Mapping Religion in Australian Federal Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of 288 Federal Statutes

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I suggest the author consider making the article less descriptive and more personal. In other words, while I appreciated the potential for describing the modes of action of religious actors, I was somewhat disappointed by the conclusions. I find the use of the interdisciplinary metaphor of frictions innovative, but I believe it ultimately describes the traditional conflicts that the law is called upon to manage.

I also feel that the legal part is lacking. I find an explicit reference to the law in the description of the Rome Call, but I don't see the legal arguments I would have liked to see: for example, the EU regulation on the ethics of AI.

Author Response

Comment 1: I suggest the author consider making the article less descriptive and more personal. In other words, while I appreciated the potential for describing the modes of action of religious actors, I was somewhat disappointed by the conclusions.

Response: Thank you for this helpful comment. In revising the paper, I have substantially restructured the introduction, discussion, and conclusion to move beyond description and to present a stronger analytical and interpretive argument. The revised text (particularly pp. 3–5 and 35–38) now explicitly articulates the paper’s central claim: that Australian federal legislation reveals a distinctive model of legislative balancing in the management of religion–state relations. This framing provides a clear authorial voice and interpretive perspective, connecting the empirical findings to broader theoretical questions about Australia’s pragmatic secularism. The conclusion now draws out the normative significance of these findings, establishing the paper’s contribution to understanding Australia’s state–religion relationship rather than simply describing legislative frequency.

Comment 2: I find the use of the interdisciplinary metaphor of frictions innovative, but I believe it ultimately describes the traditional conflicts that the law is called upon to manage.

Response: Thank you for this observation. I have taken this comment on board and removed the “frictions” metaphor from the revised manuscript. While the metaphor was intended to capture the dynamic interactions between law and religion, I accept that it risked reiterating traditional conflict-based frameworks rather than offering fresh analytical insight. In its place, I have adopted the concept of legislative balancing (see pp. 4–5, 26–28), which more accurately reflects how Australian law actively mediates religious and secular interests through statutory design rather than through conflict. This shift strengthens the legal and theoretical framing of the paper and better aligns with its empirical findings.

Comment 3: I also feel that the legal part is lacking. I find an explicit reference to the law in the description of the Rome Call, but I don't see the legal arguments I would have liked to see: for example, the EU regulation on the ethics of AI.

Response: Thank you for highlighting this concern. I have substantially expanded the legal analysis throughout the paper, particularly in the discussion sections on taxation, discrimination, and education (pp. 22–32). These now include explicit engagement with Australian legal sources, statutory frameworks, and leading scholars such as Evans, Aroney, Parkinson, and Deagon. The argument now clearly links the empirical findings to underlying legal principles, including how legislative exemptions function as a mechanism for balancing rights within Australia’s secular framework. I have chosen not to include discussion of the EU’s AI regulation, as this paper focuses exclusively on Australian law and aims to provide an empirical baseline for understanding the Australian model of legislative balancing. Including EU material would extend the scope beyond the jurisdictional and conceptual boundaries of the study.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article has a clear statement of aim and structure.

This is certainly an original contribution in terms of the empirical analysis. The authors need to do more work to articulate the significance of the paper in Australian law and religion scholarship. The article seems to be essentially saying 'religious terms are frequently mentioned in federal legislation' which is not an especially significant proposal. Some important scholars are mentioned but only briefly and selectively. For example engagement with Evans 'Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in Australia' and existing textbooks such as Paul Babie, Joshua Neoh, James Krumrey-Quinn and Chong Tsang 'Religion and Law in Australia' 3rd ed (2022) would assist in showing the significance of this work.

The authors also do not mention until the end that further analysis is required with respect to state and territory legislation. As my intuition is state and territory legislation would contain many more references to religious terms, this should be noted at the beginning with a brief explanation of Australia's federal system and that Cth law only will be considered in this article for feasibility (which I assume is the reason).

