Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Methods
3. Hypotheses
4. Results
4.1. Hypothesis 1 Tests—The Confirmation Bias (Pooled and by Gender)
A Note on Response Times
4.2. Hypothesis 2 Tests—The Impact of Deliberation
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Probit Estimation Variable | Dep Var = Participated in Online Experiment (=1) (Conditional on Recruited into Sleep Study) Coefficient (SE) |
---|---|
SR (=1) | −0.260 (0.162) |
Female (=1) | 0.156 (0.172) |
Minority (=1) | 0.190 (0.209) |
Age | −0.035 (0.027) |
Optimal Sleep | −0.033 (0.082) |
Anxiety Risk | −0.019 (0.033) |
Depression Risk | 0.060 (0.111) |
Epworth | 0.045 (0.024) * |
rMEQ | 0.023 (0.027) |
Observations | 280 |
Log Likelihood | −164.561 |
Psuedo R-squared | 0.033 |
Variable | Simple (1) Coef (SE) | Controls (2) Coef (SE) | Controls + Sleep Compliant (3) Coef (SE) | Controls + Sleep Compliant + IPW Correction (4) Coef (SE) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Constant | 19.449 (2.543) *** | 13.695 (7.623) * | 12.064 (8.203) | 12.904 (8.649) |
Liberal Score | −8.054 (0.745) *** | −6.938 (0.765) *** | −6.762 (0.848) *** | −6.948 (0.838) *** |
Age | --- | 0.316 (.277() | 0.382 (0.291) | 0.316 (0.282) |
Female | --- | −5.704 (1.536) *** | −5.034 (1.665) *** | −4.806 (1.722) *** |
Minority | --- | −3.191 (1.724) * | −3.804 (1.841) ** | −3.828 (1.625) ** |
Epworth | --- | 0.074 (0.204) | 0.003 (0.217) | −0.006 (0.201) |
rMEQ | --- | 0.092 (0.232) | 0.090 (0.255) | −0.007 (0.299) |
SR | --- | −0.643 (1.397) | −0.858 (1.515) | −0.803 (1.598) |
Pro-Social | --- | −2.329 (1.649 | −2.030 (1.748) | −2.214 (2.022) |
Race Wins | --- | 0.272 (0.321) | 0.289 (0.353) | 0.373 (0.326) |
CRT score | --- | −0.389 (0.431) | −0.423 (0.465) | −0.385 (0.448) |
Obs | 197 | 193 | 172 | 172 |
R-squared | 0.375 | 0.458 | 0.422 | 0.434 |
Appendix B
- ○
- Republican Party
- ○
- National Rifle Association
- ○
- Democratic Party
- ○
- the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence
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1 | See Dickinson and McElroy [18] on this point and for a comparison of alternative frameworks. The conclusion is that a reasonable theoretical framework would consider that sleep restriction increases the relative cost of deliberative reasoning inputs in one’s decision making “production function”, which points to a reduced use of deliberation in such instances. Such a formal framework is consistent with the empirical evidence that generally finds decision making when sleepy as consistent with reduced deliberation and increased use of heuristics or automatic decision processes. |
2 | Risk of major depressive disorder was contained in the database responses to the PHQ-2 instrument (Kroenke et al.[20]), anxiety risk was assessed using the GAD-7 (Spitzer et al.[21]), and diurnal preferences were assessed using a validated short-form morningness–eveningness instrument (Adan and Almiral [22]). |
3 | |
4 | All subjects gave their informed consent for inclusion before they participated in the study, which was not required as a condition of continuance in the main sleep study. This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of Appalachian State University (IRB approval number 17-0177). |
