From Contestation to Cooperation: The German Orthodox Church, Neo-Pietism and the Quest for an Alternative Ideal of the Nation

Abstract

The emergence of German neo-Pietism after the Napoleonic Wars appeared to contest the dominance of orthodox Protestantism, mainly in Prussia, but also in other German lands. However, nineteenth-century neo-Pietists forged a different kind of relationship with the orthodox than that of the early Pietists and the orthodox about two centuries earlier. Although challenging each other during the 1820s, from the 1830s onwards, neo-Pietists and the orthodox joined forces to confront rational theology, liberalism, and modern nationalism. This article departs from the existing scholarly discussion about these developments in arguing that the Pietist–orthodox alliance, which merged with political conservatism, did not necessarily apply a reactionary policy. Acknowledging the impact of the new liberal trends, these Christian devotees introduced an alternative national ideal that was based on their religious and political views. Invoking the ideal of a German Christian State, the rival Christian strands became woven into a modernized force which fostered a specific German national identity. This was characterized by ecumenical Christianity, a specific understanding of religion, a deep devotion to the German people, and nationalization of Judaism. Theirs was not a democratic nation-state, but an amalgamated model which combined a historic relation to Christianity with new efforts to redefine collective identity in a national age.

1. Introduction

The history of the German Church, both Protestant and Catholic, as well as the tensions between the two confessions during the nineteenth century, has won considerable attention in recent scholarship. As part of a broader attempt to rescue religious history from its historiographical ghetto, researchers have drawn attention to the importance of religion in shaping German culture, social life, and politics. Even more ample is the revisited research about German nationalism, especially after Germany’s reunification in 1990, when a united German nation had to reckon with its renewed identity after the Nazi catastrophe and the collapse of the East German dictatorship. Consideration has also been given to the convergence of the two, namely, the history of religion and that of nationalism in its German contours. Certainly, there are important works on the accommodation of Protestant culture in the ethos of the German national movement from its early inception during the conflict with Napoleon, and until the Kulturkampf that followed German national unification in 1871. This Protestant-religious and German-national amalgam, however, has been explored predominantly through its liberal manifestations, in which the national movement relied on the cultural features of the Protestant tradition rather than on the Protestant church or theology. In most cases, members of the national movement drew on the enlightened and cultural meanings of religion. Thus, for example, Johann Gottlieb Fichte saw the Reformation as an act of a people with original language (Ursprache) (Fichte 1808, pp. 177–78), and the historian Hermann Ludwig Heeren claimed that commitment of the Volk to religious belief consolidated the religious–national synthesis (Heeren [1810] 1821, p. 16). The philologist Friedrich Jacobs distinguished explicitly between the heathen French and the moral and religious Germans (Echternkamp 2004, pp. 141–55; Jacobs 1814, p. 36). In the spirit of the Enlightenment, these and other scholars conceptualized religion in increasingly secular terms, namely, moral order and the potential to unite disparate people. This understanding of religion served as a counterweight to orthodox theology and the established state church.

As far as orthodox Protestant Christianity is concerned, however, few studies have investigated the merger of this religious strand and the German national identity. The staunch Protestant orthodox, who since the 1830s were joined by neo-Pietists, were associated—and for good reasons—with political conservatism and the traditional elites, such as the agrarian aristocracy, the clergy, the higher echelon of the army, and a thin layer of intellectuals and academics. These pious conservatives, so the historiography indicates, distanced themselves from nationalism, which appeared to denote democratization, secularization, and disintegration of traditional socio-political structures, and thus jeopardized the established order of state and society and the preeminence of religion.1 Indeed, after the Napoleonic Wars, in the eyes of many conservatives, modern nationalism seemed to imply revolution. It was necessary, therefore, to “dis-invent” the nation (Levinger 2000, pp. 172–73). If the idea of the nation entailed, among other things, popular representation, which would erode the monarchial authority as well as that of the landed nobility, then the “dis-invention” of the nation would subdue any prospect of the people’s sovereignty.

However, in the aftermath of the wars against the French, the era of reform, and the emergence of national sentiment, it was impractical for the supporters of the traditional order to overlook the growing political awareness of increasing sectors of society. The latter often combined expectations to realize the concept of the political nation with all its various implications, such as a united German nation state, a constitution, and representatives’ assemblies. For the Christian conservatives, it became imperative to elaborate their own ideal of the nation, as a merely reactionary policy, they understood, would not hold back the tide. However, I would like to suggest that the Christian conservative ideal of the nation was not necessarily aimed only at countering the modern and liberal model of the nation. Rather, it was essentially imbedded in the orthodox-Pietist theology of the state, its legitimacy, and identity. In the following pages, therefore, I will focus on the emergence of the gradual synthesis between orthodox Protestantism and neo-Pietists, and examine the concept of the nation that emerged with it, which hitherto has earned scant scholarly treatment. I will analyze the scholarly writings of those who belonged to this religious school, as well as their journals and public political speeches. In this way, it will be possible to investigate their ideas from the academic, public, and political perspectives.

2. The Emergence of Neo-Pietism

With the downfall of the French army in 1815, various German rulers started the unification of the Lutheran and Reformed confessions within their territorial churches (Landeskirchen). Nassau and Prussia came first in 1817, and set the model for other states: Rhenish Palatinate (1818); Baden (1821); Rhenish Hessen (1822); and Württemberg (1827). Prussia, the largest Protestant state in the newly formed German Confederation, brought an end to the division between the Reformed Christian Union and the Lutherans in October 1817, on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the ninety-five theses announcement in Wittenberg by Martin Luther. King Frederick William III called for a union of the two denominations and issued a decree that authorized the confessional merger. A further step toward consolidating the union was taken by the King in 1821 when he designed a new liturgy, the Agende (Bigler 1972, pp. 37–38; Landry 2014, pp. 9–17). These undertakings of the Prussian monarch, which created the Evangelical Church of Prussia and introduced pan-German Protestantism, were meant to reduce intra-confessional frictions. Indeed, in terms of institutional reorganization it seems that the ecclesiastical union was successfully carried out. In the religious sense, however, the act exposed the different and contesting strands within Prussian, or rather German, Protestantism, that eventually resulted in conflicts concerning the meaning of Germanness and German national identity.

At the time of the confessional union, German Protestants were divided not only along denominations, such as Reformed or Lutheran, but also by different postures toward the meaning of religion and its appropriate practices. Clear classifications of these tendencies are not easy to establish, but historical observation of their formation might facilitate a better understanding of their development.

