Governance, Ownership Structure, and Financial Leverage: The Role of Board Gender Diversity in UK Firms
Abstract
1. Introduction
- RQ1. How does the corporate governance structure affect corporate financial leverage decisions in UK companies?
- RQ2. What is the impact of ownership structure on corporate financial leverage in UK companies?
2. Theoretical Framework
3. Literature Review: Hypotheses Development
3.1. The Relationship Between Board Size and Corporate Financial Leverage Decisions
3.2. The Role of Non-Executive Directors in Shaping Corporate Financial Leverage Strategies
3.3. The Impact of CEO-Chairman Duality on Business Financial Leverage
3.4. The Influence of Female Board Representation on Corporate Financial Leverage
3.5. The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Corporate Financial Leverage Decisions
3.6. The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Corporate Financial Leverage Strategies
3.7. The Role of Governmental Shareholding in Shaping Corporate Financial Leverage Strategies
4. Research Methodology
4.1. Sampling Process
4.2. Research Model
- β0 = Intercept coefficient
- β1 = Coefficient for each of the independent variables
- TDA = Total Debt ratio (total debt/total assets) × 100%
- LTDA = Long-term debt Ratio (long-term debt/total assets) × 100%
- STDA = Short-term debt Ratio (Short-term debt/total assets) × 100%
- BSIZE = the number of directors on the firm board
- N_EXEC = Proportion of non-executive directors sitting on the board
- CEO_DUAL = (Dummy variable) Value one (1) if the same person occupies the position of the chairman and the chief
- executive and zero (0) for otherwise.
- G_DIV = Percentage of females to the total board.
- M_OWN = Percentage of shares held by top managers.
- I_OWN = Percentage of shares held by institutions (non-government).
- G_OWN = Percentage of shares held by the government.
- FSIZE = the log value of the total asset of the firm.
- ROA = EBIT/average total assets × 100%.
- GROW = the percentage change in the value of the asset.
- TANG = the ratio of total fixed assets to the book value of total assets (%)
- LIQ = Liquidity Ratio (current assets/current liabilities)
- BETA (Risk) = Earnings Volatility (standard deviation of operating income over past 3 years)
5. Empirical Analysis and Interpretation of Findings
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
5.2. Correlation Matrix
5.3. Regression Analysis
5.4. Discussion
6. Conclusions
6.1. Theoretical Implications
6.2. Managerial Implications
6.3. Limitations
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
TDA | 4356 | 0.3490881 | 1.078288 | 0 | 56.00443 |
LTDA | 4354 | 0.4010065 | 0.3003272 | −0.3948131 | 1.30103 |
STDA | 4347 | 0.283699 | 0.1980015 | −0.3048131 | 2.331333 |
BSIZE | 4356 | 1.031749 | 0.0851497 | 0.69897 | 1.380211 |
N_EXEC | 4356 | 9.664371 | 2.085614 | 4 | 22 |
CEO_DUAL | 4356 | 0.0610652 | 0.2394774 | 0 | 1 |
G_DIV | 4356 | 0.331875 | 0.2616267 | 0 | 2.333333 |
M_OWN | 4356 | 0.5224015 | 4.289648 | −0.2648131 | 62.62 |
I_OWN | 4356 | 0.1959352 | 0.2220452 | −0.3457143 | 3.94 |
G_OWN | 4356 | 0.067984 | 0.1243015 | −0.2948131 | 3.131 |
FSIZE | 4356 | 4.330873 | 0.6527894 | 0.3 | 6.573286 |
ROA | 4356 | 0.0809193 | 0.1137497 | −0.4378799 | 0.999846 |
GROW | 4356 | 0.8222767 | 0.5154442 | −1.098152 | 3.173286 |
TANG | 4356 | 0.2009254 | 1.330859 | −0.5 | 84.5 |
TDA | LTDA | STDA | BSIZE | NEXEC | CEO_DUAL | G_DIV | M_OWN | I_OWN | G_OWN | FSIZE | ROA | GROW | TANG | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TDA | 1.0000 | |||||||||||||
LTDA | −0.0298 | 1.0000 | ||||||||||||
STDA | −0.0259 | 0.5227 | 1.0000 | |||||||||||
BSIZE | −0.0014 | 0.0027 | 0.0133 | 1.0000 | ||||||||||
N_EXEC | 0.0025 | 0.0138 | 0.0179 | 0.9385 | 1.0000 | |||||||||
CEO_DUAL | −0.0064 | 0.0771 | 0.0193 | 0.0221 | 0.0271 | 1.0000 | ||||||||
G_DIV | 0.0732 | −0.0284 | −0.0391 | 0.0187 | 0.0428 | −0.0037 | 1.0000 | |||||||
M_OWN | −0.0016 | 0.0854 | 0.0305 | 0.0285 | 0.0167 | 0.0267 | 0.0139 | 1.0000 | ||||||
