One or None? Truth and Self-Transformation for Śaṅkara and Kamalaśīla
Abstract
:1. Introduction: Truth and Self-Transformation in Comparative Perspective
Huineng’s verse does not speak of a sudden or gradual path, per se, but expresses a nondual perspective that undermines or at least throws into question several of the basic assumptions upon which a gradualist path philosophy is built: causation, effort, duality. Yet, one of the most important points made by Luis Gómez in his analysis of these issues is that the subitist’s nondualist ontology and rejection of the path “only makes sense in the context of a community already committed” to the goal and the path.7 This is a point we must continually bear in mind: Context matters, and the institutional context here for an ostensibly epistemological debate about the implications of nondualism and the means of knowing it—continuity or independence—gives voice to a central concern about spiritual path theory.From the beginning enlightenment has no tree,And the bright mirror has no stand.Buddha-nature is always pure.Where could dust settle?
2. Comparing Kamalaśīla with Śaṅkara and Early Vedānta
Demiéville depends on Deussen (1912), and therefore gives us a fairly reliable description of the main thrust of Śaṅkara’s nondualism and how it informs his passivism,16 but Gómez (1987, p. 128) cautiously reminds us that “Śaṅkara… spawned three lines of disciples—only one of which took a ‘leap-philosophy’ position (to borrow K. H. Potter’s terminology).”17[L]iberation… does not admit of any active effort on our part. It is a matter of knowledge, not of works… Liberation is inherent in our ātman… [I]t would be wrong to think that it could be revealed through purifying the ātman by our own effort… In fact the ātman can never be the object of any activity, for all activity directed toward an object implies a modification of that object—but the ātman is eternally unalterable.
The point here is that we misunderstand the nature of systematic thought and practice if we do not also recognize and respect the intractability of the tensions that such systems try to resolve. For instance, whether we label them subitist or gradualist, we can find a natural tension within spiritual path philosophies that attempt somehow to account for and describe a process of change, progression, or improvement that can seem fast at times and slow or stagnant at others. We do well to read systematic thought and polemical debates with such tensions in mind.[R]eligious systems often are dynamic attempts to solve all of these admittedly real and universal oppositions. The dichotomies are inherent to human thought, not constructed by philosophers or mystics, although religious effort and ideology often can be described as a resolution, or rather a balancing, of the tension between the two poles.
3. The Threefold Scheme and the Epistemic Continuity Thesis
Adam also suggests that for Kamalaśīla, “meditation plays an indispensable role in the quest for liberating knowledge, contributing insights that are unattainable by studying and thinking alone” (p. 354). Adam may well be right, but we can see multiple issues at play here. One is the transformative efficacy of meditation, its necessity for achieving liberating knowledge. Another is its epistemic value.While Tillemans is certainly correct in stating that meditative understanding conforms to the conclusions reached through philosophy according to Kamalaśīla, this position is not inconsistent with one that holds meditative understanding to provide a kind of experiential verification of those conclusions.
Kellner thus makes a distinction between epistemic strength and transformative efficacy, a distinction that is perhaps less clearly made by Adam in his objections to Tillemans’ interpretation of Kamalaśīla’s position, but one wonders whether Kamalaśīla himself draws the distinction quite so clearly. The debate raises questions about the nature of truth and its relationship to the knowing subject in the context of spiritual path philosophy. Can conceptual knowledge provide sufficient evidence for certainty about the world, or does knowledge require a more intimate relationship between the knowing subject and the object known? What justification, if any, does knowledge require? And what should we make of the concept of a powerful, liberating knowledge? Is it the same knowledge we gain from ordinary perception or inference? One thing is clear: when we speak about liberating knowledge in the context of Buddhism, or Vedānta for that matter, we are not simply referring to information about the nature of the world but to a state of knowledge that results from and is a significant transformation of the way the knowing subject sees, thinks about, and acts in the world.…there is no indication that Kamalaśīla would consider the certainty obtained by reasoning to be insufficient evidence when compared to evidence provided by perceptual awareness. Conceptual certainty is not regarded as sufficiently strong to remove deep-seated misconceptions in the mind, but this is more like a psychological or phenomenological insufficiency, not one of strength of evidence.
In this passage, Kamalaśīla makes a number of points that are relevant to the current discussion. For one thing, he outlines the threefold scheme as a logical or temporal sequence of practices. One begins by learning the scriptures, and then proceeds by reasoning to determine their correct meaning, before finally engaging in the practice of meditative cultivation on the true nature of reality, which for Kamalaśīla is the fact that all things are selfless: they arise in dependence on other things, and therefore from an ultimate standpoint do not arise at all. Such a process will give rise to “perfect knowledge” (samyagjñāna), the goal of the path. So, we have here something like an analysis of knowledge and its acquisition, but Kamalaśīla gives voice to the concern that one’s meditation practice must at some point take an “unreal” object, that is, an imaginary or conceptual object, as its focus. For, as Kellner (2020, p. 53) says, “the yogi has to engage in reificatory practices in order to remove reification.” This process will also involve the cultivation of nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna), which Kamalaśīla describes as “seeing the highest reality” (paramatattvadarśana) (Kellner 2020, p. 63).Regarding the three types of wisdom, that is, the wisdom arising from learning, reasoning, and cultivation, one should first of all generate the wisdom arising from learning, because with it one first determines the meaning of the scriptures. After that, by means of the wisdom arising from reasoning, one understands the meaning of the scriptures in terms of whether it is definitive or provisional. After that, once one has thereby generated certitude, one should cultivate the real object {true meaning} (bhūtam arthaṃ) and not a false {unreal} one (abhūtam). For otherwise perfect knowledge (samyagjñāna) would not arise, because one might cultivate false objects, too (viparītasyāpi bhāvanād), and doubt would not disappear. And then cultivation would be entirely meaningless {useless} (vyarthaiva), like that of the non-Buddhists. As the Blessed One [the Buddha] has said in the King of Samādhis Scripture (Samādhirāja):If one analyzes the factors of existence that are without self {essence} (nairātmyadharmān),And if, after analyzing them, one would practice cultivation,It would be the cause of obtaining the fruit of cessation (nirvāṇa).There is no other cause that would bring peace.Therefore, after one has analyzed with the wisdom arising from reasoning, that is, though both logic and scripture, one should cultivate only the truly real nature of things (bhūtam eva vastusvarūpam). And the real nature of things has been certified by scripture and reasoning to be their absolute non-origination from the standpoint of ultimate reality {truth} (paramārthataḥ).
While the remark comes in response to a hermeneutical question, the point could not be clearer: scripture provides the epistemological basis for proper reasoning about the nature of reality, and scripture supported by reasoning provides the epistemological basis for meditation. Meditation by itself, and even reasoning if detached from scripture, serves no independent purpose and therefore requires no separate prescription. Meditation accords with scripture and reasoning. When compared to Kamalaśīla, Śaṅkara makes an even stronger claim because, while Kamalaśīla still argues for the soteriological (or transformative) necessity of meditation practice, here Śaṅkara even seems ambivalent about its soteriological value. The question arises whether or how much Śaṅkara even advocates for the threefold scheme as an accurate description of the path. Now, we will turn to Śaṅkara and the place of the threefold scheme in early Vedānta.In all cases, however, since consideration through reasoning should be done only in accordance with what is ascertained by scripture, and since meditation should be done only in accordance with what is considered through reasoning, that is, through what has been certified by scripture and reasoning, a specific prescription for meditation is without purpose.
4. Śaṅkara and the Threefold Scheme in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad
It is noteworthy that Yājñavalkya actually speaks of four actions, not three, which prompts an interpretive question about the notion of “seeing” (darśana) implied here, as well as how sight relates to the other three actions mentioned in the passage. If the passage speaks of four actions, why do commentators speak of a threefold process? A look at Śaṅkara’s commentary can help us understand how, retrospectively, commentators saw three in four. Śaṅkara begins his commentary on this passage as follows:You see, Maitreyī—it is the self (ātmā) that one should see (draśtavyaḥ); it is the self that one should hear (śrotravyaḥ); it is the self that one should consider (mantavyaḥ); it is the self on which one should concentrate (nididhyāsitavyaḥ). For by seeing the self, by hearing it, by considering it, and by knowing it (vijñānena), all this is known (idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam).
