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Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union

Department of Economics, Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria
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Games 2018, 9(1), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010009
Received: 24 December 2017 / Revised: 26 January 2018 / Accepted: 31 January 2018 / Published: 19 February 2018
In this paper, we present an application of the dynamic tracking games framework to a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union to analyze the interactions between fiscal (governments) and monetary (common central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate solutions for several games: a noncooperative solution where each government and the central bank play against each other (a feedback Nash equilibrium solution), a fully-cooperative solution with all players following a joint course of action (a Pareto optimal solution) and three solutions where various coalitions (subsets of the players) play against coalitions of the other players in a noncooperative way. It turns out that the fully-cooperative solution yields the best results, the noncooperative solution fares worst and the coalition games lie in between, with a broad coalition of the fiscally more responsible countries and the central bank against the less thrifty countries coming closest to the Pareto optimum. View Full-Text
Keywords: dynamic game; feedback Nash equilibrium; Pareto solution; monetary union; macroeconomics; public debt; coalitions dynamic game; feedback Nash equilibrium; Pareto solution; monetary union; macroeconomics; public debt; coalitions
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MDPI and ACS Style

Blueschke, D.; Neck, R. Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union. Games 2018, 9, 9. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010009

AMA Style

Blueschke D, Neck R. Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union. Games. 2018; 9(1):9. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010009

Chicago/Turabian Style

Blueschke, Dmitri, and Reinhard Neck. 2018. "Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union" Games 9, no. 1: 9. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010009

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