5 | The indicator for Pro-Social = 1 individuals was based on the Social Value Orientation measure in Murphy et al. [28], Race Wins (out of 10 games) was a measure of backwards induction ability assessed using performance in a series of 10 Race Game tasks played against a computer opponent (Gneezy et al.[29]). |
6 | All results are similar if we ignore the selection issue altogether (available on request). |
7 | Variable compensation for this task was not used given that argument assessments were subjective, and there was no right or wrong number of pro-gun control information clips to view. A separate task not related to this paper was included within the survey and allowed participants to add up to another USD 3.75 (for a total of USD 8.75) to their Amazon gift code compensation for the survey. Fixed compensation for completing the sleep protocol was USD 30 paid by check after the conclusion of the study. |
8 | Taber and Lodge [6] examined both gun control and affirmative action in their study. The key feature is that the issue chosen for the task represents a rather partisan issue at the time. |
9 | Details on the questions and construction of this measure on shown in Appendix B (the “Extremity of Position” set of questions). |
10 | While the construction of the composite metric follows a similar approach, note that PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH differs from the Pro-Gun-Rights position measure in that the latter was constructed from a distinct set of arguments (for and against gun control) to which the respondent was asked to indicate his/her level of agreement, not the strength or weakness of the argument itself. |
11 | That is, a negative coefficient estimate indicates the higher one’s Liberal Score, the fewer Pro-Gun-Rights Clips viewed and the weaker the PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH. |
12 | Dickinson [16] documented a significantly stronger confirmation bias in both the political and religious domains for those participants indicating they had thought relatively more about these issues (using the same Thought Much measure as was in our survey). As an alternative, we estimated several of our main specifications that correspond to Figure 1 results by including the continuous variable Thought Much as a regressor, which necessitates the inclusion of a Thought Much * Liberal Score interaction term as all. These results are shown in the Appendix A, Figure A4, and they also highlight that the strongest impact of High Thought on the gun control issue in our confirmation bias finding is regarding PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH (especially for males). To avoid the need later for triple interaction terms to pursue this approach in examining Hypothesis 2, we conduct the analysis here using the High Thought subsample of the data where the estimated effects are most clear. |
13 | That is, the confirmation bias regarding perceived argument strength (Table 7) was equally strong across CRT scores and randomly assigned sleep levels. |
14 | Across all specifications in Table 6, the deliberation interaction term effects are consistently in the direction of the Hypothesis 2 prediction, but they vary in statistical significance. |
