Incremental Progress in Combating IUU Fishing: A Review of China’s 2020 Administrative Regulations for Distant-Water Fisheries

Abstract

Addressing the illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the water beyond its jurisdiction poses a significant challenge for China as it aims to establish itself as a responsible participant in global fishing governance. Inadequate regulation and enforcement largely contribute to the increase in the suspected illegal fishing by Chinese vessels, fishing enterprises, and crew members. In 2020, China revised the RDWF (2020) to address the growing issues of IUU fishing. This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the RDWF (2020) in addressing China’s IUU fishing in distant water. This paper concludes that RDWF (2020) represents an incremental advancement in China’s initiatives to eliminate IUU fishing. RDWF (2020) emphasizes the government’s responsibilities in regulating vessel quantities and ensuring accurate reporting. Furthermore, RDWF (2020) adopts measures to fulfill China’s responsibilities under RFMOs. Additionally, RDWF (2020) expands the roster of operators liable for penalties and delineates IUU fishing activities that necessitate sanctions. Ultimately, RDWF (2020) develops an evaluation system to monitor compliance with anti-IUU fishing obligations as stipulated by international treaties and Chinese laws and regulations. However, RDWF (2020) encounters limitations that may impede its effectiveness in addressing IUU fishing, such as the lack of responsibilities assigned to administrative bodies, insufficient penalties for serious IUU fishing activities, and inadequate compliance with international standards for sustainable fishing. This paper provides policymakers specific recommendations for improving the identified areas of RDWF (2020) and offers insights for distant-water fishing nations that are grappling with significant IUU fishing issues to make gradual improvements in combating IUU fishing.

1. Introduction

The United Nations has identified illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing as one of the seven primary threats to global maritime security.1 IUU fishing is projected to cause annual economic losses of up to billions of dollars globally while posing a direct threat to marine ecosystems and livelihoods of coastal communities reliant on fisheries (Baird 2006). The definition of IUU fishing has not been established in international law or academic discussions. Instead, the definition is frequently cross-referenced to the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) (Honniball and Schatz 2023; Serdy 2017). According to Article 3 of IPOA-IUU, illegal fishing is defined as violating national, regional, or international fisheries conservation laws and regulations. It also includes actions in waters within a state’s authority without permission; unreported fishing occurs when fishing operations are not reported or are misreported to fisheries management authorities at national or regional levels; unregulated fishing refers to stateless or non-party fishing vessels operating in regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) regions or fishing activities that take place in areas or for fish stocks where no applicable conservation or management measures exist and where such fishing activities are carried out in a manner that contradicts state responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law (Food and Agriculture Organization 2001).

The People’s Republic of China (China) is a major marine country featuring distant-water fishing. Under Chinese law, the term “distant-water fishing” refers to fishing activities and fishing-related processing, supply, and product transportation activities conducted by Chinese flagged vessels as well as Chinese natural or legal persons on the high seas and waters under the jurisdiction of other states (excluding fishery activities in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, etc., which are managed by the bilateral fishery agreements between China and other countries) (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2024). China has 177 licensed distant-water fishing enterprises and 2551 vessels operating in the Pacific, Indian, Atlantic, and Antarctic Oceans, as well as in the waters under the jurisdiction of cooperating states, producing an annual yield of 2.328 million tons (Food and Agriculture Organization 2001). Preventing Chinese flagged vessels and nationals from carrying out IUU fishing in distant water poses significant challenges for China. The IUU Fishing Index suggests that Chinese flagged vessels are responsible for a great number of IUU fishing activities in distant water and China ranks lowest in terms of fulfilling its responsibilities as a flag state in addressing IUU fishing in distant water (Yu and Jiang 2024). Over 900 Chinese-flagged vessels were reported to have harvested illegally in North Korean waters in 2017; the amount produced is comparable to that of Japan and South Korea combined (Chen et al. 2018). IUU fishing conducted by Chinese vessels and nationals is exacerbated by deficiencies in local legislation, weak enforcement tools, and a lack of international cooperation (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2023).

As a result, addressing IUU fishing has become a top concern for Chinese distant-water fisheries management. China’s Fisheries Law establishes the overarching legal framework for fishing, whereas the Administrative Regulations for Distant-Water Fisheries (RDWF) detail the specific requirements for administering Chinese distant-water fishing. RDWF is a departmental rule adopted by the State Council (Yu and Chang 2023). RDWF is adhered to by government authorities and is designed to be flexible, allowing for timely updates to solve emerging issues in distant-water fishing (Global Initiative 2019). Since its inception in 2003, RDWF has been crucial to China’s regulatory activities governing distant-water fishing. Nonetheless, the original RDWF, as well as its amendments in 2004 and 2016, lacked concrete measures to implement China’s responsibility to prevent its flagged vessels from fishing illegally. Since 2016, the Chinese government has taken steps to stop illegal fishing conducted by its vessels as well as natural and legal persons. For example, it has taken away the licenses of six fishing companies that were involved in illicit activities and fined vessels and captains connected to these companies more than one billion yuan. However, IUU fishing in distant water fails to be regulated by RDWF and RDWF lacks effectiveness (Park et al. 2020). As a result, Chinese fishing businesses continue to participate in unauthorized fishing in the water under foreign jurisdiction. In 2019, Argentine military fired on the Chinese fishing vessel Hua Xiang 801 for illegally entering Argentina’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and refusing inspection, sparking a major international scandal (Gou and Yang 2023).

