What Would ‘Indianness’ of New Testament Theology Mean? Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on Anthony De Mello, ‘Via Negativa’ and beyond the Accepted Routes in Catholic Theology

Abstract

This article focuses on one specific theological controversy, which pertains to the kataphatic—apophatic debates as a framework for New Testament theology. In the year 1998, theologians from Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a refutation of teaching of Anthony De Mello, SJ. The analysis of the Congregation’s refutation and the consequent debate led to the following hypothesis: Although the teaching of De Mello can be understood as following the apophatic line of thought in Christology and other important topics of New Testament theology, it is also bringing several distinctly Indian ideas and emphasis into the debate. Whereas apophatic theology is concerned with the problem of intellectual knowledge about God, the Indian view is concerned with the question of practical role of language in human attempts to experience the Divine. In both approaches, debates about the role of human thought, as expressed in language, are crucial, but for different reasons and with different aims.

1. Introduction

The large shift in the Christian population’s distribution from the Western (or Northern) countries to the East and South (especially to Asia) has been noted and its consequences for New Testament theology discussed by scholars for several decades (e.g., Adams 1987; Phan 2008, 2017; Kim 2015; Green et al. 2015; Gener and Pardue 2019). With the growth of numbers of Asian Christians, and with the more and more important role they play in the different Christian churches, the voices of theologians from Asia are taken more seriously than ever. Whereas centuries of interactions between Asian traditions and Christianity saw various comparisons between the concepts from the domestic thought and those of the Christian theology1, and typical approach of many theologians of different affiliation could be summarized in the expression “let some bits and pieces of Oriental wisdom to be added to the building of our Church” (see, e.g., Jones 1910), many different theological concerns and even larger variety of answers to their questions are available today.2

One of the greatest challenges for a New Testament theology, which emerges as a consequence of this enormous change, consists in answering several inter-connected questions. The theologians and other scholars from Asia try to develop new contributions to this theology, rooted in their specific cultures, in an increasing number of works. In this process, they struggle with the heritage of a specific cultural formation of the late Roman Empire, which was crucial for the emergence of the specific focus and ideas of the formative stage of Christianity. Is the resulting building of Christian theology really universal, as many theologians would like to believe, or is its intellectual framework still significantly constrained by the state of arts of the Western thought in the few first centuries after Christ (see, e.g., Beltramini (2021) on Amalados)? Connected with this question is another question: If the specific ideas and focus of the originally Western thought are recognized as culture-specific, could the originally Asian contributions bring about very significant changes in the whole structure of the theological project? Or, as even bolder objective, could they reframe the whole structure of the Christian thought?

In this way, the Asian theologians pointed out a very important direction for the development of New Testament theology (further referred also as NT theology), which by necessity leads us to the grounds of all theology, laid by interactions of the Early Church fathers with different schools of the late Antiquity. In other words, Christianity was born and developed its crucial self-understanding within a framework of specific culture, that of the late Roman Empire. During this process, not only the conceptual apparatus, but more importantly, many Neo-Platonic, Stoic, and other schools’ questions and inter-related ideas were absorbed into the emerging NT theology. This process also included re-appraisal of the earlier Jewish thought, including the key concept of NT theology, that of the Saviour. The intellectual framework of understanding Jesus as Christ was in this sense culture-specific, and it remained so for the many centuries to come. However, how would this framework change, if the intellectual contributions of other cultures would be taken seriously?

One important line of debate which the early Church absorbed, put its focus on the function of human ideas as expressed in language; more precisely, on their possibilities of and also limits within which they can contribute to the attainment of the Divine. I am referring specifically to the kataphatic—apophatic disputes as they were developed in the Neo-Platonism of the late Roman Empire, and used from the writings of Justin Martyr to those of St. Augustine (Carabine 2020; more on this topic in Section 3). Whether the Neo-Platonist debate was understood by the early Church Fathers in basically the same manner as its original source had it, or whether it was twisted and changed into a different set of ideas, this debate constituted an important framework for understanding and explaining the emerging canon of the New Testament. This framework has played a very important role in understanding the core doctrines of the Christian faith till today (typically it is discussed in connection with the Eastern Orthodox churches, but it is relevant to the theology of other Christian churches, too).

For this article, I chose one specific theological controversy, which pertains to the kataphatic—apophatic debates very much. At the same time, it is an example of a Western reaction to the work of an Asian Catholic, more precisely, a Jesuit teacher from India. In the year 1998, theologians from Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (further referred as “CDF”) issued a refutation of teaching of Anthony De Mello, internationally recognized Jesuit priest. This decision stirred considerable controversy in which Catholic and even Protestant theologians raised to defend teaching of Anthony De Mello. This article is concerned with two related questions concerning the controversy. Their relationship will need a brief explanation, hence I start with contextualizing them one after another, and only then I can explain what connects them. The first inquiry: What can be learned from the analysis of the debate started with the CDF’s refutation of De Mello’s teaching, if the whole kataphatic-apophatic framework of the New Testament theology is taken seriously? I will strive to show that theologians from CDF used only kataphasis in their criticism of De Mello’s texts, while dismissing the role of apophasis in the Catholic thought. My first point is that it will be more fruitful to explain De Mello’s teaching with the use of specific focus of apophatic theology, the position which De Mello explicitly claimed to be his inspiration (De Mello and Stroud 1992, pp. 47–48). I will demonstrate validity of my claim on several examples, starting with my response to the problem of impersonal conceptualization of God, ascribed by CDF’s theologians to the Indian Jesuit. The debate is developed in the second section of this article. In a nutshell, I argue that De Mello’s teaching is certainly holding several fundamental principles of the apophatic engagement with kataphasis, and as such, it is well-grounded in the very traditional framework of Catholic theology.

My second question takes this stance as a point of departure to find about another problem: Is it possible to formulate theologically relevant ideas from De Mello’s teaching which would be his—specifically Indian—contribution to the New Testament theology? In the Indian Jesuit’s texts and recorded talks, there seem to be a specific focus and ideas formulated as apophatic, but a closer look at them would suggest an influence of the traditional Indian thought. My task in the third section will be to try to identify them and suggest their possible contribution to the already rich field of the New Testament Theology. If the attempt will bring some interesting results, it will also show how De Mello’s more traditional Indian approach enabled him to go beyond the framework constituted by kataphatic—apophatic debate. This will be discussed in the third section. Before we will start engaging with the two questions and their possible answers, let me introduce the work and thought of Anthony De Mello.