Beginning in the late seventeenth century, the Protestant orthodoxy that had been gradually established since the Lutheran Reformation was contested. During the decades that followed the Reformation, orthodoxy focused on justifying the ‘declaratory’ essence of salvation against efforts to define it as an inward transformation. Protestant orthodoxy was actually occupied with defense of its redemptive doctrine while trying to confront any theological defiance. At this early stage, the main challenge was that of Pietism, which emerged primarily from Frankfurt, with the publication of Pia Desideria in 1675 by Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705). It then spread from the Pietist center founded in Halle by August Hermann Francke (1663–1727) into other German cities and regions. Although not a homogeneous movement, and not exclusively German in its religious style, Pietism celebrated the individual’s religious fervor and his personal experience of God’s spirit. The movement aimed to invigorate closeness to God through emotions—“religion of the heart” (Herzens-Religion)—in contrast to the more learned and rigid posture of the then dominant orthodoxy. Such a devotion sought to achieve the “new birth” (Wiedergeburt) of the believer and make him worthy of God’s mercy. These features of Pietism were merged with chiliastic anticipation, and the entire religious practices of the Pietists were foreign to the Orthodox church (Stoeffler 1965, p. ix; Strom 2002, pp. 536–54; Wallmann 2005, pp. 21–27; Lehmann 2009, pp. 13–17; Shantz 2013, p. 7; Olson and Collins Winn 2015, p. 3). The conventicles, for example, were meetings of Awakened believers who convened for Bible readings, hymn-singing, praying, and tutoring. Additionally, while the Orthodox church was backed by the political rulers and in turn legitimized their actions, the Pietists and their alternative practices were viewed by the authorities with suspicion, which eventually brought the government, primarily in Prussia, to outlaw them (Olson and Collins Winn 2015, pp. 36–37; Ellis 2017, pp. 51–53). Later, in the eighteenth century, the conventicles became accommodated by the state, although some of their more radical forms were still under scrutiny.

From the late seventeenth until the late eighteenth century, Pietism continued to spread through Germany. Different Pietist communities, such as the Saalhof aristocrats, adopted their own particular religious rituals, while others, such as those in Tübingen and Iptingen, focused on strict morality and radical social responsibility (Ritschl 1800–1886; Deppermann 1961; Marschke 2005; Shantz 2015). However, the eighteenth century was also a period in which Protestant orthodoxy and Pietism were challenged by the new enlightened philosophy of religion. The rising theological rationalism dominated the discourse about religion, and by the late century it became the prevailing current among German Protestant clergy. Increasing involvement of the clergy in the modern state apparatus, especially in the field of education, overshadowed the individual and emotional nature of Pietism that had been a focus of attraction a century earlier. Moreover, under the reign of Frederick the Great (1740 to 1786), who practiced enlightened absolutism and did not give much attention to religion as a source of inspiration, Pietists and orthodox lost prestige, although members of both groups still held important positions in state and church administrations. Despite his reservations about the centrality of religion, however, the King was acutely aware of its importance in fostering obedience to his rule, and thus avoided a direct assault on ecclesiastical institutions.

By the early nineteenth century, the Protestant clergy in Prussia largely pursued rational methods of analysis and scriptural interpretation, thus rendering reason the guiding light not only in political and social matters, but also in religious ones. These rationalists actually pushed Pietists and the orthodox into a defensive posture, taking over the theological discourse in the academies. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and the reforms, followed by the 1819 Carlsbad Decrees, it became difficult for rationalist theologians, who favored liberal political reforms such as self-government, representation, and economic liberalism, to exercise influence over the cadres of the clergy. Indeed, some of these theologians, among them Richard Rothe (1799–1867), Immanuel Nitzsch (1787–1868), and Karl Heinrich Sack (1789–1875), who were also inspired by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and his German national spirit, won respectable academic positions at the universities of Berlin and Bonn. They were all, however, warned that the government would not tolerate criticism on the part of the professors (Bigler 1972, pp. 159–61).

Schleiermacher and his liberal theologian colleagues were not the only ones who opposed the ecclesiastical changes within German Protestantism initiated by Frederick William III. The revolutionary age brought about a new phase in the development of Pietism and the views of Pietists, which in the first years after the union were chary of the King’s intentions, and thus further complicated the conjuncture of contesting Protestant schools. After the German victory in the Wars of Liberation, Pietism underwent a major revitalization. This time, however, the awakening was also of Catholic theologians and believers, although Protestants still provided the momentum. This rejuvenation constituted the neo-Pietist movement, which crossed well beyond the borders of the Prussian monarchy into the territories of Württemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony. Similar to their predecessors, the neo-Pietists emphasized the emotional nature of religious adherence and were motivated by belief in divine redemption and in eternal life as promised by Christ. The new awakened Christians had much in common with the Pietists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century—whom they considered their forebears—regarding the meaning of sincere devotion. In other respects, however, and especially in regard to their relations with orthodoxy, there were more than a few differences between the earlier Pietists and the later ones.

Neo-Pietism was not only a renewed version of the older model. Emerging on the background of the violent events of the revolutionary age, Pietists were determined to fight against the secular rationalism of the Enlightenment. They considered it their vocation to cure Christians of the religious decay caused by secular philosophy and revolution. Moreover, while theologians were the driving force behind early Pietism, in the nineteenth century the movement was fueled by estate owners, university professors, and retired generals. However, the reemergence of Pietism was not a reaction to established Protestant orthodoxy, as was the case in the seventeenth century. This time the Pietists allied with the orthodox and together constituted the Awakening movement (Erweckungsbewegung). This movement adhered to the traditional doctrine of man’s sinful disposition, and his consequent moral obligation to subordinate himself to the worldly order sanctioned by God (Bigler 1972, pp. 46–47; Ellis 2017, pp. 20–21; Sheehan 1989, pp. 561–62). These features made the movement a welcome ally for a conservative aristocracy that read in its specific kind of religiosity and values a reinforcement in the struggle against the liberals. The latter were seen as seditious individuals who sought to elevate the nation to the status of a sovereign, or at least a partner in shared sovereignty, and to free the individual from ecclesiastical restrictions. In this sense, neo-Pietists, unlike their predecessors, were deeply involved in politics.