I_OWN | −0.0061 | −0.0598 | 0.0256 | 0.0063 | 0.0028 | −0.0125 | −0.0428 | −0.0049 | 1.0000 | |||||
G_OWN | 0.0115 | −0.5220 | −0.2542 | 0.0397 | 0.0275 | −0.0556 | −0.0116 | −0.0207 | 0.1215 | 1.0000 | ||||
FSIZE | −0.1049 | 0.0224 | −0.0034 | 0.4886 | 0.4970 | 0.0108 | 0.0473 | 0.0096 | −0.0235 | 0.0011 | 1.0000 | |||
ROA | −0.0077 | −0.0020 | 0.0010 | −0.0687 | −0.0779 | 0.0071 | 0.3485 | −0.0166 | 0.0016 | −0.0006 | −0.1885 | 1.0000 | ||
GROW | 0.0007 | 0.1366 | 0.0918 | −0.1040 | −0.0875 | 0.0482 | −0.0170 | −0.0280 | 0.0864 | −0.0601 | −0.1025 | −0.0064 | 1.0000 | |
TANG | −0.0008 | 0.0415 | 0.0378 | 0.0126 | 0.0178 | −0.0028 | 0.0004 | −0.0009 | 0.0051 | −0.0272 | 0.0076 | 0.0077 | 0.0223 | 1.0000 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
---|---|---|---|
TDA | LTDA | STDA | |
BSIZE | 0.224 | −0.0955 | 0.00667 |
(0.686) | (0.467) | (0.946) | |
N_EXEC | 0.0281 | 0.00720 | 0.00332 |
(0.217) | (0.181) | (0.414) | |
CEO_DUAL | −0.0215 | 0.0495 *** | 0.000178 |
(0.751) | (0.002) | (0.988) | |
G_DIV | 0.418 *** | −0.0514 *** | −0.0356 *** |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.003) | |
M_OWN | −0.000992 | 0.00540 *** | 0.00129 * |
(0.793) | (0.000) | (0.056) | |
I_OWN | −0.0316 | −0.0121 | 0.0427 *** |
(0.668) | (0.487) | (0.001) | |
G_OWN | 0.0918 | −1.233 *** | −0.407 *** |
(0.486) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
FSIZE | −0.262 *** | 0.0126 * | −0.00236 |
(0.000) | (0.070) | (0.653) | |
ROA | −0.643 *** | 0.0574 | 0.0336 |
(0.000) | (0.120) | (0.227) | |
GROW | −0.0140 | 0.0650 *** | 0.0286 *** |
(0.660) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
TANG | 0.000119 | 0.00551 * | 0.00419 * |
(0.992) | (0.056) | (0.053) | |
LIQ | −0.175 ** | 0.00690 * | −0.0157 * |
(0.015) | (0.070) | (0.053) | |
BETA (Risk) | 0.102 * | 0.0451 * | 0.0285 * |
(0.053) | (0.066) | (0.072) | |
Constant | 0.701 ** | 0.382 *** | 0.221 *** |
(0.018) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
N | 4356 | 4354 | 4347 |
R2 | 0.0425 | 0.315 | 0.0921 |
F | 12.66 | 175.4 | 38.47 |
p | 1.01 × 10−22 | 0 | 7.88 × 10−77 |
Variable | TDA (Fixed Effects) | LTDA (Fixed Effects) | STDA (Fixed Effects) |
---|---|---|---|
BSIZE | 0.113 (0.415) | −0.053 (0.378) | 0.002 (0.851) |
CEO_DUAL | −0.015 (0.622) | 0.039 ** (0.010) | 0.001 (0.980) |
G_DIV | 0.390 *** (0.000) | −0.042 *** (0.000) | −0.030 *** (0.001) |
Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 4356 | 4354 | 4347 |
R2 (Within) | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0.09 |
Variable | First Stage (Leverage) | Second Stage (TDA) |
---|---|---|
Industry-Avg Leverage | 0.623 *** (0.000) | — |
Predicted Leverage | — | 0.377 *** (0.001) |
Cragg-Donald F-stat | 35.8 | |
Cragg-Donald F-stat | 0.231 | Yes |
Hansen J-test p-value | 4300 | 4300 |
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Angsoyiri, D.; Alkaraan, F.; John, J. Governance, Ownership Structure, and Financial Leverage: The Role of Board Gender Diversity in UK Firms. J. Risk Financial Manag. 2025, 18, 276. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18050276
Angsoyiri D, Alkaraan F, John J. Governance, Ownership Structure, and Financial Leverage: The Role of Board Gender Diversity in UK Firms. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2025; 18(5):276. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18050276
Chicago/Turabian StyleAngsoyiri, Dramani, Fadi Alkaraan, and Judith John. 2025. "Governance, Ownership Structure, and Financial Leverage: The Role of Board Gender Diversity in UK Firms" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 18, no. 5: 276. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18050276
APA StyleAngsoyiri, D., Alkaraan, F., & John, J. (2025). Governance, Ownership Structure, and Financial Leverage: The Role of Board Gender Diversity in UK Firms. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 18(5), 276. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18050276