While the scriptural passage only offers a list and does not make clear that seeing is meant to be the outcome of the other three actions, the commentary interprets it to mean that learning, reasoning, and concentration are stages of a sequential process with “perfect seeing” or knowledge of brahman as its goal. The terms, “previously,” “next,” and “after that,” introduce either temporal or logical stages of a sequence. The goal is apparent from the way the commentary interprets the concept of seeing. However, the commentary also speaks of the three practices being obtained as a unity, suggesting that they could be understood as elements of a singular practice with the same goal. The scriptural passage seems clear that the four actions of seeing and so forth have complete knowledge as their result, but it is worth emphasizing the description of the goal in the commentary as a “complete seeing.” This is a key concept in Śaṅkara’s path philosophy, equivalent to the liberating knowledge of brahman (brahmajñāna), the goal of the path: KNOWING IS SEEING.Therefore [Yājñavalkya says], “you see, it is the self that should be seen;” [that is,] it is worthy of seeing, it should be made into an object of seeing. “It should be heard,” [that is,] previously (pūrvam) from the spiritual teacher or scripture. Next (paścāt) “it should be considered,” [that is,] with reasoning (tarka, logic). After that (tataḥ), “it should be concentrated on,” [that is,] it should be meditated on (dhyātavyaḥ) with conviction (niścayena). For in this way [the self] becomes something seen by completing the efficient causes/practices (sādhanas) of hearing, considering, and concentration. When these [efficient causes/practices] are obtained as a unity, then “perfect seeing” (samyagdarśana),33 which has unity with brahman as its object, becomes clear (prasīdati),34 and not otherwise, such as by hearing alone.35
Recall that Maitreyī had asked about the benefits of possessing “the whole world and its wealth.” This passage asserts that “all this” (idaṃ sarvaṃ), which according to Śaṅkara refers to all dualistic appearances, is in fact only a mental object constructed by ignorance. In fact, “all this” is identical to our nondual essence. One could interpret him to say that the threefold process, with perfect seeing as its result, removes ignorance and enables one to know the self. When one knows the self, one knows everything as it truly is. For there is nothing other than the self.When the scripture says, “For when the self is seen, heard, considered, and known, oh, Maitreyī, then all this is known (viditaṃ),” that is, it is truly known (vijñāta), the intent (artha, object/meaning) is the destruction of that, namely, the mental object of the belief caused by ignorance (avidyāpratyayaviṣaya), which consists in the effects of action upon the doer; and is the object of the belief that is a superimposition of ignorance upon the self; and has as its characteristic the castes and estates of life (varṇāśrama) and so forth; and is the cause of karma, namely, of priestly power, royal power, and so forth; and is like the belief that a rope is a snake.
Again, the threefold scheme refers to a sequential process with seeing or knowing as its outcome. We are told here that the threefold scheme explains how the self may be seen. The comment, “but hearing is by scripture alone” (śravaṇaṃ tu āgamamātreṇa), which seems inserted into the middle of the passage, suggests that Śaṅkara views the practice of hearing or learning as a specific one distinct from reasoning, an interpretation that seems confirmed by looking at more evidence from Śaṅkara’s body of work. The commentary also highlights what happens when the self is known, and repeats the idea that knowing the self brings knowledge of “all this,” that is, knowledge of the nondual nature of reality.When Yājñavalkya says, “For, oh Maitreyī, when the self is seen…,” he says the following in response to the question of how the self is seen: “When it is heard,” [that is,] previously (pūrvaṃ) from a teacher and scripture; once again (punas) “when it is considered,” [that is,] when it is investigated (vicārite) by reasoning (tarka), [that is,] by argumentation (upapatti)—but hearing is by scripture alone—when it is considered by argumentation, afterwards (paścād) “when it is known” (vijñāte), [that is,] when it is ascertained (nirdhārite) that it is so and not otherwise. What happens (kiṃ bhavati)? Yājñavalkya says, “This becomes known.” “All this” (idaṃ sarvam) means what is other than self, because nothing exists that is different from the self.
5. The Threefold Scheme and Knowledge as Experience in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
Rambachan maintains that it would not be appropriate to regard this isolated passage as justification for the strong claim that experience must validate scripture, or that scripture is merely an indirect means of knowing brahman. The passage is framed by comments that scripture is, in fact, the sole means of knowing brahman. When seen in context, the above-cited passage suggests that perception, inference, and other valid means of knowledge can play a role in supporting the inquiry into brahman alongside scripture and reasoning based on it.Unlike in the case of the inquiry into religious duty (dharmajijñāsa), scripture and so on are not the only valid means in the case of the inquiry into brahman. Rather scripture and so on as well as experience (anubhava) and so on are in this case, in accordance with their nature, valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), because knowledge of brahman culminates in experience (anubhavāvasānatva) and because it takes as its object a truly existent thing (bhūtavastuviṣayatva).
Rambachan emphasizes here that Śaṅkara sees knowledge of brahman as a state of mind, but one may ask, if Śaṅkara says that knowledge conforms to its object, and he also says that brahman is nondual, undifferentiated, and free from conceptualization (nirvikalpa), as he does on several occasions in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,45 then would not knowledge of brahman as a mental state also be nonconceptual or at least give rise to a nonconceptual experience?46 If so, and since the scriptures, which have words as their nature, are conceptual, then it becomes possible to ask the question: How, for Śaṅkara, do concepts give rise to a nonconceptual experience of knowledge?It is exceedingly important to note that Śaṅkara all along sees brahmajñāna [knowledge of brahman] as a mental process occurring in the mind and not transcending it. Brahmajñāna is of the nature of an antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti [a mental state] coinciding with the nature of brahman and produced by its authoritative pramāṇa [valid means of knowledge], the śruti [the scriptures].
Rambachan reads Śaṅkara as saying that knowledge of brahman is a conventional, conceptual state of mind. Given this interpretation, Rambachan (1991, p. 68ff) explains how Śaṅkara can maintain that scripture, limited as it is by its linguistic nature, can still reveal the limitless. If we grant further that the absolutely real is itself beyond conceptuality, then Rambachan’s explanation may begin to suggest Śaṅkara’s possible answer to the question of how conceptual knowledge practices can give rise to knowledge of the nonconceptual.47Śaṅkara accepts that this vṛtti [mental state], produced in the mind by the Vedānta-vākyas [the statements found in the Upaniṣads], does not enjoy the status of absolute reality (pāramārthika sattā [sic]). Its reality would be the same as the world, the Vedas, and the antaḥkaraṇa [the mind]. He sees no difficulty, however, in its capacity to negate ignorance and effect the knowledge of the absolutely real. He willingly concedes that once brahmajñāna is effected, the absolute reality of the Vedas is also negated. The Vedānta-vākyas, having negated from brahman all upādhis [mistaken attributions], eventually negate themselves.
Śaṅkara makes several important claims here. One we will discuss more below: knowledge is distinct from action. This claim recurs when he discusses the difference between knowledge and meditation. Meditation, he will claim, is an action like ritual action. He also says that knowledge of brahman is immediately available to experience because it is something we already possess. One is reminded here of many passages in Śaṅkara’s writings, including the analogy of the sun cited above from the Upadeśasāhasrī, which suggest that brahman is awareness itself. Insofar as we are already aware that we are aware, we already possess knowledge of brahman. While the scriptures may be said to remove the apparent ignorance that makes us identify ourselves with our mind/body complex, they cannot remove or grant us our awareness of ourselves. Rather, scripture simply enables our awareness to know itself. Apparently, it must do more than this, however, because it also informs us of the identity, the nonduality, of self and world. Whether this knowledge is also directly available to experience would seem to depend on whether such an experience of knowledge is conceptual or nonconceptual.Because knowledge [of brahman] has a perception as its effect, it is not reasonable to have doubt about the absence of its effect. In the case of the effects of action (karma, i.e., ritual action), however, such as heaven and so on, which are not present to experience, there could be a doubt as to whether the result will occur or not, but the result of knowledge [of brahman] is present to experience, as it says in the scriptures, “That brahman, which is direct and immediate…” and “You are that (tat tvam asi),” which instructs one that [the effect of knowledge of brahman] is already accomplished. The statement, “You are that,” cannot be interpreted to mean, “You will be that after you have died.” Furthermore, another scriptural passage indicates that one will perceive the fruit of perfect seeing (samyagdarśana), namely [the understanding] that everything is the self, precisely at the moment of perfect seeing: “Seeing that this [self] is that [brahman], the seer, Vāmadeva, understood, ‘I was Manu and the sun.’”
