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Games 2017, 8(3), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030029

Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game

1
IESE Business School, Av. Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
2
Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Via Inama 5, 38122 Trento, Italy
3
Faculty of Economics and Organizational Sciences, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Industrigata 17, 2619, Lillehammer, Norway
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 26 May 2017 / Revised: 5 July 2017 / Accepted: 10 July 2017 / Published: 14 July 2017
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Abstract

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant. View Full-Text
Keywords: ultimatum game; anticipated communication; experiment ultimatum game; anticipated communication; experiment
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
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Capizzani, M.; Mittone, L.; Musau, A.; Vaccaro, A. Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game. Games 2017, 8, 29.

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