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Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology

School of Philosophy, Psychology & Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK
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Humanities 2013, 2(3), 351-368; https://doi.org/10.3390/h2030351
Received: 12 June 2013 / Revised: 21 June 2013 / Accepted: 25 June 2013 / Published: 8 July 2013
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Legacy of Richard Rorty)
We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty’s view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach. View Full-Text
Keywords: transcendental arguments; radical skepticism; metaepistemological skepticism; theoretical diagnosis; Barry Stroud transcendental arguments; radical skepticism; metaepistemological skepticism; theoretical diagnosis; Barry Stroud
MDPI and ACS Style

Pritchard, D.; Ranalli, C. Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2013, 2, 351-368. https://doi.org/10.3390/h2030351

AMA Style

Pritchard D, Ranalli C. Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities. 2013; 2(3):351-368. https://doi.org/10.3390/h2030351

Chicago/Turabian Style

Pritchard, Duncan, and Christopher Ranalli. 2013. "Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology" Humanities 2, no. 3: 351-368. https://doi.org/10.3390/h2030351

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