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Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature

Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse 9, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
Games 2010, 1(4), 551-585;
Received: 27 August 2010 / Revised: 27 October 2010 / Accepted: 11 November 2010 / Published: 15 November 2010
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We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflictbetween risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as a whole. We use Ellison’s [1] Radius-Coradius Theorem to present prominent results on local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning in a localandin a global- interactions setting. View Full-Text
Keywords: coordination games; learning; local interactions coordination games; learning; local interactions

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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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Weidenholzer, S. Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature. Games 2010, 1, 551-585.

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