2. Prayer, Meditation and New Testament in De Mello’s Teaching

Anthony De Mello (1931–1987) was a Jesuit priest of Indian origin, who worked as a spiritual guide and therapist, with focus on different practices generally described as prayer. De Mello founded a retreat and prayer centre in Northern India, called “Sadhana”. In order to rise financial support for this centre, he regularly travelled to the United States, Europe and Australia. His books gained a considerable popularity and were translated into more than twenty languages; his workshops were overfull and recordings of his lectures were circulated within wide audiences on several continents. After his sudden death, his friend J. Francis Stroud, also a Jesuit priest, founded De Mello Spirituality Centre, which had been hosted by Fordham University in the United States. Let me conclude this brief biographical introduction by a quote from yet another Jesuit follower of Father De Mello:

Many consider that Tony de Mello’s original book on prayer, Sadhana: A Way to God for Today, has been one of the outstanding contributions and practical aids to orthodox, creative and practical Christian prayer published in the last twenty-five years. In 1997, that book reached its twenty-second edition and is still greatly in demand. … David Toolnan, SJ and associate editor of America magazine, says that in his view the book was, and remains, the best Catholic ‘how to’ book for someone looking for instruction in methods of prayer.

(Callanan 2001, n. p.)

From the early reactions of other theologians to De Mello’s writings it looks as if his was a way of spiritual and therapeutic guidance, and it is hard to point out a text from his pen which will be focused on the Christian theology per se. The reviewers of De Mello’s books praised him for original synthesis of Christian and Eastern traditions’ practical ways of prayer and meditation; thus for Nugent, for example: “the splendid ‘The Sunrise’ seems an original synthesis of an externalization of the ‘Prayer of the Heart’ and the Hindu ‘Salutation to the Sun,’ and one issuing in a kind of Teilhardian Christification.” (Nugent 1991, p. 51) Meyer considered The One Minute Nonsense to be “really a good book”, in which De Mello proved himself to be “the Master of story-telling spirituality” (Meyer 1994, p. 5563). Similar acknowledgements and praise were expressed by others (for examples, see De Jong 1983; Kern 1990; Messner 1992). In a recent text, De Mello’s work was compared with theology of inter-religious dialogue developed by Thomas Merton; yet author of the text emphasized mainly how “De Mello’s combination of stories, and his insights about the self, touch on a common theme… how to find the sublime in the context of everyday life and the pressures of work and domestic life” (Lynch 2018). David Moss, with many years of experience in pastoral care and counselling, strongly recommended book Awareness to readers of the Journal of Religion and Health. In his experience, the practical guidance of De Mello’s words from this book helped people to get rid of different problems. Allow me to quote comments of a wealthy client, whose struggle with addiction to gambling Moss tried to solve in psychotherapy. After reading Awareness, this client wrote:

De Mello has introduced me to a fresh perspective that has enticed me into re-examining some products of my Catholic conditioning. Due to his influence, I’ve been discarding certain religious barriers that have encumbered my deepest beliefs. I’m letting go of several dogmatic tenets that have inhibited my personal convictions about Providence, Real Presence and the beauty of human existence. The net result has been a revitalization of my faith and a new awareness of “God as I understand Him.”

(Moss 1992, p. 177)

In short, Anthony De Mello provided an interesting direction in the fields of spiritual guidance and therapy, resulting in considerable impact on life of many Catholic believers. However, this does not mean that De Mello’s teaching has no theological relevance. Let me highlight several points which characterize De Mello’s theologically relevant thought. It is true that in order to attempt at any systematic presentation, it is necessary to find out and connect the Jesuit’s ideas from his different texts. This is my task in the following paragraphs, which formulate at least partial answer to the question: How did De Mello’s reading and understanding New Testament look like?

The message of Gospels is also message about change of people, about their true turning to the Saviour through prayer and contemplation, as repeatedly emphasized by the Indian Jesuit. In his meditations on chosen passages from the New Testament canon, De Mello distinguished between two kinds of changes within people, which are connected with their search for God. The first kind of change has its source in human ego, brings superficial results and does not help on the path to God, rather the opposite can be said about it. The second kind of change is understood as grace of God working through the “wisdom of Nature” (De Mello 1992, p. 53). Interestingly, De Mello described these two kinds of changes in connection with two different kinds of violence. He chose the following line from the New Testament: “The kingdom of heaven has suffered violence, and men of violence take it by force. (Matthew 11:12)” (De Mello 1992, p. 59). For the Indian Jesuit, it was important to think about violence towards ourselves in connection with this New Testament quote. Not self-violence in a sense of physical harm, but another kind of violence, which has serious consequences for spiritual life of people. This kind of violence arises from self-dissatisfaction, and is caused by “laborious self-pushing”, according to De Mello. The root of the dissatisfaction with ourselves is jealousy, envy, and finally, endless desires:

…you are driven, are you not, to be like someone else who has more knowledge, better looks, more popularity or success than you. You want to become more virtuous, more loving, more meditative; you want to find God, to come closer to your ideals.

(De Mello 1992, p. 60)

Such desires are, according to the Jesuit’s understanding, driving people away from their true human blossoming, and from finding God, too. De Mello kept distinguishing between the change caused by such a “laborious self-pushing” arising from our “cunning, restless ego”, and the change caused by “the way of self-understanding” (De Mello 1992, pp. 60–61). In connection with this basic difference, De Mello explained also Matthew 10:16, which advises believers to be “wise as serpents and innocent as doves”. Our Indian Jesuit described the efforts to “become something that your ego has planned” as “the serpent fighting the dove” (De Mello 1992, pp. 56–57). On the other hand, if people allow “Reality to effect changes according to Nature’s plans”, it is “the perfect blending of the serpent and the dove” (ibid.). However, it is not easy to properly distinguish between the ego-driven changes and those coming from true self-understanding. A spiritual adept should beware, because:

Your ego is a great technician …It goes for methods and techniques and produces so-called holy people who are rigid, consistent, mechanical, lifeless, as intolerant of others as they are of themselves—violent people the very opposite of holiness and love. The type of “spiritual” people who, conscious of their spirituality, then proceed to crucify the Messiah.

