Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Experimental Section
3. Results and Discussion
Classification | Number | Percentage |
---|---|---|
Reciprocator | 10 | 31% |
neutral | 10 | 31% |
Anti-Reciprocator | 4 | 13% |
Free Rider | 8 | 25% |
Total | 32 | 100% |
Classification | Number | Percentage |
---|---|---|
Reciprocator | 42 | 22% |
neutral | 87 | 45% |
Anti-Reciprocator | 13 | 7% |
Free Rider | 50 | 26% |
Total | 192 | 100% |
4. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Conflict of Interest
References
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Appendix
Subject | Response Function | Average Response Function | |||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | ||||||||||||||||
ρ | p | type | ρ | p | type | ρ | p | type | ρ | p | type | ρ | p | type | ρ | p | type | ρ | p | type | |
1 | 0.89 | 0.00 | R | 0.87 | 0.00 | R | 0.86 | 0.00 | R | 0.80 | 0.01 | R | 0.83 | 0.00 | R | 0.89 | 0.00 | R | 0.94 | 0.00 | R |
2 | 0.15 | 0.69 | N | 0.23 | 0.52 | N | 0.16 | 0.66 | N | 0.16 | 0.66 | N | 0.12 | 0.74 | N | 0.13 | 0.72 | N | 0.12 | 0.74 | N |
3 | 0.23 | 0.52 | N | 0.64 | 0.04 | R | 0.78 | 0.01 | R | 0.05 | 0.90 | N | 0.87 | 0.00 | R | 0.23 | 0.53 | N | 0.94 | 0.00 | R |
4 | 0.78 | 0.01 | R | 0.17 | 0.65 | N | 0.98 | 0.00 | R | 0.87 | 0.00 | R | 0.98 | 0.00 | R | 0.98 | 0.00 | R | 0.96 | 0.00 | R |
5 | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.52 | 0.12 | N |
6 | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | −0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.10 | 0.79 | N | 1.00 | 0.00 | R | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.19 | 0.60 | N | 0.31 | 0.38 | N |
7 | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.52 | 0.12 | FR |
8 | −0.80 | 0.01 | AR | −0.48 | 0.16 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | −1.00 | 0.00 | AR | 0.20 | 0.57 | N | −0.90 | 0.00 | AR |
9 | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR |
10 | 0.64 | 0.04 | R | 0.64 | 0.04 | R | 0.64 | 0.04 | R | 0.64 | 0.04 | R | 0.64 | 0.04 | R | 0.64 | 0.04 | R | 0.64 | 0.04 | R |
11 | 0.63 | 0.05 | R | 0.63 | 0.05 | R | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.75 | 0.01 | R | 0.68 | 0.03 | R | 0.70 | 0.02 | R | 0.94 | 0.00 | R |
12 | −0.40 | 0.25 | N | 0.16 | 0.65 | N | −0.19 | 0.60 | N | −0.44 | 0.20 | N | 0.05 | 0.90 | N | −0.14 | 0.70 | N | −0.10 | 0.79 | N |
13 | 0.42 | 0.23 | N | 0.42 | 0.23 | N | 0.42 | 0.23 | N | 0.42 | 0.23 | N | 0.42 | 0.23 | N | 0.42 | 0.23 | N | 0.42 | 0.23 | N |
14 | −0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.12 | 0.74 | N | −0.27 | 0.44 | N | 0.20 | 0.58 | N | 0.05 | 0.89 | N | −0.74 | 0.02 | AR | −0.43 | 0.22 | N |
15 | −0.90 | 0.00 | AR | −0.98 | 0.00 | AR | −0.66 | 0.04 | AR | −0.98 | 0.00 | AR | −0.99 | 0.00 | AR | 0.68 | 0.03 | R | −0.89 | 0.00 | AR |
16 | 0.66 | 0.04 | R | 1.00 | 0.00 | R | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.03 | 0.93 | N | 0.94 | 0.00 | R | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.87 | 0.00 | R |
17 | 0.40 | 0.26 | N | 0.45 | 0.19 | N | 1.00 | 0.00 | R | −0.49 | 0.15 | N | 0.46 | 0.18 | N | 0.58 | 0.08 | N | 0.65 | 0.04 | R |
18 | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR |
19 | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N |
20 | −0.89 | 0.00 | AR | 0.01 | 0.99 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | −0.83 | 0.00 | FR |
21 | 0.83 | 0.00 | R | 0.92 | 0.00 | R | 0.55 | 0.10 | N | 0.07 | 0.85 | N | 0.81 | 0.00 | R | 0.67 | 0.03 | R | 0.87 | 0.00 | R |
22 | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR |
23 | 0.81 | 0.00 | R | 0.80 | 0.01 | R | 0.35 | 0.32 | N | 0.30 | 0.40 | N | −1.00 | 0.00 | AR | 0.52 | 0.12 | N | 0.76 | 0.01 | R |
24 | −1.00 | 0.00 | AR | 0.53 | 0.11 | N | 0.66 | 0.04 | R | 0.20 | 0.57 | N | 0.24 | 0.50 | N | 0.53 | 0.12 | N | −0.06 | 0.87 | N |
25 | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR |
26 | −0.13 | 0.72 | N | −0.44 | 0.21 | N | −0.53 | 0.12 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | −0.51 | 0.13 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | −0.41 | 0.24 | N |
27 | −0.55 | 0.10 | N | −0.32 | 0.37 | N | 0.28 | 0.44 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | −0.70 | 0.02 | AR | −0.54 | 0.11 | N |
28 | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR |
29 | −1.00 | 0.00 | AR | −0.45 | 0.19 | N | −0.45 | 0.19 | N | −0.45 | 0.19 | N | −0.45 | 0.19 | N | −0.45 | 0.19 | N | −0.85 | 0.00 | AR |
30 | −0.52 | 0.12 | N | −0.41 | 0.24 | N | −0.29 | 0.42 | N | −0.17 | 0.63 | N | −0.06 | 0.87 | N | 0.06 | 0.87 | N | −0.97 | 0.00 | AR |
31 | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR |
32 | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.75 | 0.01 | R | 0.68 | 0.03 | R | 0.00 | 1.00 | FR | 0.68 | 0.03 | R | 0.75 | 0.01 | R | 0.91 | 0.00 | R |
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Smith, A. Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game. Games 2013, 4, 367-374. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030367
Smith A. Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game. Games. 2013; 4(3):367-374. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030367
Chicago/Turabian StyleSmith, Alexander. 2013. "Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game" Games 4, no. 3: 367-374. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030367
APA StyleSmith, A. (2013). Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game. Games, 4(3), 367-374. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030367