- freely available
Future Internet 2010, 2(3), 212-237; doi:10.3390/fi2030212
2. Spectrum Sharing Processes
2.1. Sensing and Monitoring
2.3. Distribution of Rules
3. Attacker Profiles
- Malicious nodes are nodes violating the rules on purpose, without even necessarily attempting to obtain direct (short-term) benefit. Their goal is to cause disturbance either to the underlying network as a whole, or to selected (victim) nodes.
- Rational nodes are those whose aim is to increase their utility (gained by using the underlying network), mainly by using more spectrum resources (bands, or larger time frames, or codes etc.) than those assigned to them or agreed to by them (possibly implicitly). Rational nodes may attempt to determine unused resources and use them against explicit or implicit allocations, with no negative effect to others, or cheat, i.e., attempt to maximize their payoff by degrading the performance of others (which are cheated out of their allocated resources).
4. Security Threats
4.1. Sensing and Monitoring
- Primary user masking: A (malicious) node may transmit signals able to mask the primary user’s ones towards misleading the spectrum sensing procedure. Thus, a legitimate node would not be able to detect the primary user’s transmissions and falsely assume it found a spectrum hole .
- Primary user emulation (PUE) attacks: A node may transmit elaborately created signals which seem exactly the same as a primary user’s ones. A sensing node may be unable to distinguish the real from the fake signals and falsely mark a spectrum portion as occupied by a primary user and defer its transmission, thus leaving more spectrum for the attacker. Mechanisms to counter PUE attacks are presented in [17,29,30].
- Non-standards-compliant sensing techniques: Standards as to how sensing should be implemented or requirements so that the desired sensing performance is achieved may be in place. Here we refer to cases when, either due to malice or selfishness, or even due to software or hardware failures, nodes do not follow the stipulated sensing behavior and we elaborate with some examples. First, nodes may use sensing intervals that are too long in order to allow for a timely reaction, e.g., to the appearance of a licensed user. Second, a node may not release a channel for sensing purposes in due time (given that sensing is to be performed at specified intervals, time during which secondary users need to remain “silent”). Other examples of misbehavior would be deliberately introducing de-synchronization between nodes, in order to blur the boundary between deliberate and accidental misuse or sensing with insufficient sensitivity. Finally, there is the case for tampering with spectrum sensor software and hardware to affect their normal and stable operation .
4.2.1. Negotiation Obstruction
4.2.2. Fake Spectrum Requests Injection
4.2.3. Spectrum Requests Falsification
4.2.4. Client Feedback Falsification
4.2.5. Spectrum Needs Over-reporting
4.2.6. False Claims of Continuous Changing Demands or Environmental Conditions
4.2.7. Auction Cheating
- Bid Shielding : An attacking node may announce an extremely high bid to a sharing mechanism with the view to discourage its competitors from making any more offers. Since each node maintains its own affordable upper bid limit, in such a case it would be obliged to retire early from the whole process. To make things worse, if a node has the right to retract its last bid, allowing the second biggest one to be accepted, a number of colluding nodes may exploit such a vulnerability to successfully mislead the underlying mechanism and gain access to the auctioned spectrum at a really low price.
- Shilling: One or more attacking nodes may announce sequential bids to a sharing mechanism with aiming to increase the winning price of a special spectrum portion. In fact, these nodes may even have no intention to win the auction, but their sole objective would be to press nodes in real need of the available spectrum to offer more and more money.
- Sniping: An attacking node may choose to announce a high (or higher than the current) bid, just before an auction closes. As a consequence, none of its opponents would have the time to respond with a higher one, losing automatically the chance to gain access to the spectrum. Since nodes could stop offering higher bids even before reaching the highest price they can afford (for example when they know that there has been no higher bid offered by their competitors until then), a legitimate node could fail to win the auction, even if it had not reached its price limit.
- Sub-leasing : One or more cheating nodes may do their best to win an auction at the lowest possible price and, in turn, sublease the spectrum to others (and losers of the original auction may be included). The primary objective of such an attacker would be to earn extra profit at zero cost by gaining benefits which should be credited to the original spectrum auctioneer.
4.2.8. Fake Complaints Regarding the Received QoS
4.2.9. Identity Theft and the Use of Multiple Identities
4.3. Distribution of Sharing Rules
4.3.1. Rules Never Received Claim
4.3.2. Altered/Distorted Rules Received Claim
4.3.3. Unreachable Rules
- Positive rules: This category contains rules defining the conditions under which a node is allowed to use the available resources.
- Negative rules: These rules define the requirements to be satisfied to prevent a node from using the aforementioned resources.
4.3.4. Fake Rules Injection
4.3.5. Rules Altering
4.4.1. Timeslots Usage Violation
4.4.2 Transmission Power Thresholds Violation
4.4.3 Channel Usage Violation
4.4.4. Control and Management Time Period Violations
4.4.5. Common Control Channel Jamming
4.4.6. Identity Theft/Multiple Identities
4.4.7. NEPA, CEPA and LORA Parasite Attacks
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- All these apply independently of the category of the control channel. Note that according to , there are three types of control channels: global, local, and the dynamically selected ones.
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