On the Stability of Couples
Institute for Theoretical Economics, University of Leipzig, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany
HR Department, TU Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany
Games 2018, 9(3), 48; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030048
Received: 22 May 2018 / Revised: 28 June 2018 / Accepted: 2 July 2018 / Published: 11 July 2018
In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can model couples. We analyze two cases: a symmetrical one with only one type of men and one type of women; and one with several types of women and men. View Full-Text
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Hiller, T. On the Stability of Couples. Games 2018, 9, 48.
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Hiller T. On the Stability of Couples. Games. 2018; 9(3):48.Chicago/Turabian Style
Hiller, Tobias. 2018. "On the Stability of Couples." Games 9, no. 3: 48.
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