(De Mello 1992, p. 54)

In contrast to the ego-driven violence, there is another kind of violence, apparently much needed for the change finally caused by God’s grace, according to De Mello. While dealing with our own attachments, we should “pluck out, chop off, those parts of our psychological being” (De Mello 1992, p. 111). The Indian Jesuit developed his idea of this kind of violence while commenting on the famous passage from Mark 9:43ff, which advises the followers of Jesus to cut off a hand or to pluck out an eye which caused them to sin. In his metaphoric understanding, a hand or an eye represent human attachments which must be “cut off”. In this connection, our Indian Jesuit used a phrase “to strike with the sword of awareness” (De Mello 1992, pp. 113–15).

Although the passage is not a systematic commentary, the following ideas can be derived from it: Firstly, this kind of violence shall not be identified with the violence caused by renunciation (ibid., p. 114). Secondly, it is needed to enable “the world of love to arise in one’s awareness” (ibid., p. 113). Thirdly, although the metaphor of sword usage can easily create an image of very swift movement, or even one efficient cut, De Mello compounded this metaphor with another one. It is an image of very patient, compassionate but also “matter-of-fact” cutting done by a surgeon´s knife (ibid.). However, with all that said we must note that our Jesuit priest accepted also literal meaning of the abovementioned passage from Mark:

But this much is certain, once you have had even a fleeting taste of this thing called love, you will know that no price is too high, no sacrifice too great, not even the loss of one’s eyes, nor the computations of one’s hand, if you can have in exchange the only thing in the world that makes your life worthwhile.

(De Mello 1992, pp. 116–17)

It seems that such profound changes, resulting from the wise violence, were also seen on larger than personal scale by the Indian Jesuit. He claimed that when Nature destroys, it is “not from ambition or greed or self-aggrandizement, but in obedience to mysterious laws that seek the good of the whole universe” (De Mello 1992, p. 62). In his understanding it is the very same kind of violence “that arises within mystics”, awakening them to awareness of evils “entrenched in their societies and cultures” towards which their contemporaries are blind to. As a consequence of this awareness, mystics “storm against” such evil ideas and structures of their societies (ibid., p. 62). This description certainly does not comply with a widely spread image of a passive and socially indifferent hermit (as a model of contemplative life).

Finally, let us note how De Mello connected the two kinds of changes and corresponding kinds of violence with two different attitudes on the path of self-understanding. He gave an example of difference between attitude of a scientist who studies the habits of ants without “the slightest desire to change them” and the attitude of a dog trainer who also studies the habits of a dog, but with a goal to make it to learn something (ibid., pp. 60–61). The second attitude is clearly another description of the ego-driven efforts. The first kind of self-study is called awareness, which finally brings changes and holiness on its own power. The Indian Jesuit called this “Grace” (ibid., p. 145), which indicates his understanding of how God’s grace could work. This is what he described also as “leaving all change to the mighty force of God in Nature” (ibid., p. 63). In other words, the most important avenue to holiness is to let changes happen by force other than human, by opening to mysterious ways of God’s force working in this world:

…you will not be in control of those changes, or be able to plan them in advance, or decide how and when they are to take place. It is this nonjudgmental awareness alone that heals and changes and makes one grow. But in its own way and at its own time … It is enough for you to be watchful and awake. For in this state your eyes will see the Savior.

(ibid., pp. 145–47)

I hope that by now, we have plausible understanding of De Mello’s focus in his teaching concerning the New Testament message. More will be discussed in the following section, where I will try to analyse how theologians from CDF found De Mello’s teaching dangerous. They issued a Notification, together with an Explanatory note to the same, which concluded several pages of refutations of De Mello’s teaching as follows: “…in order to protect the good of the Christian faithful, this Congregation declares that the above-mentioned positions are incompatible with the Catholic faith and can cause grave harm” (Ratzinger and Bertone 1998a). This official Notification (together with its Explanatory Note) was accompanied by a covering letter signed also by the then prefect of CDF, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI), instructing Catholic bishops to withdraw the production and sale of De Mello’s books. The decision stirred considerable controversy; especially Jesuits, but also other Christian scholars from India and other countries criticised the Notification and defended the teaching of Anthony De Mello (see for example UCA News 1998; Dolejšová 1999). Let us consider the theological lessons which can be drawn from this controversy.

3. What Can Be Learned from the Debate about CDF´s Refutation of De Mello’s Teaching?

In this section, I want to show how the theologians from CDF resorted to a defence of one line of the theological thought, that is, kataphatic theology, or affirmative way. By doing so, they did not use the opportunity to reconcile this dominant line of Catholic thought with apophatic theology, which is as old as the affirmative way. Such an attempt would be an important contribution for theological and practical debates, certainly relevant for Catholics and other Christians today. I will also argue that this choice of affirmative theology necessarily led to misrepresentation of the claims from De Mello’s teachings, and as a consequence, the refutation formulated in the CDF’s documents is based on a position only ascribed to the Jesuit priest. Later I will discuss apophasis, as a complementary position to the kataphatic focus; I think that only after understanding the debate as a framework of ideas constituted both by affirmative way and via negativa, it is possible to develop also a better understanding of what exactly was Anthony De Mello’s teaching.

What were the main points of criticism raised by the guardians of faith from CDF? They are summarized in the Explanatory note to the issued Notification as follows: “Father De Mello had gradually arrived at concepts of God, revelation, Christ, the final destiny of the human person, etc., which cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the Church” (Ratzinger and Bertone 1998b). Obviously, each of the listed topics has been rather large field of debates and controversies in the history of Catholic theology. A reader could already at the first look at the CDF’s documents ask himself or herself, if the brief Explanatory note (of about six pages) to the even shorter Notification could discuss these topics properly. However, the Explanatory note states clearly, what the theologians from CDF considered to be the crucial problem of De Mello’s teaching. It can be summarized as follows: Because Anthony De Mello developed a wrong concept of God, he pursued a path of “unilateral and exaggerated apophatism”, which led him to “criticism and frequent irony directed toward any attempt at language of God” (Ratzinger and Bertone 1998b). After criticism and refutation of De Mello’s claims about Jesus, destiny of a human being, function of the Creed and role of revelation, and also evil and sin, to which we shall return later in this and also in the following section, the Explanatory note explicitly states how its authors saw the impersonal concept of God as a structure of background ideas, shaping De Mello’s teaching about all the above mentioned topics:

Clearly, there is an internal connection between these different positions: if one questions the existence of a personal God, it does not make sense that God would address himself to us with his word. Sacred Scripture, therefore, does not have definitive value. Jesus is a teacher like others; only in the author’s early books does he appear as the Son of God, an affirmation which would have little meaning in the context of such an understanding of God. As a consequence, one cannot attribute value to the Church’s teaching. Our personal survival after death is problematic if God is not personal. Thus it becomes clear that such conception of God, Christ and man are not compatible with the Christian faith.

