5.1. Insights from Either/Or
Kierkegaard is, among other things, known for his thesis of three stages or spheres of existence. The first sphere is the aesthetic life—this is ground zero for every person. Here, “one simply attempts to satisfy one’s natural desires or urges” (
Evans 2006, p. 86). The second is the ethical life, where “one grasps the significance of the eternal and by ethical resolve attempts to transcend one’s natural desires and create a unified life” (
Evans 2006, p. 87). The third life, superior to the prior two, is the religious life. Philosopher Lars Svendsen attempts an engagement with Kierkegaard’s first two spheres of existence, vis-à-vis the fashion system. Svendsen critiques fashion as an obstacle to securing selfhood and attaining unity. He echoes Gilles Lipovetsky, who argues that fashion has created a new type of person, “the fashion person,” who does not connect strongly to anything or anyone, and who has a constantly changing personality or taste (
Svendsen 2006, p. 148). Fashion, Svendsen asserts, is “the missing essence of the postmodern self, which is programmed constantly to go off in search of new versions of itself, but it becomes a self without any constancy whatsoever” (
Svendsen 2006, p. 148). Again, fashion’s obsession with change, whether with the eternal recurrence of the new, or in contemporary rearticulations of prior trends, inhibits constancy, stability, and anchorage.
The ‘fashion self’ bears resemblance to the aesthete, as presented by Kierkegaard in
Either/Or. Svendsen notes that according to Kierkegaard, “the aesthete is characterized by immediacy, not in the sense of openness but in the sense of dependency on everything he has round about him” (
Kierkegaard 1987, p. 149). The aesthete despairs, says Svendsen, for two reasons. First, there is something random and transient about his life: “his life is built on sand” (
Kierkegaard 1987, p. 150). Second, man is a spiritual being, and the aesthete seems to deny this truth. Svendsen insists that the aesthete, much like the fashion self, “is in need of a view of life that can provide him with something firm and unchanging in the constant flux of life” (
Kierkegaard 1987, p. 150). Put differently, the aesthete needs continuity, since he lives without any recollection of his own life. He lives unmoored to anyone or anything, in a perpetual state of whimsical wandering.
This is how garments, and desire for garments, are packaged and sold, and how the fashion-forward individual lives. Another concern we encounter in the fashion system and its embeddedness in change is its roots in the market economy. Negrin notes that, beginning in the 1970s, feminists framed women’s quest to partake in shifting fashion trends as “yoked to the imperatives of the capitalist economy which used the mechanism of built-in obsolescence as a way of increasing expenditure on consumer goods” (
Negrin 1999, p. 103). Here, the purchasing, curating, and wearing of garments was undergirded by the demands of the market, and the desire it generated.
The market itself demands and depends on the kind of aesthetic fluctuation that Kierkegaard highlights. In engaging with Kierkegaard’s sense of an “authentic self” from
The Sickness Unto Death, Michal Valčo argues that liberal capitalist democracies stifle this self, by inviting its citizens to “celebrate their freedom of choice” through purchases, and are thus “ridden of the burdensome task of a true self-reflection” (
Valčo 2015, p. 135). He continues: “They are to devote their time and energy into solving ‘practical issues’ at hand and shy away from the ‘impractical issues’ of spiritual integrity and deep moral responsibilities” (
Valčo 2015, p. 135). If they, unluckily, buckle under the weight of insurmountable social ills, they can “flee into the more ‘intelligible’ and ‘real’ world of economic choices and instantly available gratifications” (
Valčo 2015, p. 135).