To resolve these concerns and enhance cooperation with the international community in combating IUU fishing, China implemented significant revisions to RDWF and issued the revised version in 2020 (RDWF (2020)) (Wang and Zou 2021). RDWF (2020) specifically incorporates the concept of anti-IUU fishing and categorically prohibits this practice, in contrast to its predecessor. In 2023, the Development of China’s Distant-Water Fisheries indicated that a comprehensive anti-IUU fishing system has been built under RDWF (2020), and a number of enforcement actions have been implemented in compliance with RDWF (2020) (Xue 2006). Despite the reported gains, there is a lack of research into the effectiveness of China’s new anti-IUU fishing regulations. This report reviews RDWF’s (2020) IUU fishing prevention measures, assesses their success and problems, and makes recommendations to improve them. The second part provides a history of RDWF’s formulation as well as an outline of its composition. The third part focuses on the progress made by RDWF (2020) in combating IUU fishing. Finally, this paper discusses potential concerns encountered by RDWF (2020) and recommends additional improvements. This paper can serve as a reform guide for Chinese authorities to eliminate IUU fishing in distant water, as well as provide lessons for other distant-water finishing nations that face severe IUU fishing difficulties to make consistent progress in combating IUU fishing.

2. Evolution and Impact of RDWF (2020)

The evolution of RDWF reflects China’s shifting priorities in fisheries governance and the growing demand for international cooperation. Initially introduced in 2003, RDWF was a response to the need for more effective control and oversight over China’s distant-water fishing vessels. Moreover, international standards developed in this period in treaties and soft laws, such as provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As global awareness of the environmental and economic consequences of unregulated fishing in the water under foreign jurisdiction and on high seas increased, so too did the demand for more stringent regulations. RDWF (2020) marked a significant shift toward more comprehensive regulations. This part examines the rules from the perspective of UNCLOS and subsequent fisheries treaties, focusing on its obligations and China’s response (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2023; State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2019).

2.1. Obligations to Control IUU Fishing Under UNCLOS and Subsequent Fisheries Treaties

UNCLOS signifies the initiation of the global efforts to address illegal and unregulated fishing. Subsequent fisheries treaties establish and delineate obligation for combating IUU fishing. This section will examine the legal framework governing states’ obligations to regulate IUU fishing under the most prominent subsequent fisheries treaties of global application, including the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA) (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2003), the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement) (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2016), and the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (PSMA) (He 2022). UNCLOS mandates that states fulfill obligations to regulate fishing operations and manage unlawful fishing in a zonal approach. In territorial fisheries jurisdiction, geographically confined to internal waters, territorial seas, international straits, and archipelago waters, the coastal state exercises almost full prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement authorities over fishing activities and fishermen within the territory in question, regardless of their nationality or location of registry (Schatz 2016a).

The coastal state bears the principal responsibilities for regulating fishing activity within its EEZ,2 because coastal states are granted sovereign rights to fisheries within their EEZ,3 including both prescriptive4 and enforcement jurisdiction (Schatz 2016b). And UNCLOS also stipulated a supervisory obligation for flag states to ensure private vessels flying a flag comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal state when operating in the foreign EEZ.5 Also, Article 58(3) of UNCLOS suggests a due diligence obligation on states to take the necessary measures to ensure that their nationals are not engaged in IUU fishing activities (Honniball and Schatz 2023).

On the high seas, it is the flag state that bears primary responsibilities for regulating and penalizing illicit fishing.6 UNFSA further requires that parties implement measures to prevent high seas fishing by vessels that do not comply with the stipulations of their licenses, authorizations, or permits.7 The Compliance Agreement strengthens the means for the flag state to exercise jurisdiction and control over fishing vessels that have the right to fly its flag in accordance with the UNCLOS and, at the same time, promotes transparency in high seas fishing operations (Tsai and Wang 2023). And the RFMO is authorized by UNCLOS to promote collaboration among flag states whose vessels operate in the same region to make and implement conservation measures relevant to those vessels.8 UNFSA delineates the flag state’s responsibility to ensure that vessels under its flag adhere to the measures established by RFMOs for straddling fish species and highly migratory fish stocks. In addition to the responsibilities of the flag state, Article 117 of UNCLOS suggests the necessity of implementing active personality-based methods to identify and combat unlawful fishing on the high seas. It requires that the state of nationality must take measures for its crew members to conserve living resources in the high seas. Controversies exist on whether the term “national” in that article pertains to natural and legal persons of a state or is equivalent to vessels bearing the flag of a state, as indicated in the travaux préparatoires of UNCLOS as well as academic discussions.9 Article 7.1 of UNFSA clarifies the obligation of the state of nationality by establishing a distinct obligation from the obligation of the state of nationality in the second section of the flag state to collaborate with the coastal state. The requirement to implement active personality-based measures is referenced in the preambles of both the Compliance Agreement and PSMA. IPOA-IUU encompasses comprehensive obligations for the state of nationality, including directives on prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement actions. In conclusion, although the due diligence obligations upon the state of nationality to address IUU fishing are in a greater state of flux than the more established duties of flag states and coastal states, the winds of change are blowing in the direction of increasing the use of active personality-based jurisdiction to combat IUU fishing as a duty (Honniball 2021).