I am not an expert in empirical studies, but the method seems logicial and clearly set out. However, why have Christian as a specific category in Appendix A? This is not explained. I also note the 'Miscellaneous' category is the second most frequent to appear. The authors address this on p 8, but it remains that if it is the second most frequent category, perhaps there needs to be more rigour in the articulation of categories. The results otherwise are presented clearly.

The discussion of tax exemption and charities on pp 9-10 is one-sided. It would be appropriate to mention that 1) taxpayers who are employed by or volunteer for religious organisations already pay income tax as individuals and 2) relief from tax burdens is on the basis that religious organisations are providing a public good and removing work from the state in doing so. See eg related work by Fowler and Deagon on this.

The discussion of discrimination and education is more balanced but requires more engagement with relevant scholarship. This includes publications by Aroney, Parkinson, Deagon, Foster etc.

At line 538 - how does legislative balancing risk privileging FoRB? This is asserted without explanation or justification. Relatedly, it does not make sense to claim that legislative balancing protects and privileges FoRB while leaving less well-known religious practices vulnerable (at line 637), since the former entails protection of the latter.

Typos/expression: Generally well written but some errors including line 30 should be 'no', lines 92, 193, 239, 302-303, 327-328, 526-528 need to be redrafted, line 221 should be 'statutes', line 483 should be Monsma, line 552 should be 'within', line 603 should be Act's, line 631 should be 'of'.

Overall, the article could make an important contribution but requires revisions. If these are implemented then I will look forward to seeing it published.

Author Response

Comment 1: This is certainly an original contribution in terms of the empirical analysis. The authors need to do more work to articulate the significance of the paper in Australian law and religion scholarship. The article seems to be essentially saying 'religious terms are frequently mentioned in federal legislation' which is not an especially significant proposal. Some important scholars are mentioned but only briefly and selectively. For example engagement with Evans 'Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in Australia' and existing textbooks such as Paul Babie, Joshua Neoh, James Krumrey-Quinn and Chong Tsang 'Religion and Law in Australia' 3rd ed (2022) would assist in showing the significance of this work.

Response: Thank you for this valuable feedback. I have substantially revised the introduction and discussion to more clearly articulate the paper’s significance within Australian law and religion scholarship. The revised text (pp. 3–6 and 34–38) now situates the study within existing debates about the Australian model of state–religion relations and explains how the findings provide an empirical foundation for understanding legislative balancing as a distinctive form of rights management. I have also expanded engagement with key Australian scholars, including Evans (Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in Australia), and Babie, Neoh, Krumrey-Quinn, and Tsang (Religion and Law in Australia, 3rd ed, 2022). These additions demonstrate how the paper complements and extends doctrinal analyses by providing the first comprehensive empirical mapping of religious references across Commonwealth legislation, thereby establishing its scholarly and practical significance.

Comment 2: The authors also do not mention until the end that further analysis is required with respect to state and territory legislation. As my intuition is state and territory legislation would contain many more references to religious terms, this should be noted at the beginning with a brief explanation of Australia's federal system and that Cth law only will be considered in this article for feasibility (which I assume is the reason).

Response: have revised the introduction and methods sections (pp. 5–7) to clarify at the outset that the analysis is limited to Commonwealth legislation and to explain why state and territory laws are excluded. The revised text now includes a short explanation of Australia’s federal system, noting that many areas of law—such as education, health, and criminal law—fall primarily within state and territory jurisdiction. This contextualises the study’s focus on federal statutes as a deliberate methodological choice made for feasibility and to establish an empirical baseline for future comparative research across jurisdictions. The conclusion (p. 38) also reiterates this point, highlighting that analysis of state and territory legislation will form the next phase of this broader research project.

Comment 3: I am not an expert in empirical studies, but the method seems logicial and clearly set out. However, why have Christian as a specific category in Appendix A? This is not explained. I also note the 'Miscellaneous' category is the second most frequent to appear. The authors address this on p 8, but it remains that if it is the second most frequent category, perhaps there needs to be more rigour in the articulation of categories. The results otherwise are presented clearly.

