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Nonspecific Networking

University of Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Saint-Etienne-Lyon, 42023 Saint- Etienne, France
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2011, 2(1), 87-113;
Received: 27 October 2010 / Revised: 25 January 2011 / Accepted: 15 February 2011 / Published: 17 February 2011
A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent’s investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to investment costs for supermodular as well as submodular networking games. We also study supermodular games with potentials. We find that the set of potential maximizers forms a sublattice of the lattice of Nash equilibria and derive comparative statics results for the smallest and the largest potential maximizer. Finally, we provide a broad spectrum of applications from social interaction to industrial organization. View Full-Text
Keywords: social networks; local interaction games; nonspecific networking social networks; local interaction games; nonspecific networking
MDPI and ACS Style

Durieu, J.; Haller, H.; Solal, P. Nonspecific Networking. Games 2011, 2, 87-113.

AMA Style

Durieu J, Haller H, Solal P. Nonspecific Networking. Games. 2011; 2(1):87-113.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Durieu, Jacques, Hans Haller, and Philippe Solal. 2011. "Nonspecific Networking" Games 2, no. 1: 87-113.

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