(ibid.)

With this explanation of the CDF theologians in mind, we should return to their accusation of “unilateral and exaggerated apophatism” now. Because this claim is only briefly mentioned in the Explanatory note (with a conclusion that De Mello denied the Bible contains valid statements about God), and other connected ideas about the role of Jesus, etc., are just assumed to illustrate the claim, we have to summarize several important points in the theological debate about apophatism as such. Before we embark on this journey, let us note that De Mello explicitly recognized apophatic ideas of Thomas Aquinas as a source of his inspiration (see for example De Mello and Stroud 1992, pp. 47–48). Therefore, the theologians from CDF certainly had a good reason to describe De Mello’s ideas as apophatic. However, it can be shown that because they simply refused to engage with the tradition of apophasis, their response is fundamentally flawed in several aspects.

In the debate about CDF’s refutation of De Mello’s teaching, it was Dolejšová who brought attention of its participants to the question about the role of apophatic theology and who discussed De Mello’s claims on this ground briefly (Dolejšová 1999, pp. 15–16). The author rightly pointed out that apophatic way of theology is rooted in the Bible and it is not evident how De Mello’s acceptance of this way would really lead him away from the recognition of the authority of the Scriptures and of the Church (ibid., p. 15). Dolešjová also criticized the Notification’s factual denial of “the possibility of silent awareness (of God) in Christianity”, because such a denial does not comply with the Vatican the Second acceptance of the role of the Holy Spirit, whose work can be seen in different practices of Asian traditions. These practices were the source of inspiration for Anthony De Mello and their acceptance is not “in opposition either to the central role of Christ or to the freedom of the flowering of the Spirit also outside of the Christian tradition” (ibid., p. 16). I agree with Dolejšová’s basic assertion that De Mello “did not provide us with theological discussions in his writings” (ibid.), because his work is best understood as a collection of prayers, poetic stories and anecdotes (De Mello 1982 is a famous example). The author also showed how the arguments of the CDF’s Explanatory Note misunderstood several claims of the Jesuit teacher: From the displaced, out of context of De Mello’s texts quoted statements to the treatment of metaphors or stories as if they present some literal description of the Jesuit’s beliefs (ibid., pp. 16–17). Dolejšová concluded that the CDF’s theologians committed two major hermeneutic mistakes: Firstly, they treated the texts of Anthony De Mello as if they were doctrinal manuals and not collections of prayers, stories and practical advices on meditation; secondly, by their attempt to explain De Mello’s metaphorical language, they turned it “into literal descriptions and thus destroyed it” (ibid., p. 17).

All that said, I suggest that we can learn more from both the role via positiva played in the CDF’s refutation and from the possibilities De Mello’s teaching opens for the apophatic approach to the New Testament theology today. What exactly should “unilateral and exaggerated apophatism” (Ratzinger and Bertone 1998b) mean, after all? Firstly, a historical reminder would place the debate into a more appropriate perspective: Although the apophatic theology is often described as dominant and characteristic of the thought of the Eastern Orthodoxy, its role in the Western Christianity and Catholic Church is beyond dispute (it is interesting to consult older sources, such as Wrighton 1951). To the studies which analyse work of the theologians who have been recognised as proponents of apophatism for a long time, such as Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, John Scotus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas Cusanus, or Saint John of the Cross, the last decades of research add insights about the crucial role of via negativa in the thought of Augustine (Carabine 1992; Finn 2016), Thomas Aquinas (Buijs 1988; Carabine 1988), and even theologians of the twentieth century, such as Bernhard Welte (Welte 1978) or Thomas Merton (Teahan 1978).

Secondly, several theologians kept reminding devout believers that via negativa is not a trivial negation of everything that can be said about God in a human language. Equally wrong is to understand this line of theological thought as finally resigning on the use of human language to understand the great mysteries of God’s existence (for the debate about conceptualizing language as a human faculty in these debates, see Milbank 1988). Apophatic and kataphatic ways have been connected together by theologians as complementary modes of thought, and both have played an important role in the scriptural exegesis. Let us consider two respected voices in this regard:

We should not be tempted to make a too radical distinction between apophatic and kataphatic, for apophasis exists at the heart of all true theology; without the initial assertion of apophatic principles, kataphatic theology is impossible, and without something to negate, apophatic theology is impossible, at least for the Christian believer.

(Carabine 1992, pp. 5–6)

All types of Christian negative theology keep negations connected; they do not isolate some apophatic principle of God’s transcendence as if it were an independent epistemological truth. Negations remain connected, first of all, to affirmations, for there must be something to be negated, some content to work with; even negative prefixes negate some specific positive quality. Secondly, the negations are closely connected to biblical texts, since both the negations and the words that are negated are originally scriptural. Indeed, biblical symbols and metaphors reveal the interplay of affirmation and negation: the symbol is both like and unlike God.

(Rorem 2008, pp. 451–52)

The theologians of the apophatic line of thought set several intellectual aims for themselves, obviously with the final goal to reach God. On this journey, one aim is to acknowledge limits of human intellectual efforts and consequently, to ascertain the limits on the debates about being (or nature) of God. Its core question can be formulated in a simple manner as follows: “What can be known about God with the use of human intellect?” Many theologians over centuries worked on this problem in order to establish the epistemological grounds for its possible answers. The real difficulty for any intellectual debate of the claims made by apophatic way of theology lies in the connection between focus on mystical experiences of God and the intentionally paradoxical language, which was used to express such experiences. However, we can keep an intelligible talk about the apophatic idea of “negation of negation”, which was developed by theologians from the early stage of development of Christianity. It serves as a method, intellectually stimulating and yet, it is also supposed to finally break through the established patterns of thought about the Divine. This understanding is crucial for any debate about the Biblical revelation. However important the revelation is, it cannot give human beings full knowledge of God, because this entails a different kind of knowledge from the knowledge we are used to in this world. Such understanding was presented by Justin Martyr and other early Church Fathers, as succinctly summarized in the research of Carabine:

…the central Christian truth of the Incarnation, the Word crossing the distance between the world and the Father, becomes the culmination of God’s most supreme manifestation. It would seem then that the Word reveals God. Of course, this cannot be the full truth. As the Christian philosophers and theologians of later centuries demonstrate, God remains unknown in essence, despite the ‘revelation’ of God in the descent of the Word; in fact, transcendence make sense only in the light of the Incarnation, in so far as the Word ‘reveals’ the transcendent Father.