The lack of effective control and enforcement by flag states, coastal states, and states of nationality makes port state measures a necessary supplementary tool against IUU fishing (Elvestad and Kvalvik 2015). Entered into force in 2016, PSMA lays down a minimum set of standard measures for Parties to apply when foreign vessels seek entry into their ports or while they are in their ports and it is the first binding international agreement that specifically targets IUU fishing. As stipulated in Article 9.4 of PSMA, when a Party has sufficient proof that a vessel seeking entry into its port has engaged in IUU, the Party shall deny that vessel entry into its ports. This measure is designed to prevent IUU fishing by preventing vessels from remaining in ports and unloading their catch (Yu and Chang 2023).

The international standards set out in UNCLOS and other treaties above put forward the obligations for China as a crucial member within to fulfill. The unresolved issues such as devastating ecosystems and exploiting vulnerable labor forces highlight the urgent need for a complete overhaul of China’s fisheries governance, prioritizing international alignment, transparency, and accountability. The initial regulation prioritized domestic economic gain and corporate interests, sidelining crucial environmental protections and international responsibilities. Articles embodying environmental protection reflected the necessities at that point, that is, in the 8th to 9th five-year plan of the economic and social development. However, the weak penalties for non-compliance emboldened operators to engage in illegal practices, treating fines as merely a cost of doing business. Furthermore, accusations of human rights abuse aboard Chinese fishing vessels, including forced labor, poor working conditions, and the exploitation of migrant workers, were ignored, adding another layer of severity to the regulatory shortcomings (Fujii et al. 2021; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2020b).

Revisions to the regulations in 2004 and 2016 failed to address these escalating issues. The 2004 adjustments made minor improvements to licensing procedures but failed to alter the monitoring system or impose responsibilities for unauthorized fishing in the water under foreign jurisdiction. The 2016 update attempted to strengthen enforcement mechanisms but lacked the capacity to ensure compliance across China’s massive vessels. Reports of Chinese vessels engaging in illegal fishing activities, such as fishing in prohibited zones, poaching endangered species, and dumping bycatch at sea, continued to mount. These activities not only exacerbated environmental degradation but also strained diplomatic relations with nations in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, where Chinese vessels have been accused of exploiting lax regulatory environments (Global Initiative 2023; Wang and Zou 2021). Generally, the international standards stand above, while existing revisions could not fulfill the international standards in a proper manner, which, in turn, requires China to conduct what we can see in the RDWF (2020).

2.2. RDWF’s Implementation of China’s Obligations Under the Treaties

Apart from UNCLOS, the international community, particularly through organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and RFMOs, had also raised concerns about the environmental and social consequences of illegal fishing practices.10 The 2020 modification of RDWF marked a major shift in China’s strategy for managing distant-water fisheries. This revision was driven by several factors: the growing international pressure to combat illegal fishing in the water under foreign jurisdiction and on high seas, China’s increasing role in global fisheries management, and the need to address environmental sustainability in the face of widespread global concern.

China has increasingly shown its international commitment to combat IUU fishing. Regarding internationally applicable treaties on fishery management, China is a party to the UNCLOS and recently became a party to PSMA in 2025. But China has signed but not ratified UNFSA and did not sign the Compliance Agreement. For regional fishery conservation cooperation, China has participated in several RFMOs functioning under UNFSA. These include the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, and the Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (Liu 2021).

Most provisions in the RDWF reflect China’s fulfillment of obligations as the flag state and the state of nationality under UNCLOS. The adoption of RDWF demonstrates China’s dedication to its flag state obligations under UNCLOS and reflects a favorable stance towards the Compliance Agreement and UNFSA (Xue 2006).

Generally, RDWF does not distinguish the requirements of fishing vessels inside foreign EEZs and on the high seas; nonetheless, it specifies obligations that are exclusively applicable to vessels operating on the high seas. RDWF (2020) implements a blacklist system to prohibit non-compliant vessels from functioning.11 RDWF acknowledges the other coastal states’ authority to preserve and exploit living resources inside the EEZ. According to Article 10 and Article 30.2 of RDWF, fishing vessels operating in foreign EEZs must secure fishing authorization from the relevant governmental authority of that state and comply with boarding inspections by the competent authorities.12 And Chinese-flagged fishing vessels must maintain a buffer distance from the outer boundaries of other governments’ fisheries authorities where they lack authority to operate.13 For vessels fishing on the high seas, Article 31.1 of RDWF requires the pelagic fishing vessels which operate on high seas to obtain the approval of MARA to conduct fishing activities with the restriction of area, time, species, and ration.14 Fishing vessels that contravene the specified conditions shall incur administrative fines as stipulated in Chapter 7 of RDWF, hence ensuring the successful implementation of flag state management.

