Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media
Abstract
:1. Introduction
‘More than two-thirds of teens say they would rather communicate with their friends online than in person’—The Wall Street Journal, 10 September 20181
2. Experimental Design
2.1. Stage Game
2.2. Communication Stage and Treatments
- No Communication (NC)
- Participants were told that experimenters needed time to setup for the next stage of the experiment. During the ten-minute “setup” time, participants were allowed to open their internet browsers and surf the web but could not communicate with one another. Participants were not given any new information about other people in their session.
- Face-to-Face communication (FTF)
- Participants in a group were seated around a table. These tables were situated as far as possible from one another so that one group did not hear the discussions of the other group. Participants could see and listen to each other “live”, but were not given each others’ names. Communications were audio-recorded with participants’ consent.
- Facebook-to-Facebook communication (FB)
- Participants communicated in Facebook groups created by the experimenter. Participants belonging to the same group could post messages and reply to each others’ messages via the Facebook group. They could see each other’s Facebook profiles, pictures, and names,11 but did not see or listen to each other “live”; the experimenter could monitor their online communication as group administrator. Once the communication time was over, the experimenter removed all the participants from the Facebook group and asked them to log out from Facebook. At the end of each session, Facebook group communication logs were saved, and the groups were then deleted.
- Online Chat (Chat)
- Participants interacted with their group members via the z-Tree software’s online text messaging option, “Chat box”. Participants were only identified using their Subject ID number, were not shown each others’ names or pictures, and could not see or hear each other “live”. The experimenter monitored communications among participants via the experimental software; chat logs were saved in z-Tree.
2.3. Procedures
3. Results
4. Communication Analysis
4.1. Communication Summary
4.2. Game-Relevant and Social Communications
4.3. Linguistic Analysis
5. Conclusions
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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1. | |
2. | Trust engenders voluntary cooperation, which, in turn, increases economic production in a society where many contracts are incomplete and efficient behavior cannot be enforced formally [4]. Trust and trustworthiness have been found to lower the incidence of violence and increase tolerance toward outgroups [5], increase workplace productivity [6], and improve environmental management [7]. They are are considered an important component of social capital, a determinant of economic growth [8]. |
3. | |
4. | Facebook Marketplace can be accessed via https://www.facebook.com/marketplace/. |
5. | |
6. | Ederer and Stremitzer [28] finds that game irrelevant “empty talk” communication does better than sending no message. |
7. | Greiner et al. [30] also find that communication had little effect on Second Life residents in an ultimatum game experiment, suggesting environmental or selection effects among Second Life residents. |
8. | Charness and Dufwenberg [24] report that promises in partnerships may enhance trustworthy behavior because players believe that their promises change others’ expectations of their action; a guilt-averse player would then tend to live up to these expectations and choose an efficient but costly action. Vanberg [37] questions these conclusions and suggests that people have a preference for keeping their promises per se. See also Charness and Dufwenberg [38], Ederer and Stremitzer [28] and Di Bartolomeo et al. [39]. |
9. | Indeed, communication logs indicate that not all participants understood well the ways to achieve joint-payoff maximizing outcomes even after participating is part 1 of the game. See sample logs included in the Supplementary Materials. |
