On the Ālayavijñāna in the Awakening of Faith: Comparing and Contrasting Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s Views on Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna

Abstract

The Awakening of Faith, one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna. Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, in which ālayavijñāna is described as a defiled consciousness, the Awakening of Faith explains it as a “synthetic” consciousness, in which tathāgatagarbha and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes noted the innovative explanation of the Awakening of Faith and compiled the commentaries, among which Huayan master Fazang’s (643–712) commentary had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative tathāgatagarbha texts in East Asia. However, as scholarly perceptions that the commentators’ interpretations do not always represent the Awakening of Faith’s tenets themselves have grown, the propriety of relying on Fazang’s commentary for understanding the treatise has also been questioned. What attracts our attention in this regard is that the Silla scholar-monk Wŏnhyo’s (617–686) commentaries, which are known to have significantly influenced Fazang’s, present very different views. This article demonstrates that two distinct interpretations existed in Wŏnhyo’s days for tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith, by comparing Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries, and further considers the possibility that the Awakening of Faith’s doctrine of ālayavijñāna is not doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra on the basis of Wŏnhyo’s view on ālayavijñāna.

1. Introduction

The Treatise on the Awakening of Faith According to the Mahāyāna (C. Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論, hereafter, the Awakening of Faith), one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of tathāgatagarbha (“womb of Tathāgatas”, viz., the potential to achieve buddhahood) and ālayavijñāna (“storehouse consciousness”, viz., the fundamental mind of a sentient being). Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, in which ālayavijñāna is described as a defiled consciousness, the Awakening of Faith explains it as a “synthetic” consciousness, in which tathāgatagarbha and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes, who noted the innovative way of explanation of the Awakening of Faith, compiled commentaries, and among them, Huayan 華嚴 master Fazang’s 法藏 (643–712) Dasheng qixinlun yiji 大乘起信論義記 (hereafter, Yiji), had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative tathāgatagarbha texts in East Asia.1

However, as scholarly recognition that the original tenets of the Awakening of Faith should not directly be identified with the commentators’ interpretations has grown, the prevailing reliance on Fazang’s commentary in understanding the Awakening of Faith has also been questioned. For instance, Kashiwagi Hirō states, in the preface of his extensive research on the Awakening of Faith, that the theories of the Awakening of Faith that were discussed by later Chinese Buddhist scholars are the so-called “ideas of the Awakening of Faith (起信論思想)”, rather than the original teaching of it (Kashiwagi 1981, p. 4).2 Indeed, the dharma characteristics school (C. faxiang zong 法相宗), the Yogācāra school of Dharmapāla’s (ca. 6th century CE; C. Hufa 護法) line, which Fazang attempts to reconcile in the Yiji with the Madhyamaka teaching of Bhāvaviveka’s (ca. 500–570; C. Qingbian 淸辯/清辨) line,3 had not even spread to China when the Awakening of Faith was compiled.4

The fact that Fazang’s commentary is no more taken as the ‘standard text’ for understanding the Awakening of Faith leads us to reconsider the doctrinal significance of other commentaries. In this regard, particular attention is given in this paper to the Silla master Wŏnhyo’s 元曉 (617–686) commentaries, the Kisillon so 起信論疏 and the Taesŭng kisillon pyŏlgi 大乘起信論別記 (hereafter, Pyŏlgi), which are known to have substantially influenced Fazang’s Yiji, but hold a distinctly different position than it. By comparing Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries of the Awakening of Faith, this article seeks to demonstrate that the Awakening of Faith’s notions of tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna may be understood in a different way than what has broadly been accepted so far by relying on Fazang’s commentary. I shall discuss that while Fazang takes the position that despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, tathāgatagarbha interacts directly with the arising-and-ceasing mind, Wŏnhyo considers that tathāgatagarbha, which has a twofold nature, interacts with the arising-and-ceasing mind on the one hand, but on the other, preserves the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature. Based on Wŏnhyo’s understanding, I shall also suggest a possible doctrinal compatibility between the Awakening of Faith and the early Yogācāra, which has been dismissed among scholars.