15 | Specifically, an examination of other outcomes by sleep condition do not support increased random choice. If one examines the Liberal Score impact on favorability ratings shown in Appendix A Figure A2, and compares the Liberal Score impact of SR versus WR participants on partisan personalities like Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton (or, on wealthy individuals versus those on welfare), we find no significant different in the partisan effect on favorability ratings by SR assignment (results available on request). A more random response pattern from SR individuals would not be predicted to produce a systematic pattern such as this. Castillo et al.[31] examined how sleepiness impacted risky choice and documented that the increased preference for risk in their sleepier participant was not due to increased randomness in choice. |
Variable | Mean (Std Dev) | Notes |
---|---|---|
Female (=1) | 0.614 (0.488) | n = 121 females, n = 76 males |
Minority (=1) | 0.239 (0.427) | n = 47 minority, n = 150 nonminority |
Age (in years) | 19.822 (2.900) | ≥40 years of age excluded from study |
Parent Income category | 7.995 (3.108) | 8 = USD 75,000 total household income |
Mother’s Education Level | 8.178 (2.014) | 8 = Associate degree |
Epworth daytime sleepiness score | 8.173 (3.487) | ≥10 indicate significant daytime sleepiness |
Prosocial (=1) | 0.767 (0.424) | Based on Social Value Orientation (n = 193) |
Race Game Score [0, 10] | 4.253 (2.215) | Backwards induction measure (n = 194) |
6-item Cognitive Reflection Task score | 2.273 (1.691) | (n = 194) |
Liberal Score (1–5) | 3.274 (0.967) |
Variable | Simple (1) Coef (SE) | Simple + SR Compliant (2) Coef (SE) | Controls (3) Coef (SE) | Controls + SR Compliant (4) Coef (SE) | Controls + SR Compliant HIGH THOUGHT (5) Coef (SE) | Controls + SR Compliant LOW THOUGHT (6) Coef (SE) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Constant | 3.961 (0.262) *** | 3.973 (0.293) *** | 3.770 (0.844) *** | 3.915 (0.857) *** | 4.079 (1.032) *** | 3.808 (1.274) *** |
Liberal Score | −0.266 (0.078) *** | −0.278 (0.086) *** | −0.238 (0.073) *** | −0.260 (0.079) *** | −0.227 (0.086) *** | −0.277 (0.165) * |
Age | --- | --- | 0.018 (0.040) | 0.015 (0.040) | 0.022 (0.046) | −0.026 (0.062) |
Female | --- | --- | −0.0077 (0.121) | −0.073 (0.129) | −0.104 (0.148) | −0.033 (0.270) |
Minority | --- | --- | −0.467 (0.159) *** | −0.435 (0.169) ** | −0.362 (0.249) | −0.586 (0.232) ** |
Epworth | --- | --- | 0.006 (0.016) | 0.006 (0.017) | 0.020 (0.020) | −0.017 (0.028) |
rMEQ | --- | --- | 0.002 (0.021) | −0.0002 (0.022) | −0.021 (0.024) | 0.055 (0.038) |
SR | --- | --- | −0.016 (0.117) | −0.005 (0.128) | −0.059 (0.170) | 0.023 (0.181) |
Pro-Social | --- | --- | −0.047 (0.143) | −0.074 (0.150) | −0.088 (0.206) | −0.014 (0.208) |
Race Wins | --- | --- | −0.041 (0.026) | −0.056 (0.029) * | −0.132 (0.038) *** | 0.057 (0.045) |
CRT score | --- | --- | 0.010 (0.041) | 0.032 (0.044) | 0.070 (0.051) | −0.017 (0.081) |
IPW-correct | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 197 | 176 | 193 | 172 | 102 | 71 |
R-squared | 0.091 | 0.093 | 0.163 | 0.172 | 0.257 | 0.243 |
Variable | Simple (1) Coef (SE) | Simple + SR Compliant (2) Coef (SE) | Controls (3) Coef (SE) | Controls + SR Compliant (4) Coef (SE) | Controls + SR Compliant HIGH THOUGHT (5) Coef (SE) | Controls + SR Compliant LOW THOUGHT (6) Coef (SE) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Constant | 16.755 (1.926) *** | 15.954 (2.222) *** | 12.975 (5.061) ** | 13.592 (5.407) ** | 21.985 (6.887) *** | −2.678 (9.065) |