However, the Pietist–orthodox conservative alignment was not easy to establish as, at least during the 1820s, it generated conflict between the two parties. For the Prussian neo-Pietists, first and foremost the noble estate owners among them, the 1817 and 1821 monarchial acts seemed to be attempts of the crown to tighten centralization through state administration. These suspicions were also nourished by the continuous eroding of the privileges of the nobility that started in the era of reform. For pious aristocrats, the union seemed related to a more comprehensive monarchial effort to restore absolutist authority. Consequently, following ecclesiastical union, tensions rose between the awakened nobles—who held conventicles in their own estates—and the state church, whose orthodox sterile practices they challenged. Here, too, neo-Pietist aristocrats defied the state church by introducing their own alternative (Landry 2014, pp. 9–17; Clark 1993, pp. 34–35, 43).

These dividing lines between the neo-Pietist, orthodox and liberal-rational schools were not always as evident as those between the Pietists and the orthodox of the late seventeenth century. Within the new religious constellation of the early nineteenth century, both neo-Pietists and orthodox considered themselves as evangelisch, namely, holding fast to the perceptions of the sixteenth-century Protestant reformers, and the importance of the gospel’s divine messages. The former, with all their reservations regarding the state church and their distrust of the intra-Protestant union, did not seek to subvert monarchial authority in the grace of God. Their main opposition was the bureaucrats which, they believed, served the reintroduction of absolutist monarchy and dominance in religious matters. Considering the constellation of the restoration years, therefore, these Christian devotees thought it essential to formulate an alternative political theology and to secure religious independence. Theologically, they conceived genuine faith as insistence on the dominance of the supernatural messages of the Gospel. The rationalists, on their part, formed another school. They followed Hegel’s philosophy of religion, by which Christianity meant also a self-understanding of the spirit (Geist). Rationalists adhered to a critical reading of the scriptures, and disparaged phenomena and events that were rationally unintelligible. Against this enlightened concept of religion, the orthodox, backed by the political authority, stood as guardians of the true Christian way. They upheld the testamental model, emphasizing Luther’s dictum that salvation is possible only through God. This model implies a perpetual contractual commitment, irrespective of man’s violation of that contract. Nonetheless, the orthodox and the rationalists had reservations about what they considered the excessive emotional zeal of the neo-Pietists, and their tendency toward mysticism (Ellis 2017, pp. 450–51; Berdahl 1988, pp. 247–48). The exclusive reliance on reason, however, came under attack by both the neo-Pietists and the orthodox. For these Evangelicals, human reason failed to provide an adequate alternative to Christian doctrine. It was therefore essential to restore the divine order sanctioned by God. Now they fused their religiosity with the emerging political conservatism which had begun to crystalize as opposition among the agrarian aristocracy to the reforms implemented in the aftermath of defeat to the French.

The core of this partnership was formed in 1811 with the establishment in Berlin of the Christian German Dining Club (Christlich-Deutsche Tischgesellschaft). Aristocrats and intellectuals joined the club in order to provide mutual help following the Prussian defeat. In their meetings, members would read patriotic texts, and proclaim their loyalty to Christianity, to the King, and to the Fatherland. During the Wars of Liberation (1813–1815) the club held few activities, but in 1815 some of the members started to reconvene and designated themselves the May Chafers (Maikäferei), after the inn in which they met. Among the members were aristocrats such as the brothers Leopold, Ludwig, and Wilhelm von Gerlach, Friedrich Karl von Bülow, Karl von Lancizolle, Clemens von Brentano, Count Cajus von Stolberg, and others, among them Catholics. These Pietist aristocrats set up the nascent German conservative camp, and continued their contact well into the 1850s, after the Maikäferei club was dissolved. In fact, from 1815 and throughout the Vormärz years (1815–1848), religious devotion and political ideology and interests defined German political conservatism (Avraham 2008, pp. 36–38).

3. Orthodox and Neo-Pietist Alliance

The Christian–conservative synthesis was not exclusively German. Religion provided the opponents of strict rationalism and revolutionary liberalism with the theoretical contours required for a convincing and effective ideology. In England, Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) was an indictment against the revolutionary changes which relied on the stabilizing quality of tradition and the respect for authority and morality imbedded in Christianity. In France, it was Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald who saw a fundamental link between the appropriate order and religious legitimacy. During the Restoration in the German lands, Carl Ludwig von Haller, a Swiss aristocrat, presented a reactionary political theory encompassing semi-feudal and Christian notions in his six-volume work, the Restoration of State Science (Restauration der Staats-Wissenschaft, 1816–1834). Haller’s ideas, which ignored the concept of nation, seemed outdated at a time when the need for the political modernization of the state was acknowledged even by monarchs themselves. Moreover, Haller’s work did not adequately address the questions which preoccupied the Christian conservatives, namely, the clash between the rationalist and Pietist-orthodox strands, the confessional divide between Catholics and Protestants, and the increasing engagement with the concept of the nation and national identity. Consequently, these conservative figures forged a more comprehensive theoretical framework—primarily through theology faculties in the academies and political offices—to deal with these theological, philosophical, and political issues. In the next two sections I will analyze the theological groundwork, and in Section Five I will elaborate on activities in the political sphere.

Seeking to influence Christian teaching in academic institutions, the neo-Pietists, backed by the orthodox, sought to develop strongholds within the faculties of theology. These ardent believers in the irrational nature of religion critiqued what they considered the overly academic religiosity of the professors. Yet, they also recognized the importance of the academic establishment for their confessional cause. After all, the early nineteenth-century universities, unlike their seventeenth-century counterparts, were a source of authority, also in religious matters, that celebrated subjective and emotional devotion. To this end, they won the support of Ludwig Nicolovious (1767–1839), the director of the Kultusabteilung, which was the part of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior entrusted with the reorganization of the Protestant church in the era of reform. Nicolovious, a bureaucrat and zealous Protestant, perceived his vocation as advancing the cause of God. He thus eschewed a rational critical approach to religion in favor of an inquiry into its mysteries. For Nicolovious and his fellow believers, the proper task of theology was to explicate the hidden wisdom in Christianity, and therefore theologians were expected to reveal the truth in religion rather than raising difficulties concerning its meaning.