10. | The instructions read: “While Person A(B) is making their decision, Person B(A) will be asked how much they expect A(B) to send (send back) to them. Person B(A) will receive a $1 bonus if their expectation exactly matches A’s (B’s) decision and the bonus will decrease as B’s (A’s) expectation gets further away from A’s (B’s) decision. The lowest value for the bonus is $0.” |
11. | Individuals were randomly invited and assigned into sessions. Within a session, individuals were further randomly assigned into communication groups. Participants in a session were very unlikely to know each other from before the experiment. |
12. | To see this, remember that both the sender and the receiver start with an equal initial endowment of $10. Letting x, be the amount sent, and y, be the amount returned, the final wealth of the sender is given by , and that of the receiver by ; hence if and only if . Likewise, if , and if . |
13. | Figures S1–S4 in the Supplementary Materials show the frequencies of amounts sent by senders and amounts returned by receivers, by treatment. |
14. | Under the difference-in-difference approach, one should compare the changes, rather the absolute amounts, of the amounts sent across treatments. Yet we believe comparing the absolute levels after communication is more informative in our setting because the amount sent was bounded by $10. The differences in changes in the amount sent and the probability of sending all after communication among three communication treatments were not significantly different at 5% level either. |
15. | Expected share returned has an insignificant effect on the amount sent, regression (2); it has a significant and positive effect on the probability of sending all (regression (5)), but results in overall lower fit of the regression compared to the regression using expectation of fair return (regression (6)). |
16. | As communication appears to have an overwhelming effect on post-communication decisions, we also consider if frequent Facebook users with a large network of online friends behaved any differently from others in Part 1 of experiment (before communication). Additional regressions estimations of Sender (and Receiver) behavior in Part 1, as given in the Supplementary Materials, Tables S2 and S3, confirm that the frequent FB use had no significant association with game behavior, and senders under FB treatment sent less. |
17. | Here, we employed linear regression as well as Tobit to estimate expected returns, as very few senders’ expectations were at the boundaries of 0 or 300 percent. Further, for the expectation of fair return, we employed Probit rather than Logit maximum likelihood estimation because of better convergence of the former method. |
18. | Note that these regressions are likely to under-estimate the effect of communication since in four cases when senders sent zero (three of which occurred under NC treatment, one in Part 1 and two in Part 3; one in Part 1 under FB; see Figure 1 and Figure 2), the expected returns are treated as missing. This may explain why the change in the expectation of fair return from Part 1 to Part 3 is estimated to be significant at 10% level only between NC and FB treatment, although the frequency of expected fair return remained unchanged under NC (9% in Part 1 and 10% in Part 3), whereas it increased from 45.5% in Part 1 to 66.7% in Part 3 under FB. |
19. | Additional regression estimations of receiver behavior presented in Table S3 in Supplementary Materials confirm a significant effect of receiver expectations on actions in the pre-communication trust game. |
20. | Agreements came close to promises as player roles were not always disclosed. |
21. | We define a message as a player’s uninterrupted statement. An alternative would to define a message as a piece of verbal communication by the same participant until followed by another participant. However, the same participant sometimes typed several verbal entries one after another under FB or Chat communications. Under FTF, verbal entries were audio-taped and then transcribed, and were not tied to specific participants in a group. We therefore used "Enter" command in online communications, and a pause in FTF communications, as a way to separate messages. |