RDWF also seeks to govern Chinese natural and legal entities involved in distant-water fishing. The scope of application of RDWF encompasses Chinese natural and legal persons.15 The rationale behind China’s emphasis on regulating its fishing enterprises is the widespread use of “flags of convenience” as well as “charter” and “joint venture” arrangements that render difficult the identification of actual beneficial ownership and indeed the flag a vessel is flying often has little bearing on the beneficial ownership of the landed catch (Pauly et al. 2013). Under RDWF, Fishing firms are required to have authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs before engaging in fishing activities within foreign EEZs. A fishing company must have well-maintained vessels, sufficient financial resources, and managerial staff with a minimum of three years of experience to secure approval.16 Directors of distant-water fishing enterprises are likewise subject to IUU blacklists, and those identified will be ineligible to qualify and retain their positions for a specified duration.17 Furthermore, RDWF has mandated that Chinese fishing firms enhance protections for the labor rights of crew members and implement safety and health measures.18

It is also notable that RDWF has included a new provision on port management, which aligns with the PSMA. Article 38 prohibits vessels listed for IUU fishing by international fisheries organizations from accessing Chinese ports without explicit authorization.19

As above, RDWF (2020), based on the former adjustments, mandates the implementation of a vessel retirement and decommissioning program, aimed at removing outdated and non-compliant vessels from the fleet. The new regulation also introduces a blacklist system to prevent non-compliant vessels from operating. These measures address one of the primary concerns of the international community: illegal and unreported fishing by outdated or non-compliant vessels. These changes signal a shift toward more proactive management practices (Su et al. 2021). Activities mainly including unauthorized fishing in water under foreign jurisdiction were clearly defined as IUU fishing in this document, and the enforcement organs from now on had an official authority to combat the specified IUU fishing in this sphere (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2025).

3. Major Accomplishments of RDWF (2020) in Addressing IUU Fishing

As discussed in Section 2, RDWF represents a significant step forward in strengthening China’s management framework for distant-water fishing. It introduces a series of new provisions to improve China’s capacity to regulate IUU fishing and fulfill its international obligations for marine sustainability. Among these, four aspects of RDWF are particularly noteworthy: the control of vessel numbers, the alignment with international obligations, the enhancement of legal responsibility, and the implementation of annual assessment.

3.1. Enhancing Government Control of Distant-Water Fishing

The Chinese government has encountered criticism for its insufficient control of distant water fishing business (Chu 2024). RDWF (2020) proposes two main approaches to strengthen governmental monitoring of pelagic fishing activities and improve management capacities.

First, regulations controlling the number of pelagic fishing vessels have been strengthened. Article 17 of RDWF (2020) requires that pelagic fishing enterprises return decommissioned fishing vessels to China upon the cessation of pelagic fishing operations. Within five working days after the vessels’ arrival, pelagic fishing operators are required to submit the Notice of Completion of Port Entry Procedures together with a berthing certificate to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA). In contrast to the prior version, which required merely a report from pelagic fishing firms to fishery administrations, the new provision increases MARA’s awareness of the quantity of pelagic fishing vessels and their registration status (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2023). Furthermore, vessels that are beyond their specified operational lifespan are prohibited from participating in pelagic fishing. According to Article 21(2) of RDWF (2020), obsolete vessels must be demolished to prevent their continued involvement in pelagic fishing operations. In practice, by 2022, China’s pelagic fishing vessels reduced from 2701 to 2551, while the number of vessels operating on the high seas declined from 1589 to 1490, reflecting reductions of 5.6% and 5.7%, respectively (Gou and Yang 2023). And these regulations facilitate the Chinese government’s objective of rigorously limiting the number of pelagic fishing vessels to a maximum of 3000 throughout the span of the 14th Five-Year Plan (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2023).

Second, the vessel reporting requirement is enhanced. Article 38(1) of RDWF (2020) establishes a new rule that imposes more stringent reporting obligations for pelagic vessels while entering or departing from ports. The MARA Notice on the Implementation of the Reporting System for Fishing Vessels Entering and Exiting Fishing Ports specifies that the vessel report must encompass facts such as the time of arrival or departure, crew makeup, and means of safety communication; the administrative departments will continuously oversee vessels that either fail to report or do not meet the reporting system’s verification criteria and will impose penalties on vessels that provide fraudulent information or decline to rectify inaccuracies (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2020a). This requirement collaborates with additional monitoring methods, such as the vessel monitoring system (VMS) and annual reporting obligation, alleviating concerns about the disintegration of China’s regulatory system addressing unreported fishing harvest. In 2023, China equipped over 100 Chinese tuna fish vessels operating on the high seas with electronic monitoring systems (Gou and Yang 2023). This routine monitoring also addresses criticisms that China’s responses to IUU fishing are solely reactive to major incidents (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2023). This clause reflects a lesson learned from the practices of leading states, such as Singapore, which mandates that vessel captains report upon approaching a domestic port (Singapore Statutes Online 1992). Consequently, the vessel reporting requirement enhances governmental surveillance of pelagic vessel operations, hence aiding in the prevention and reduction of illegal fishing activities outside regulatory control.