It was not only the Klutusabteilung, however, that imparted special significance to theology in these years, but also the monarch himself. Frederick William III, the architect of the inter-confessional Protestant union, believed that his confessional policy hinged on theologians’ defense of his conduct. This notion brought theology and politics closer together than it had been for decades. In this sense, theology became politically instrumentalized, stretching across a wide range of political strands from republicans on the left to ultra-conservatives on the right, all of whom invested it with an interpretation that suited their views. This does not mean that believers lost interest in theology as the study of religion, but it does imply that theology crossed over the bounds of being an academic discipline. This crossover heightened the importance of the recruitment of specific personnel for influential functions in the church and for prestigious positions in the theology faculties in the universities. Holding the highest authority in the state, the monarch and his administration, as well as conservative aristocrats and clergymen, who were united in their opposition to rationalist theologians, exercised their influence on the nomination of the right men.

Nicolovious, together with Baron Hans Ernst von Kottwitz, one of the leading members of the Berlin neo-Pietist circle, tried to convince theologians such as August Tholuck, August Hahn, Heinrich Leonhard Heubner, and Ferdinand Guericke to join their cause. Their goal was to make these scholars protégés in university positions, and thus introduce an academic alternative to professors who endorsed the use of rationalism in theology (Eylert 1844, p. 105; Bigler 1972, pp. 22–23). These endeavors were joined by the theologian Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (1802–1869), who engineered the neo-Pietist and the orthodox Protestant merger. He was the editor of one of the few conservative periodicals in the Vormärz years, the Evangelische Kirchen Zeitung (EKZ). Although he studied philosophy and philology, Hengstenberg also earned a doctorate in theology, and in 1826 became a professor at Berlin University. As a Pietist, he clung to the anti-rationalist method of scriptural interpretation. This alarmed his colleague Philipp Conrad Marheineke, who advised him to take care to safeguard his academic career (Bachmann 1876, p. 228). Moreover, together with other scholars of the neo-Pietist and orthodox circle, such as the professor of law Friedrich Julius Stahl, the theologian Friedrich Abraham Strauß, and the Gerlach brothers, Hengstenberg formed, during the 1830s, the religious-conservative faction along the German political spectrum, centered in Prussia. As a man who was engaged in church affairs, academic life, and politics, Hengstenberg was keen to fight liberalism and rationalism in each of these spheres. His circle used the EKZ as an instrument for safeguarding the members’ religious and political beliefs against any contesting ideas. In 1830, for example, the journal harshly attacked the application of rational theology at the University of Halle. In 1840, the EKZ set off the ‘Sintenis affair’ that fueled the neo-Pietist–orthodox merger. In February, Wilhelm Franz Sintenis, a pastor from Magdeburg, published an article in a local journal in which he argued that the worship of the cross is idolatry. The EKZ denounced such an interpretation and vowed that the struggle would not stop until the spirit of rationalism, liberalism, and revolt was destroyed. Tholuck and Heubner requested the dismissal of Sintenis, and eventually the entire affair was brought to the decision of the government in Berlin, which was reluctant to take severe measures against the pastor as he had won the public’s support. Moreover, the Hengstenberg faction reassured believers that questions concerning dogmas are not a matter for democratic decisions, and that the clergy was obliged to accept the divine authority of the state (Weir 2014, pp. 34–35).

This strict alliance was motivated by political and religious considerations. From the political angle, conservatives were concerned about the growing power of the liberal movement, which carried the banner of a constitutional German nation-state that would grant the people political rights. In this sense, the monarchy—especially in the Prussian case—seemed to be a barrier against such subversive aspirations. In religious terms, and especially during the 1840s, the Pietists and the orthodox had to face the challenge of dissenting strands such as the German Catholic Movement (deutschkatholische Bewegung) and the Protestant Friends of Light (Lichtfreunde), which advocated a Christianity unhampered by dogmatic instructions for the practice of religion. They even argued for the involvement of women in religious matters, and for the creation of a German church that would include both confessions and serve as a platform for national unification (Olenhausen 1994, pp. 295–96; Landry 2014, pp. 30–38).

Politically, these liberal attempts were futile, as the Prussian King, Frederick William IV, who ascended the throne in 1840, was determined to stem dissent and to impose conformity with the evangelical church. Theologically, the concept of an ecumenical Christianity or ecumenical church had already been raised by the early Pietists. Now, this idea gathered momentum against the liberal views, and, against the background of a growing awareness of the importance of national unification, appeared to be more relevant than before. In fact, the pious King and the Awakened around him—who backed the notion of interconfessional merger—had a firm theological-political ideology, rooted in the works of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Pietists, which provided them with their own theoretical ground for the establishment of a national Christian State. Additionally, it was this Pietist–orthodox synthesis, I argue, that served as the conservative substitute for the envisioned German nation state. Here, theology and politics were almost inseparable.

The divergent liberal and conservative concepts of Christianity also assigned different meanings to the idea of confession. In the early nineteenth century, the term Konfessionalisten was usually applied to pious conservatives who had rejected the 1817 Act of Union and who endorsed the Augsburg Confession as the guiding ideal against the intensifying rational trend in theology and the declining impact of the church. The Konfessionalisten were those who held tight to the old religious ideal and who were rivals of secularism. Konfessionalisierung (confessionalization) was also meant to denote the dominance of dogmatism in religion while at the same time implying pertinence to a specific collective. Against this understanding of religion, liberals associated confession with Bekenntnis (creed), which entailed free confession of the believer. Bekenntnis was actually an acknowledgement of philosophy and history as dominant elements in shaping the modern concept of religious belief, and consequently tolerated Germans of different denominations (Blaschke 2000, p. 61; Hölscher 2007, pp. 11–52; Weir 2014, pp. 34–35).

4. Ecumenical Christianity: The Pietist–Orthodox Synthesis

German theologians who endorsed the neo-Pietist cause introduced the importance of confessional union, although they were not part of any national movement or association. Heinrich Leonhard Heubner was among the leading theologians who had striven to formulate the conservative line in the theological discipline since the beginning of the renewed Awakening. Together with Nicolovious and the theologian August Neander, in 1817 Heubner re-established the neo-Pietist seminary in Wittenberg and became a member of the Wittenberg Circle, which exercised influence on a long list of theologians, among them Hengstenberg himself. Moreover, the fact that these three leading figures had connections with the Prussian Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Education, as well as with aristocrats who were close to the King, helped them to monitor developments among the clergy and the academics (Bigler 1972, pp. 63–74; Weyel 2006, pp. 98–101).