One might see “messaged” garments depart from this sort of civic anesthetization. After all, political wares seek to highlight social concerns and draw attention to pressing ethical concerns in the public sphere. I am skeptical of this achievement, however. One cannot approach such garments without acknowledging their role as fashion items, as they are “in fashion” in the twenty-first century. Garments are also marketable objects, born from the fashion system and propagated by companies and corporations. Here, we might consider the teloses, or ends, of these systems. Towards what are they geared? The telos of the market is, ultimately, to satisfy one’s shareholders and furnish one’s bottom line; the telos of fashion is to be potentially endless. As Svendsen intuits, “fashion does not have any telos, any final purpose, in the sense of striving for a state of perfection” (
Svendsen 2006, p. 29). While both the market and the fashion world can accommodate and create space for participants to achieve their telos, neither the market nor fashion orient themselves fully towards these ends. The purposes of these garments may be manifold, but it is likely that brands produce such “messaged” apparel to build rapport among their clientele, further desire for these garments, and further brand development. The end, here, is mammon, both ethically dubious and spiritually troublesome. In the Book of Matthew in the New Testament, a firm warning resounds: “no man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon” (Mt. 6:24).
The way in which desire is formed in the marketplace, through monetary choice, is of utmost importance to this work. Consider the conscious consumer, who desires to broadcast his personal commitments and beliefs. He might, if he takes the prior claims surrounding dress to be true, choose a garment, such as a graphic T-shirt, that accomplishes his goal. James K.A. Smith suggests that “rituals” such as these—the choosing, purchasing, and wearing of the item, as well as the act of going shopping for the acceptable garment—takes on a liturgical tone. For Smith, a liturgy can be “practices or rituals of ultimate concern” (
Smith 2009, p. 131). These liturgies “shape and constitute our identities by forming our most fundamental desires and our most basic attunement to the world” (
Smith 2009, p. 25). Smith beckons further, presenting a definition of religion that entails “institutions that command our allegiance, that vie for our passion, and that aim to capture our heart with a particular vision of the good life” (
Smith 2009, p. 90).
The market’s potent manufacturing of desire cannot be overstated. In the North Atlantic West, in particular the United States, identity is intimately constructed in the marketplace, while being forged by market systems. Through advertising, companies display products or service that claim to satiate one’s desires, while stimulating and constructing new desires (
Holden 1999). Holden offers four types of desire constructions by advertisements: object-mediated desire (through the product, desire is made manifest), object-induced desire (the product stimulates desire for its consumer in external, unrelated others), object-directed desire (whereby the presenter and product are conflated), subject-oriented desire (desire for the person depicted in the ad is ancillary to the desire expressed for the product). Desire is not unidirectional or directed merely towards goods (or in the ideal sense, the Good). Rather, desire is scattered, serving multiple ends—and again, these ends are molded by and pass through the logics of the market.
Valčo and I share a similar hesitation towards valorizing the freedom to choose through purchases; he goes so far as to call “a unilateral promotion of economic and cultural freedoms” as he describes it “a new idol of our liberal society” (
Valčo 2015, p. 135). His hesitation, it seems, stems from a suspicion towards larger social structures that overwrite contemporary notions of contentment, satisfaction, and goodness. Though it may not be his intention, Valčo offers a damning indictment of “messaged” garments:
“Human individuality and personhood seem to be lulled by the omnipresent slogans of freedom, especially in its economic and moral senses, only to be consumed and ‘flattened’ by the soft totalitarian power of consumerism. The loss of authentic individuality (in Kierkegaard’s sense) goes unnoticed in this process, as individuals are being subconsciously influenced by the omnipresent normative images and messages of economic, political, and cultural marketing ads and media content”.
Despite his attunement to the pernicious logics of the market (which also find their place in fashion, too), Valčo offers little respite to wearer or reader. He suggests, as an antidote to the mindless “mob individuals” that equate shopping sprees and activist tees with true freedom, a rediscovery, appropriation, and public emphasis on the constitutive character of cultural and religious traditions (
Valčo 2015, p. 137). Furthermore, he says that the state “should be open to the cultural influences of extra-governmental institutions and movements and make it possible for such institutions and movements to exist” (
Valčo 2015, p. 138). Here, one can imagine that Valčo is speaking about movements attached to “messaged” garments, such as The March for Our Lives, climate movements, Pride Month, and more. Paraphrasing George McLean, Valčo insists that the shared values and practiced virtues of our cultural and religious traditions constitute “[the] deepest, most penetrating self-understandings and ultimate commitments which shape [the individuals’] modes of life” (
Valčo 2015, p. 138).