2. Tathāgatagarbha

In the Awakening of Faith, ālayavijñāna is defined as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness) (viz. tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing (mind) in a neither-identical-nor-different condition.5 Such exegetes as Wŏnhyo and Fazang both find the doctrinal origin of this unique nature of ālayavijñāna in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.6 In the same manner as the Awakening of Faith, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra explains the consciousness of a sentient being as having not only a phenomenal (or defiled), but also a ‘true’ or ‘real’, nature. In Guṇabhadra’s four-fascicle recension of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the consciousness is described as consisting of three kinds of mental attributes; that is, [self] true character (C. [zi]zhenxiang [自]眞相), karmic character (C. yexiang 業相), and evolving character (C. zhuanxiang 轉相).7 Likewise, Bodhiruci’s ten-fascicle version presents these three characters of the consciousness with slightly different names: the consciousness of wisdom character (C. zhixiangshi 智相識), the consciousness of karmic character (C. yexiangshi 業相識), and the consciousness of evolving character (C. zhuanxiangshi 轉相識).8 While the first character of the three, the (self) true character (or self-character) or the consciousness of wisdom character, corresponds to the true nature of the consciousness, the other two correspond to the phenomenal nature. Wŏnhyo also indicates that the (self) true character among the three characters of the four-fascicle recension is also referred to as the self-character (C. zixiang 自相) in the 10-fascicle edition.9 Consulting the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra in commenting ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith, Wŏnhyo and Fazang both explain the first character of the three kinds of mental attributes described in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra as the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind, viz., tathāgatagarbha, of ālayavijñāna.10

Although Wŏnhyo and Fazang both consider the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature of ālayavijñāna as tathāgatagarbha by relying on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the next passage of Wŏnhyo’s Kisillon so suggests that the two commentators did not agree in their views on tathāgatagarbha. In response to the question of whether or not the self-character (K. chasang 自相), i.e., tathāgatagarbha, of the consciousness arises due to defiled conditions, Wŏnhyo answers by introducing three types of views on the mind-essence (of the self-character) (K. chasang [simch’e] 自相[心體])11, as follows:

Question: Should it be said that the self-character of this consciousness arises just due to defiled conditions, or that it does not conform to the conditions? If it arises just due to defiled conditions, then when defiled conditions are exhausted, the self-character should disappear; if the self-character does not conform to defiled conditions and thus does not disappear, then it would naturally exist by itself (K. chayŏnyu 自然有). Again, if the self-character also disappears [as in the former case], then it amounts to nihilism; likewise [if] the self-character does not disappear [as in the latter case], in turn it amounts to eternalism.

Answer: Some say: The mind-essence of ālayavijñāna is ripened (K. isuk 異熟, vipāka) dharma, which is produced by karmic afflictions. Therefore, when karmic afflictions are exhausted, the base consciousness (K. ponsik 本識; viz. ālayavijñāna) disappears altogether. At the resultant [stage of] Buddhahood, however, there exists the pure consciousness that corresponds to the great perfect mirror cognition (K. taewŏn kyŏngji 大圓鏡智, ādarśa-jñāna), which has been attained from the two types of practice, practice of merits and wisdom. Thus, the minds in the both cases have identical meaning. Based on this meaning, the mind is said to be consistent until the resultant [stage of] Buddhahood.

Some say: The mind-essence of self-character moves its essence, and [this] is raised due to nescience (K. mumyŏng 無明, avidyā). This means that the serene [mind-essence] is moved and raised, not that nothing turns to something. [In other words, this mind-essence should be what originally exists, not what arises from nothing.] Therefore, the moving of this mind is what is caused by nescience, and is called the karmic character. This moving mind is basically the mind in itself, which is also called self-character. The nature of self-character is not involved with nescience. However, this mind, which is moved by nescience, also has the implication that [karmic seeds inherent in the mind continuously] produce the same types [of seeds]. Thus, although not falling into the fallacy of “naturally [existing by itself],” it still has the nature of non-ceasing. When nescience is exhausted, the moving character [of the mind] accordingly ceases, and [yet] the mind returns to the original basis by going after the initial enlightenment (K. sigak 始覺). [Therefore, the mind-essence of this mind does not cease.]