In 1830, Heubner delivered a sermon in the castle church at Wittenberg, marking the tercentenary of the 1530 Augsburg Confession (the Augustana) in the place where Martin Luther first published his ninety-five theses. On this occasion, Heubner celebrated the confessional reconciliation between the Lutheran and Catholic princes of the Holy Roman Empire. He asked his audience to remember the confessor for the sake of their own beliefs, and conveyed a message of a single Christian faith. Regarding religious conviction, all Christians must return to the early Christianity, he said. He argued for the harmony of Christianity and claimed that it is unreasonable to forge a new kind of Christianity for “Jesus Christ, [is of] yesterday and today, and the same forever”. Heubner expressed concern about the religious divide and advised that such an internal rift not thwart a joint faith. Some Christians adhere to the beliefs of three hundred years ago, and some hold fast to the Apostolic Church. Yet, all Christians must acknowledge that “the salvation of all humans depends on him [i.e., Jesus Christ], and that is why we should remain faithful to the Augsburg Confession”. The Augustana appeared to Heubner so important that its rejection meant dismissing the Evangelium (Heubner 1830, pp. 20–21). However, this sermon was not meant to deliver only an all-Christian or eschatological message for ardent believers, as Heubner mentioned the specific setting of the confessional accord. He told his congregation about the particular German context in Augsburg, where evangelical princes and their councils left their homelands and came to the convention. Their proclamation of belief was stated in the German language, thus “all the German Fatherland” (das ganze deutsche Vaterland) was able to hear it. For Heubner, 1530 marked “the establishing year of our church” (Heubner 1830, pp. 4–5).

Although he did not intend to support a concrete design for German national unification, Heubner reasserted the idea invoked by the early Pietists who sought the integration of all confessions as part of a larger community of German Christians. Indeed, the older generation of Pietists had an overt orientation toward religious toleration, especially when Christian confessions were at the center of discussion. By the first half of the nineteenth century, and in contrast to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was little contestation among those who advocated a union of German Christians, whether orthodox or Pietists. Rather, by this time, Christian orthodoxy found partners in the Awakened, and the Pietists conceived of the orthodox as an ally against a new contesting development: the growing power of the liberal movement and increasing secularization. These adversaries did not really exist at the time of early Pietism and orthodoxy. Then, it was a matter of two different theological concepts. In the Vormärz years, the difference between Pietists and orthodox seemed much less important than that between Christian believers and German liberals who sought to establish a modern secular nation-state in which religion, especially Protestantism, would provide a cultural and ethical source, rather than religious guidance and political legitimacy. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it appears that the Protestant–Catholic, and Pietist–orthodox Christian synthesis served both as a common ground for the foundation of a German Christian State—a state that integrates German Christian confessions—and as an alternative to liberal secular nationalism. It is easy to dismiss this posture as reactionary, aimed at preserving conservative values and the church’s status. Yet, the fact is that the idea of interconfessional German compromise emerged well before the rise of nationalism, and Christian legitimacy of the state was a core idea of conservative thought from its very beginning. Additionally, if we follow Thomas Nipperdey, the Pietist–orthodox alliance was not a mere relic of preceding times which created a collection of traditionalist conservatives. It was a modern religious force that redesigned the meaning of religion in life altogether (Nipperdey 1993, p. 425; Ellis 2017, p. 21).

A more pragmatic attitude in this matter was taken by August Tholuck (1799–1877), a gifted scholar who began his career as a protégé of the Kottwitz–Nicolovius Pietist group. In 1823, with the support of the group’s members, he became a professor of theology at the University of Berlin, although many of his works focused on the investigation of languages. Two years later he moved to the University of Halle, aiming to halt the growing rationalist school there (Kloes 2019, pp. 63–68). Tholuck tried to forge a confessional union between Germans of the two main denominations, but not necessarily in institutional terms. In his 1845 Sermons for the Times, Preached before the University of Halle (Zeitpredigten in akademischen Gottesdienste der Universität Halle), he argues that a true unity of confessions is created by various elements, exactly as the image of the Lord is constituted of members of all confessions. Yet, this universalistic statement is only one part of Tholuck’s ecumenism, which refers specifically to the German context of the confessional rift (Tholuck 1847, p. 148). He asserts proudly that a Christian Gemeinschaft that provides mutual aid and spurs solidarity between Christians is most perceptible among the Germans. He recalls the many associations of compassionate Christians founded in Germany for the support of the poor and of neglected children. These agencies also aimed “to provide our German brothers in America with sermons, to provide our German brothers in Russia with school teaching, to spread Christian scriptures, as well as the word of God” (Tholuck 1847, pp. 181–83).

Tholuck credits the evangelical church for such benevolent deeds, yet he explains that these endeavors were realized by a community of caring German Christians, without referring to their confessional affiliation. Although cherishing the mutual help between Christians of the same nation, Tholuck does not envision confessional union in terms of a single German church. His idea about a Gemeinschaft of Christians means common actions of all for the benefit of the people. In fact, his contemplation about a Gemeinschaft of German Christians does not provide a theological conceptualization, but rather encourages actions within a specific group which will eventually fashion unity between German Protestants and Catholics. Following Tholuck’s rationale, the Christian love of the Germans and the social solidarity between them bridge the confessional rift in practice, and stand above all theological elucidations. The Germans, so it emerges from his argument, were a Christian Gemeinschaft of kinship who established their unity by themselves, from below, and through mutual commitment. In this sense, the difference between the neo-Pietists and their orthodox allies could not be avoided. For the former, the official theological aspect of religion was less crucial than for the latter, which considered the church, as an institution, to be the most significant feature of unity.

Ideas about a German Christian community of kinship received overt national meaning in the Christian conservative press, which was best represented by Hengstenberg’s EKZ. The fact that support of German nationalism came from this journal is telling. First, it indicates that discussions about the correlation between Christianity and nationalism were not only scholarly in nature, but also won public attention. Second, Hengstenberg, who considered himself an awakened Christian, seemed to draw more toward rigid orthodoxy than to the less institutionally oriented Pietists. In his conservative religious milieu, he was considered one of the “fighters for the cause of God”. He endorsed a firm orthodox Bible Christianity, and sympathized with the strict devotion of Pietism. Hengstenberg merged his religious views with political conservatism, and emphasized the importance of obedience to worldly authorities, thus instrumentalizing the church against the rational criticism of religion (Bigler 1972, pp. 123–24). It is thus notable, that Hengstenberg used his arch-conservative journal to support the idea of a German nationalism, which a few decades earlier seemed to his like-minded as revolutionary.