Liberal Score | −4.312 (0.533) *** | −4.113 (0.608) *** | −3.896 (0.497) *** | −3.795 (0.543) *** | −4.742 (0.633) *** | −1.714 (1.02) * |
Age | --- | --- | 0.391 (0.185) ** | 0.451 (0.188) ** | 0.352 (0.194) * | 0.396 (0.461) |
Female | --- | --- | −1.846 (0.982) * | −1.531 (1.066) | 0.124 (1.409) | −2.789 (1.597) * |
Minority | --- | --- | −2.268 (1.185) * | −2.520 (1.246) ** | −3.332 (1.869) * | −1.115 (1.592) |
Epworth | --- | --- | −0.042 (0.142) | −0.093 (0.152) | −0.048 (0.193) | −0.073 (0.205) |
rMEQ | --- | --- | −0.205 (0.169) | −0.318 (0.185) * | −0.488 (0.219) ** | 0.254 (0.269) |
SR | --- | --- | −0.622 (0.963) | −0.613 (1.041) | −0.540 (1.461) | −0.678 (1.439) |
Pro-Social | --- | --- | −0.773 (1.251) | −0.871 (1.330) | −2.329 (1.767) | 1.401 (1.974) |
Race Wins | --- | --- | 0.025 (0.187) | −0.076 (0.203) | −0.299 (0.285) | 0.328 (0.321) |
CRT score | --- | --- | −0.046 (0.258) | −0.051 (0.276) | 0.112 (0.354) | −0.388 (0.432) |
IPW- correct | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 197 | 176 | 193 | 172 | 102 | 71 |
R-squared | 0.288 | 0.253 | 0.348 | 0.362 | 0.467 | 0.159 |
MALE SUBSAMPLE | FEMALE SUBSAMPLE | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | (1) Coef (SE) | SR Compliant (2) Coef (SE) | Compliant HIGH THOUGHT (3) Coef (SE) | Compliant LOW THOUGHT (4) Coef (SE) | (5) Coef (SE) | SR Compliant (6) Coef (SE) | Compliant HIGH THOUGHT (7) Coef (SE) | Compliant LOW THOUGHT (8) Coef (SE) |
Constant | 3.27 (1.13) *** | 3.85 (1.16) *** | 4.39 (1.10) *** | 3.91 (1.74) ** | 4.75 (0.75) *** | 4.79 (0.81) *** | 4.39 (1.17) *** | 5.12 (0.87) *** |
Liberal Score | −0.20 (0.09) ** | −0.26 (0.09) *** | −0.36 (0.08) *** | 0.92 (0.27) *** | −0.28 (0.10) *** | −0.29 (0.11) *** | −0.10 (0.14) | −0.57 (0.16) *** |
Age | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.05 (0.05) | 0.04 (0.04) | −0.14 (0.07) * | −0.04 (0.03) | −0.04 (0.03) | −0.03 (0.03) | −0.05 (0.04) |
Minority | −0.29 (0.20) | −0.20 (0.22) | −0.34 (0.37) | −0.38 (0.29) | −0.52 (0.21) ** | −0.49 (0.22) ** | −0.32 (0.33) | −0.57 (0.26) ** |
Epworth | −0.01 (0.03) | −0.004 (0.03) | −0.02 (0.03) | −0.11 (0.05) ** | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.03) | −0.01 (0.03) |
rMEQ | −0.02 (0.03) | −0.04 (0.04) | −0.05 (0.04) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) | −0.01 (0.03) | 0.07 (0.04) * |
SR | −0.21 (0.16) | −0.19 (0.18) | −0.25 (0.23) | −0.48 (0.28) | 0.17 (0.16) | 0.16 (0.17) | 0.15 (0.24) | 0.01 (0.19) |
Pro-Social | −0.06 (0.20) | −0.10 (0.22) | −0.15 (0.29) | 0.10 (0.38) | 0.04 (0.19) | 0.004 (0.20) | 0.11 (0.30) | −0.11 (0.21) |
Race Wins | −0.05 (0.03) * | −0.08 (0.04) ** | −0.12 (0.04) *** | −0.06 (0.11) | −0.04 (0.04) | −0.06 (0.04) | −0.17 (0.06) *** | 0.04 (0.05) |
CRT score | 0.07 (0.05) | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.15 (0.08) * | −0.12 (0.09) | −0.05 (0.06) | −0.03 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.06) | −0.08 (0.11) |
IPW-correct | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 75 | 64 | 40 | 24 | 118 | 108 | 62 | 47 |
R-squared | 0.237 | 0.286 | 0.474 | 0.525 | 0.197 | 0.187 | 0.212 | 0.447 |