3.2. Adopting Rules to Meet China’s Obligations in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

As a member of multiple regional fisheries management organizations, including the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC) and WCPFC, China is dedicated to meeting its international obligations in those RFMOs and has undertaken measures to harmonize its domestic laws with conservation measures set by those RFMOs.

First, pelagic vessels are prohibited from operating without authorization in the waters under the jurisdiction of other states. The WCPFC and NPFC require their member states to establish domestic measures to prevent fishing vessels from participating in unauthorized fishing activities within the jurisdictions of other states (Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 2000; The North Pacific Fisheries Commission 2015). As a member of the aforementioned RFMOs, China has strengthened this commitment in two respects. Article 31(2) of RDWF (2020) stipulates that pelagic fishing vessels shall maintain a buffer distance from the outer limits of waters where they lack authorization to operate. The General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has issued a notice that specifies the buffer distance of 1 nautical mile for pelagic fisheries safety management, stating that any vessel entering this zone without authorization will face stringent penalties.20 This precautionary action seeks to deter unlawful transnational fishing activities. Furthermore, Article 32(1) of RDWF (2020) stipulates that pelagic fishing vessels must adequately preserve their catches, secure their fishing gear, and promptly notify authorities prior to navigating through waters governed by other states. This provision seeks to address the fishing activities of Chinese vessels operating within the jurisdictions of other states without prior authorization for entry. For example, in 2020, around 340 large Chinese trawlers unlawfully entered the waters of Ecuador (Hu 2020). The newly adopted restrictions prohibit pelagic vessels from unauthorized access to other states’ jurisdiction, and their operations are strictly limited while navigating these areas.

Secondly, pelagic fishing operators are required to comply with and cooperate in enforcement activities by states other than China and regional fisheries management organizations, including boarding and inspection. Article 30(2), as a new provision of RDWF (2020), states the vessel captain’s obligation to identify and cooperate with authorized vessels and personnel for boarding and inspections and bans dodging or resisting inspection by violent or dangerous means. This amendment addresses earlier occurrences in which Chinese vessels suspected of engaging in fishing that violates laws of the coastal state refused to accept boarding inspections by the fishery management authority of the coastal state. For instance, in 2019, the Chinese pelagic vessel Hua Xiang 801 unlawfully operated within Argentina’s EEZ, refused inspection by Argentine authorities, and executed aggressive maneuvers towards an Argentine vessel. This prompted the Argentine coast guard to discharge firearms at Hua Xiang 801, culminating in a significant international dispute (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2019). In addition, the deficiency of education concerning international obligations imposed on China may result in non-compliance by crew members. To resolve this issue, RDWF (2020) establishes the requirement for accepting boarding and inspections, rendering the associated obligations more comprehensible for the crew members. This modification also aligns with international commitments under the regulations of RFMOs to which China is a party, including Article 13(7) of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the North Pacific Ocean and Article 6(2) of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (The North Pacific Fisheries Commission 2015; Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 2000). China’s new move follows the practices of pioneering states, such as the United States, which mandates that vessels permit comprehensive inspections by authorized inspectors (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations 2024). Furthermore, in contrast to the United States, China has prioritized adherence to international treaties and the mandates of RFMOs, highlighting its dedication to meeting international responsibilities. Indeed, over 4000 Chinese vessel captains and crew members in the distant water fishery sector have received qualification training from 2020 to 2022, enhancing the industry’s compliance capacity (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2023). Additionally, after the implementation of RDWF (2020), the boarding inspection conducted by Chinese authorities that targets at Chinese-flagged vessels has been strengthened. In 2020, the Chinese coast guard inspected and recorded 105 Chinese-flagged vessels, which is a significant improvement compared to recording 21 vessels in 2019 (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2018).

Third, RDWF (2020) imposes responsibility for non-compliance with obligations under international treaties. According to Articles 39(6), 39(8), and 39(10), pelagic enterprises, vessels, or crew members shall be held accountable if they obstruct boarding inspections, refuse to accept observers from RFMOs or other states, or are recognized by relevant RFMOs as engaging in, facilitating, or aiding IUU fishing activities. These articles explicitly codify established practices in China that associate breaches of international duties with legal responsibilities under Chinese law. For example, in 2025, the Chinese government imposed sanctions on a Chinese-flagged vessel reported by Canada to the NPFC for the captain of the vessel misreporting catch data (Noticias Jurídicas 2003). This addition also corresponds with leading state practice, exemplified by Spain, which holds fishing vessels accountable for non-compliance with international responsibilities under domestic law (Baird 2006).

3.3. Strengthening the Legal Responsibility for Violations of Anti-IUU Rules

Numerous countries are beginning to implement stricter punishments on illegal fishing. For example, Australia has adopted a rigorous forfeiture of vessels as a sanction for non-compliance (Yin and Wang 2024). Egypt has established a maximum penalty of EGP 10 million for violations of its fisheries regulations (Oanta 2022). Similarly, China has adopted several provisions to enhance legal responsibility for illegal and unreported fishing activities through RDWF (2020), addressing deficiencies in the earlier versions of RDWF that omitted such responsibilities.