Two tensions arise here. First, public displays of enthusiastic support, of creative tension, and of a beckoning towards God, must be palatable by the standards of the state (
Alonso 2021, p. 61). This does not only refer to political or cultural beliefs that are reduced to mere fashion, but also to public displays of dissent that suffer media scorn, versus that which is acceptable and endorsed by state officials, celebrities, and communities. Usually, those with corporate sponsors are palatable enough, while spontaneous declarations are met with police resistance and media condemnation.
Second, it is in these relationships and communal participation in social associations that the logics of the market are reiterated. So often are our communal desires co-opted for monetary ends. We are embedded in a cultural landscape of corporatized desire. This dissatisfying social terrain is a breeding ground for fragmentation, exhaustion, and collective despair. The reduction of communal hopes for the good of neighbors, and goods that gesture towards the good, to mere objects available for purchase endangers expressions of tangible, demonstrable hope.
This is not to say that communities do not attempt to resist corporatization and market forces. Grassroots makers, or groups that print their own shirts separate from stock shelves, cultivate spaces of resistance within the world of politicized fashion apparel. These subversive practices, independent of corporate production, push against the co-opting wiles of larger organizations and fashion companies. Such garments can make present the collective hopes and dreams of the wearers’ group, while also signaling towards the deceptions of the systems in which they are worn. Antonio Eduardo Alonso notes that the “cries” of the collective, of hopes and dreams, and of the divine persist even in a landscape of misshapen desire and fragmented commodification (
Alonso 2021, p. 77). Still, it remains difficult to say where authentic “messaged” apparel begins and where corporatized messaging ends. The subversive practices and products of the activist group can be adopted by the mainstream fashion brand or used in advertising by larger corporations. Says Alonso, “even conscious acts of market dissent…are themselves so easily commodified…” (
Alonso 2021, p. 206). Such is a risk that exists, and while it may not discourage groups from paving their own way, it dilutes the effectiveness of the practice (in this instance, the practice is wearing a “messaged” garment). In acknowledging the differences between a shirt made by an individual group and a shirt made by a market-oriented corporation, we must also acknowledge that these differences are easily obscured and can collapse into ambiguity.
Corporate actors not only manufacture desire, but also manufacture the notion that these garments can adequately present the self, that “messaged” garments should be a first choice for self-expression, for publicly responding to ills, and more. The symbols, visages, and phrases on these garments do evoke a sense of responsibility, of alignment with social causes, but these garments ultimately fall flat. They flatten the self to say, “I am [the sentiment expressed on] this shirt.” The shirt does not, and cannot, say enough about the complexities of identity—and even if it could, it constantly refers itself back to other systems with other ends. Dreyfus suggests, “if one leaps into the aesthetic sphere with total commitment expecting it to give one’s life meaning, it is bound to break down” (
Dreyfus 2009, p. 82). I suggest, if one adheres to “messaged” garments with the expectation that these wares will effectively anchor groups and effect change, without considering its rootedness in the fashion world, then this expectation (and others) will likely not be met. Ultimately, the ethically “messaged” garment is subsumed into the aesthetic, and the self and its hopes become yet another “thing” to dispense for sale. We see this demonstrated in the dominance of personal responsibility logics in the United States; it is through purchases that we allegedly “help” others, change the world, and, as former President George H.W. Bush’s organization Thousand Points of Light purported, volunteer our way to social salvation. Purchasing power is legitimate, but not a panacea.