6. Śaṅkara on Meditation and Its Difference from Knowledge
So, for Śaṅkara, the intent of the passage at Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad 2.4.5, which appears to the opponent to prescribe certain actions, is simply to divert one’s attention away from the sense objects of the world and towards the self.53 It does not require any action from us. It simply directs the mind toward inquiry into brahman. It certainly does not provide anything like a complete map of the spiritual path. Śaṅkara offers the same interpretation again in the commentary on Brahmasūtra 3.2.21: “Even those scriptural passages such as ‘[the self] should be seen’ and so on, which speak of the duty to know the highest brahman, have as their principal purpose to bring one face to face with reality (tattvābhimukhīkaraṇapradhānā) and not to require that one realize reality.”54 Such passages can only direct one’s attention to reality. They are prompts, not rules. They literally bring one “face to face” with the knowledge of brahman, but they cannot cause or enjoin it because such knowledge is not something one can cause or effect. In fact, we already possess it.Meditation (dhyāna) and thinking (cintana) are, indeed, mental in the sense that a person has the ability to do them, or not to do them, or to do them differently, because they are dependent on the person. Knowledge (jñāna), however, is born from a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇajanya), and a valid means of knowledge takes as its object something that is truly existent. Knowledge is entirely dependent on the object alone. It is not dependent on a rule. It is not even dependent on a person. Therefore, even though it is mental, knowledge differs greatly [from meditation and the like].
7. On “Perfect Seeing” and the Sudden/Gradual Dichotomy in the Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya
Śaṅkara, like Kamalaśīla, is sensitive to the concern that one can meditate upon unreal objects and that meditation can thereby become ineffective or misleading. In responding to this concern, Śaṅkara draws upon the conceptual metaphor that KNOWING IS SEEING in order to distinguish knowledge from meditation. He wants to ensure the reality of the object of knowledge. However, the conclusion to the commentary on this verse suggests a kind of gradualism that seems to accept that meditation can play a preparatory role in the attainment of liberating knowledge:In this case, an act of meditation can also take an unreal thing as its object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But an act of seeing can only take a real thing as its object, as we know from experience in the world; we therefore conclude that in the passage last quoted only the highest self, which is the real object of perfect seeing (samyagdarśana), is indicated as the object of sight.
Śaṅkara makes a noteworthy concession here. Elsewhere in the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya, he is adamant that liberation itself can have no degrees and neither can knowledge of brahman: “For all the scriptures assert that the state of liberation has only one form. For the state of liberation is nothing but brahman, and brahman is not connected with different forms because it has the character of being one.”57 However, Śaṅkara admits that knowledge of brahman may arise after a longer or shorter period of time, depending on the strength of the means employed and the qualifications of the individual practitioner. So, here again we see a manifestation of the tension between immediacy and progression, as well as between spontaneity and regularity of causation.With reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is not an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest self, we finally remark that the objection is removed if we understand the passage to refer to liberation by stages (kramamukti). He who meditates on the highest self by means of the syllable Aum, consisting of three mātrās, obtains for his reward the world of Brahma and afterwards gradually “complete seeing” (samyagdarśana).
Śaṅkara states here that some meditation practices have liberating knowledge of brahman as their goal. He even employs a metaphor of repeated effort to describe the process. However, he does not say that such practices will actually produce liberating knowledge. It seems the best we can do is improve the conditions for liberation by removing the obstacles to knowledge in our minds. We do this primarily through the prerequisites to knowledge, preparing ourselves for study, thought, and meditation upon the scriptures under the guidance of the authoritative teacher; but we still cannot thereby bring about our liberation, since in truth we are already liberated.The first section of the present chapter has established that one should practice repetition of all meditations. With respect to those meditations that have “perfect seeing” (samyagdarśana) as their goal, however, a distinction is made that such meditations terminate when their effect is accomplished, just as one stops beating rice when the husks are separated from the grains. For as soon as the effect, that is, perfect seeing, is attained, no further effort can be enjoined, since scriptural injunctions do not apply to one who knows brahman, which is not the object of any injunction, as his own self.
8. An Alternative Voice from Early Vedānta: Maṇḍanamiśra on the Threefold Scheme and Using Conceptuality to Attain Knowledge of the Nonconceptual
Maṇḍana goes on to explain how the practices of learning, thinking, and meditation, though conceptual, can eliminate both ignorance and conceptuality at the same time, leaving only the “pure, transparent nature” of self-awareness. Toward the end of the same passage, he raises the question explicitly: “How can one destroy difference with difference itself (kathaṃ bhedenaiva bhedaḥ pratisaṃhriyate)?” Maṇḍana responds, “because of its being the antidote of difference, like powder eliminates powder” (yathā rajasā rajaḥ). He explains the analogy here by referring to a method by which a powdered substance is introduced into water dirtied by another substance. The introduction of the powder causes a chemical reaction whereby both substances are precipitated, leaving the water pure. He then offers two more analogies:Again, by what means is ignorance ended? It is by the repeated practice of learning, thinking, and meditation (dhyāna), and by the religious life (brahmacarya) and so forth, which are the different means (sādhanabheda) stated in the treatises (śāstras). How? The person who previously practices learning and thinking and then repeatedly practices meditation on the entire diffusion of differences that is denied with respect to the self—“It is not this, not this”—such a person, opposed to seeing difference, clearly causes it to end.
Maṇḍana thus addresses the question of how a practice that depends on conceptuality and duality could give rise to a nondual and nonconceptual experience.The repeated practices of learning, thinking, and meditation on brahman, which is beyond difference, are clearly the antidote to seeing difference, even though they are connected with ignorance, just like stomach fluid digests fluid and is itself digested or poison destroys another poison and is itself destroyed.
We can see how Maṇḍana understands and interprets the key passage from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad. He, like Śaṅkara, walks a fine line between enjoining a series of practices and emphasizing the singular power of the scriptures to reveal the true nature of reality. Interestingly, the comments above immediately lead to another question, namely, whether the scriptures can give rise to knowledge of reality only with the support of such methods as living the religious life. Maṇḍana quickly responds, just as Śaṅkara does, that hearing the scriptures can by itself give rise to knowledge of reality; the supporting qualifications are not necessary for acquiring such a vision of the truth. Maṇḍana argues that hearing the scriptures brings “certitude” (niścaya), but he also admits that one can fall back into error. Thus, repetition is said to be useful for the purpose of stabilizing the correct vision of reality and destroying false views.False appearances (mithyāvabhāsa) persist even for a person who has understood the true nature of the self from the scriptures, about which there is no doubt, because of the strength of latent dispositions that have power due to the accumulation of repeated false perceptions from beginningless time… Therefore, even if a vision of reality has arisen from a valid source of knowledge, it is thought that repetition of the vision of reality serves to overpower or destroy the latent dispositions made firm by having arisen through the repetition of false views from beginningless time. Thus it is said, “It is the self that one should consider; it is the self on which one should concentrate” (mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ), and there are the regulations (vidhāna) on the qualifications (sādhana) of mental quietude (śama), restraint (dama), living the religious life (brahmacarya), ritual action (yajña), and so forth. Otherwise, what is the purpose of teaching them?
The problem that the repetition of meditation and other such practices, including the performance of Vedic ritual, is meant to solve for Maṇḍana is the same problem that, on Kellner’s reading, motivates Kamalaśīla’s arguments for the necessity of cultivating nonconceptual meditation on the gradual path. We also see here that Maṇḍana makes a distinction between epistemic certainty and spiritual efficacy similar to the one Kellner finds in Kamalaśīla. More broadly, this example reminds us of the importance of looking carefully at immediate context: both Kamalaśīla and Śaṅkara were involved in debates within their respective traditions as much as, if not more than, between them.67 Yet, it also suggests the value of broader comparisons for what Foucault (1998) calls “the history of thought,” which he describes as distinct from both “the history of ideas” and “the history of mentalities,” because the history of thought focuses on “problems” or “problematizations.68On the path to liberation, a perceptual awareness of reality was regarded as necessary for the particular reason that only this kind of awareness, when preceded by a gradual process of acquiring insight, has the power of removing the afflictive and epistemic obscurations. Ascertainment by inference alone is simply not powerful enough to effect this kind of fundamental transformation of consciousness.