Some say: Both of the two masters’ views have a reasonable basis, because both rely on the teachings of the sacred scriptures. The former master’s view coincides with the tenets of the Yogācārabhūmi, and the latter’s with that of the Awakening of Faith. However, one should not take the meanings in a literal sense. Why? If the meaning of the former teaching is taken in a literal sense, then this would be attachment to dharmas (K. pŏp ajip 法我執, dharma-grāha); if the meaning of the latter teaching is taken in literal sense, this would be called attachment to self (K. in agyŏn 人我見, ātma-grāha). Again, if one attaches to the former meaning, one would fall into nihilism; if one attaches to the latter meaning, one would fall into eternalism. [Therefore,] one should know that the two meanings may not be taught. [However,] although they may not be taught, they may also be taught, because although they are not like [what it means], they are not unlike [what it means] either.12

According to the first view, the mind-essence of the ālayavijñāna is described as what is subject to arising-and-ceasing in accordance with karmic afflictions. It is regarded as being produced by karmic afflictions and disappears when they are exhausted. By contrast, in the second view, the mind-essence is neither-arising-nor-ceasing. The mind-essence, or self-character, should originally exist (viz., does not arise from nowhere), and moves its essence when being prompted by nescience; however, with nescience exhausted, the mind returns to the original basis (viz., does not cease).

In the third view, the first and second views are both accepted in that they have a reasonable basis, which relies on the sacred scriptures. This position might seem idiosyncratic at first, since the two former views take contrasting positions. In fact, the first and second views are respectively attributed to the Yogācārabhūmi and the Awakening of Faith, which are generally considered to take distinct or even incompatible doctrinal positions on a concept such as ālayavijñāna. According to this third view, however, the real messages of the two teachings should not be assumed merely by their literal expressions. In other words, if properly understood beyond their literal meanings, the first and second views may both be accepted without any doctrinal conflict. It may then be said that in this view, the mind-essence—i.e., tathāgatagarbha—has a twofold nature, though in a somewhat paradoxical way; that is, the nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing.

Wŏnhyo advocates the third view that the mind-essence—i.e., tathāgatagarbha—of ālayavijñāna, has a twofold nature.13 When taken in their literal senses, the nature of arising-and-ceasing of the first view and the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing of the second should be seen as two distinct natures, which are incompatible for one single mind of ālayavijñāna. In the same vein, the teachings of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Awakening of Faith would be two incompatible doctrinal positions, because their explanations of a concept such as ālayavijñāna, as mentioned above, conflict with each other. However, when considered beyond the literal meanings, these two seemingly opposite natures may be taken as compatible as a twofold nature of one single mind of ālayavijñāna. The teachings may have literal meanings, and may also mean what is beyond the literal meanings. In this regard, the Yogācārabhūmi and the Awakening of Faith’s positions on ālayavijñāna need not be seen as doctrinally conflicting with each other. It is a well-known fact that Wŏnhyo seeks to reconcile the early Yogācāra texts with the Awakening of Faith in the Kisillon so and the Pyŏlgi.14

What should be noted, particularly in terms of our current issue, is that this passage reveals that there were two different views, that is, the second and the third, on the mind-essence (i.e., tathāgatagarbha). According to the typical understanding, based on Fazang’s interpretation of the Awakening of Faith, tathāgatagarbha is considered neither-arising-nor-ceasing. This way of understanding seems very similar to the second view. However, there was another view on tathāgatagarbha, the third view that tathāgatagarbha has the twofold nature of not only neither-arising-nor-ceasing but also arising-and-ceasing, and this view was advocated by Wŏnhyo.