22. | Maximum likelihood estimations of the probability of sending all and the probability of fair return could not be completed even with a limited set of content variables, as convergence was not achieved in either case. Likewise, bootstrap replications could not be successfully completed. The effect the indicator variable for sender promise to send more, and for group agreements on ‘10/20’ strategy (in addition of group discussions of this strategy) could not be estimated under most or all regression specifications. |
23. | Message type categories, such as the share of questions and approvals, had an insignificant effect on behavior and were dropped from the set of explanatory variables. |
Treatment | Number of | Number of | Number of | Number of |
---|---|---|---|---|
Sessions | Participants | Sender-Receiver Pairs | Communication Groups | |
NC | 3 | 24 | 12 | 6 |
FTF | 3 | 24 | 12 | 6 |
FB | 3 | 24 | 12 | 6 |
Chat | 3 | 24 | 12 | 6 |
Treatment | Amount Sent, $ | Frequency of | Percentage | Frequency of | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Sending All, % | Returned, % | Fair Return, % | |||||||
Before | After | Before | After | Before | After | Before | After | ||
NC | actual | 6.58 | 6.17 | 41.67 | 41.67 | 54.84 | 48.25 | 54.55 | 60.00 |
expected | 6.00 | 6.42 | 25.00 | 33.33 | 47.37 | 42.00 | 9.09 | 10.00 | |
FTF | actual | 5.83 | 9.17 | 16.67 | 83.33 | 58.76 | 59.03 | 41.67 | 75.00 |
expected | 6.25 | 9.50 | 33.33 | 91.67 | 41.36 | 65.28 | 8.33 | 75.00 | |
FB | actual | 4.17 | 8.42 | 25.00 | 58.33 | 51.16 | 63.61 | 27.27 | 83.33 |
expected | 4.75 | 8.08 | 0.00 | 58.33 | 51.16 | 57.04 | 45.45 | 66.67 | |
Chat | actual | 6.67 | 9.83 | 33.33 | 91.67 | 51.99 | 62.50 | 33.33 | 75.00 |
expected | 6.00 | 9.92 | 16.67 | 91.67 | 50.61 | 66.67 | 33.33 | 83.33 |
Amount Sent, $, | Probability Send All, | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tobit Estimation | Logit Estimation | |||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
Expected Return | 1.42 | 0.92 ** | ||||
(1.25) | (0.64) | |||||
Expect Fair Return | 6.12 *** | 3.29 *** | ||||
(1.17) | (0.89) | |||||
FTF | −1.34 | −2.06 | −2.44 | −1.28 | −1.34 ** | −1.77 * |
(2.33) | (1.85) | (1.64) | (0.80) | (0.74) | (0.96) | |
FB | −3.06 | −3.74 ** | −5.76 *** | −0.83 | −1.09 | −2.71 ** |
(2.59) | (1.78) | (1.68) | (0.83) | (0.74) | (1.21) | |
Chat | 0.07 | −1.12 | −2.35 | −0.39 | −0.68 | −1.73 |
(2.71) | (1.87) | (1.75) | (0.83) | (0.74) | (0.99) | |
After | −0.69 ** | 0.65 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.35 * | 0.20 * |
(0.76) | (0.51) | (0.32) | (0.00) | (0.24) | (0.24) | |
FTF After | 8.46 ** | 5.31 | 3.25 ** | 3.25 *** | 2.33 ** | 1.64 *** |
(13.21) | (10.67) | (9.62) | (0.98) | (1.00) | (0.60) | |
FB After | 7.16 ** | 4.71 ** | 4.11 ** | 1.45 ** | 0.90 | 0.94 |
(9.26) | (7.32) | (6.19) | (1.03) | (0.98) | (1.38) | |
Chat After | 10.24 ** | 7.00 ** | 5.49 ** | 3.11 *** | 2.36 | 2.19 |
(11.84) | (10.74) | (10.20) | (0.86) | (0.96) | (1.49) | |
FB Daily Use, Many Friends | 1.45 | 0.67 | -0.40 | 0.42 | 0.21 | −0.38 |
(1.48) | (1.64) | (1.64) | (0.65) | (0.65) | (0.89) | |
Male | −1.15 | 0.06 | 0.60 | −0.02 | 0.20 | 0.41 |
(2.02) | (1.42) | (1.05) | (0.68) | (0.59) | (0.70) | |
Constant | 7.38 *** | 6.11 ** | 8.02 *** | −0.58 | −1.70 | −0.28 |
(1.62) | (2.62) | (1.44) | (0.60) | (1.25) | (0.95) | |
Sigma | 4.98 *** | 4.34 *** | 3.81 *** | |||
(0.72) | (0.42) | (0.37) | ||||
R-squared (Adjusted/Pseudo) | 0.097 | 0.099 | 0.163 | 0.207 | 0.223 | 0.381 |
Number of Observations | 96 | 92 | 92 | 96 | 92 | 92 |
Sender Expected Return, | Probability Expect Fair, | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Linear Regression | Tobit Estimation | Probit Estimation | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
FTF | −0.17 | −0.18 | −0.19 | −0.19 | −0.02 | −0.00 |
