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Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics
Open AccessArticle

A Note on the Core of TU-cooperative Games with Multiple Membership Externalities

Department of Social Sciences, ETH Zürich, Clausiusstrasse 37-C3, Zürich 8092, Switzerland
Games 2014, 5(4), 191-203; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040191
Received: 3 August 2014 / Revised: 19 September 2014 / Accepted: 10 October 2014 / Published: 21 October 2014
A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements are illustrated and discussed. View Full-Text
Keywords: cooperative games; core; externalities; multiple membership; stability cooperative games; core; externalities; multiple membership; stability
MDPI and ACS Style

Nax, H.H. A Note on the Core of TU-cooperative Games with Multiple Membership Externalities. Games 2014, 5, 191-203.

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