Response: 

I have revised the methods and findings sections (pp. 12–17 and 20–23) to provide clearer explanations for the categorisation system, including the rationale for the “Christian” and “Miscellaneous” categories. The term Christian was included only when statutes explicitly referenced Christianity or its institutions (e.g. “Christian schools,” “Christian missions”), to preserve accuracy in coding where the reference could not be interpreted generically. This clarification is now explained in the revised methodological notes (pp. 13–14).

Similarly, the “Miscellaneous” category has been more rigorously defined (pp. 21–22). It now captures unique, one-off references that do not align with existing thematic categories—such as isolated mentions of non-Abrahamic traditions or singular religious contexts—while avoiding duplication or over-fragmentation of theme. These refinements strengthen the methodological transparency and replicability of the study.

Comment 4: The discussion of tax exemption and charities on pp 9-10 is one-sided. It would be appropriate to mention that 1) taxpayers who are employed by or volunteer for religious organisations already pay income tax as individuals and 2) relief from tax burdens is on the basis that religious organisations are providing a public good and removing work from the state in doing so. See eg related work by Fowler and Deagon on this.

Response: 

I have revised the taxation and charities discussion (pp. 20–26) to ensure greater balance and nuance. The updated section now explicitly notes that religious organisations’ employees and volunteers remain personally subject to income tax and that organisational exemptions are justified by the public benefits they provide through charitable and social services. These points directly address your concerns about fairness and fiscal rationale.

I have also added citations to relevant Australian scholarship, including Fowler and Deagon, who analyse the justification for religious tax exemptions in the context of public benefit and charity law. These revisions make the discussion more even-handed and situate the analysis more firmly within the Australian scholarly debate. The expanded section now clearly distinguishes between policy critique and empirical observation, emphasising how taxation exemptions illustrate the complexity—not partiality—of Australia’s state–religion relationship

Comment 5: The discussion of discrimination and education is more balanced but requires more engagement with relevant scholarship. This includes publications by Aroney, Parkinson, Deagon, Foster etc. 

Response: 

I have revised the sections on discrimination and education (pp. 26–33) to engage more directly with leading Australian scholars, including Aroney, Parkinson, Deagon, and Foster. These additions strengthen the doctrinal and theoretical grounding of the analysis by connecting the legislative patterns identified in the empirical data to broader debates about religious freedom, anti-discrimination law, and the regulation of faith-based education.

In particular, I have incorporated discussion of Aroney and Parkinson’s work on legislative balancing and institutional autonomy, Deagon’s scholarship on religious exemptions and equality law, and Foster’s analysis of freedom of religion in educational contexts. These references clarify how federal legislation reflects ongoing efforts to reconcile religious freedom with non-discrimination norms. The revised discussion thereby deepens the analytical framework while maintaining the empirical focus of the paper.

Comment 6: At line 538 - how does legislative balancing risk privileging FoRB? This is asserted without explanation or justification. Relatedly, it does not make sense to claim that legislative balancing protects and privileges FoRB while leaving less well-known religious practices vulnerable (at line 637), since the former entails protection of the latter.

Response: 

The relevant section (pp. 30–31) has been substantially revised to clarify the reasoning behind the argument about legislative balancing and its potential to privilege freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). The revised text now explains that because balancing occurs at the legislative drafting stage rather than through judicial proportionality analysis, exemptions tend to reflect the beliefs and practices that are already institutionally recognised or socially visible. This can unintentionally privilege dominant or well-understood religions—those likely to be considered in parliamentary debate—while leaving less familiar or minority faith practices unprotected. The revision also clarifies that the risk is structural rather than doctrinal: the privileging arises from who is anticipated when laws are framed, not from what FoRB protects.

This clarification directly addresses the reviewer’s concern by distinguishing between protection in principle (which covers all religions equally) and protection in practice (which depends on recognition within the legislative process)

 

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I have read the new version. I believe the author has made appropriate changes and made the paper scientifically sound. The
gaps have been addressed. The paper can now be published without
further revision. 

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I am satisfied that the authors have adequately responded to the peer review comments. There are a few typos that need to be fixed but otherwise it's ready for publication.