(0.16) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (2.90) | (2.98) | |
FB | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 1.20 ** | 1.10 ** |
(0.25) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.25) | (2.50) | (2.37) | |
Chat | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 1.01 ** | 0.98 ** |
(0.14) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (2.39) | (2.50) | |
After | −0.16 | −0.16 | −0.17 | −0.17 | 0.07 | 0.11 |
(0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.07) | (0.09) | |
FTF After | 0.87 *** | 0.81 *** | 0.91 *** | 0.86 *** | 2.20 ** | 0.46 |
(0.14) | (0.28) | (0.16) | (0.30) | (3.03) | (3.90) | |
FB After | 0.34 ** | 0.29 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.60 * | −0.75 |
(0.18) | (0.25) | (0.20) | (0.27) | (0.35) | (3.05) | |
Chat After | 0.64 *** | 0.56 | 0.65 *** | 0.59 | 1.50 ** | −0.24 |
(0.20) | (0.34) | (0.21) | (0.36) | (0.87) | (4.15) | |
Discussed 10/20 Strategy | 0.04 | 0.02 | 1.62 | |||
(0.31) | (0.34) | (5.22) | ||||
Agreed on 10/20 Strategy | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.88 | |||
(0.15) | (0.15) | (4.71) | ||||
FB Daily Use, Many Friends | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.94 ** | 1.23 ** |
(0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (1.23) | (2.39) | |
Male | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | −0.14 | 0.25 |
(0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.93) | (0.69) | |
Constant | 1.34 *** | 1.34 *** | 1.34 *** | 1.33 *** | −2.02 | −2.44 |
(0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (2.27) | (2.93) | |
Sigma | 0.44 *** | 0.44 *** | ||||
(0.05) | (0.05) | |||||
R-squared (Adjusted/Pseudo) | 0.2184 | 0.2011 | 0.2130 | 0.2141 | 0.3407 | 0.4523 |
Number of Observations | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 |
Amount Returned, $ | Share Returned | Probability of Fair Return | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Linear Regression | Tobit Estimation | Logit Estimation | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
Receiver Expectation | 0.71 *** | 0.04 *** | 0.38 ** | |||
(0.15) | (0.01) | (0.24) | ||||
Amount Sent | 1.28 *** | 1.47 *** | −0.02 | −0.00 | −0.25 | −0.21 |
(0.37) | (0.42) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.19) | (0.23) | |
Sent All $10 | 1.55 | 0.47 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 2.62 ** | 2.77 * |
(1.60) | (2.09) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (1.12) | (1.46) | |
FTF | 1.58 | 1.30 | 0.06 | 0.04 | −0.18 | −0.34 |
(2.48) | (2.50) | (0.16) | (0.15) | (5.79) | (5.77) | |
FB | −0.93 | 0.24 | −0.06 | 0.01 | −1.45 | −1.06 |
(2.73) | (2.95) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.93) | (1.23) | |
Chat | 1.14 | 1.12 | −0.02 | −0.02 | −1.02 ** | −1.24 |
(2.35) | (2.37) | (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.70) | (1.03) | |
After | −1.88 ** | −1.60 | −0.07 * | −0.05 | 0.21 ** | 0.39 |
(1.06) | (1.48) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (4.52) | (5.07) | |
FTF After | 3.67 ** | 1.15 | 0.07 | −0.08 | 0.42 | −1.07 |
(1.49) | (1.95) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (7.23) | (7.17) | |
FB After | 6.53 ** | 3.52 | 0.22 | 0.05 | 2.93 | 2.07 |
(3.08) | (2.66) | (0.16) | (0.11) | (4.67) | (5.13) | |
Chat After | 4.18 *** | 1.13 | 0.18 ** | −0.00 | 1.05 | −0.54 |
(1.29) | (1.97) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (4.77) | (5.11) | |
FB Daily Use, Many Friends | 1.32 | 1.02 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.01 | −0.09 |
(1.46) | (1.34) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.88) | (0.97) | |
Male | −0.88 | −0.77 | −0.03 | −0.02 | −0.83 | −0.97 |
(1.88) | (1.81) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.89) | (1.06) | |
Constant | 0.49 | −4.54 | 0.60 *** | 0.31 | 1.25 | −1.23 |
(2.68) | (3.66) | (0.19) | (0.21) | (1.55) | (2.96) | |
Sigma | 0.22 *** | 0.20 *** | ||||
(0.02) | (0.02) | |||||
R-squared (Adjusted/Pseudo) | 0.557 | 0.608 | 0.948 | 3.648 | 0.200 | 0.288 |
Number of Observations | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 |