Wŏnhyo’s twofold view on tathāgatagarbha is also evident in his interpretation of the concept of [original] enlightenment (C. [ben]jue, K. [pon]gak [本]覺), one of the two aspects of ālayavijñāna presented in the Awakening of Faith, along with non-enlightenment (C. bujue, K. pulgak 不覺).15 It is stated in the Awakening of Faith that (original) enlightenment indicates the mind-essence that is freed from deluded thoughts, implying that original enlightenment has the same connotation as tathāgatagarbha.16 Wŏnhyo also says that it has a twofold meaning, just in a way that recalls the aforementioned twofold nature of the mind-essence; in his answer to the question of whether the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of awakening, Wŏnhyo answers by saying that original enlightenment has a twofold meaning, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment (C. shijue, K. sigak 始覺), as follows:

Question: Is the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of enlightening (K. kakcho 覺照)? If it is called original enlightenment only because it lacks non-enlightenment, then it would not have the [function of] illumination of enlightening. If then, it should be non-enlightenment. If it is called original enlightenment only because it has the function of illumination of enlightening, then I am not sure if all defilements are eradicated from this [original] enlightenment. If defilements have not been eradicated, then [in turn] it would not have the function of enlightening; if the defilements have been eradicated, then sentient beings should never exist.

Answer: [The reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is] not only because it lacks non-enlightenment, but also because it has the function of illumination. Because it has the [function of] illumination, defilements can be also eradicated. What does this mean? When enlightenment that comes after delusions is considered to be called enlightenment, initial enlightenment has [the meaning of] enlightenment, while original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of delusion is said to be called enlightenment, original enlightenment is enlightenment, but initial enlightenment is not. The [matter of] eradicating defilements [may be discussed] likewise. When eradication of previously exiting defilements is called eradication, initial enlightenment has the [function of] eradication, but original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of defilements is called eradication, original enlightenment refers to eradication, but initial enlightenment does not. Viewed from this [latter] way, [defilements] are originally eradicated, and thus originally there is no ordinary being, just as stated in the passage below, “all sentient beings are originally consistently abiding (C. changzhu, K. sangju 常住) within the dharmas of nirvāṇa and bodhi.” However, although it is said that original enlightenment exists and thus originally there is no ordinary being (凡夫), there is not yet initial enlightenment and thus originally there are ordinary beings. Therefore, there is no fallacy [between the two cases]. If you [take only one aspect and] claim that because there is original enlightenment, originally there are no ordinary beings, then there would not be initial enlightenment at last. If then, on what basis could ordinary beings exist? If those [ordinary beings] do not have initial enlightenment at last, then there would be no original enlightenment, [which is contrasted to initial enlightenment,] then on basis of what original enlightenment can it be said that there is no ordinary beings?17

Wŏnhyo argues that the mind-essence is called original enlightenment because it has the meaning of not only original enlightenment, as represented in the literal expression of original enlightenment, but also initial enlightenment. On the one hand, original enlightenment has the meaning of the original lack of non-enlightenment and, in this sense, all sentient beings are considered as constantly abiding. On the other hand, original enlightenment is called as such because it has the function of illumination of enlightening, explaining the presence of ordinary beings. Two seemingly contrasting characters are both accepted as the twofold aspect of original enlightenment, i.e., tathāgatagarbha. Here again, Wŏnhyo takes original enlightenment not just in the literal sense, but in the sense beyond literal expression.

One might indicate that the division of (original) enlightenment into original and initial enlightenment is already stated in the Awakening of Faith and Fazang also provides a proper explanation of them in his commentary. However, a comparison of Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s explanation on the two types of original enlightenment, original enlightenment that is pure in nature (C. xingjing benjue, K. sŏngjŏng pon’gak 性淨本覺) and original enlightenment that conforms to impurity (C. suiran benjue, K. suyŏm pon’gak 隨染本覺), discloses that their views on original enlightenment are not identical, but rather implies a significant difference. In the Kisillon so, Wŏnhyo addresses these two types of original enlightenment as the basis of the twofold aspect of (original) enlightenment, which have just been discussed above, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment, respectively.18 In other words, Wŏnhyo explains each side of the twofold aspect of original enlightenment in a separate way, by relating them to each type of original enlightenment among the two; that is, the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the original enlightenment that conforms to impurity. This respective interpretation of the twofold meaning of original enlightenment may also be applied back to the twofold nature of the mind-essence, the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing and arising-and-ceasing. Then, it seems that in Wŏnhyo’s interpretation of the Awakening of Faith, the terms that have the connotation of tathāgatagarbha, such as the mind-essence or original enlightenment, have a twofold nature/meaning, each side of which has a distinct meaning/nature. In Wŏnhyo’s commentary on the Nirvana Sutra, the Yŏlban chongyo 涅槃宗要, original enlightenment that conforms to impurity appears with a slightly modified name, as the nature of realization that conforms to impurity (K. suyŏm haesŏng 隨染解性).19 Given this, we may presume that in Wŏnhyo’s works, the two terms—nature of realization (K. haesŏng 解性) and original enlightenment—are distinguished from each other, with different implications.