9. Different Types of Meditation and the Addition of Nonconceptual Meditation to the Threefold Scheme in Post-Śaṅkara Vedānta
10. Conclusions
- (1)
- Śaṅkara is right and Kamalaśīla is wrong.
- (2)
- Kamalaśīla is right and Śaṅkara is wrong.
- (3)
- Both of them are right (in some way).
- (4)
- Both of them are wrong (in some way).
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | |
2 | Pierre Hadot had reached a somewhat similar conclusion, although he developed a reading of Aristotle that emphasized theory as a form of practice. See, for instance, Hadot (2002), especially chapter six, and the comments of Kapstein (2001, p. 9). |
3 | Foucault uses the term “spiritual technique” in the 1978 interview published as “The Theatre of Philosophy” (La scène de la philosophie) on which see Collins (2020, pp. 89–90). As is now well-known, Foucault developed his notion of “technologies of self” in dialogue with the work of Pierre Hadot and his notion of “spiritual exercises” (exercices spirituels). On the use of Hadot (and Foucault) in exercises of comparison with Buddhism and non-western traditions, see Collins (2020) as well as the essays collected in Fiordalis (2018a) and the references therein. |
4 | On Foucault’s skepticism, see the passing remark of Collins (2020, p. xxxv). |
5 | |
6 | Gómez (2015, pp. 1125–26). The above is Gómez’s translation. The concept of “all-knowledge” or “omniscience” (sarvajñā) indicates the goal of the path. For more on this concept in the works of Kamalaśīla, see McClintock (2010). |
7 | Gómez (1987, pp. 77–78), italics in the original. The translation of Huineng’s poem is also from Gómez (1987, p. 73). |
8 | A great deal has been written on the so-called Samye (bSam yas) debate. In the introduction to his edition of the first Bhāvanākrama, Tucci ([1956–1958] 1986, pp. 316, 348–51, 393) discusses some of the Tibetan sources that link the composition of the three Bhāvanākrama treatises to a formal debate. On the nature of the debate itself and whether it was actually a series of written correspondences, see the secondary sources by Demiéville and Ueyama cited in Kellner (2020, p. 41), footnote 5. See also Higgins (2016) for a bibliography of other relevant studies. |
9 | |
10 | For evidence, Adam cites Balagangadhara (2005, p. 105ff), which actually makes only a somewhat cursory reference to the threefold scheme, but Adam also cites an unpublished masters thesis by Christine Fillion from McGill University on the threefold scheme in Śaṅkara’s Upadeśasāhasrī. On that basis he refers to the two passages in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad that will concern us in this article, especially when we look at the threefold scheme in Śaṅkara and early Vedānta. Kapstein (2001, p. 25), footnote 29, also includes a brief reference to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad and notes the similarity of its progression with the Buddhist scheme. By contrast, no mention is made of this broader non-Buddhist context in Eltschinger (2010), an excellent article focused on the development in Buddhist thought of the concept of wisdom arising from reasoning and a commonly cited source on the threefold scheme. Fiordalis (2018b, p. 255) makes only a passing reference to Adam (2006) and Balagangadhara (2005). |
11 | Rambachan (1991) gives many concrete examples in the introductory chapter of his work from which it becomes abundantly clear that the threefold scheme is well-known in Indian religious philosophy from its presence in the Vedānta tradition. A casual, if well-informed, search of the internet reveals the same thing. Ramana Maharshi would be an interesting modern figure to consider, but there is no space to do so in this article. |
12 | Scholars debate the dating of and historical relationships among these important early Vedānta figures, but we can be reasonably certain that Gauḍapāda and Bhartṛprapañca preceded Śaṅkara and Maṇḍanamiśra, who may have been contemporaries. On the vexed figure of Gauḍapāda, see Potter (1981, pp. 103–5). On Bhartṛprapañca, who wrote a now lost commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad, see Hiriyanna (1957, pp. 79–94) and more recently Andrijanić (2015) and Uskokov (2018). On Maṇḍanamiśra and the question of his relationship to Śaṅkara, see Thrasher (1979) and Tola (1989). See Harimoto (2006) for a discussion of the dating of Śaṅkara. On the apparent influence of Buddhism on Śaṅkara (and Gauḍapāda) see, for instance, Whaling (1979), which also discusses the view that Śaṅkara introduced into the Hindu tradition a monastic organizational structure on par with and influenced by Buddhist monasticism. Regarding Bhartṛprapañca and Maṇḍanamiśra, it seems clear that they were influenced by the Yoga tradition, and if so, then they were also influenced by Buddhism, albeit indirectly, as Buddhism probably had a strong influence on development of the Yoga tradition. |
13 | Foucault apparently misidentifies the relevant chapter from Epictetus’ Dialogues, but the editor points the reader toward book 1, chapter 4, “Of progress or improvement.” For a translation, see Long (1890, pp. 13–17). There is also a question about the Greek terminology. In his French translation of Plato’s Republic, Leroux (2002, p. 585), note 128, comments on a passage from Book III, section 407b–d: “Plato distinguishes here between study (mathēsis), activities of reflection (ennoēseis), and concentration on oneself (melétas pròs heautòn)… this list puts us in the presence of the three registers of philosophical exercise…” My translation of the French. In their English translation of the relevant passage from the Republic, Grube and Reeve give “…learning, thought, or private meditation…” (Cooper 1997, p. 1043). At issue is the distinction between the practices of “thinking” or “reflection” (ennoēseis) and “concentration” or “meditation” (meletē), and the conceptual question of whether meletē and indeed all these practices should be classified as types of askēsis or not. A note of thanks to Marc-Henri Deroche for drawing my attention to this noteworthy passage from the Republic. |
14 | I became aware of Aleksandar Uskokov’s dissertation, Uskokov (2018), only at the final stage of revising this article for publication, thanks to a comment from one of the anonymous reviewers for the journal. Uskokov’s work includes a thorough discussion of the threefold scheme in Śaṅkara and early Advaita Vedānta and explores a number of questions raised in this article. In fact, it is precisely the recent study I wish I had known earlier because it would have made my research easier and allowed me to do more with this article. Rather than revising my entire article in light of his research, however, I have chosen to keep it intact, making only a few references to his dissertation here and there, and I would encourage interested readers to consult it and compare our interpretations. |
15 | |
16 | The terms “passivism” and “passivity” will be used here to refer primarily to the distinction Śaṅkara draws between knowledge as a state of passive receptivity and a more “active” sense of acquiring knowledge or liberation. It is thus distinct from “quietism,” at least as Tillemans (2016, p. 3) defines the term: “reasoned disengagement from all philosophical theses and hence debates (vivāda) about them.” Gómez (1987, p. 128) notes that Zaehner considered Śaṅkara a “quietist,” but I leave open the question of whether Śaṅkara’s position has any similarities with the “quietism” of the Spanish mystic, Miguel de Molinos, and other Christian “quietists.” We should bear in mind that “quietism” and “passivism” (as distinct from “pacifism”) have been given various pejorative connotations which should not be imported unconsciously into this context but considered critically alongside the positions described here and below. |
17 | |
18 | |
19 | Foucault (2001, p. 17). My translation. |
20 | See the clear statement by Śaṅkara in the commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad cited and translated by Rambachan (1991, pp. 66–67). Consider also Uskokov (2018, p. 441ff), and chapter seven, on the key role played by the desire for liberation in this path system. |