First, the scope of those subject to punishment has been broadened to enhance the efficacy of punishing distant fishing that violates Chinese laws on regulating distant-water fishing. Article 34(1) of RDWF (2020) has imposed legal liability on the management personnel of the pelagic fishery project. The MARA subsequently released a blacklist where the management personnel were categorized as project leaders, managers, and captains. Article 34(2) of RDWF (2020) requires that individuals on the blacklist are prohibited from serving as primary managers or project leaders of pelagic fishery enterprises for three years and are ineligible to apply for a fishing vessel crew certificate for up to five years following the revocation of their credentials. These rules increase the expenses associated with illegal fishing by directly holding management personnel liable. And they align with advanced state practices, such as those in Spain, which impose liability on people operating or managing IUU vessels or owners of IUU vessels (García 2022).

Secondly, RDWF (2020) specifies IUU fishing activities that incur legal responsibility. It represents a significant advancement over preceding iterations of RDWF. Article 39(4) clarifies the spectrum of penalties associated with illicit fishing activities, including the use of prohibited fishing gear or methods, targeting species restricted by relevant RFMOs, and the capture of rare and endangered marine animals. Article 39(9) specifies illegal fishing activities occurring during distant-water fishing, including the intentional disabling, relocation, or interference with ship position monitoring and the automatic identification of fishing vessels; the deliberate submission of false information; the arbitrary alteration of the vessel’s name, identification code, or fishing parameters; and the unauthorized modification of the fishing vessel’s main engine. Where a pelagic fishing enterprise, vessel, or personnel has conducted the aforementioned violations, penalties will be imposed in accordance with the Fishery Law of the People’s Republic of China, and MARA will suspend or cancel their qualifications. For example, in 2025, two vessels from a marine fishery enterprise in Shandong Province were discovered dismantling the position monitoring equipment. As a result, the enterprise was fined CNY 400,000 in total, the qualifications of two vessels were suspended, and the certificates of two captains were temporarily withheld (Shen and Heino 2014). These particular rules on IUU fishing responsibilities establish a precise legal basis for the enforcement agencies, facilitating targeted and effective enforcement.

3.4. Establishing an Assessment System for Monitoring Compliance

A new evaluation system has been established in accordance with RDWF (2020), alongside amendments to regulations aimed at improving government control, reinforcing the obligations of firms and vessels, and augmenting legal liabilities. Establishing an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance is crucial for combating IUU fishing (Chu 2024). This evaluation system seeks to enhance the governance of distant-water fisheries and elevate conformity with RFMOs’ regulations, thereby aligning with China’s obligations as a flag state and state of nationality (Chu 2024; Shen and Huang 2021). Furthermore, it mitigates the enduring issue of China’s inadequate enforcement of domestic and international rules on conservation of fish, including insufficient oversight of compliance and inadequate enforcement resources (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2019).

In 2022, the MOA instituted an assessment mechanism aligned with RDWF (2020) to examine the compliance of pelagic fishing firms during distant-water fishing operations (China Ocean Fisheries Association 2023). These obligations include those mandated by China’s domestic legislation and regulations as well as international treaties. The assessment criteria consist of four principal indicators, sixteen subsidiary indicators, and forty-two tertiary indicators (see

Table 1. Partial content of the assessment indicators regarding the performance of obligations.

Primary Indicator	Secondary Indicator	Tertiary Indicator
Violations of Laws and Regulations	Illegal Operation	29. Departure of Vessels from the Country Without Approval
		30. Engaged in Fishing Production Without a Legal Fishing License
		31. Illegal Fishing Across Borders
		32. Unauthorized Change in the Prescribed Mode or Area of Operation
		33. Deliberately Disabling or Moving the Monitoring Equipment without Authorization, or Submitting False Information
		34. Unauthorized Alteration of Vessel Names, Identification Numbers, or Parameters
		35. Unauthorized Replacement of the Main Engine of Vessels
		36. Using Prohibited Fishing Gear Defined by China, Relevant States or International Organizations
		37. Catching or Retaining Prohibited Species Defined by China, Relevant States or International Organizations
		38. Occurrence of Severe Safety Accidents
		39. Failure to Carry the Required Vessel Certificate
		40. Obstructing or Rejecting Boarding Inspection or Port Inspection by Relevant Authorities
		41. Rejecting Mandated Observers or Interfering with Their Work
		42. Failure to Pay Wages to Crew Members in Accordance with the Contracts

). Significantly, the obligations outlined in RDWF (2020), including compliance with boarding inspections and aiding observers, are incorporated into the evaluation criteria, thereby enhancing the execution of RDWF (2020).

The evaluation occurs annually, mandating participation from all pelagic fishing enterprises registered within the nation. Statistics indicate that 173 participated in the 2022 assessment (Ibid.), while 167 companies participated in 2023 (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2023). The outcomes of these evaluations are publicly revealed and serve as a criterion for subsequent industrial policy support and oversight of distant-water fisheries (Branstetter et al. 2023). This method fosters accountability by motivating distant-water fishing firms to refine their management techniques, circumvent legal infractions, and augment their overall adherence to both domestic and international duties. Simultaneously, it improves the openness of the Chinese government’s enforcement operations.