5.2. Insights from Stages on Life’s Way
Corporate manipulation and co-option are addressed, albeit indirectly, by Kierkegaard in his work
Stages on Life’s Way. As the sequel to
Either/Or, Kierkegaard uses
Stages to further engage with his three spheres of existence; yet the latter departs from the former in marked ways. As he writes in his Journals, in
Either/Or, “the esthetic component was something present battling with the ethical, and the ethical was the choice by which one emerged from it” (
Kierkegaard 1978a, p. 41). Conversely, in
Stages, “the esthetic-sensuous is thrust into the background as something past (therefore ‘a recollection’), for after all it cannot become utterly nothing” (
Kierkegaard 1978a, p. 41). The ethical and religious stages take on new directions, too, but neither warrant explanations at present. Most pressing to the conundrum of “messaged” garments is the aesthetic sphere, explored at a banquet of several people.
In the section entitled “In Vino Veritas,” we are introduced to five figures, who muse about erotic love over an intoxicating meal (hence the “vino”). Four of the five are familiar to those acquainted with Kierkegaard’s works; the banquet guests are Johannes the seducer (from
Either/Or), Victor Emerita (editor of
Either/Or), Constantin Constantius (pseudonymous author of
Repetition), and the Young Man (who appears in
Repetition and is credited with authoring several essays in the first portion of
Either/Or) (
Storm 2021). These familiar figures are acquainted with the Fashion Designer, a peculiar and vitriolic man. The Fashion Designer is a confounding character: “it was impossible to get a genuine impression of this man” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 22). The narrator remarks that this Designer is an expert in deception: “even when he was talking most maliciously, his voice always had an element of boutique-pleasantness and polite sweetness, which certainly must have been extremely nauseating to him personally…” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 22) Fashion, for the Designer, is “a sneaky trafficking in impropriety that is authorized as propriety” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 66). It is fickle nonsense, hurtling towards ridiculous ends, as it “inevitably becomes more and more extravagantly mad” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 66).
Such is the system. And what of its participants? The Fashion Designer has a striking resentment of women, as primary participants, and his most loyal customers (“fashion is a woman”). According to him, these women who visit his boutique cannot resist it, for it is “as seductive and irresistible to a woman as Venusberg to the man” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 66). The Fashion Designer loathes woman’s absorption in fashion; according to him, “she wants to be that [in fashion] at all times, and it is her one and only thought” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 67). He obliges, inviting her into his boutique, and “when I have her dolled up in fashion, when she looks crazier than a mad hatter, as crazy as someone who would not even be admitted to a loony bin, she blissfully sallies forth from me” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 71). The Fashion Designer, motivated by an insatiable desire to mold these women into ludicrous spectacles, achieves this end by creating and selling “fool’s costume” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 67). Robert L. Perkins positions the Designer as “the ‘high priest’ of a sustained hoax at the expense of women” (
Perkins 1984, p. 15).
At first blush, the Fashion Designer’s words can be interpreted as just another misogynistic tirade against women. Yet, the Fashion Designer paints an unflattering portrait not simply of women, but of women as fashion participants. His harshness exposes his own resentment for the system in which he exists and works. Though the Designer cannot be regarded as the sole spokesperson of the fashion world, his dialogue unearths the same insidious motives of the fashion system and the market that we encounter when scrutinizing “messaged” apparel. I have two points to accompany this claim. First, we can see in the Fashion Designer glimpses of corporate advertising tactics. Companies manufacture “sustained hoaxes,” such as deceitful greenwashing campaigns marketed under the guise of “sustainability,” to attract, captivate, and placate consumers for the sake of selling products and services.