21 | This conceptual metaphor is identified and discussed in Lakoff and Johnson (1980, pp. 48, 103–5). See also Lakoff and Turner (1989, pp. 48, 158, 190–91, 206). Following them, I capitalize key metaphors for the sake of clarity and emphasis. KNOWING IS SEEING seems related to, but distinct from, the conceptual metaphor, SEEING IS BELIEVING, which is only half of a quote from the 17th-century English clergyman, Thomas Fuller: “Seeing’s believing, but feeling’s the truth.” There is clearly a productive tension to be considered further between seeing as belief and seeing as knowledge, both in general and in the history of Indian thought. In this respect and others, it would be useful to consider Bouthillette (2020) more fully than I have been able to do in this article. |
22 | Foucault (2001, p. 18). My translation. |
23 | |
24 | Few specialists today seem to feel these conditions are sufficient for describing knowledge, but most still agree that they are either necessary for or even largely constitutive of knowledge. For a lucid discussion, see Ichikawa and Steup (2018). |
25 | Tillemans (2016, p. 191). Italics in original. |
26 | Tucci (1958, p. 198): tatra prathamaṃ tāvat śrutamayī prajñotpādanīyā | tayā hi tāvad āgamārtham avadhārayati | tataś cintāmayyā prajñayā nītaneyārthaṃ {Ms: nītaneyārthatayā} nirvedhayati | tatas tayā niścitya bhūtam arthaṃ bhāvayen nābhūtam | anyathā hi viparītasyāpi bhāvanād vicikitsāyāś cāvyapagamāt samyagjñānodayo na syāt | tataś ca vyarthaiva bhāvanā syāt | yathā tīrthikānām | uktaṃ ca bhagavatā samādhirāje | nairātmyadharmān yadi pratyavekṣate | tān pratyavekṣya yadi bhāvayeta | sa hetur nirvāṇaphalasya prāptaye | yo anyahetu na sa bhoti śāntaye | iti | tasmāc cintāmayyā prajñayā yuktyāgamābhyāṃ pratyavekṣya bhūtam eva vastusvarūpam bhāvanīyam | vastūnāṃ svarūpaṃ ca paramārthato ’nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaś ca niścitam. The translation above is my own, but the passage is also cited and mostly translated in Kellner (2020, pp. 55–56), and I have benefitted from her reading and translation as well as that of Adam (2002, p. 128). Another translation is found in Beyer (1974, pp. 104–5). |
27 | |
28 | Śaṅkara (1964, p. 770): sarvathāpi tu yathā āgamenāvadhāritaṃ tarkatastathaiva mantavyam | yathā tarkato mataṃ tasya tarkāgamābhyāṃ niścitasya tathaiva nididhyāsanaṃ kriyata iti pṛthaṅnididhyāsanavidhiranarthaka eva. The editor’s name is not provided in my copy of this edition. This edition and indeed the editions of all the Vedānta works cited in this article can be compared with the online editions of these texts available on the Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages (GRETIL). All the translations from Sanskrit here and below are my own unless otherwise noted. |
29 | See Mayeda (1979, p. xv), note 8. In the introduction to his Sanskrit edition of the Upadeśasāhasrī, Mayeda (1973, pp. 66–67) makes the same suggestion while discussing the formation of the text: that the content of the three chapters of the prose part appears to illustrate “respectively the stage of hearing (śravaṇa), the stage of thinking (manana), and the stage of meditation (nididhyāsana), which constitute the three Vedāntic stages to attainment of final release (mokṣa).” Again, citing the same pages from Hacker (1949), Mayeda concludes that the prose part “constitutes the whole which is complete both in content and in form,” and that “the three prakaraṇas of the Prose Part were written at one time after the composition of at least the 15th prakaraṇa of the Metrical Part,” and “that the three prakaraṇas originally constituted a work independent of the Metrical Part.” Mayeda describes the prose text as “a handy ‘Guide’ for teachers while the Metrical Part is, at it were, a ‘Text Book’ for students.” |
30 | Uskokov (2018) further demonstrates that Bhartṛprapañca (circa mid 6th century) also supported prasaṅkhyāna meditation, and that the practice likely had its origins in the yoga tradition. See especially chapter five of his dissertation, which explores the topic in detail. Therein Uskokov (2018, p. 236) describes Bhartṛprapañca as being “along with Kumārila, Śaṅkara’s main foil,” which suggests the significant influence he had on Śaṅkara’s thinking. |
31 | See Mayeda (1979, p. xv), note 7. Rambachan (1991, pp. 1–14), especially 10ff, offers a useful survey of views; in chapter five, Rambachan (1991, pp. 97–116) goes into a more detailed analysis of the threefold scheme and attempts to reconcile it with his previous arguments about Śaṅkara’s epistemology and soteriology. See also Uskokov (2018) for a thorough treatment. |
32 | For the Sanskrit of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad itself, I have mainly followed the edition in Olivelle (1998, p. 66ff). |
33 | This concept seems key in Śaṅkara’s thought. We will look at its presence in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya more below. The first occurrence of the term therein is found in the commentary on 1.3.13, a translation of which is found below, but for the whole passage one can also look at Thibaut (1890, p. 172) and also consider his footnote 2. |
34 | That is, the mind becomes settled down or calm and therefore clear, like pure, still water. This state of mental clarity would seem to be the precondition for experiencing oneness with brahman. The verb used here is related to the Buddhist concept of prasāda, “faith or trust.” |
35 | Śaṅkara (1964, p. 760): tasmād ātmā vai are draṣṭavyo darśanārho darśanaviṣayamāpādayitavaḥ | śrotavyaḥ pūrvamācāryata āgamataśca | paścānmantavyastarkataḥ | tato nididhyāsitavyo niścayena dhyātavyaḥ | evaṃ hyasau dṛṣṭo bhavati śravaṇamanananididhyāsana-sādhanair nirvartitaiḥ | yadaikatvametānyupagatāni tadā samyagdarśanaṃ brahmaikatvaviṣayaṃ prasīdati nānyathā śravaṇamātrena. |
36 | Nididhyāsana must derive from ni-dhyai, which puts it in the same etymological stemma as dhyāna, which also derives from dhyai. Another key term for meditation in the writings of Śaṅkara, that is, in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and his commentaries on the Upaniṣads, is upāsana. Samādhi is not commonly used therein. According to Comans (1993, pp. 23–24), it is found only three times in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and never prominently as a feature of the authoritative (siddhānta) viewpoint. For instance, in Brahmasūtra 2.3.39 and commentary it is found in close proximity to a reference to Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad 2.4.5, but the commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.3.40 makes it clear that these verses are considered by Śaṅkara to be arguments of an opposing viewpoint. |
37 | Rambachan (1991, p. 157), note 62, sees this change as significant, perhaps as a basis for arguing that nididhyāsana can be seen as equivalent to knowledge and thus distinct from meditation. Rambachan also prefers “contemplation” to meditation as a translation for nididhyāsana. However, the work of Uskokov (2018, pp. 191, 204ff), especially chapter three, suggests to me a different possibility, as he argues for the general equivalency of knowledge (vidyā) and meditation (upāsana) in the doctrine of the Upaniṣads and in early Vedānta, that is, in Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahma-sūtra itself, and for the importance of meditation as the primary means to liberation therein. |
38 | For the first claim, see, for example, the comment on Brahmasūtra 2.1.3: “Knowledge of reality, however, arises only from the Vedānta texts alone” (tattvajñānaṃ tu vedāntavākyebhya eva bhavati). Rambachan (1991, pp. 46, 140), note 89, also cites this passage. On the second claim that hearing scripture can produce immediate knowledge of brahman, see particularly Comans (2000, pp. 300–3), where he cites and discusses Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brahmasūtra 4.1.2 and the Upadeśasāhasrī, chapter 18, verses 104 and 192; see also the discussion in Comans (1996). |
39 | Part 1, chapter 17, verse 66. The translation is from Mayeda (1979, p. 166). Following Mayeda (1973, p. 141), the Sanskrit reads: bhārūpatvād yathā bhānor nāhorātre tathaiva tu | jñānājñāne na me syātāṃ cidrūpatvāviśeṣataḥ. |