Although Fazang likewise mentions the two types of original enlightenment in the Yiji, it does not seem that he recognizes any distinction between them, because he often interchangeably uses the terms “original enlightenment” and “nature of realization”, which are distinguished by Wŏnhyo as the two types of original enlightenment: the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the nature of realization that conforms to impurity.20 For instance, in explaining original enlightenment as the cause of uncontaminated (C. wulou 無漏, anāsrava) dharmas along with the conditions of permeation from learning (C. wen xunxi 聞熏習, śruta-vāsanā), Fazang draws on a passage from Paramārtha’s commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in which the nature of realization, not original enlightenment, is presented as the cause of sainthood, together with the permeation from learning.21 This shows that Fazang identifies original enlightenment with the nature of realization. Faznag also uses these two terms side by side in a compound word, as if the words have the same meaning.22 Most of all, he clearly identifies these two concepts in the Huayan wujiao zhang 華嚴五敎章 by saying that the nature of realization mentioned in Paramārtha’s commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha refers to the original enlightenment of the Awakening of Faith.23 Given all of this, it does not seem that Fazang distinguishes the two types of original enlightenment in the same way as Wŏnhyo does. Although Fazang addresses the two types of original enlightenment, it is apparent that he does not see any valid distinction between them. Rather, it seems that these two terms just refer to two names given to tathāgatagarbha, which has only one (not a twofold) nature, merely by depending on whether or not it is combined with the arising-and-ceasing mind.

In fact, just as Fazang identifies the two types of original enlightenment, Fazang describes tathāgatagarbha as having one, not a twofold, nature. Unlike Wŏnhyo, as discussed above, who considers the mind-essence, i.e., tathāgatagarbha, to have a twofold nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing, Fazang says that the tathāgatagarbha has only the one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing.24 This implies, along with his identification of the two types of original enlightenment, that, for Fazang, tathāgatagarbha and other concepts that have an equivalent connotation, such as original enlightenment, do not have a twofold meaning/nature, but only one. I have mentioned that among the three views introduced by Wŏnhyo on the mind-essence, the second view is very similar to Fazang’s interpretation of tathāgatagarbha as neither-arising-nor-ceasing. It seems very likely then that Wŏnhyo introduced the second view by keeping in his mind an exegete such as Fazang.

3. Ālayavijñāna

Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s distinct views on tathāgatagarbha are also reflected in their understanding of ālayavijñāna. As mentioned above, ālayavijñāna is defined in the Awakening of Faith as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness, viz. tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. Wŏnhyo accounts for the unification of these two minds in ālayavijñāna as twofold, namely, in a non-identical (K. piil 非一) condition on the one hand, and in a non-different (K. pii 非異) condition on the other hand, in a similar way to how he considers tathāgatagarbha to have a twofold nature.25 It may be said that there are two (viz., non-identical) minds in ālayavijñāna, that is, the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind; however, the mind-essence of these two minds are not separated (viz., non-different) and thus constitute one single mind. This mind, which has the two minds and yet is not separated, is called ālayavijñāna.26

The twofold condition of ālayavijñāna is explained by Wŏnhyo as a logical consequence that follows when two mistaken views are removed; the view that the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., tathāgatagarbha) is either identical with or different from the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., phenomenal mind). Wŏnhyo also gives a warning, in this regard, of nihilism and eternalism in a similar way to how he does in discussing the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha, mentioned above. The view that they are identical would end up with nihilism because the mind-essence, or tathāgatagarbha, should also disappear when the arising-and-ceasing mind is eradicated; the view that they are different would amount to eternalism because the mind-essence, which would be regarded as just neither-arising-nor-ceasing, could not move along in accordance with various conditions.27 The logical basis of this twofold condition of ālayavijñāna, in this sense, may be traced back to the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha. Viewed from the perspective of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, tathāgatagarbha is distinct from the arising-and-ceasing mind and thus their unification in ālayavijñāna will also be in a non-identical condition. In this case, ālayavijñāna may not be seen as identical to (or not-different from) tathāgatagarbha. By contrast, from the perspective of the arising-and-ceasing nature of tathāgatagarbha, it may be said to accord with the arising-and-ceasing mind and accordingly, their unification will be in a non-different condition. In this case, ālayavijñāna is viewed as identical to (or not-different from) tathāgatagarbha.