(Carabine 2020, pp. 151–52; compare with analysis of writings of Pseudo-Dionysius in Jones 1996)

Now we can come back to the main accusation of the theologians from CDF, which presented De Mello’s teaching as a refutation of personal concept of God. Let us consider properly that the accusation of holding concept of impersonal God, ascribed to De Mello by the CDF’s theologians, in fact revives a question as old as Christianity: What does it mean exactly that God is a person? How many times did the theologians, and not only those leaning to apophasis, warn believers not to make God to the image of human beings? Was not an anthropomorphization of God one of the main problems which the Early Church fathers took over from the Ancient philosophers and used against the cults of “pagan” gods and goddesses? Cannot believers easily lose sight of the Divinity when they just accept the affirmative conceptual representation of God as complete? These concerns led for example A. H. Armstrong to his development of via negativa, which is pertinent to our debate:

Negative theology establishes a spiritual disquietude which calls the soul forth into further and unceasing search for the divine. It subverts our deep human tendency to settle for idols, reminding us that all theology can function properly only as an icon of the divine, leading the spiritual self into the immediacy of God. Thus, apophasis saves us from idolatry, that is, from exaggerated love of those graven images of the human spiritual imagination.

(Kenney 1993, p. 441)

Works of A. H. Armstrong reveal how sterile dogmatism and quite futile moralistic teaching can emerge from the one-sided kataphatism; a dogmatism which is not connected with real lives of the believers. One-sided emphasis on the affirmative understanding of the Bible, and of the teaching of Jesus as depicted in the New Testament, leads to the problems which apophatic approach strives to overcome. The situation can be described as follows: Believers shall not stick to the positive way only, otherwise their use of language describing God, Jesus as the Saviour, etc., will result in strengthening their very limited, very human ideas about that which properly cannot be described. They will only think they understood the message of Scriptures; they will become “convinced” believers of hard hearts. Their dogmatism is dangerous, because such believers are able to use their understanding to cause and justify an immense suffering in the world, in other words, to sin (see more in Kenney 1993). In this perspective, De Mello’s words can be understood as apophatic warning:

You miss God because you think you know. That’s the terrible thing about religion. That’s what the gospels were saying, that religious people ‘knew’, so they got rid of Jesus. The highest knowledge of God is to know God as unknowable. There is far too much God talk; the world is sick of it… There’s too little dropping of illusions, dropping of errors, dropping of attachments and cruelty, too little awareness. That’s what the world is suffering from, not from a lack of religion.

(De Mello 1992, p. 48; emphasis M.F.)

Theologians from CDF accused De Mello of impersonal, even void concept of God, quoting from his book Sadhana: “But what do I gaze into when I gaze silently at God? An imageless, formless reality. A blank!” (Ratzinger and Bertone 1998b). The text quotes in this connection De Mello’s conviction about the development of “mystical heart”, which is a human faculty meant to experience God directly. Yet the context and implications of this concept are not discussed at all; in fact, by just mentioning it before the abovementioned quote, the CDF’s theologians diverted reader’s attention from a very Christian context of De Mello’s focus on the mystical heart. I think that De Mello’s claims about “imageless, formless reality”, which is perceived by a believer while “gazing silently at God” (ibid.) can be understood from the perspective of via negativa very well. Instead of interpreting them as a presentation of a void concept of God, we should consider such claims to be practical instructions which try to grasp the experience of silent contemplation. This comes out clearly from reading the criticized part of Sadhana book further:

If they… persevere in the exercise of prayer and expose themselves, in blind faith, to the emptiness, the darkness, the idleness, the nothingness, they will gradually discover, at first in small flashes, later in a more permanent fashion, that there is a glow in the darkness, that the emptiness mysteriously fills their heart, that the idleness is full of God’s activity, that in the nothingness their being is recreated and shaped anew… and all this in a way they just cannot describe either to themselves or to others.

(De Mello 1984, p. 31)

It is evident here, how De Mello’s claims correspond to the language use of apophasis: God is neither a person, not non-person. The Divine is beyond the positive affirmation as well as beyond its simple negation. Although human thought can help to contemplate the great secret in different ways, finally, it is in silence where the purified heart can experience God. De Mello repeatedly referred to the Christian mystical tradition which is connected with apophatic theology, and it is really difficult to raise objections to the Jesuit’s claims from this point of view. If the CDF’s theologians refused De Mello’s descriptions of the final goal of human life, would they also refuse the descriptions of mystical union in the Catholic tradition, which go back as far as to Justin Martyr and Pseudo-Dionysius? This is what the latter theologian had to say about mystical experience of a devout Christian:

… plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing. Here, renouncing all that the mind may conceive, wrapped entirely in the intangible and the invisible, he belongs completely to him who is beyond everything. Here, being neither oneself nor someone else, one is presumably united to the wholly Unknown by an inactivity of all knowledge, and knows beyond the mind by knowing nothing.

(Pseudo-Dionysius, quoted in Rorem 2008, p. 456)

Let me stress that apophasis is also a way of asking believers to constantly reconsider their dearly held ideas about God. From the focus on experiences we just discussed, and from other statements it should be clear by now, that De Mello did not develop an impersonal concept of God. His claims about the great secret are meant to guide people to silence, to a mode of awareness of reality, in which they can let go of their ideas about God and be open to His touch:

Ordinarily all our contact with God is indirect—through images and concepts that necessarily distort his reality. To be able to grasp him beyond these thoughts and images is the privilege of this faculty which… I shall call the Heart… The dross is the vast number of thoughts and words and images that we constantly interpose between ourselves and God when we are communicating with him. Words sometimes serve to impede rather than foster communication and intimacy. Silence—of words and thoughts—can sometimes be the most powerful form of communication and union when hearts are full of love.