In an article published in the EKZ in 1846, Christian-conservative nationalism received interesting elucidation. In a review of a book entitled Lectures on History of the German National Literature (Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der deutschen Nationalliteratur), written by the theologian and literature historian August Friedrich Christian Vilmar from the Electorate of Hessen, the EKZ appears to justify nationalism. The reviewer finds in Vilmar’s text confirmation of the national peculiarity of the German people. Following the journal, the book’s author traces the distinctiveness of the Germans from the pagan period on. Already back then, they displayed their special features as loyal, strong, firm, and united among themselves. As such, they were best suited to accept Christianity—a religion that asked for the individual’s spirit, soul, and body. In the same article, the reviewer also refers to the Swiss–German philologist Wilhelm Wackernagel whose work, to the reviewer of the EKZ, gives the impression that “the German Volk have been chosen above all other people to be the bearer and preacher of the Gospel”. This people’s peculiarity is also revealed in the history of its philological and literary works (EKZ 1846a, pp. 805–6).

Further evidence for the accommodation of the national cause by orthodox and neo-Pietists was the journal’s unexpected consent to the argument presented by the liberal historian Georg Gottfried Gervinus. In a book he published in 1846 under the title Mission of the German Catholics (Die Mission der Deutsch-Katholiken), Gervinus maintained that the “present mission of the Germans is not the formation of a new church, but the healing of the deep lesions inflicted on the churchdom (Kirchenthum), namely the German Fatherland”. Common tolerance, following Gervinus, is the means that can mitigate confessional zeal and clear the way for ‘national-ecclesiastical union’ (national-kirchliche[n] Einigung). The journal concludes that this argument should be applied by anyone who expects a renewed constitution for the church (EKZ 1846b, p. 19).

The EKZ, with its strict religious conservatism, actually confirms the affinity between the original adherence to Christianity and the peculiarities of the German people, while supporting toleration of all Christian confessions in the name of German religious and patriotic solidarity. Such Pietist-orthodox statements about the authenticity of Germanness and its special religiosity nationalize the German Christian identity. The same course was evident among the EKZ circle in the coming years. During the 1848 revolution, Hengstenberg’s journal tried to offer a remedy for the rebellious Germans. It explained that restoring the splendor of the German people is possible only by holding on to Christianity after the revolution has elevated atheism. No other people was as faithful to that religion from its very beginning as the Germans. Going back to Tacitus, the EKZ mentions that already this Roman historian conceived of the Germans as the most able people to represent the “people of God” (ein Volk Gottes) (EKZ 1848).

5. The Christian State Ideal: The German Political Model

The discussions about German Christian particularism were conducted by theologians, journalists, and other publicists who followed the Pietist-orthodox course. These were certainly public and academic deliberations that introduced the meaning of national identity by a conservative-religious strand. Yet, they did not offer an explicit political program or a clear vision about the actual meaning of such German distinctiveness. To explore the concrete facets of German Christianity, one must turn to the works of other members of the Pietist-orthodox circle. However, even before analyzing their views, there is a need to differentiate between their German Christian national concept, and the idea of Germanic Christianity, usually associated with conservative orthodox Christianity.

Conjuring the Germanic roots of Christianity did not necessarily aim to imply a national feature. It was essentially a romantic perspective with a clear nostalgic expectation for a renewed model of the old Ständestaat—a state that represents the hierarchical structure of society. In this regard, it also denoted the exclusion of Jews as a religious minority. The antagonism contained in this concept was not merely that of ‘christlich-germanisch’ people and Jews, but was more particular, that is, between ‘Juden und Franken’, ‘Teutsche und Hebrär’, or ‘Germanen und Asiaten’. The focus, therefore, was the crucial difference between Christian European people and those who rejected Christ (Sterling 1969, pp. 111–13; Stroh 1985, pp. 638–41; Avraham 2020, p. 107).2 The notion of a German Christian nation forged by Pietists and the orthodox did not have the same transnational element of Germanic Christianity, and as we will see below, it produced a coherent political vision.

Beginning in the mid-1840s, the leading ideologist of German conservative Christianity was Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802–1861), a converted Jew who came from a rabbinic family in Würzburg. Stahl studied law at the University of Würzburg and in 1840, with the sponsorship of the Prussian King Frederick William IV, he was granted the chair at the University of Berlin previously held by Hegel. Although his early works from 1830s bore explicit conservative philosophical-political views, he seemed suspiciously liberal for the Pietist-orthodox circle of Hengstenberg and the noble estate owners who eventually partnered with him. However, it was only after the publication of The Monarchical Principle (Das monarchische Prinzip) in 1845 that the conservatives endorsed his political philosophy. In 1846, during the first Prussian General Synod that convened to discuss ecclesiastical questions, Stahl, together with Ludwig von Gerlach, Heubner, and Hengstenberg, formed the ultra-right wing. They insisted that clergymen who declined the dogmas expressed in the Apostles’ Creed should be denied any position in the clergy (Masur 1930; Grosser 1963; Kann 1967). However, in spite of his defence of strict Protestant doctrine and support of the traditional role of the aristocracy, Stahl’s writings reflect a more liberal orientation, especially when he elaborates on the nature of the state that ought to reflect the German Christian identity.

Stahl’s main work was published, during the 1830s, in two volumes under the title The Philosophy of Law (Philosophie des Rechts). One of the main threads in this work is the attempt to defy Hegel’s philosophy of religion and state. State and society, according to Stahl, are organic entities which represent the image of God. In fact, the organic essence of the world is incomprehensible in rational terms. It is intelligible only when seen as reflecting ‘God’s personality’ (Persönlichkeit Gottes) which eludes any logical elucidation. The state in this theoretical scheme is designed primarily to incorporate God’s commandments, while its laws form ‘the temporal Kingdom of God’ (das zeitliche Reich Gottes) (Stahl 1833, vol. 2, pp. 18–19, 189). However, beyond the divine origins of state and society, Stahl argues that “Christianity is the norm, the foundation and the objective [of the state]”, and therefore it should be recognized in all state institutions (Stahl 1847, p. 27). Hence, the Christian State is a political construction guided by Christian morality and conventions. Yet, the political model suggested by Stahl is not universal. It also does not constitute a theocracy or an abstract configuration. Through the application of historicist analysis, Stahl clarifies that every Christian State has its own specific attributes. The people (Volk), an organic, natural force, becomes a legal entity by the power of the state. Every people, however, is formed through a particular historical evolution which drafts its own concept regarding the universal essence of the entire world. Thus, according to Stahl, every people is assigned a certain vocation, as part of a larger whole. Consequently, states reflect the distinctiveness of their people. However, he also adds that “the Volk is the natural force and the community (Gemienschaft) which is legally ordered by the state” (Stahl 1837, vol. 2, pp. 21–22). When writing about the correlation between Christianity and German peculiarity, Stahl did not overlook the confessional divide between Catholics and Protestants, and he lamented its harmful consequences. Yet, as he wrote in his 1847 essay, the common ground of these two confessions outweighs the differences between them. For Stahl, confessional divergences are less disturbing than they appear, as they result from a distinct interpretation of the revelation to which the two Christian confessions adhere (Stahl 1847, p. 60).