On the basis of this twofold unification in ālayavijñāna, Wŏnhyo also explains the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra’s inconsistent statements on the relationship between ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra is well-known for taking an ambiguous position on the relationship between ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha. Ālayavijñāna is sometimes equated with tathāgatagarbha, thereby implying that it is pure; at other times, it is regarded as separate from it, with the connotation that it is impure.28 Wŏnhyo seeks to resolve this problem by drawing upon the twofold condition of the ālayavijñāna. When the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing mind are unified in a non-identical condition, the ālayavijñāna is described as separated from the tathāgatagarbha. On the contrary, when they are unified in a non-different condition, ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha are identified with each other.29 In Wŏnhyo’s view, if the tathāgatagarbha did not have a twofold nature, but had only one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, the unification, if ever, between tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind would only occur in a non-identical condition, and tathāgatagarbha could not move along in accordance with the arising-and-ceasing mind.

Fazang’s view on ālayavijñāna is quite different from Wŏnhyo’s. I have mentioned that Fazang only accepts the unitary nature of tathāgatagarbha: the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing. Then, the twofold unification in ālayavijñāna should occur between the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind; Fazang does not need the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha to explain the twofold unification in ālayavijñāna. When considered from Wŏnhyo’s perspective, the unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind constitutes only one side of the twofold unification, that is, the unification in a non-identical condition. In Fazang’s view, however, the tathāgatagarbha, which only has the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, still moves itself and produces the arising-and-ceasing [phenomena],30 and is unified with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. The former activity of the tathāgatagarbha, the activity of moving itself and producing the arising-and-ceasing, is well-known as the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. rulaizang yuanqi 如來藏緣起) or the dependent origination of Thusness (C. zhenru yuanqi 眞如緣起); the latter activity of its unification with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition as the unification of truth and delusion (C. zhenwang hehe 眞妄和合).31

The doctrine of dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (or Thusness) means that all of the phenomenal world is evolved from tathāgatagarbha (or Thusness). This doctrine is often regarded as deviating from, or even contradictory to, the position of the early Yogācāra tradition, according to which the evolution of the phenomenal world typically occurs from ālayavijñāna, an arising-and-ceasing (viz., conditioned, C. youwei 有爲, saṃskāra) dharma, not from tathāgatagarbha or Thusness, neither-arising-nor-ceasing (viz., unconditioned, C. wuwei 無爲, asaṃskāra) dharma. In East Asia, however, as Fazang’s interpretation of the Awakening of Faith was established as the most influential commentary of the treatise, the theory of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha was also predominantly accepted as a doctrinal frame for understanding it. In the four-fold taxonomy (C. jiaopan 敎判) of Buddhist teaching, which Fazang explicates at the beginning of the Yiji, texts such as the Awakening of Faith and the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra are attributed to the fourth and highest level as the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaizang yuanqi zong 如來藏緣起宗).32 According to this doctrine, tathāgatagarbha, despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, directly participates in such an activity as the dependent origination. Fazang declares that the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha indicates the doctrine of interfusion and non-obstruction between the principle and phenomena (C. lishi rongtong wuai shuo 理事融通無礙說), implying that a direct interaction occurs between the principle (C. li 理; viz., tathāgatagarbha) and phenomena (C. shi 事; viz., the arising-and-ceasing).33 Indeed, Fazang states that the tathāgatagarbha of this teaching, which conforms to (phenomenal) conditions to constitute the ālayavijñāna, refers to the principle and it penetrates into phenomena (C. liche yushi 理徹於事).34 In Fazang’s view, the tathāgatagarbha’s interaction with the arising-and-ceasing mind, which is described in the Awakening of Faith, is none other than a direct interaction between principle and phenomena.

