The Hypostasis of the Archons: Platonic Forms as Angels

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

On the whole I liked this piece. It's original, ambitious, and generally well-written (though there are quite a few typos and minor grammatical mistakes that will need to be corrected in the final version). 

I do have some concerns that I think should be addressed:

Page 1: Feibelman’s book was originally published in 1959 – that should be indicated in some way in its citation / reference

Page 2: may need to argue further re: the claim that for Plato, Form can be equated with a sort of activity. Might be better to say it can be equated with a sort of actuality. Ditto for Aristotle (substantial form anyway isn’t activity, though it enables activity by actualizing prime matter and determining a thing’s causal capacities).

Page 2: might want to add a footnote regarding this language of the Form being “in” matter. A lot of Plato folk might object to that wording. Could use some further explication anyway. (The immediately following passage, which distinguishes between unparticipated and participated Form, is somewhat helpful here in explaining what the author really means. But it’s also worth noting that this distinction and its implications are arguably clearer in later Neoplatonists – like Proclus – than in Plato himself.)

Page 2: I like the proportion-language here (God/Good is to form as form is to matter), but this could really use some further explanation. Liable to sound VERY odd to folks unfamiliar with this train of thought.

Page 3: worth noting that Plotinus was in the minority on this issue of the reality of Forms of particulars. Most of the larger Platonist tradition rejects it (e.g., Proclus).

Page 3: I was surprised to hear the author claiming outright that Proclus, Plotinus, Aquinas and Marsilius Ficino identify Forms with angels. This is apt to be misunderstood. Aquinas does say that each angel is its own substantial form, but that’s a far cry from saying that in general Forms = angels. And I don’t think the cited passages from Plotinus or Proclus really point in that direction either – at least, the claim that they do would need considerable further argument. (I don’t know Ficino well enough to comment on his work.) For Proclus in particular, remember that the divine henads are not the same things as Forms. People sometimes get this subtle point confused, and I’m wondering if the author may be repeating that misconception here?

Page 4: lots of readers will dispute the notion that God is an activity, or more broadly the notion that pure actuality entails being an activity. Aquinas for instance wouldn’t say that God is an activity, even though He is pure Act. God, for him, transcends our normal ontological categories (including the Aristotelian categories). Similarly many readers will dispute the notion (again) that Forms should be thought of as activities, though I grant that the author’s clarification here re: the sort of activity involved  (changelessly being-the-sort-of-manifestation-of-Good that they are) helps.

Page 5: it’s going a bit too far to say that that picture of absolute divine simplicity (where all of God’s attributes are identical with His essence) characterizes all of classical theism. It does characterize much of it, but there are also plenty of strands that differ here (e.g., Scotism within western Christianity and Palamism in the east). It’s worth noting this, because the author’s argument here does require absolute divine simplicity. (I.e., Forms can’t participate in just one or a few divine attributes / energies, because God doesn’t have literally distinct divine attributes / energies.)

Page 5: since the author earlier cited St. Dionysius, it’s worth recalling that there are multiple places in his works where he notes that some beings exist even though they aren’t alive, which indicates that Being and Life are distinct since they aren’t always found together. He uses this as a premise in an argument to the effect that Being is a more universal principle than Life. In this he is (I believe) following Proclus. So even if Plotinus is claiming that beings are all necessarily living (in some sense), I don’t think that principle is adhered to within the wider Platonic tradition. The author’s philosophical reply to this sort of concern (on page 6) is clever, though I do want to make sure we’re getting the history right.

Page 9: here I think the author will get a lot of pushback from orthodox Christians. Historically, evil/vice has been viewed by Christian thinkers (and by most of the pagan Platonists, including Proclus) as a privation, rather than as something with its own sort of being. Here the author is suggesting that there are real Forms of evils/vices, corresponding to demons. This is quite a departure from the historical consensus. That’s fine for present purposes, but the fact of it’s being a departure (and a dramatic one!) should at least be footnoted.

Page 10: De Young (2018) is cited on this page, but there is no corresponding reference provided in the bibliography. Is the author referring to a work by Fr. Stephen De Young? If so, s/he should consider citing as well his latest book God is a Man of War (2021) in which this theme of the Nephilim and their origin is explored in further detail.

Page 14: I would recommend adding a brief concluding section, in which the main claims & arguments are briefly summarized. (As it is, the paper ends a bit abruptly.)

Author Response

Thank you for your comments on this paper. Please find below a list of changes made in light of them:

• p 1 Citation for Feibelman 1959 is corrected.
• p 2 Footnote added re: form being in matter
• p 2 attempted to clarify/expand the notion of God:Form:Body
• p 3 noted that many Platonists would disagree with Plotinus re: Forms of particulars
• p 3 withdrawn the claim about Proclus and Plotinus saying “Forms=Angels” – I was being a bit generous with myself, thank you for stopping that. I now quote just Aquinas and Ficino, and also Eriugena – clarifying that they don’t say “Forms=Angels” but that they say things in that vicinity.
• p 5 I think there is a difference in how we are using ‘classical theism’ – in the usage I’m familiar with, people would see divine simplicity, of some quite stiff kind, as definitional of classical theism – e.g. would reject that Palamists are classical theists. In any case, I think it's fair to say that divine simplicity is "central" to classical theism.
• p 9 I have clarified the discussion re: evil as a negation. I (probably) don’t want to deny that evil is a negation – I am trying to navigate away, not so much from evil as a negation, but from the conclusion of some Platonists that there cannot be demons because the ontologically superior must also be ethically superior.
• p 10 updated the Dr. Stephen De Young reference – for some crazy reason my citation software alphabetizes De Young under “Y” rather than “D”…
• p 14 Added a brief conclusion
• Throughout, typos and grammatical mistakes have been caught, light editing for clarity.

Reviewer 2 Report

This article is skillfully and competently written by an author with a teacher's heart. It should be published.  There are two issues (1) The title of the article is also the name of a gnostic tractate in the Nag Hammadi Library edited by James M. Robinson. However, there is no reference to this tractate anywhere in the article. The author should at least include a brief paragraph that acknowledges this tractate and shows its relevance to the author's thesis and title. (2) The authorship of the Zohar is disputed although associated with Shimon bar Yochai and Moses de Leon.  In an academic study, a more conventional citation of this work should be used (e.g., Zohar 19b instead of Bar Yochai 2004, 19b, and, in the bibliography, Matt, Daniel C. (ed). The Zohar, etc. instead of Bar Yochai, Shimon 2004, etc.). 

Author Response

Thank you for your comments. The two issues have now been addressed

• On p.1, a footnote explains the choice of title and cites the Nag Hammadi library
• The citations for the Zohar have been altered