(De Mello 1984, pp. 29–30)

How would other criticized points of De Mello’s teaching look like, if we explain them in the framework which accepts the importance of the apophatic theology? Within this framework, it will become clear how problematic are the other accusations of CDF. Let us start with the presumed degradation of Jesus to the role of “just another spiritual teacher”. The references to De Mello’s books, as quoted in the Explanatory note would suggest that, certainly. But only if you take these sentences to be rooted in the affirmative framework of thought. If you allow them to be understood from the point of view of via negativa, several interesting insights can be gained. First of all, even such radical statements as “Jesus… was so at home with sinners, because he understood that he was not one bit better than they were” (De Mello 1992, p. 17) could help a Christian believer to destroy different images his mind created about Jesus as the Son of God. They would also allow for contemplation of a human side of Jesus, which does not automatically exclude acceptance of the statements from the Credo about Jesus as God incarnated, as discussed within the affirmative framework. Cannot such claims help to open up the believer´s heart to experience the presence and work of the Saviour, in accordance with the tradition of Catholic mysticism? Let us remind ourselves that precisely this is De Mello’s goal in many prayers and meditative practices he developed for believers.

Similarly, the apophatic approach helps us to understand that De Mello did not dismiss the role of revelation and scriptures, as CDF’s explanation claimed. Apophatism is concerned with the literal, sometimes primitive dogmatism in the Biblical exegesis, which oftentimes caused enormous suffering of people: “What is scripture then? It’s a hint, a clue, not a description … It’s terrifying to see what sincere believers will do because they think they know.” (De Mello 1992, p. 48; emphasis added) Even metaphors judged and dismissed as a Hindu influence on De Mello’s conceptualization of the final destiny of human beings, such as that of salt dissolving into the ocean, could be discussed in much more fruitful way. In fact, the metaphor of an ocean as expressing a mystical absorption was important for Christian tradition, too (compare McGinn 1994).

To conclude this part about the insights which apophasis brought into our debate: The CDF’s Explanatory note was trying to find out a consistent kataphatic position, ascribing to De Mello’s teaching a set of doctrines, which clearly is not what the Jesuit meant. While accusing the teaching of De Mello of the extreme apophatism, did not the theologians from CDF took another extreme, that of leaning on the approach of via positiva exclusively? Is not the analysis of CDF’s refutation of De Mello’s teaching disclosing, that to keep up only with the positive way of conceptualizing God would bring soon a danger of anthropomorphizing the Divine? Would not believers tend to ascribe to God their imperfect images and also material qualities, as a consequence of this one-sided stress on kataphasis? Did not the CDF theologians de facto refute their own recognition of De Mello’s life-long work on different kinds of prayer to Jesus, a path of prayer which would enable believers to experience the Saviour and let the Holy Spirit work in their lives?

In my analysis, this is the crucial problem of the theological stance taken by CDF: They were assuming the doctrinal core of the affirmative kind where there was none such; De Mello did not question the existence of personal God, of Jesus being the Son of God, etc.; rather, very much in accord with the apophatic way of theology, he questioned the final epistemological and even soteriological value of any such a claim. Even though De Mello focused on prayer and meditation, and did not develop his apophatically oriented thought into a systematic elaboration, his ideas present a challenge for current theology. In this regard, two intellectual stances are competing today. One is the line of thought which suggests to purge all Christian theology of the heritage of the kataphatic—apophatic debates, because they are seen as a distorting influence of Proclus and other Neoplatonists on the thought of the early Church. This programme would like to have Biblical revelation understood rather along the lines of via positiva, and would endorse CDF theologians’ criticism of De Mello’s teaching. Many theologians would not go that far; they still maintain that the kataphatic—apophatic debates are an important framework for understanding the message of scriptures. However, even in this second line of thought, there is dominant tendency to constrain the role of apophasis to a safe territory of the mystical, to use the words of Denys Turner (Turner 1999, p. 143). A fruitful debate about implications of De Mello’s teaching can be a contribution to the real challenge of apophasis to today’s theology: How would consequences of apophasis look like, if expanded beyond the area of mysticism, to other important topics in current theology of the New Testament? Leaving all these ideas for future debates, we shall turn to the second aim of our analysis of the teaching of the Indian Jesuit now. I think that although his ideas overlap with via negativa in several aspects, they also have a specific Indian character which would suggest a possible Indianness of his theological thought.

4. Beyond Kataphasis and Apophasis: Notes on De Mello’s Indian Contribution to the New Testament Theology

We strived to show how the Jesuit’s teaching can be understood from the point of view which takes seriously ideas of negative theology, as important part of the Western thought. What would the specific Indianness of De Mello’s approach be, then? One possible way how to find answer to this question would be to put the Jesuit’s contribution into an Indian context, that is, an explanation of his concrete links with one or more schools of the traditional Indian thought. However, such an attempt will not bring the desired fruits, as I will explain in the next paragraph. Therefore, I am suggesting a different approach. I will contrast the focus of apophasis on the role which a human thought (as expressed in language) can play on the path of attaining realization of the Divine, with the focus emerging from De Mello’s teaching. If there will be some significant differences, they should have originated from the Jesuit’s cultural background, because all education he got was the Christian education proper for a Jesuit priest. I will strive to show that although De Mello did not present any systematic work on the New Testament theology, it is possible to identify several characterizations of his thought which are culture-specific and which will have theologically relevant consequences. I am formulating them in form of tentative thesis, because they certainly are in need of further debate. This section can only present them as brief remarks, or seed-like ideas, intended for more fruitful development in the future.

Before proceeding in this direction, let me address the question of De Mello’s possible link with the traditional schools of Indian thought. Can we clearly show that the Jesuit’s ideas followed one or more traditions of India (e.g., different schools of Vedanta, different Buddhist, Jaina or Shaiva-siddhanta schools)? If a researcher would expect to find a systematic, or even partial development of such thought in the teaching of De Mello, he will be disappointed. The Jesuit used Indian concepts such as ananda, moksha, and maya, but without elaboration on their specific meaning. In fact, these concepts occur on very few pages in his books (see for examples short stories in De Mello 1985; De Mello and Stroud 1992, p. 30), and he used them very seldom in the talks I was able to listen to. He used concepts from the Western thought, as expressed in English (God, bliss, love, mystical heart, etc.), incomparably more often than the traditional Indian concepts. From the numerous teachers of the Indian past and present, the Jesuit mentioned mainly Buddha Gautama, on occasions we can read about unidentifiable “Hindu gurus”. He used several stories from Puranas, such as that about Narada or Lakshmi (De Mello 1988, pp. 23, 25–26), and Indian gods and goddesses were mentioned by him here and there. That is all a researcher can find in terms of explicit use of the traditional Indian thought in De Mello’s work. It is simply not possible even to start attempts at comparisons of the traditional Indian and Christian thought along explicitly conceptual line, and to speculate about their complementarity, etc. (for such attempts, see, e.g., Kirsteen 2006). If you add to this finding the well-known fact about the Jesuit’s frequent use of concepts and stories from other Asian traditions (such as Zen Buddhism) and from Jewish and Muslim resources, the claim that there is much specifically Indian in De Mello’s thought seems very doubtful.