Second, in his diatribe against women, the Fashion Designer claims a cheapening of the “sacred.” He accuses woman of being reflective “to an incomprehensibly high degree,” engrossed in possibility (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 67). Though Kierkegaard often characterizes men as reflective and women as lacking reflectiveness in his authorship, here the Fashion Designer says otherwise (
Walsh [1997] 2011, p. 199). But this is no compliment. Woman, according to the Designer, “knows how to relate everything to adornment or fashion” (
Walsh [1997] 2011, p. 200). For woman, “there is nothing so sacred that she does not immediately find it suitable for adornment, and the most exclusive manifestation of adornment is fashion” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 67). He continues, noting, “no wonder she [the wearer] finds it suitable, for fashion, after all, is the sacred” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 67). If we lead with the Designer’s charge that fashion is the sacred, or rather, that woman understands fashion as the sacred, then it follows that woman’s reflective capabilities always refer back to this “deficient” notion of the sacred. Woman’s reflection, according to the Designer,
evacuates objects (and ideas) of deeper, more rooted meanings. It is through reflection that woman, allegedly, reduces everything to an item of adornment, something to be worn and flaunted on the body. Thus, woman’s reflective capacities are something to be scorned and perceived as degrading. Everything, it seems, can be worn. This, according to the Designer, is an unsurprising route for fashion, given that fashion, as mentioned above, is understood as the sacred. The Designer begrudges the reduction of religious inclinations not only to adornment, or perhaps aesthetic impulses, but also maligns a system that he regards as ludicrous and yet cannot escape.
We see here how the Designer expressly faults woman for the desacralization of all. His charge distracts from his own hand in corrupting through his work in fashion. Thus, in critiquing woman, he critiques the fashion system. The Designer himself co-opts fashion to achieve his own end. Similarly, it is industry that presently co-opts phrases, images, and symbols for a profitable end. The Designer does not consider profit in his speech; in fact, he admits that he incurs a loss in pursuing his feat (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 67). However, contemporary corporations do consider profit, if not first, then certainly in accordance with other interests. There is also profit in co-option, particularly if what is co-opted is “in fashion” and enthusiastically consumed. I counter the Designer’s charge towards woman with the insistence that systems, not individuals, hold responsibility. Furthermore, I suspect that the Designer’s anger might be more fairly distributed away from women towards those who uphold the fashion system, for it is designers, brands, and marketers that find objects, ideas, and even vocalized proclamations “suitable for adornment.” Here, we might think of brands that produce garments that depict phrases and words, or even Christian iconography. One need not look far, for instance, to find T-shirts, jackets, and baseball caps that bear the visage of Jesus and Mary. We might also consider the influx of religious symbols in clothing design during the 1990s as a tangible example of the Designer’s charge (
McDannell 1995, p. 61). Thus, it appears that the systems which create items for adorning endorse a wearing of all, and in doing so, co-opt and reinvent notions of the sacred.
It is in the Designer’s words that we also encounter his stance towards interpersonal connectedness. We recall that he delivers his diatribe in the company of others to further his own view of love. The Designer concludes his statement by urging his listeners to “not go looking for a love affair, stay clear of erotic love as you would the most dangerous neighborhood, for your beloved, too, might eventually wear a ring in her nose (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 71). The Designer, in contenting himself with making a mockery of women, uses his life’s work to retreat from others. His work in fashion serves to justify his own distance from people, specifically, a romantic partner. By reducing women to fools through his work, and through his insistence to “stay clear of erotic love,” he endorses a communal avoidance of women. Thus, the Designer’s work is to sabotage and disavow any potential encounter with erotic love, a love that unifies, fosters intimacy, and leaves those involved vulnerable. In short, his work disavows displays of the good.
The Fashion Designer’s motives stand in sharp contrast to the contemporary wearer, who dons a “messaged” garment to achieve greater unity with others, and to make themselves vulnerable by dressing. To wear a garment that speaks to maligned identities, demonstrates solidarity with marginalized groups, and bears bold and politically provocative phrases, is to face risk. The Designer scorns this risk, by turning from erotic love. The wearer, conversely, turns towards a plurality of loves encountered in communal movements. The Designer acts to be alone, and the wearer acts to draw nearer to others.