MALE SUBSAMPLE | FEMALE SUBSAMPLE | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | (1) Coef (SE) | SR Compliant (2) Coef (SE) | Compliant HIGH THOUGHT (3) Coef (SE) | Compliant LOW THOUGHT (4) Coef (SE) | (5) Coef (SE) | SR Compliant (6) Coef (SE) | Compliant HIGH THOUGHT (7) Coef (SE) | Compliant LOW THOUGHT (8) Coef (SE) |
Constant | 23.72 (8.90) *** | 24.91 (9.58) ** | 28.59 (10.25) *** | 21.83 (32.70) | 3.93 (5.32) | 4.65 (5.83) | 13.66 (10.067) | −13.20 (8.40) |
Liberal Score | −5.07 (0.61) *** | −5.02 (0.66) *** | −5.66 (0.72) *** | 1.89 (3.26) | −3.07 (0.69) *** | −3.02 (0.74) *** | −3.63 (1.08) *** | −3.14 (1.24) *** |
Age | 0.10 (0.34) | 0.12 (0.35) | 0.13 (0.32) | −1.05 (1.07) | 0.58 (0.16) *** | 0.64 (0.16) *** | 0.56 (0.20) *** | 1.06 (0.43) ** |
Minority | −2.56 (2.31) | −2.50 (2.56) | −5.22 (4.11) | −0.27 (6.61) | −1.94 (1.35) | −2.07 (1.39) | −2.48 (2.07) | −0.60 (1.92) |
Epworth | −0.14 (0.26) | −0.12 (0.26) | −0.19 (0.35) | −0.17 (0.44) | 0.01 (0.15) | −0.04 (0.16) | 0.09 (0.20) | −0.14 (0.26) |
rMEQ | −0.25 (0.25) | −0.31 (0.30) | −0.33 (0.39) | 0.28 (0.91) | −0.22 (0.23) | −0.35 (0.25) | −0.63 (0.30) | 0.31 (0.30) |
SR | −0.08 (1.58) | 0.46 (1.78) | 0.16 (2.78) | −1.89 (3.80) | −0.87 (1.23) | −1.27 (1.26) | −0.84) (1.66) | −1.75 (1.85) |
Pro-Social | −2.15 (2.01) | −2.82 (2.27) | −2.32 (3.11) | −1.71 (5.28) | 0.11 (1.61) | 0.19 (1.65) | −1.79 (2.13) | 2.25 (2.43) |
Race Wins | −0.09 (0.32) | −0.44 (0.38) | −0.79 (0.49) | −0.61 (1.60) | 0.04 (0.22) | 0.08 (0.22) | −0.13 (0.29) | 0.28 (0.36) |
CRT score | 0.45 (0.36) | 0.60 (0.44) | 0.77 (0.52) | −0.18 (1.32) | −0.23 (0.37) | −0.20 (0.38) | −0.003 (0.53) | −0.80 (0.60) |
IPW-correct | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 75 | 64 | 40 | 24 | 118 | 108 | 62 | 47 |
R-squared | 0.418 | 0.397 | 0.532 | 0.091 | 0.224 | 0.237 | 0.384 | 0.258 |
Interaction of Liberal Score Strength with SR | Interaction of Liberal Score Strength with CRT | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Compliant (1) Coef (SE) | Full (2) Coef (SE) | Compliant (3) Coef (SE) | Full (4) Coef (SE) | Compliant (5) Coef (SE) | Full (6) Coef (SE) | Compliant (7) Coef (SE) | Full (8) Coef (SE) |
Constant | 4.827 (0.615) *** | 4.444 (0.554) *** | 4.812 (1.005) *** | 4.330 (1.032) *** | 3.242 (0.553) *** | 3.224 (0.513) *** | 3.743 (0.950) *** | 3.584 (0.908) *** |
Liberal Score | −0.505 (0.166) *** | −0.387 (0.148) *** | −0.403 (0.153) *** | −0.307 (0.134) ** | −0.107 (0.164) | −0.080 (0.151) | −0.036 (0.142) | −0.006 (0.142) |
SR | −1.507 (0.715) ** | −1.069 (0.657) | −1.091 (0.668) | −0.835 (0.618) | --- | --- | −0.015 (0.168) | −0.080 (0.161) |
Lib Score * SR | 0.422 (0.200) ** | 0.296 (0.184) * | 0.297 (0.191) * | 0.211 (0.173) | --- | --- | --- | --- |
CRT | --- | --- | 0.058 (0.051) | 0.027 (0.049) | 0.315 (0.236) | 0.308 (0.218) | 0.399 (0.200) ** | 0.359 (0.186) * |
Lib Score * CRT | --- | --- | --- | --- | −0.071 (0.065) | −0.074 (0.059) | −0.095 (0.055) ** | −0.094 (0.051) ** |
Age | --- | --- | 0.018 (0.037) | 0.028 (0.040) | --- | --- | 0.012 (0.033) | 0.020 (0.033) |
Female | --- | --- | −0.127 (0.145) | −0.117 (0.146) | --- | --- | −0.094 (0.145) | −0.111 (0.145) |
Minority | --- | --- | −0.302 (0.247) | −0.400 (0.244) | --- | --- | −0.354 (0.254) | −0.452 (0.249) |
