Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game
AbstractAnticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant. View Full-Text
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Capizzani, M.; Mittone, L.; Musau, A.; Vaccaro, A. Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game. Games 2017, 8, 29.
Capizzani M, Mittone L, Musau A, Vaccaro A. Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game. Games. 2017; 8(3):29.Chicago/Turabian Style
Capizzani, Mario; Mittone, Luigi; Musau, Andrew; Vaccaro, Antonino. 2017. "Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game." Games 8, no. 3: 29.
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