40 | Śaṅkara (1964, p. 760): yadbrahmakṣatrādi karmanimittaṃ varṇāśramādilakṣaṇaṃ ātmany avidyādhyāropita-pratyayaviṣayaṃ kriyākārakaphalātmakaṃ avidyāpratyayaviṣayaṃ rajjvām iva sarpapratyayaḥ tadupamardanārtha āha—ātmani khalv are maitreyi dṛṣṭe śrute mate vijñāte idaṃ sarvaṃ viditaṃ vijñātaṃ bhavati. The comment here also suggests that Śaṅkara reads the second sentence of the scriptural passage in the same way it appears at 4.5.6. |
41 | Śaṅkara (1964, p. 941): ātmani khalv are maitreyi dṛṣṭe | kathaṃ dṛṣṭa ātmanīti ucyate—pūrvam ācāryāgamābhyāṃ śrute punas tarkeṇopapattayā mate vicārite | śravaṇaṃ tvāgamamātreṇa mata upapattyā paścādvijñāta evametan nānyatheti nirdhārite | kiṃ bhavatīty ucyata idaṃ viditaṃ bhavati | idaṃ sarvam iti yadātmano ’nyat | ātmavyatirekeṇābhāvāt. The final sentence of the received scriptural passage differs here slightly from the previous passage at 2.4.5. The second sentence of 4.5.6 reads as follows: “For, oh Maitreyī, when the self is seen (dṛṣṭe), heard (śrute), considered (mate), and known (vijñāte), all this is known.” This reading coincides with the passage as quoted in the final sentence of Śaṅkara’s commentary on 2.4.5. |
42 | The discussion that follows can be usefully compared with chapter nine of Uskokov (2018, p. 438ff). For one thing, he offers therein an interpretation of the three prose chapters of the Upadeśasāhasrī from the perspective of the threefold scheme (pp. 459–77). |
43 | Śāstrī (1938, pp. 88–89): vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatiḥ nānumānādipramāṇāntaranirvṛttā … śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt | tathāhi ‘śrotavyo mantavyaḥ’ iti śrutiḥ… puruṣabuddhisāhāyyam ātmāno darśayati. |
44 | Śāstrī (1938, p. 89): na dharmajijñāsāyāmiva śrutyādaya eva pramāṇaṃ brahmajijñāsāyām kiṃtu śrutyādayo ’nubhavādayaśca yathāsaṃbhavamiha pramāṇaṃ anubhavāvasānatvādbhūtavastuviṣayatvācca brahmajñānasya. Rambachan (1991, pp. 113–15) discusses this key passage; so does Comans (2000, p. 308); so does Uskokov (2018, p. 447ff). |
45 | The word nirvikalpa does not appear at all in the commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad, and as Comans (1993) points out, the word samādhi is virtually absent from the ten principal upaniṣads. However, although the word nirvikalpa appears only three times in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and never in connection with samādhi or jñāna, Śaṅkara does use it as an adjective describing brahman, where it seems synonymous with the terms abheda, “nondual,” and nirviśeṣa, “without description.” See the commentary on 3.2.11–12 and 3.2.21. We find there the statement, “brahman is free from conceptualization” (nirvikalpam eva brahma). |
46 | In the present context, Rambachan (1991, p. 155), note 42, includes the comment: “The mental modification which destroys avidyā is sometimes conceived as a final thought or vṛtti, the crystallization of brahmajñāna. As such it is termed as brahmākāravṛtti (a thought coinciding with the nature of brahman) or akhandākāra cittavṛtti (a mental modification centered on nonduality).” However, I cannot find these latter terms used in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya or Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya. They may be later Vedānta technical terms. |
47 | Consider also in this same light the evocative language used by Uskokov (2018, p. 522) in the final few paragraphs of his dissertation, beginning with the following comment: “While the pursuit of liberation had to terminate in personal experience, this ‘intuitus’ or ‘dawning of insight’ or ‘vision’ precisely had to be reasoned out, by means of the two forms of reasoning, theological or scriptural exegesis (śravaṇa) and philosophical reflection (manana) based on analogy (sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa)…” Italics in original. |
48 | One may note besides that Kamalaśīla also speaks of “making the true nature of reality perceptible” (pratyakṣī-kṛ), using similar terminology to Śaṅkara, but he speaks of meditation as the mechanism by which one does so. See Adam (2016, p. 364), for the relevant passage from the first Bhāvanākrama. |
49 | Śāstrī (1938, p. 818): pratyakṣaphalatvācca jñānasya phalavirahāśaṅkānupapattiḥ | karmaphale hi svargādav anubhānārūḍhe syādāśaṅkā bhāved vā na veti | anubhavārūḍhaṃ tu jñānaphalam ’yatsākṣādaparokṣabrahma’ iti śruteḥ ‘tattvamasi’ iti siddhivadupadeśāt | na hi ‘tattvamasi’ ityasya vākyasyārthas tattvam mṛto bhaviṣyasīty evaṃ pariṇetuṃ sakyaḥ | ‘taddhaitatpaśyannṛṣir vāmadevaḥ pratipede ’ham manurabhaṃ sūryaśca iti ca samyagdarśanakālam eva tatphalaṃ sarvātmatvaṃ darśayati. Comans (2000, p. 309) translates and discusses the same passage above. See also the commentary on Brahmasūtra 3.4.15, which is also mentioned by Comans. |
50 | Śāstrī (1938, p. 113): ‘śrotravyo mantavyo nididhyāsitvayaḥ’ iti ca śravaṇottarakālayor manananididhyāsanayor vidhidarśanāt. See the alternate translation in Thibaut (1890, p. 26). |
51 | Śāstrī (1938, pp. 126–28). See the translation in Thibaut (1890, pp. 28–29, 33–34). See also Rambachan (1991, pp. 59–60), where the relevant passage is translated as well. |
52 | Śāstrī (1938, p. 129): dhyānam cintanaṃ yadyapi mānasaṃ tathāpi puruṣeṇa kartumakartumanyathā vā kartuṃ sakyaṃ puruṣatantratvāt jñānaṃ tu pramāṇajanyam | pramāṇaṃ ca yathābhūtavastuviṣayam | kevalaṃ vastutantrameva tat | na codanātantram | nāpi puruṣatantram | tasmān mānasatve ’pi jñānasya mahadvailakṣaṇyam. Alternate translation in Thibaut (1890, p. 35). |
53 | Śāstrī (1938, pp. 129–30): kimarthāni tarhi ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ’ ityādīni vidhicchāyāni vacanāni? Svābhāvika-pravṛttiviṣayavimukhīkaraṇārthānīti brumaḥ. Alternate translation in Thibaut (1890, p. 35), and see also Thibaut (1890, pp. 36–44) for the continuation of the discussion, which includes a series of statements that refer to the three practices and argue again for the priority of scripture over reasoning and meditation, up to the end of the long commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.1.4. |
54 | Śāstrī (1938, pp. 713–14): draṣṭavyādisabdā api paravidyādhikārapaṭhitāstattvābhimukhīkaraṇapradhānā na tattvāvabodhividhi-pradhānā bhavanti. See Thibaut (1896, p. 164). |
55 | Śāstrī (1938, pp. 287–88): tatrābhidhyāyateratathābhūtamapi vastu karma bhavati; manorathakalpitasyāpy abhidhyāyatikarmatvāt | īkṣatestu tathābhūtameva vastu loke karma dṛṣṭamityataḥ paramātmaivāyaṃ samyagdarśanaviṣayabhūta īkṣatikarmatvena vyapadiṣṭa iti gamyate. |
56 | Śāstrī (1938, p. 289): atha yaduktaṃ -- paramātmābhidhyāyino na deśaparicchinnaphalaṃ yujyata iti | atrocyate—trimātreṇoṃkāreṇālambanena paramātmānamabhidhyāyataḥ phalaṃ brahmalokaprāptiḥ, krameṇa ca samyagdarśanotpattiriti kramamuktyabhiprāyametadbhaviṣyatītyadoṣaḥ. |
57 | Śāstrī (1938, p. 926): muktyavasthā hi sarvavedāntavākeṣv ekarūpaivāvadhāryate | brahmaiva hi muktyavasthā na ca brahmaṇo ’nekākārayogo ’sti ekaliṅgatvāvadhāraṇāt. |
58 | Uskokov (2018, pp. 185–87, 197–207, 443) has an illuminating discussion of this section of the Brahmasūtra. |
59 | Śāstrī (1938, pp. 928–29): ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ…’ iti caivamādiśravaṇeṣu saṁśayaḥ -- kiṃ sakṛtpratyayaḥ kartavyaḥ āhosvidāvṛttyeti. |
60 | |
61 | See Śaṅkara’s comments on Brahmasūtra 1.1.1 and Rambachan (1991, p. 87ff). See also the beginning of the prose portion of the Upadeśasāhasrī in Mayeda (1979). |
62 | Śāstrī (1938, pp. 950–51): āvṛttiḥ sarvopāsaneṣvādartavyeti sthitamādhye ‘dhikaraṇe | tatra yāni tāvatsamyagdarśanārthāny upāsanāni tānyavaghātādivatkāryaparyavasānānīti jñātamevaiṣāmāvṛttipariṇam | na hi samyagdarśane kārye niṣpanne yatnāntaraṃ kiṃcicchāsituṃ sakyam; aniyojyabrahmātmatvapratipatteḥ śāstrasyāviṣayatvāt. |
63 | Śāstrī ([1937] 1984, p. 12): kena punarupāyenāvidyā nivartate? Śravaṇamananadhyānābhyāsair brahmacaryādibhiśca sādhanabhedaih śāstroktaiḥ | katham? Yo ’yam śravaṇamananapūrvako dhyānābhyāsaḥ pratiṣiddhākhilabhedaprapañce “sa eṣa neti neti” ātmani, sa vyaktam eva bhedadarśanapratiyogī tannivartayati. |
64 | Śāstrī ([1937] 1984, pp. 12–13): vyaktameva bhedātītabrahmaṇi śravaṇamananadhyānābhyāsānāṃ bhedadarśanapratipakṣatvam avidyānubandhe ’pi | yathā payaḥ payo jarayati svayaṃ ca jīryati, yathā ca viṣaṃ viṣāntaraṃ śamayati svayaṃ ca śāmyati. See also the brief summary in Potter (1981, pp. 353–54). |