Epworth | --- | --- | 0.013 (0.020) | 0.006 (0.020) | --- | --- | 0.012 (0.021) | 0.003 (0.021) |
rMEQ | --- | --- | −0.020 (0.024) | −0.020 (0.024) | --- | --- | −0.022 (0.025) | −0.025 (0.024) |
Pro-Social | --- | --- | −0.109 (0.208) | −0.028 (0.200) | --- | --- | −0.117 (0.217) | −0.037 (0.207) |
Race Wins | --- | --- | −0.121 (0.041) *** | −0.094 (0.035) *** | --- | --- | −0.147 (0.037) *** | −0.111 (0.033) *** |
IPW-correct | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 104 | 115 | 102 | 113 | 102 | 113 | 102 | 113 |
R-squared | 0.160 | 0.121 | 0.286 | 0.222 | 0.139 | 0.123 | 0.292 | 0.242 |
Interaction of Liberal Score Strength with SR | Interaction of Liberal Score Strength with CRT | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Compliant (1) Coef (SE) | Full (2) Coef (SE) | Compliant (3) Coef (SE) | Full (4) Coef (SE) | Compliant (5) Coef (SE) | Full (6) Coef (SE) | Compliant (7) Coef (SE) | Full (8) Coef (SE) |
Constant | 21.23 (3.30) *** | 21.31 (2.63) *** | 11.10 (8.30) *** | 21.61 (7.47) *** | 19.24 (4.19) *** | 18.78 (3.62) *** | 22.15 (6.89) *** | 20.89 (6.49) *** |
Liberal Score | −5.33 (0.82) *** | −5.32 (0.65) *** | −4.79 (0.96) *** | −4.82 (0.79) *** | −5.03 (1.04) *** | −4.95 (0.90) *** | −4.84 (1.06) *** | −4.58 (0.96) *** |
SR | −2.27 (4.96) | −2.43 (4.40) | −0.84 (5.19) | −1.73 (4.52) | --- | --- | −0.56 (1.44) | −0.82 (1.30) |
Lib Score * SR | 0.61 (1.27) | 0.62 (1.15) | 0.09 (1.29) | 0.26 (1.15) | --- | --- | --- | --- |
CRT | --- | --- | 0.11 (0.35) | 0.23 (0.32) | 0.09 (1.56) | 0.42 (1.37) | −0.05 (1.39) | 0.41 (1.25) |
Lib Score * CRT | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.06 (0.42) | −0.01 (0.36) | 0.05 (0.37) | −0.05 (0.34) |
Age | --- | --- | 0.35 (0.20) * | 0.30 (0.20) | --- | --- | 0.36 (0.22) | 0.30 (0.22) |
Female | --- | --- | 0.12 (1.41) | −0.60 (1.27) | --- | --- | 0.12 (1.42) | −0.57 (1.28) |
Minority | --- | --- | −3.31 (1.87) * | −2.77 (1.81) | --- | --- | −3.34 (1.88) | −2.83 (1.82) |
Epworth | --- | --- | −0.05 (0.20) | −0.05 (0.19) | --- | --- | −0.04 (0.20) | −0.05 (0.19) |
rMEQ | --- | --- | −0.49 (0.22) ** | −0.39 (0.21) * | --- | --- | −0.49 (0.22) ** | −0.39 (0.21) * |
Pro-Social | --- | --- | −2.34 (1.78) | −2.12 (1.65) | --- | --- | −2.32 (1.77) | −2.11 (1.64) |
Race Wins | --- | --- | −0.30 (0.30) | −0.19 (0.26) | --- | --- | −0.29 (0.30) | −0.20 (0.26) |
IPW-correct | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 104 | 115 | 102 | 113 | 102 | 113 | 102 | 113 |
R-squared | 0.380 | 0.408 | 0.467 | 0.480 | 0.390 | 0.423 | 0.467 | 0.480 |
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Dickinson, D.L. Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics. Games 2020, 11, 57. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040057
Dickinson DL. Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics. Games. 2020; 11(4):57. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040057
Chicago/Turabian StyleDickinson, David L. 2020. "Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics" Games 11, no. 4: 57. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040057
APA StyleDickinson, D. L. (2020). Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics. Games, 11(4), 57. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040057