However, I argue that it is possible to discern specifically Indian line of thought, if we would opt for a different approach. De Mello claimed apophatic theological stance, as a corrective to the one-sided kataphasis, but his teaching exhibits an overall approach and formulates several ideas which differ from the ideas and focus of the theological framework constituted by the interactions of via negativa with via positiva. In other words, I suggest that although De Mello’s teaching can be largely reconciled with more traditional Western apophatic emphasis, it goes also beyond this framework. Contrasting several important points from the Jesuit’s texts and talks with the apophatically based explanation (from the previous section) will shed some light on the differences.

Let me summarize the points of agreement between the traditional Christian kataphatic-apophatic framework and De Mello’s teaching first, because this should help us to see the difference better, as two contrasting sets of attitudes and ideas. I see at least three points where De Mello agreed with apophatic correction of kataphasis: (a) Human language is incapable to fully grasp and express knowledge of God, including the good message of the New Testament. Although the affirmative statements of the kataphatic theology are important, they remain imperfect and tentative claims about that which cannot be expressed. The positive theology is always in danger of falling into the trap of illusions about our knowledge of God, about his will, etc. Therefore, it must be continuously corrected and kept under watch by apophatic criticism. (b) On this way of continuous corrections, the language use changes from clear and consistent affirmative statements to the set of provocative, paradoxical, sometimes nonsensical claims (let us just recall the “shining darkness” and other oxymorons). (c) In this way, the intellectual knowledge of God grows as a continuum of interactions between kataphatic and apophatic thought, which develops new interesting paths, such as theology of silent prayer, or ideas about nothingness as an important intellectual concept on the path to God (see, e.g., Welte 1978).

With these points of agreement between the traditional Christian debates constituted by kataphatic—apophatic framework of ideas and De Mello’s thought in mind, we can start a debate about the possible differences between the two. I suggest that apophatic theology is primarily concerned with the problem of intellectual knowledge of God, which can be formulated as a question: What can or cannot be properly claimed in a human language about God and Christ as His Son? De Mello’s approach, however, seems to be preoccupied with a different question: How can human thought and its expression in a language help to experience God? In other words, in a way resembling apophasis, he was also concerned with the role of conceptualization on the path to the Divine. In contrast to the apophatic debates, De Mello suggested a contemplative way which does not depend on the way of negation, or negation of negation. In his approach, the debates about the limits of human thought, and about the use of language are not so important. He was satisfied with pointing out insufficiency of human thought and its expression in language, but instead of trying to formulate it as a theoretical position, he experimented with different forms of language expressions which would help in the practical contemplation.

I can identify at least three different forms of language expression which De Mello used frequently: (a) Stories, short or longer, without consideration about their original source; (b) Provocative, even shocking statements, which defy any attempt at their explanation by placing them into some systematic theological thought; (c) Descriptions of practices, which are meant to serve as guiding instructions to be implemented. Please note that these language forms serve only as examples; at this stage of research, I do not develop any logical order, nor typology. Let us discuss examples of these three forms of language briefly.

Years of De Mello’s spiritual and therapeutic praxis can be traced in the books he published; his last completed work Taking Flight—A Book of Story Meditations is the culmination of this path, published post mortem (De Mello 1988). When your read the introductory instructions of its author, you will note that the stories of the book were carefully organized under several themes (prayer, awareness, religion, grace, the saints, the self, love and truth). Even within each section, stories were sequenced one after another into a specific chain, which should lead their reader on the path of development step by step. De Mello suggested that the reader takes no more than one or two stories at a time, and keeps reading them in the order of their organization in the book. In this way, he prepared a manual which should help believers on their path to realization of God. Let us note the instrumentality and very practical way in which the stories should help:

Carry a story around in your mind so you can dwell on it in leisure moments. That will give it a chance to work on your subconscious and reveal its hidden meaning. You will then be surprised to see how it comes to you quite unexpectedly just when you need it to light up an event or situation and bring you insight and inner healing. That is when you will realize that, in exposing yourself to these stories, you were auditing a Course in Enlightenment for which no guru is needed other than yourself!

(De Mello 1988, 11; emphasis added)

This certainly can be used as an example of practical use of this language form: It is not a morale of the story which we should find out, intellectually understand and absorb as a rule, or even meta-rule, and then hopefully apply in our life: It is a piece of practical wisdom, taken and applied in different ways, which literally takes blood and life in reality. For example, a devout Catholic man would attentively read a story of a passion with which Mullah Nasreddin searched for the truth in debates with Koranic scholars. “One day, his wife told him how unfairly he was treating her—and discovered that her husband had no interest whatsoever in that kind of Truth (ibid., p. 12)!” The devout Catholic is also a husband and when he failed to treat his own wife in a nice way next time, suddenly the Nasreddin’s story comes to his conscience and makes him feel deeply ashamed. Since this moment on, he is much more aware of the situations when he tended to behave condescendingly to his wife. This leads the men to real change of his behaviour. Is this not a good example of the transformative function of a story? Does it not help to solve problems of believers—practically? If the application of story-practice will bring the good fruits of self-transformation, dropping bad behaviour, or extending our helping hand even if the social norms do not expect us to do so, etc., shall not a theologian be open to the possibility that through these stories, the Holy Spirit could work?