The Designer does not, however, shy away from the social function of dress and adornment. He notes that women often detect “whether the lady passing by has noticed it—because for whom does she adorn herself if it is not for other ladies!” (
Kierkegaard 1988, p. 67) The women of the Designer’s time, and the people of ours, seek to be seen, and in being seen, participate in communal demonstrations of commitments, beliefs, and even religiousness. In acknowledging the idolatrous behavior of the fashion consumer, the Designer hints at the deeper desires of the wearer. The women of his heyday resemble the contemporary person, anxious to dress in a way that not only appeals to self and others, but conveys ethical commitments, connotes trustworthiness, and draws one into community and wholeness. Though he may discount these desires as superficial, I see more at work here. The Designer’s commentary on his craft illustrates how garments fail to sustain the wearer’s desires or effect their ends, as empty, cheapened relics of ethico-religious desires led astray, and how garments in fashion can bury these deeper hopes. His words, and his motivation for ridiculing women, also remind us of the forces acting against well-meaning consumers. The Designer, in this way, serves as the face of corporate manipulation, exposing the deceitfulness of numerous corporate actors. He also unearths the complexity of garments, as tools of deceit, as objects of fashion, and as social accessories.
5.3. Insights from Two Ages
It would be too tidy a claim to suggest that Kierkegaard’s vision of his “present age” is synonymous with the twenty-first century. However, there are specific observations that Kierkegaard makes of his social place that are consonant with the social terrain unearthed by “messaged” garments.
In his concluding essay, “The Present Age,” Kierkegaard asserts that the present age is comprised of the following attributes: it is “essentially a sensible, reflecting age, devoid of passion, flaring up in superficial, short-lived enthusiasm and prudentially relaxing in indolence” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 68). Here, Kierkegaard takes issue with reflection, or an endless musing on possibility without choosing to do something. He heralds the revolutionary age for its social heroes, who serve as inspirational prototypes for onlookers (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 72). In contrast, the present age seems neutered to such prototypes, and does not even house them, for the sake of sensibility (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 72). Concerning reflection, Kierkegaard bemoans the ways in which reflection allows for the individual to escape to endless possibilities—the person who reflects may hum and haw over a decision, without making a choice (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 77).
The present age for Kierkegaard is one of empty phrases: “certain phrases and observations circulate among the people, partly true and sensible, yet devoid of vitality” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, pp. 74–75). Here, Kierkegaard observes that words and those who speak them devolve into empty abstractions. A passionless, reflecting age “lets everything remain but subtly drains the meaning out of it” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 77). His charges resound against those who have weakened the meaning of the phrases emblazoned on a shirt. For example, a corporation that claims to champion women’s rights might emblazon company merchandise, websites, and various ephemera with phrases such as “WE SUPPORT WOMEN” to demonstrate adherence to their assertions. Does the company materially enact the phrase in their corporate structure? To what lengths does it go to support women? Would they, for instance, pay more for their feminist tokens and reduce their bottom line to ensure that the women workers several countries away who manufacture these items are paid well? And what of the company that incorporates the phrases “sustainability” and “going green” into their corporate motto and advertising? Does the company want to “save the planet” by changing to clean energy to power their corporate offices? Do they opt for eco-friendly products, and even reduce the production of certain products to avoid landfill contribution? Or is the phrase another instance of greenwashing? Here, objects such as garments become substitutions for generative action, not just among individuals but within larger organizations.
Whether it be from learned helplessness or an unfamiliarity with consumer agency, reflective potentialities emerge in the realm of “worn” activism. Kierkegaard offers his own example: “the established order continues to stand, but since it is equivocal and ambiguous, passionless reflection is reassured” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 80). Furthermore, in the example of Christianity, “In the same way we are willing to keep Christian terminology but privately know that nothing decisive is supposed to be meant by it” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 81). Our evocative phrases have, in some sense, been evacuated of their ethical import and transformative power. “Messaged” apparel is too familiar a medium to effectively convert others to causes; instead, it illuminates the weariness of the wearer in the face of structural distress.