The unification of truth and delusion refers to the unification of the tathāgatagarbha (viz., truth) and the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., delusion) in a neither-identical nor-different condition. Fazang used this term to account for the unification of the two minds in the ālayavijñāna,35 and afterwards, it came to be adopted widely throughout East Asia, along with its connotation. As a result, the ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith is generally called the consciousness in which truth and delusion are unified (C. zhenwang hehe shi 眞妄和合識). Fazang’s view on the twofold unification in the ālayavijñāna might not appear different from Wŏnhyo’s in its appearance; just as Wŏnhyo does, Fazang also explains the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra’s equivocal statements regarding the relationship between tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna36 in terms of the twofold unification in ālayavijñāna.37 However, the implications of the twofold unification in Fazang’s view are different from those in Wŏnhyo’s. Unlike Wŏnhyo, who explains each side of the twofold unification respectively based on the twofold nature of the tathāgatagarbha, Fazang interprets this twofold unification in the ālayavijñāna as a single state, in which the truth and delusion are interfused to each other. In other words, for Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different condition of the unification is a new state in the unitary condition, which is distinguished from both the non-identical condition and the non-different condition. Although the neither-identical-nor-different condition of ālayavijñāna may be called ‘twofold’ merely based on its formal division into ‘not-identical’ and ‘not-different’, it does not mean that it has two distinct aspects, because the tathāgatagarbha has a unitary, now twofold, nature. This interfused state of the unification of the tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind in ālayavijñāna is known by Fazang as “the unification of truth and delusion”, and is explicated in his comments on ālayavijñāna, as follows:

As for the above statement, “This consciousness has two natures [of the enlightenment and the non-enlightenment],” the “natures” are somewhat difficult [to understand] and now I summarize the [entire] passage above and below to briefly describe the meaning. For the rest of the passages, one will then understand it when [later] reading it. As for what [it is like, it is] as follows: Thusness (C. zhenru 眞如) has two aspects. One is the aspect of unchangeability (C. bubian yi 不變義), and the other is the aspect of conforming to [changing] conditions (C. suiyuan yi 隨緣義). Nescience (C. wuming 無明, avidyā) also has two meanings. One is the aspect of emptiness that lacks the essence (C. wuti jikong yi 無體即空義), and the other is the aspect of functioning that forms phenomena (C. youyong chengshi yi 有用成事義). Truth (C. zhen 眞), [i.e., Thusness] and delusion (C. wang 妄), [i.e., nescience] constitute the abode of Thusness (C. zhenrumen 眞如門) on the basis of the former aspects, and constitute the abode of arising-and-ceasing (C. shenmiemen 生滅門) on the basis of the latter aspects.

[The two latter aspects, that is,] Thusness that conforms to conditions (C. suiyuan zhenru 隨緣眞如) and nescience that forms phenomena (C. chengshi wuming 成事無明) each also have two aspects. One is the aspect of opposing itself and according with the other (C. weizi shunta yi 違自順他義), and the other is the aspect of opposing the other and according with itself (C. weita shunzi yi 違他順自義). In the case of nescience [that forms phenomena], the first [aspect of] opposing itself and according with the other has two further aspects. One is [the aspect of] being capable of refusing [language] expositions to reveal the virtuous merits of the nature [of Thusness] (C. nengfanduiquan shixinggongde 能反對詮示性功德), and the other is [the aspect of] being capable of knowing the meaning of names to accomplish pure functions (C. nengzhimingyi chengjingyong 能知名義成淨用). The [second aspect of] opposing the other and according with itself also has two aspects. One is [the aspect of] covering truth (C. fu zhenli 覆眞理), and the other is [the aspect of] forming delusory mind (C. cheng wangxin 成妄心). In the case of Thusness [that conforms to conditions], the [aspect of] opposing the other and according with itself has also two aspects. One is [the aspect of] reversing delusion and defilements to reveal its own merits (C. fanduiwangran xianzide 翻對妄染顯自德), and the other is [the aspect of] internally perfuming nescience to arouse pure functions (C. neixunwuming qijingyong 內熏無明起淨用). [The aspect of] opposing itself and according with the other has also two aspects. One is the aspect of hiding its true essence (C. yinzizhenti yi 隱自眞體義), and the other is the aspect of manifesting delusive dharmas (C. xianxianwangfa yi 顯現妄法義).