A more stringent theocratic nature of the Christian State was evident in the thought of Ludwig von Gerlach, although he, too, did not distinguish between the Christian and the German identity of the state. For Gerlach, the state and its activities should be assessed only through the norms set by the New Testament, and God’s commandments delivered through the church should be accepted by all. Indeed, for Gerlach, the biblical Ten Commandments provide the foundation for the state’s constitution and its judicial system. He also explains the specific relation between this state and the Germans. For this people, the church is the ‘womb of the German nation’ (Mutterschoß der deutschen Nation), and therefore if ever the German Reich were to be separated from the church, it would cease to be ‘a German Reich’ (ein deutsches Reich) (Schoeps 1952, pp. 12–14). Religious devotion, according to Gerlach, characterized the German people and became a precondition for its specific national identity. Yet, his view about the German qualities of the Christian State was not merely abstract, for he traces the religious-national origins of the people back in history, and especially to the aftermath of the Reformation. For him, the Reformation was a historical turning point; before this, nations were immersed in great empires. By the expansion of their vernaculars and literature, which were evident from the time of the Reformation, the nationalities contested the universal church of God. Following this reasoning, he concludes that nations existed prior to the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, even if they were not conspicuous before that time. However, even when they emerged in a more distinct manner, nationalities could not overshadow the state, which was meant to realize God’s universal commandments (Meinecke 1970, pp. 179–82). In this regard Gerlach acknowledges the peculiarity of the people as representing a specific nation, while the state remains a framework with divine origins. Additionally, although the nation is subordinate to the state, namely, to the divine universal essence, separation of the two seems unnatural.

The Christian State ideal—of which Stahl and Gerlach were only two representatives—sought to Christianize the state in the sense that all its laws, institutions, citizenship, and identity would be shaped by Christianity. In ecclesiastical terms, and as part of the dominant Pietist-orthodox doctrine, the advocates of this political model tried to coerce rationalist dissidents to renounce their right to become members of the ‘concessioned’ churches following the 1847 Toleranzedikt (known also as the Dissident’s Law) that granted them such an option. The new concept of the Christian State was thus different from the old model of the Prussian monarchy. For although the latter was responsible for the Protestant confession, it conceived of religion as a private sphere (Weir 2014, pp. 58–59; Avraham 2020, p. 85). Indeed, the Christian State did not entail a certain dogma or aim to impose religious performance on all citizens. In terms of confessional distinctions, some of the orthodox and Pietists envisaged a union of the two confessions that would eventually form evangelische[n] Katholizität (Stahl 1847, p. 60; Altgeld 1992, pp. 140–42; Von Kloeden 1998, pp. 43–45). Yet, unlike the older model, the new one suggested the fortification of religion against intensifying rational theology, modern political theories, secularism, and universal citizenship. The Christian State, with all its particular German attributes, lent politics and society religious justification and moral values that meant to counter growing de-Christianization. In this sense, relying on orthodox institutions was crucial as, against the background of such unprecedented threats, ‘religion of the heart’ alone would not endure.

Coherent conceptualization of the Christian State was also a result of the intensifying debate about Jewish emancipation. In Vienna, Privy Councilor Anton Edler von Krauß published in 1842 his work The Christian State-Principle (Das christliche Staatsprincip), declaring that Christianity is the highest wisdom that shapes the public life of every Christian State. Following Krauß, this idea had become clear already when Christ told Pontius Pilate that he did not come to this world in order to create a new kingdom for the Jews (Clark 1995, p. 169).3 During the 1845–1846 discussions in the Chamber of Deputies in Baden about the Jews’ entitlements, opponents explained that investing Jews with equal rights would be impossible as Baden was a Christian State (Herzog 1996, pp. 75–81). Jews’ emancipation, therefore, was another element in the political theology of the Pietist-orthodox design for the nation, as we will see in the following section.

6. Orthodox, Neo-Pietist, and the Nationalization of Judaism

The German and orthodox elements associated with the Christian State were discernible also in its posture toward the Jews. Certainly, ideas about modernizing and constitutionalizing the German states encouraged additional elaboration on the essence of such states, which, due to their Christian religion, could not grant emancipation a priori.4 Yet, the decline of Jews’ entitlements did not require a special model such as the Christian State. Rather, it was inherent in the orthodox conceptualization of that state. As mentioned above, early Pietism tried to free religion from strict dogmas and offered a more tolerant concept of religiosity. This was applied toward Christian confessions and also toward Jews, whose conversion was anticipated, but could have been accommodated even if they preferred to keep their original religion. However, the growing merger between Pietists and orthodox, and the efforts to reinforce the religious contours of the state against growing secularism, could not but result in rejection of emancipation. When Pietists joined the orthodox in the service of the state ecclesiastical apparatus, they lost flexibility in matters of religious tolerance. The Christian State appeared therefore as an almost natural political configuration for nineteenth century conservative religiosity, and as such it should not have been ‘invented’ to deny Jews’ equal rights. Moreover, the idea of the Christian State was not a mere theoretical model, but was translated into practice. In January 1850, Prussia amended its constitution. The new Article 14 declared that Christianity is the foundation of state institutions involved in the practice of religion. It thus ignored the religious freedom allowed by Article 12. The result was that non-Christians were unable to hold official positions that required an oath, such as in the fields of culture, religion, and education. The fruits of this constitutional revision were evident also after the establishment of the German nation-state. The 1871 constitution, which granted equal rights to all citizens, was routinely ignored, as the federal states could follow their own constitutions that were still in effect. Thus, Article 14 of the Prussian constitution remained valid also after 1871 (Huber 1961, vol. 1, p. 402).