The choices for the “messaged” wearer seem limited; one can choose to be informed, or blissfully ignorant. Try as they might, the informed risk slipping in to window shopping ethical commitments or consuming tremendously distressing media, for the sake of being informed: “So the present age is basically sensible, perhaps knows more on the average than any previous generation, but it is devoid of passion. Everyone is well-informed; we all know everything, every course to take and the alternative courses, but no one is willing to take it” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 104).
In fairness, social participation in the world of “messaged” garments signals towards competency not only in reading and interpreting ethical signs (e.g., a “recycle” symbol on a shirt or blue can), but also towards an awareness of macroscopic cognitive dissonance in the general populace. Consumers know that women face oppression throughout the world, that the environment is buckling under human consumption, and that gay men are being murdered in Chechnya. One of our first responses to these ills is to don a relevant garment—a FEMINIST shirt, a GO GREEN shirt, a rainbow shirt. In some sense, one may know this is not enough. But what more can be done? I empathize with the frustrated wearer, who feels dissatisfied with buying her way to a better world but is at a loss of what more to do. Furthermore, there exist numerous shirts that one could wear—how are they to decide which garment takes precedence? Again, such is the concern presented by the “present age,” or more specifically, “the Public” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 91). The Public obliterates qualitative distinctions, and levels all. Without being able to deduce which cause is more pressing, more pertinent, and more deserving of one’s attention, the wearer faces a conundrum, one that intersectionality seeks to ameliorate.
4 Still, as one can choose to align with a cause, one can also choose to disengage. Dreyfus suggests that “a commitment does not get a grip on me if I am always free to revoke it” (
Dreyfus 2009, p. 85). This tension to choose or not to choose is part and parcel of market participation and of fashion. There is always another shirt to choose from.
I acknowledge that “messaged” wearers often comprise communities that are desperate to enact concrete change, that desire goodness for those most vulnerable, and that ache for unity. Here, they scorn superficiality, disengagement, and the Public. Wearers don specific “messaged” wares to claim distinctions, to claim the importance of the ideas, policies, and hopes to which they align themselves. Still, I worry their use of garments as a mode of communication inches them closer towards abstraction. Slogan shirt firebrand Katherine Hamnett has herself cautioned that “T-shirts by themselves are all very nice but they achieve nothing. This is the danger” (
Molvar 2017). Her words are reminiscent of Kierkegaard, who remarks that in the present age, “so little is actually done…” (
Kierkegaard 1978b, p. 105). Hamnett urges wearers to effect political change by contacting politicians and applying pressure on constituents. She gestures beyond the endlessly reflecting public sphere, suggesting that action cannot be postponed; one must act (
Dreyfus 2009, p. 76). Here, she endorses a journey towards the ethical sphere of existence, where “one engages in involved action” (
Dreyfus 2009, p. 83).
5 Yet not all actions are held in equal value. Wearing a garment may be less effective than contacting one’s lawmakers, while contacting one’s representatives may be less effective than striking, and so on. At this venture, Kierkegaard might remark that the ethical sphere, too, fails to sustain commitment or forestall despair. Here, my concern lies with how attempts to stretch “messaged” garments beyond their foundation as fashion objects and as objects for sale hasten this failure.
There are numerous other passages in Kierkegaard’s works that might have served well here. I have purposely limited myself to concepts found in Either/Or, Stages on Life’s Way, and Two Ages, to think through the problematics of “messaged” apparel and the theoretical and tangible implications it raises, while teasing out the nuances rarely addressed in this kind of garment. I do not have the last say on Kierkegaard and “messaged” apparel, though my hope is that my musings can inspire further engagement with what has proven thus far to be a socio-politically, ethically, and spiritually relevant way of dressing oneself.