65 | Śāstrī ([1937] 1984, p. 35); Potter (1981, p. 370). The Brahmasiddhi contains three more citations of the word nididhyāsitavyaḥ, including one that reads draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ. See Śāstrī ([1937] 1984, pp. 153–55). |
66 | Śāstrī ([1937] 1984, p. 35): nirvicikitsādāmnāyād avagatātmatattvasyānādimithyādarśanābhyāsopacitabalavatsaṃskārasāmarthyān mithyāvabhāsānuvṛttiḥ... tasmājjāte ’pi pramāṇāttattvadarśane anādimithyādarśanābhyāsapariniṣpannasya draḍhīyasaḥ saṃskārasyābhibhavāyocchedāya vā tattvadarśanābhyāsaṃ manyante | tathā ca ‘mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ’ ityucyate | śamadamabrahmacaryayajñādisādhanavidhānam ca | anyathā kastad upadeśārthaḥ? See also Comans (2000, p. 383) and Comans (1996, p. 50), where the early part of the passage is translated at somewhat greater length, but not the latter part. For the French translation of the whole passage, see Biardeau (1969, p. 186). |
67 | Ingalls (1952, p. 13), quoted in Uskokov (2018, p. 9), reminds us that Śaṅkara’s “novelty and original synthesis” were “directed not so much against Buddhism, which is the traditional claim, as against the Mīmāṁsā and against schools of a more realistic Vedānta such as the Bhedābheda which flourished in Śaṃkara’s time.” See also Uskokov (2018, p. 4) for a similar statement. |
68 | For the full passage by Foucault with an insightful analysis that explains its application to comparative studies like the present article, see Charles Hallisey’s afterword in Collins (2020, pp. 197–98). |
69 | See verses 19 and 181ff in Nikhilananda (1931), which is an edition and translation of the Vedāntasāra. Verse 19 says only “learning, etc.” (śravaṇādi) but verse 181 gives the list of four practices as follows: śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana, and samādhi. These four terms are defined in the verses that follow. For instance, in verses 191ff, Sadānanda attempts to distinguish between “reflection” (manana), “meditation” (nididhyāsana), and “absorption with or without conceptualization” (savikalpa- or nirvikalpa-samādhi). |
70 | See Potter (1981, p. 335); see also Grimes (2004, pp. 13–14). Uskokov (2018, p. 16), note 23, concludes on the basis of terminology that it is later than Śaṅkara, but he does not say how much later. |
71 | |
72 | Madhavananda (1921, p.161); Grimes (2004, p. 209): śruteḥ śataguṇaṃ vidyānmananaṃ mananādapi | nididhyāsaṃ lakṣaguṇam anantaṃ nirvikalpakam. The verse is numbered 364 in the former and 365 in the latter. |
73 | See Uskokov (2018, p. 480) for a clear statement to this effect. He also demonstrates the strong influence of the Yoga tradition upon the development of prasaṅkhyāna, and shows how the roots of parisaṅkhyāna can be found not only in the Mīmāṁsā tradition but also in the Mahābhārata. The story he tells is of the centrality of meditation in the Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtra, and pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta, and for its recovery as a central practice in the work of Vācaspatimiśra (circa 9–10th century), who was responsible for synthesizing the philosophies of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍanamiśra. The window for Śaṅkara’s rationalism appears narrow indeed. |
74 | It would also be interesting to consider further the place of the threefold scheme in the Yoga tradition, more broadly, and how Yoga path philosophers account for the shift from conceptual practices to nonconceptual meditation. Note, for instance, that the Yogasūtra, book 1, verses 48–50, mentions the concept of “truth-bearing wisdom” (ṛtambharā prajñā), which seemingly arises from a type of samādhi, and contrasts it with wisdom that derives from learning (śruta) and inference (anumāna). |
75 | |
76 | See Adam (2016, p. 372), note 37, for his take on Kamalaśīla’s position here. |
77 | |
78 | For an overview of Buddhist debate narratives, see Cabezón (2008, pp. 71–92). |
79 | Tillemans (2016, pp. 193–94) identifies the 14th-century Tibetan Buddhist philosopher, Longchenpa (Klong chen Rab ’byams pa), as a good candidate, and indeed a comparison between him and Śaṅkara could be fruitful. In the process, it may be that the distinction between “continuity” and “independence” theses will need to be rethought along with, of course, the one between “subitism” and “gradualism.” |
References
- Adam, Martin. 2002. Meditation and the Concept of Insight in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas. Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, Montreal, ON, Canada. [Google Scholar]
- Adam, Martin. 2006. Two Concepts of Meditation and Three Kinds of Wisdom in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas: A Problem of Translation. Buddhist Studies Review 23: 71–92. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Adam, Martin. 2016. Philosophy, Meditation, and Experience in the Great Debate at Bsam yas. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 39: 351–74. [Google Scholar]
- Andrijanić, Ivan. 2015. Quotations and (Lost) Commentaries in Advaita Vedānta: Some Philological Notes on Bhartṛprapañca’s “Fragments”. Journal of Indian Philosophy 43: 257–76. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Arnold, Dan. 2010. Self-Awareness (svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga: Philosophical Characterizations of Some of the Main Issues. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38: 323–78. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Balagangadhara, S. N. 2005. How to Speak for the Indian Traditions. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 73: 987–1013. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Beyer, Stephan. 1974. The Buddhist Experience: Sources and Interpretations. Belmont: Wadsworth. [Google Scholar]
- Biardeau, Madeleine. 1969. La Philosophie de Maṇḍana Miśra vue à partir de la Brahmasiddhi. Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient. [Google Scholar]
- Bouthillette, Karl-Stéphan. 2020. Dialogue and Doxography in Indian Philosophy: Points of View in Buddhist, Jaina, and Advaita Vedānta Traditions. Abingdon: Routledge. [Google Scholar]
- Cabezón, José Ignacio. 2008. Buddhist Narratives of the Great Debates. Argumentation 22: 71–92. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Collins, Steven. 2020. Wisdom as a Way of Life: Theravāda Buddhism Reimagined. Edited by Justin McDaniel. New York: Columbia University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Comans, Michael. 1993. The Question of the Importance of Samādhi in Modern and Classical Advaita Vedānta. Philosophy East and West 43: 19–38. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Comans, Michael. 1996. Śaṅkara and the Prasaṅkhyānavāda. Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 49–71. [Google Scholar]
- Comans, Michael. 2000. The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and Padmapāda. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Google Scholar]
- Cooper, John M., ed. 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. [Google Scholar]
- Demiéville, Paul. 1987. The Mirror of the Mind. Translated by Neal Donner. In Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought. Edited by Peter N. Gregory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 13–40. [Google Scholar]
- Deussen, Paul. 1912. The System of the Vedānta. Translated by Charles Johnston. Chicago: Open Court. [Google Scholar]
- Duerlinger, James, Binita Mehta, and Siddharth Singh. 2020. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the Advaita Vedānta Theory of a Self. Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 21: 35–52. [Google Scholar]
- Eltschinger, Vincent. 2010. Studies in Dharmakīrti’s Religious Philosophy: 4. The cintā-mayī-prajñā. In Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy. Edited by Piotr Balcerowicz. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 553–92. [Google Scholar]
- Fiordalis, David V. 2018a. Buddhist Spiritual Practices: Thinking with Pierre Hadot on Buddhism, Philosophy, and the Path. Berkeley: Mangalam Press. [Google Scholar]