4. Rectifying Deficiencies in RDWF (2020)

RDWF (2020) has made significant progress, but it still has significant shortcomings that hinder its ability to effectively address IUU fishing challenges. Areas for enhancement encompass the absence of explicit legal obligations for administrative bodies, inadequately stringent penalties for IUU fishing activities, and restricted adherence to international standards. This section analyzes these issues and proposes solutions for their resolution.

4.1. Absence of Responsibilities for Administrative Entities

RDWF (2020) demonstrates a notable shortcoming owing to the lack of regulations on the responsibilities of administrative entities. In distant-water fisheries, regulatory bodies are crucial for the execution of fisheries regulations. Nevertheless, the existing rule provides little guidance regarding the accountability of these departments in ensuring compliance. This to some extent affects the enforcement of rules on decreasing subsidies. China has been working on subsidies reforms in the past ten years, whose fruits in reality rely on the administrative entities, especially the grass-roots units.

First, RDWF (2020) lacks clarity concerning the cessation of subsidies or other financial incentives granted by the Chinese government to fishing enterprises engaged in distant-water operations. International organizations and adjacent states have articulated concerns that Chinese subsidies may bolster vessels involved in overfishing in foreign jurisdiction and on the high seas. Subsidies, by definition, must be specific to a certain classic industry, and the enterprises receiving these funds are required to utilize them in a manner that fosters the development of the industry (Tissière et al. 2020). Nonetheless, fishing activities transpire in the ocean, rendering it challenging for governmental agencies to oversee whether fishers or enterprises utilize the subsidies for unreported fishing harvest. The lack of restrictions on subsidies enables Chinese fishery management authorities to clandestinely endorse over-exploitation.

China had made efforts in other parts to balance the restricted measures on penalties in RDWF (2020). For instance, in subsidies, since 2015, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs initiated reforms to gradually reduce subsidies for domestic fishing operations. By 2019, subsidies were cut to 40% of the 2014 levels, with optimized fund allocation through “special transfer payments + general transfer payments”. Post-2024, subsidies are transitioning to “fishery resource conservation subsidies”, including closed fishing season subsidies and responsible fishing subsidies. Eligibility requires compliance with regulations (e.g., vessel monitoring systems, fishing logs). To comply with the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, China has shifted traditional fuel subsidies toward sustainable fisheries management. For example, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces now allocate subsidies based on adherence to closed seasons and fishing compliance (People Government of Shengsi County 2024).

Moreover, RDWF (2020) lacks comprehensive procedures for Chinese administrative bodies to execute this regulation. No concrete provisions exist in RDWF (2020) that dictate the procedures for authorities to perform inspections, apply sanctions, or report infractions. The absence of transparency results in a deficiency of accountability, perhaps allowing certain violations in distant water to remain undetected. Moreover, without a framework for external scrutiny for the execution of RDWF (2020), the regulation may exhibit inconsistencies in its application. In comparison, some countries advocate for the enforcement of fishing regulations via an external oversight agency. For example, France established the French National Federation of Fishing Associations (FNPF), which is responsible for the management of fishing in high seas. Fishing firms need to get licenses before they can engage in fishing activities. There is a wide variety of license types, including the adult cross-federal card, adult card, women’s exploration card, and minor card (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2019).

To address these challenges, the regulations must include clear provisions outlining the responsibilities of fishery management authorities and the oversight framework for those authorities. These steps include rules on how subsidies are given out to stop supporting illegal fishing, as well as clear ways to keep an eye on how RDWF (2020) is being carried out by administrative agencies. The provisions outlined in the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, established during the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) of the World Trade Organization, indicate the introduction of further measures for IUU fishing regulations. The agreement establishes a prohibition on subsidies for fishing activities on the high seas. Additionally, a complaint and redress mechanism must be instituted to allow fishing companies to report negligent fishery management authorities and to pursue remedies for unlawful enforcement.

4.2. Restricted Penalties for IUU Fishing

The sanctions for IUU fishing under current legislation are relatively moderate in comparison to the international trend of IUU fishing sanctions, such as those proposed by Spain. Spain implements penalties for carrying out illegal fishing activities and participating in illegal transshipment. Based on the severity of the violation and the specific fishing method employed, the penalties vary. In cases of substantial illegal fishing, dissuasive financial penalties up to EUR 600,000, the impossibility of obtaining subsidies, and the annulment of fishing permits will occur. In cases of extreme severity, criminal sanctions may also be carried out (García 2022).

In contrast, China does not impose significant sanctions on illegal fishing, and the primary form of punishment is monetary penalties. In certain instances, the penalties are insignificant in comparison to the potential revenue generated by illegal fishing. Some operators regard fines as a trivial operational expense, as the financial benefits derived from illegal fishing in international waters frequently fail to outweigh the penalty (China Ocean Fisheries Association 2023). In order to increase the deterrent effect of RDWF (2020), penalties for IUU fishing must be increased to align with international standards. Violators would be unable to operate without incurring substantial repercussions if sanctions were expanded beyond fines. Additionally, the severity of the infractions should be reflected in the penalties, which should be proportional to the magnitude and revenue of the illegal operations.