What about the role which De Mello’s provocative, even shocking statements should play? Here, it must be acknowledged that from the affirmative point of view, De Mello’s claims look not only contradictory to the main doctrinal statements; some seem to be inconsistent with his other claims; several statements are really difficult to explain. Let us look at statements which apparently deny that Jesus was God incarnated, unique and the only Son of God. They could be shocking even to an open minded believer with some training on the path of imitatio Christi: “Meditating on and imitating externally the behaviour of Jesus is of no help. It is not a question of imitating Christ, it is a question of becoming who Jesus was. It is a question of becoming Christ, becoming aware, understanding what is going on within you (De Mello 1992, p. 71; emphasis MF).” One way how to look at this claim is to simply resign on the debate about human and Godly nature of Jesus, and to ask instead, in full trust in God’s mercy, for help in the meditation (see De Mello’s meditations; for example, chapter Devotion in Sadhana book). “Becoming Christ” would mean “to take part in His wisdom and other Divine qualities, as much as a human being can have them.” The descriptive truth value of such claims is not important; the effect they can have on perception of believers and their transformation is.

The third kind of language form, descriptions of the meditative practices seem to be difficult to connect with a theological debate. But there are certainly moments which can be pondered about. One such example is the description of meditations about Jesus. Both kataphatic and apophatic ways of thinking would doubt if in the case of this exercise, the believer is not under the wild rule of his imagination, rather than under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. When confronted with such doubts, De Mello indicated that if there is seriousness of the heart of the practitioner, the exercise will open it to the work of the Holy Spirit, whatever problems our intellect can raise against this or that particular image of Christ in this exercise.

At the end of these tentative notes, let me point out one focus which I see in De Mello’s use of language as specifically Indian in character. Although concepts are finally to be dropped, they are useful in their descriptive role of problems on the path to God. More specifically, a human language can successfully conceptualize obstacles on this path, in order to enable a believer to remove them. These obstacles, as Indian traditions saw them, are desires and fears, which is exactly how De Mello described them: “To see at last with a vision that is clear and unclouded by fear or desire (De Mello 1992, p. 79)”. Like apophasis, the Indian approach is also concerned with the limits of human thought and the role of conceptualization, but apparently with a different set of assumptions, and with different aims. I am suggesting the following formulation of one of the aims, which can be deduced from the previous analysis: How to use concepts, anecdotes, stories, in fact any specific language form in which a human thought is expressed, in order to go beyond human thought. By going beyond the thought I mean that the forms of language expression have direct transformative effect upon the reader or listener: They help to change perception of the world, to handle or change emotions, to deal with memories, etc. We can also formulate this understanding as the concern with practical usage of language, in order to go beyond language. Different language forms are used literally as instruments which help practitioners to overcome obstacles on their spiritual path.

5. Conclusions

What did we learn from the CDF theologians´ refutation of Anthony De Mello’s teaching? Firstly, I argued that because the guardians of faith from CDF chose the positive theology as their only stance, they understood De Mello’s teaching as a set of positively formulated doctrinal statements. Such set of doctrinal claims can be compared with the positive formulation of the Catholic credo, of the accepted statements from the Church’s catechism, etc. This is exactly what the criticism set out to do, as expressed by the Notification and the Explanatory Note of the CDF. It is interesting that the authors of these documents hinted at apophasis, as a complementary theological line of thought, but did it in a very dismissive way. In their explanation, apophasis was not given even a small chance to bring about some insights into the criticized texts of De Mello. I argued that by resorting to this approach, the theologians form CDF missed the key to the theological problems which they wanted to address. Strange, provocative, even shocking statements made by De Mello about God, Jesus, scriptures and revelation, etc., will look very different if we use the apophatic approach.

First of all, if we would walk via negativa for a while, we will not see in De Mello’s texts a set of positively formulated doctrines. It makes much more sense to understand them as apophatic claims which should lead believers closer to experience of the Divine. I have shown that De Mello’s approach does not differ in this aim, and also in the language use, from the aims and language of the tradition of negative theology within Catholic Church. Instead of interpreting his teaching as a presentation of a void concept of God, we should consider such claims to be practical instructions which try to grasp the experience of silent contemplation. At the same time, De Mello’s ideas suggest acceptance of apophatic epistemological scepticism towards final validity of affirmative claims about the Divine. Therefore, criticism raised by theologians from CDF shows the problems of their own kataphatic approach, when confronted with the apophatic thought. The latter has been developed in order to correct the former; I am suggesting that in our debate we are witnessing the one sided focus on kataphasis (presented by CDF’s refutation), formulated as against any apophatic criticism of the danger which via positiva brings to human thought about God and Jesus as His Incarnation. Secondly, via negativa offers much more interesting explanation of De Mello’s teaching than the description suggested by the guardians of the faith from CDF. In fact, many “inconsistences” and strange, or even “blasphemous” claims of De Mello can be understood in a very meaningful way.

It is also important to explore the possibility that De Mello had shown what Indianness of New Testament theology could mean. It could be practically oriented way of thinking, which uses many different forms of language expressions to bring the believers closer to the experience of the Divine. It does so, for example, by using stories as a way of discovery, understanding, and transformation. It uses language as an instrument for practical change of believers, and its final aim is above any intellectual efforts. In this sense, it uses language in order to go beyond language. This constitutes an important difference between the Indian approach on one side and the kataphatic-apophatic debate on the other. Whereas for the latter the aim of language use is to formulate as perfect intellectual position as possible, including the concepts such as negation of negation, the former does not see in such intellectual attempts a generally important value. If a set of stories, or descriptive language use of the meditation manuals will help believers to come closer to God, they do not need to dive into difficult theological debates. On the other hand, if the intellectual debates help some believers to experience the Divine, it is also recognized as a possible way. Hopefully, these suggestions will help to stir a good debate in the future; please remember that I am considering them to be seed-like ideas at this stage of research.

To conclude: Anthony De Mello’s teaching can be taken as an example of how the traditional Asian, non-Christian thought could enrich the existing framework of New Testament theology, which is still constrained by tensions between kataphatic and apophatic lines of thought. What if De Mello (and other Christian thinkers from India, and also from other Asian countries) are showing ways which can go beyond this established framework? While keeping the important criticism that apophasis brought about, I suggest that De Mello’s thought shows one such possibility how to overcome the centuries old tension—by placing the focus of theology on the practical use of language (finally, to use language in order to go beyond language, as the Indian Jesuit would say). Therefore, while taking seriously this intellectual discussion, it would be very good to keep all these past, present and future attempts within the perspective which Father De Mello emphasized as the most necessary:

Ours would be a different world, indeed, if those of us who are scholars and ideologues, whether religious or secular, had the same passion for self-knowledge that we display for our theories and dogmas.

(De Mello 1988, p. 12)