- Fiordalis, David V. 2018b. Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating: The Practice of Wisdom and the Treasury of Abhidharma. In Buddhist Spiritual Practices: Thinking with Pierre Hadot on Buddhism, Philosophy, and the Path. Edited by David V. Fiordalis. Berkeley: Mangalam Press, pp. 245–89. [Google Scholar]
- Foucault, Michel. 1998. Polemics, Politics and Problematizations: An Interview with Michel Foucault. In Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: New Press, vol. 1, pp. 18–24. [Google Scholar]
- Foucault, Michel. 2001. L’Herméneutique du Sujet. Cours au Collège de France: 1981–1982. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil. [Google Scholar]
- Foucault, Michel. 2017. Subjectivity and Truth. Lectures at the College de France: 1980–1981. Translated by Graham Burchell. London: Palgrave Macmillan. [Google Scholar]
- Gómez, Luis O. 1983a. Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment. In Early Ch’an in China and Tibet. Edited by Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, pp. 393–434. [Google Scholar]
- Gómez, Luis O. 1983b. The Direct and Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen. In Studies in Ch’an and Hua-Yen. Edited by Robert M. Gimello and Peter Gregory. Berkeley: Kuroda Institute, pp. 69–167. [Google Scholar]
- Gómez, Luis O. 1987. Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice. In Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought. Edited by Peter N. Gregory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 67–168. [Google Scholar]
- Gómez, Luis O. 2015. Stages of Meditation (The Bhavanakrama). In The Norton Anthology of World Religions, Vol. 1: Buddhism. Edited by Donald Lopez Jr. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 1123–45. [Google Scholar]
- Grimes, John. 2004. The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śaṅkarācārya Bhagavatpāda. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate. [Google Scholar]
- Hacker, Paul. 1949. Upadeshasāhasrī von Meister Shankara, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt und erläutert. Bonn: Röhrscheid Verlag. [Google Scholar]
- Hadot, Pierre. 2002. What is Ancient Philosophy? Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Harimoto, Kengo. 2006. The Date of Śaṅkara: Between the Cāḷukyas and the Rāṣṭrakūtas. Journal of Indological Studies 18: 85–111. [Google Scholar]
- Higgins, David. 2016. Preface: The Bsam yas Debate: Challenges and Responses. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 39: 339–50. [Google Scholar]
- Hiriyanna, Mysore. 1957. Indian Philosophical Studies. Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers. [Google Scholar]
- Ichikawa, Jonathan J., and Matthias Steup. 2018. Analysis of Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online: plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ (accessed on 17 November 2021).
- Ingalls, Daniel. 1952. The Study of Śaṁkarācārya. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 33: 1–14. [Google Scholar]
- Kapstein, Matthew. 2001. Reason’s Traces. Boston: Wisdom Publications. [Google Scholar]
- Kellner, Birgit. 2020. Using Concepts to Eliminate Conceptualization: Kamalaśīla on Non-Conceptual Gnosis (Nirvikalpajñāna). Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 43: 39–80. [Google Scholar]
- Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Google Scholar]
- Lakoff, George, and Mark Turner. 1989. More than Cool Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Google Scholar]
- Leroux, Georges. 2002. Platon: La République. Paris: Flammarion. [Google Scholar]
- Long, George. 1890. The Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments. London: George Bell and Sons. [Google Scholar]
- Madhavananda, Swami. 1921. Vivekachudamani of Sri Sankaracharya. Mayavati: Advaita Ashrama. [Google Scholar]
- Mayeda, Sengaku. 1973. Śaṅkara’s Upadeśasāhasrī. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press. [Google Scholar]
- Mayeda, Sengaku. 1979. A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. [Google Scholar]
- McClintock, Sara L. 2010. Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority. Boston: Wisdom Publications. [Google Scholar]
- McCrea, Larry. 2009. ‘Just Like Us, Just Like now’: The Tactical Implications of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception. In Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness. Edited by Eli Franco. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 55–70. [Google Scholar]
- Nikhilananda, Swami. 1931. Vedantasara of Sadananda. Mayavati: Advaita Ashrama. [Google Scholar]
- Olivelle, Patrick. 1998. The Early Upaniṣads. New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Potter, Karl, ed. 1981. The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 3: Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Potter, Karl. 1963. Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. [Google Scholar]
- Rambachan, Anantanand. 1991. Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a Source of Valid Knowledge in Śaṅkara. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. [Google Scholar]
- Śaṅkara. 1964. The Ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śaṅkarabhāṣya. Works of Śaṅkarācārya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, vol. 1. [Google Scholar]
- Śāṣtṛī, Anantkṛiṣṇa. 1938. The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya with the Commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala. Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press. [Google Scholar]
- Śāstrī, S. Kuppuswami. 1984. Brahmasiddhi by Acharya Maṇḍanamiśra. Reprint. Delhi: Sri Satguru. First published 1937. [Google Scholar]
- Thibaut, George. 1890. The Vedānta-Sūtras with the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya. Part 1. Sacred Books of the East. Oxford: Clarendon Press, vol. 34. [Google Scholar]
- Thibaut, George. 1896. The Vedānta-Sūtras with the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya. Part 2. Sacred Books of the East. Oxford: Clarendon Press, vol. 38. [Google Scholar]
- Thrasher, Allen. 1979. The Dates of Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṃkara. Wiener Zeitschift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie 23: 117–39. [Google Scholar]
- Tillemans, Tom J. F. 2013. Yogic Perception, Meditation, and Enlightenment: The Epistemological Issues in a Key Debate. In A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 290–306. [Google Scholar]
- Tillemans, Tom J. F. 2016. How Do Mādhyamikas Think? Somerville: Wisdom Publications. [Google Scholar]
- Tola, Fernando. 1989. On the Date of Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara and their Doctrinal Relation. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 70: 37–46. [Google Scholar]
- Tucci, Giuseppe. 1986. Minor Buddhist Texts, Parts One and Two. Reprint. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. First published 1956–1958. [Google Scholar]
- Tucci, Guiseppe. 1958. Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II, First Bhāvanākrama. Rome: Serie Orientale Roma. [Google Scholar]
- Uskokov, Aleksandar. 2018. Deciphering the Hidden Meaning: Scripture and the Hermeneutics of Liberation in Early Advaita Vedānta. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA. [Google Scholar]
- Whaling, Frank. 1979. Śaṅkara and Buddhism. Journal of Indian Philosophy 7: 1–42. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Williams, Paul. 1998. The Reflexive Nature of Awareness. London: Curzon Press. [Google Scholar]
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. |
© 2021 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Fiordalis, D.V. One or None? Truth and Self-Transformation for Śaṅkara and Kamalaśīla. Religions 2021, 12, 1043. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121043
Fiordalis DV. One or None? Truth and Self-Transformation for Śaṅkara and Kamalaśīla. Religions. 2021; 12(12):1043. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121043
Chicago/Turabian StyleFiordalis, David Vincent. 2021. "One or None? Truth and Self-Transformation for Śaṅkara and Kamalaśīla" Religions 12, no. 12: 1043. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121043