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Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort

Faculty of Economic Sciences, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, Göttingen D-37073, Germany
CIRANO and University of Montréal, 2020 University Street, Montréal, H3A 2A5 Canada
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2011, 2(3), 277-301;
Received: 21 June 2011 / Revised: 3 August 2011 / Accepted: 8 August 2011 / Published: 19 August 2011
We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of laboratory experiments. This allows for high cooperation payoffs but also provides individual free-riding incentives. Due to significant cooperation, we observe that, in team remuneration, participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less. View Full-Text
Keywords: team effort; voluntary collaboration; experimental economics team effort; voluntary collaboration; experimental economics
MDPI and ACS Style

Keser, C.; Montmarquette, C. Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort. Games 2011, 2, 277-301.

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Games, EISSN 2073-4336, Published by MDPI AG
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