However, there is another aspect of the Christian State’s relationship with the Jews. As much as members of the conservative Christian alliance saw religion as the source of the German national identity, so they conceived of the Jews as a nation and not merely as a religious minority. This concept appears more explicit if we look at the posture of the liberals. Certainly, there was more than one understanding of the meaning of Judaism among liberals, but in general they tried to dissociate themselves from the rigid religious policy of the state. For them, religious belief was the free choice of the individual, and all rights—civil and political—were universal in essence, regardless of the individual’s religion. Jews, therefore, could adhere to their religious belief and at the same time remain faithful to the German nation.5 The Christian conservatives, in contrast, could not separate the Jewish religion from Jewish nationality, as they did not detach German national identity from German Christianity.

In his The Christology of the Old Testament and Commentary (Christologie des Alten Testaments und Commentar), published in three volumes between 1829 and 1835, Hengstenberg argues that, unlike the people who believe in the messianism of Jesus, “in Israel the Messianic expectations form the very central point of the life of the nation”. Thus, following Hengstenberg, Jews constitute a nation whose origins are divine, with their own sacred hopes for coming generations (Hengstenberg 1858, vol. 4, pp. 55–56, 384–85). Hengstenberg’s associate, Otto von Gerlach, the youngest of the Gerlach brothers, wrote explicitly about the nationality of the Jews. He was a theologian who studied at the collegia pietatis in Wittenberg, and with the endorsement of the Prussian crown prince and the sponsorship of Hengstenberg and his orthodox allies, Gerlach was granted a professorship at the University of Berlin. In his Commentary on Pentateuch, an exegesis of the Hebrew Bible published in 1835, Gerlach introduces the dominant national element within Judaism. The Book of Exodus, he explains, reflects the explicit recognition of the Jews as a people in national terms. Jews, he argues, were constituted as a nation in a specific historical moment: at the exodus from Egypt. This was the moment in which the Hebrews realized that “we belong to Him: we owe Him sacred duties, from which no man can set us free. While their words expressed their sense of religious dependence, they declare their national independence” (Von Gerlach 1860, p. 217). Such an argument thus reinforced the distinct belief and existence of the Jews. Gerlach, similar to Hengstenberg, wrote his texts primarily as a theologian, namely, his interest in Judaism was a religious one. Yet, both, as well as others among their colleagues, could not avoid the application of the modern concept of the nation and national identity on Jews. In this sense, their theological exegesis was up-to-date, but their fundamental political view was conservative. They explained the Jews’ age-old religious distinctiveness through the modern vocabulary and theories of the nation. Consequently, their characterization of the ’People of Israel’ clearly implied that equal status for Christians and Jews was inconceivable.

More practical in their answer to the “Jewish question” were those Pietist-orthodox conservatives who were also engaged in politics. One of them was General Ludwig August von Thile, known as “Bible Thile”, a chief minster in the royal Prussian cabinet, and enthusiastic supporter of the Christian State model. In a speech he delivered in the United Diet of 1847, Thile explained that no people on earth represent the inseparable link between religion and nationalism as the Jewish People did. For him, the Jewish nation is inexplicable without the Mosaic religion, and those Mosaic laws belong exclusively to the Jews. A Jew, according to Thile, could not belong to any fatherland but that which his religion orders him. He claimed that “Zion is the fatherland of the Jew. Every Jew who is a believer Jew (gläubiger Jude)… every Jew who believes his religion, has there a homeland from which he cannot turn his eye”. This territorial orientation of the Jew, thus, would prevent him from being a German or a Prussian (Prussia 1847, p. 195). In 1847, on the occasion of the United Diet, Stahl published his essay The Christian State and its Relation to Deism and Judaism (Der christliche Staat und sein Verhältniß zu Deismus und Judenthum), in which he follows a similar direction. Judaism, he argued, forms a “religious community” (religiöse Gemeinschaft) and a “national community” (nationale Gemeinschaft) at one and the same time. As a Christian who was part of the Pietist-orthodox conservative wing, Stahl disparaged reform Judaism, and thought that real Jews should yearn for the reestablishment of the ‘Temple state’ (Tempelstaat). These Jews, he asserts, “expect the messiah and the return to Jerusalem, unlike the Christian, who expects the second coming of the Lord and the heavenly Jerusalem (das himmliche Jerusalem)”. Jews, following Stahl’s reasoning, are thus longing for the tangible city of Jerusalem, not for an abstract one (Stahl 1847, pp. 42–43). Discarding the idea of Jews’ mass conversion similar to many of his associates, Stahl did not see any prospect for real integration of Jews within Christian society. He understood emancipation as an idealization of Christian–Jewish relations rather than an acknowledgement of the situation itself (Stahl 1847, pp. 53–54). Additionally, although not feasible at that specific historical moment, it appears that Stahl and other Christian conservatives envisaged the independent existence of Jews in a land of their own as the appropriate solution to the “Jewish question”. The Tempelstaat, perhaps unwittingly, became the Jewish equivalent of the Pietist-orthodox model of the Christian State, representing the merger of the religious with the national.

7. Conclusions

Initially a movement of religious awakening in the early nineteenth century, German neo-Pietism contested the established orthodox church and its ecclesiastical institutions. As part of their conflict with growing state centralism, neo-Pietists conceived of orthodox Protestantism as an ally of the state in establishing a renewed form of absolutist regime. During the 1830s, however, neo-Pietists and the orthodox drew closer, not as differences in their respective religiosity became irrelevant, but as both had to face unprecedented challenges. Increasing secularization, intensifying rationalization of theology, consolidation of political liberalism, and growing national movement—all of which indicated a distancing from religion—motivated the formation of a Pietist-orthodox strategy. These two religious strands provided the theological platform for political conservatism. Yet, the conservative Christian partnership was not regressive, as it is often depicted. Acknowledging the impact of the new forces which idealized the establishment of a modern liberal German nation-state, these conservative Christians did not merely apply suppressive policies, but introduced their own ideal of a German Christian State. Following the dominance of the state church, as advocated by the orthodox, and implying the central place of religion in the formation of the individual’s and society’s “personality”, neo-Pietist-orthodox Christianity introduced its own ideal of German nationalism and national identity that defied the liberal model. Merging their religious adherence with German particularism, neo-Pietists and the orthodox designed a new, practical type of nationalism that reflected certain flexibility of a specific religious amalgam, one often considered merely reactionary in substance.