Expectation of Amount Sent, $ | Probability Expect Send All, | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Linear Regression | Tobit Estimation | Probit Estimation | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
FTF | 0.30 | 0.23 | 0.48 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.09 |
(1.12) | (1.09) | (1.54) | (1.59) | (0.27) | (0.30) | |
FB | −1.24 | −1.27 | −1.92 * | −1.91 ** | −4.72 *** | −5.19 *** |
(0.87) | (0.84) | (1.06) | (0.81) | (0.19) | (0.32) | |
Chat | 0.00 | −0.05 | −0.27 | −0.39 | −0.35 | −0.46 |
(1.07) | (1.13) | (1.17) | (1.22) | (0.30) | (0.34) | |
After | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.24 * | 0.25 * |
(0.82) | (0.83) | (1.11) | (1.08) | (0.24) | (0.25) | |
FTF After | 2.83 ** | 0.57 | 6.72 ** | 1.36 | 1.57 *** | −0.07 |
(1.15) | (1.60) | (8.19) | (5.97) | (0.35) | (0.45) | |
FB After | 2.92 | 1.08 | 4.67 | −0.15 | 5.34 *** | 0.07 |
(2.11) | (1.80) | (6.83) | (1.89) | (0.74) | (0.60) | |
Chat After | 3.50 ** | 1.36 | 8.54 ** | 4.74 | 2.14 *** | 0.97 ** |
(1.36) | (1.25) | (9.57) | (6.01) | (0.52) | (0.40) | |
Discussed 10/20 Strategy | 3.30 ** | 8.56 ** | 11.13 *** | |||
(1.15) | (7.67) | (0.85) | ||||
Agreed on 10/20 Strategy | −0.74 | −4.58 *** | ||||
(0.75) | (0.66) | |||||
FB Daily Use, Many Friends | 0.20 | −0.02 | 0.24 | −0.52 | −0.12 | −0.49 |
(0.59) | (0.54) | (1.27) | (1.06) | (0.40) | (0.48) | |
Male | −0.13 | −0.18 | −0.53 | −0.63 | −0.13 | −0.15 |
(0.50) | (0.49) | (0.98) | (0.95) | (0.36) | (0.45) | |
Constant | 5.91 *** | 6.12 *** | 6.60 *** | 7.24 *** | −0.50 | −0.19 |
(0.84) | (0.83) | (1.57) | (1.44) | (0.44) | (0.52) | |
Sigma | 3.69 *** | 3.38 *** | ||||
(0.32) | (0.32) | |||||
R-squared (Adjusted/Pseudo) | 0.2877 | 0.3327 | 0.1315 | 0.1831 | 0.3561 | 0.5094 |
Number of observations | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 |
Treatment | Number of Groups | Disclosed Role? | Disclosed Past Decisions? | Discussed 10/20? | Agreed on 10/20? | Sender Promise: Send More | Receiver Promise: Be Fair | Discussed Expectations? | Used Names? | Share Matches Implemented 10/20 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FTF | 6 | 1.00 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.67 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.67 | N/A | 0.75 |
FB | 6 | 0.50 | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.17 | 0.5 | 0.58 |
Chat | 6 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.17 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.5 | 0.75 |
FTF Treatment | FB Treatment | Chat Treatment | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Message Description | % Observed | % Observed | % Observed | ||||
Message Content Categories | |||||||
Empty Content | 0.14 | 0.7798 | 0.94 | 0.7186 | 8.03 | 0.6047 | |
Social Discussion | 46.48 | 31.13 | 45.58 | ||||
Norms and Goals Discussion | 7.17 | 9.91 | 6.83 | ||||
Strategy: Division and Payoff | 15.45 | 29.25 | 27.11 | ||||
-in particular, send 10 | 3.17 | 6.13 | 4.82 | ||||
-in particular, send 10, return 20 | 5.66 | 15.09 | 15.26 | ||||
Strategy: Implementation | 9.93 | 16.04 | 4.42 | ||||
-in particular, messages on cheating | 0.97 | 3.30 | 0.20 | ||||
-in particular, messages on trust | 7.31 | 7.08 | 1.00 | ||||
Payoff/Game Discussion | 8.97 | 7.55 | 6.02 | ||||
Personal Game-Related Discussion | 11.86 | 5.19 | 2.01 | ||||
Message Type Categories | |||||||
Empty Content | 0 | 0.94 | 7.83 | ||||
Statement/Proposition | 71.57 | 0.7381 | 67.45 | 0.7625 | 66.27 | 0.5973 | |
Question/Doubt/Confusion | 21.00 | 18.40 | 13.45 | ||||
Approve/Agree/Ok | 7.43 | 13.21 | 12.45 | ||||
Message Volume Data | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | |
Number of Messages | 120.67 | (30.26) | 35.17 | (6.82) | 76.33 | (19.36) | |
Share of game-relevant messages | 0.56 | (0.24) | 0.70 | (0.13) | 0.54 | (0.23) | |
Number of Communication Groups | 6 | 6 | 6 |
Amount Sent | Probability of | Share Returned | Probability of | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Send All | Fair Return | |||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
Amount Sent | 0.06 *** | 0.09 *** | 10.38 *** | |||