4.3. Inadequate Compliance with International Standards for Sustainable Fishing

RDWF (2020) promoted the alignment of China’s fisheries regulations with international treaties. Nonetheless, further enhancement is necessary. The current regulation predominantly focuses on China’s compliance with UNCLOS and regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) agreements. Despite the fact that these treaties provide a substantial framework for fisheries management, they are unable to address the exhaustive challenges of contemporary fisheries governance by addressing all aspects of sustainability and biodiversity conservation.

The regulations must incorporate specific measures that implement general rules in international treaties to improve compliance. As indicated, this may include marine protected zones (MPAs) in international waters frequented by Chinese vessels and stricter bycatch and discard laws to protect at-risk marine species. Integrating international collaboration tools like joint patrols and maritime monitoring databases will help China achieve treaty obligations and build trust with global partners.

4.4. Prospects for RDWF (2020) and China’s Response

Addressing shortcomings in RDWF (2020) requires a holistic approach that combines domestic changes with international collaboration. RDWF (2020) should delineate specific steps to oversee and regulate administrative authorities in the implementation of anti-IUU fishing measures. This involves establishing criteria for subsidy distribution and implementing an external oversight process. These measures will enhance accountability and guarantee that administrative activities align with the primary objectives of RDWF (2020).

The penalties for violations must be reevaluated to strengthen the repercussions for such fishing activities. This should involve fines proportional to the revenue generated by illegal and unreported fishing, in addition to the restriction of non-compliant vessels from operating in distant water. These measures would provide a more effective deterrent and align China’s enforcement measures with the global trend. The regulation must have explicit methods to enforce those criteria. The measures may include setting clear sustainability goals, enhancing collaboration with international partners, establishing marine protected areas (MPAs) in international waters frequented by Chinese vessels, strengthening regulations on bycatch and discards to protect vulnerable marine species, and implementing strategies to address escalating challenges. By more rigorously enforcing these agreements, China may strengthen its role as a responsible actor in global fisheries governance (United Nations Development Program 2022).

China should incorporate explicit measures for sustainable fisheries management and biodiversity protection into its regulatory framework to improve its compliance with the international rules above. This may involve the implementation of measures to reduce bycatch, protect endangered species, and promote the sustainability of marine ecosystems. China should require that all distant water fishing vessels disclose bycatch data and employ fishing strategies that reduce environmental impact. This requires cooperation with other states and regional groups to promote sustainable fishing, notably in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean, where China’s fishing vessels operate.

While RDWF (2020) indicates significant progress, it also reveals critical shortcomings that necessitate revision to create a thorough and effective policy. Through the augmentation of oversight for administrative bodies, the escalation of penalties for IUU fishing, and the improvement of compliance with international standards, China can leverage the progress made in 2020 and position itself as a responsible contributor to sustainable fisheries management. These reforms are essential for addressing internal challenges, meeting international standards, and ensuring the long-term sustainability of global marine ecosystems.

5. Conclusions

The fight against IUU fishing is a global issue requiring effective governmental oversight. China faces significant challenges in preventing its vessels, fishing enterprises, and crew members from being involved in IUU fishing in the distant water beyond its jurisdiction. RDWF (2020) enhances the government obligations for regulating vessel numbers and reporting, hence improving governmental oversight of distant-water fishing. Furthermore, RDWF (2020) establishes regulations to fulfill China’s commitments within RFMOs. Fishing vessels are forbidden from operating without permission in the waters under the jurisdiction of other states. Vessel operators must adhere to and assist with boarding and inspections conducted by RFMOs and their member states. In addition, RDWF (2020) assigns accountability for non-compliance with duties established by RFMOs’ regulations. Moreover, RDWF (2020) delineates IUU fishing activities that warrant penalties and expands the range of operators liable for punishment, thereby reinforcing accountability for breaches of anti-IUU fishing regulations. Ultimately, RDWF (2020) creates an assessment mechanism to monitor compliance with anti-IUU fishing obligations pursuant to China’s domestic legislation and regulations as well as international treaties.

However, RDWF (2020) faces several limitations that may hinder its ability to effectively address illegal and unreported fishing in foreign jurisdiction and on the high seas, including the absence of responsibilities for administrative bodies, insufficient penalties for significant IUU fishing activities, and inadequate adherence to international standards for sustainable fishing. Thus, China’s existing and predictable response provides the prospect for future improvement. RDWF (2020), if adjusted, will include explicit rules to supervise and regulate administrative agencies in the execution of the combating actions and the penalties with reassessment to enhance the consequences for such fishing practices. RDWF (2020) will incorporate concrete approaches to enforce criteria in the SDGs, considering the close link between the 2030 Agenda and international organizations. Despite the aforementioned shortcomings, RDWF (2020) represents substantial progress for China in its efforts to combat fishing against existing laws. RDWF (2020) assists China in incrementally aligning with international standards for responsible engagement and adhering to global best practices.