person devoted to the concepts and practices of dialogue. I have also explained this in greater detail in my latest book. I-Thou dialogue is not a holy sacrament, it is a deed we do, and in this sense it can be likened to what in Zen is called an “ordinary mind,” that is, a simple spirituality emptied from the accruals of extraneous theological hindrances. The principal hindrances to a dialogical life are the social constructs that prevent us from putting into practice the quotidian deeds of I-Thou dialogue. It is in this sense that Buber’s philosophy intersects with political ideas and programs. In other words, dialogue should not be understood solely as a relationship between two participants, as that could be construed as a “monologue of two.” Dialogue, in its essence, is a social project. In order to be able to practice I-Thou relationships we must create a society within which dialogue can be made manifest. I-Thou dialogue requires the building of a social structure within which the hindrances to its actualization could be minimized, a structure Buber identified as “Religious Socialism.” As Buber reminded us, I-Thou is a relationship each person does in accordance to his abilities and circumstances, insisting, as he did, that there are no formulas or codes to proscribe the forms and contents of a dialogical relationship for this would amount to adopting an I-It approach to the practice of relationships. Dialogical deeds can be recognized not by recourse to mystical experiences, transcendental divine entities or exalted emotional contents, but only in the deeds themselves. In this regard, we can say that since we cannot describe what I-Thou is, we can try to describe what it is not. That is to say, every time we reduce the scope and reach of I-It, we are creating the space and time of I-Thou. In my analysis, this emptying of Itness is what in Zen is known as the creation of “The Pure Land of the Buddha in the human realm.” Nothing in dialogical relationships is transcendental or mystical, it is simply a mindful renewal of genuine human community.
Round 2
Reviewer 2 Report
Compared with the previous version, this revised article is a great improvement. It explains how Buber's dialogical thought opposes a world-denying mysticism. The article is expanded, better referenced and more nuanced.
Please note the lack of some page references (notes 21,34,35,45,47), and an unclear sentence on p. 3, line 15 from the bottom.
Author Response
Thank you! I will carefully review and follow your suggestions.
Reviewer 3 Report
I find the revised version much better regarding clarity, coherence, and method of reference.
My only concern now is the abstract. The author extended it to make his core argument more apparent but I'm afraid the present version might only disturb the reader. The text can be shortened by about 60%. No need to follow all the details of the discussion, just a clear formulation of the bottom line.
a light editing is neede.
Author Response
I have shortened the length of the abstract and continued the detailed discussion in the body of the article.