(0.01) | (0.02) | (0.95) | ||||
Amount Sent Before | 0.25 | 0.03 | 0.17 | −0.02 ** | −0.02 ** | −0.04 |
(0.23) | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.09) | |
Percentage Returned Before | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.20 | |||
(0.18) | (0.17) | (2.77) | ||||
Social Messages, Number | 7.89 * | −0.28 ** | ||||
(4.04) | (0.11) | |||||
Game-relevant Messages, Number | 24.02 ** | −0.22 | ||||
(10.46) | (0.17) | |||||
Messages on Send 10, Number | 24.36 | −0.42 | ||||
(17.50) | (0.55) | |||||
Messages on Send10/Return20, Number | 49.33 *** | −0.23 | ||||
(12.00) | (0.41) | |||||
Messages on No Cheating, Number | −134.01 *** | 0.82 | ||||
(43.78) | (0.76) | |||||
Messages on Trust, Number | 9.61 | −0.16 | ||||
(14.08) | (0.35) | |||||
Discussed 10/20 Strategy | 7.35 *** | 11.70 *** | −0.04 | 11.81 *** | ||
(0.92) | (0.75) | (0.06) | (1.73) | |||
Agreed on 10/20 Strategy | −0.04 | |||||
(0.04) | ||||||
Receiver Promise to be Fair | 0.12 * | 4.93 *** | ||||
(0.06) | (1.13) | |||||
FB | −3.87 * | −0.83 | −4.59 *** | 0.10 * | 0.05 | 52.14 *** |
(2.19) | (1.40) | (0.60) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (4.70) | |
Chat | −1.69 | 3.58 *** | 5.33 *** | 0.06 | −0.01 | −0.05 |
(2.03) | (0.96) | (0.21) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.61) | |
Constant | −8.52 | 6.09 *** | −6.58 *** | 0.28 ** | −0.19 | −114.29 *** |
(8.86) | (1.46) | (1.18) | (0.12) | (0.15) | (12.04) | |
Sigma | 2.63 *** | 2.22 *** | ||||
(0.58) | (0.47) | |||||
(Pseudo) R-squared | 0.3499 | 0.4161 | 0.7885 | 0.5642 | 0.5363 | 0.6686 |
Number of Observations | 36 | 36 | 36 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
Dependent Variable: | Amount Sent ($) | Share Returned | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
Amount Sent Before | 0.09 | ||||
(0.09) | |||||
Share Returned Before | 0.24 | ||||
(0.15) | |||||
Amount Sent to Receiver | 0.08 *** | 0.08 *** | |||
(0.02) | (0.02) | ||||
FB | −1.60 * | −1.58 * | −0.04 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
(0.86) | (0.88) | (0.10) | (0.07) | (0.07) | |
Chat | 0.47 | 0.08 | −0.00 | −0.04 | −0.10 |
(1.40) | (1.27) | (0.19) | (0.13) | (0.12) | |
Words per Sentence | −0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
(0.06) | (0.06) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | |
Numerals | 0.36 ** | 0.35 ** | 0.02 | −0.01 | −0.00 |
(0.13) | (0.14) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | |
Money | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.04 | −0.00 | 0.02 |
(0.53) | (0.54) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | |
Positive Emotions | 0.20 | 0.17 | −0.01 | −0.03 | −0.02 |
(0.27) | (0.27) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | |
Negative Emotions | −0.75 * | −0.69 | −0.01 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
(0.44) | (0.41) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | |
Question Marks | −1.13 *** | −1.09 *** | −0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
(0.38) | (0.35) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | |
Exclamation Marks | 0.45 | 0.49 | −0.01 | −0.05 | −0.02 |
(0.34) | (0.33) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.05) | |
Constant | 9.69 *** | 8.84 *** | 0.56 *** | −0.25 | −0.46 * |
(1.54) | (1.70) | (0.16) | (0.26) | (0.27) | |
R-squared | 0.58 | 0.6 | 0.27 | 0.53 | 0.6 |
Number of Observations | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
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Abatayo, A.L.; Lynham, J.; Sherstyuk, K. Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media. Games 2020, 11, 48. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040048
Abatayo AL, Lynham J, Sherstyuk K. Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media. Games. 2020; 11(4):48. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040048
Chicago/Turabian StyleAbatayo, Anna Lou, John Lynham, and Katerina Sherstyuk. 2020. "Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media" Games 11, no. 4: 48. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040048