Among the four aspects for each of the truth and delusion, on the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of refusing [language] expositions to reveal [the virtuous merits] in case of nescience and the aspect of reversing delusion to reveal merits in case of Thusness, one can come to have original enlightenment. On the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of being capable of knowing the meaning of names in case of nescience and the aspect of internally perfuming in case of Thusness, one can come to have initial enlightenment. In addition, on the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of covering the truth in case of nescience and the aspect of hiding the essence in case of Thusness, one can come to have the original non-enlightenment (C. genben bujue 根本不覺). And, on the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of forming delusion in case of nescience and the aspect of manifesting delusion in case of Thusness, one can come to have the derivative no-enlightenment (C. zhimo bujue 枝末不覺).

In this abode of arising-and-ceasing, [the nature of] the truth and delusion is briefly divided into four aspects, but in detailed level, there are eight aspects. When [paired aspects from Thusness and nescience] are unified to constitute the dependent origination, there are four divisions, namely, two for enlightenment and two for non-enlightenment. When the origin and its derivatives are not separated from each other, there are only two divisions, namely, enlightenment and non-enlightenment. When [they are all] interfused to encompass each other, there are only one, namely, the abode of arising-and-ceasing of the one mind (C. yixin shengmie men 一心生滅門).38

The unification of the truth and delusion, described in the above passage, may be represented in Figure 1.

As seen in Figure 1, the mutual interfusion between Thusness and nescience represents a state, in which truth and delusion, are intricately interconnected to constitute ālayavijñāna. For Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different state of the unification in ālayavijñāna is not dividable into two aspects of the non-identical condition and the non-different condition; rather, it is a unitary state called ‘synthetic’ consciousness. It was due to this interpretation that the concept of ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith has been regarded as doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra Buddhism. The ‘synthetic’ structure of the ālayavijñāna, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha is directly interacting with the arising-and-ceasing mind, is simply incongruous with the early Yogācāra’s understanding of tathāgatagarbha or Thusness as the unconditioned dharmas. Moreover, the ālayavijñāna in this ‘synthetic’ state has a metaphysical implication, which is generally not accepted in Buddhist tradition.40 It might be said that Fazang succeeded in compromising the contemporary doctrinal tension by interpreting ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith as the ‘synthetic’ consciousness, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind are interpenetrated to each other. However, as far as Fazang’s claim that tathāgatagarbha and the phenomenal world, or Thusness and nescience, are unified in one state has a metaphysical connotation, his interpretation of ālayavijñāna also remains odd from the general standpoint of Buddhist tradition.

4. Concluding Reflections

The Awakening of Faith has been considered to doctrinally deviate from the early Yogācāra because of its innovative description of ālayavijñāna as the ‘synthetic’ consciousness, in which the tathāgatagarbha and the phenomenal mind are unified. This way of understanding has mostly been based on Huayan exegete Fazang’s commentary, according to which Thusness and nescience, truth and delusion, or principle and phenomena, are interpenetrated in the ālayavijñāna. The question of how the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha can participate in the arising-and-ceasing activities of the phenomenal world still remains a problem innate to Fazang’s interpretation. In comparison, Wŏnhyo’s commentaries of the Awakening of Faith suggest an alternative view on the ālayavijñāna. By considering the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha, which includes not only the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, but also the arising-and-ceasing nature, Wŏnhyo explains how tathāgatagarbha keeps its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature on the one hand, and also engages itself in the phenomenal world on the other hand. On the basis of this understanding the tathāgatagarbha, the unification of the tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind in ālayavijñāna is also explained in a twofold way—the unification in a not-identical condition on the one hand, and in a not-different condition on the other hand. In this way, Wŏnhyo explains doctrinal compatibility between the ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith and that of the early Yogācāra, and based on his perspective on the tathāgatagarbha and the ālayavijñāna, we may see a possible doctrinal connection between the Awakening of Faith and the early Yogācāra.