CEO Attributes and Corporate Performance in Frontier Markets: The Case of Jordan

Abstract

The objective of this study is to examine the impact of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) attributes on corporate performance in Jordan, a representative frontier market. The analysis focuses on four key CEO attributes, comprising two socio-demographic variables—age and educational—and two corporate governance-related ones—tenure and origin. Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are used as proxies for firm performance. Using a sample of 416 firm-year observations from companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during 2015–2023, the study employs the system GMM methodology to estimate dynamic panel data models, addressing potential endogeneity and capturing the dynamic nature of firm performance. The results show that CEO age has a positive but insignificant effect, whereas CEO education and tenure significantly enhance firm performance. Conversely, CEO origin has a statistically negative impact on firm performance, reflecting the value of insider CEOs. The significant effects of CEO education, tenure, and origin—observed within the models that also incorporated firm- and country-level controls—reflect their incremental contribution to firm performance in frontier markets. Robustness checks, including controls for the COVID-19 pandemic and industry effects, confirm these findings. The study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the applicability of established theories—namely Upper Echelons, Stewardship, Resource Dependence, and Human Capital Theories—while identifying the CEO traits that drive success in frontier markets. It also offers practical guidance for shareholders, board directors, and policymakers in designing effective leadership and governance strategies.

1. Introduction

Corporate governance (CG, hereafter) refers to the rules, practices and processes by which a company is executed and managed (Bui & Krajcsák, 2024). In practice, CG plays a crucial role in supporting economic efficiency, sustainability and stability, because it has a significant impact on how resources are allocated in capital markets. Applying CG principles effectively is a priority for countries, especially for frontier markets to grow, attract investors, and ensure long-term success. According to the Association of Governance, Risk & Compliance (2020), good corporate governance helps businesses run better, attract funding, and reduce risks. It further ensures companies are transparent, accountable, and responsive to investors and stakeholders. Hence, it supports economic growth by making it easier to secure financing, create jobs, and encourage new investments—key drivers for long-term success. On the other hand, poor corporate governance brings big problems for businesses, such as financial fraud, lost trust, and even bankruptcy.

Chief Executive Officers (CEO, hereafter) play a crucial role in corporate governance research because they make key strategic decisions, allocate resources, and run daily business operations, thereby helping business either to success or failure. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that a CEO’s personal traits, in general, are important determinants of various company outcomes. Therefore, Hambrick (2007) argues that the most suitable method to truly understand a firm’s performance is to investigate the characteristics and perceptions of its top managers. Various studies examined the relationship between CEO attributes and corporate performance (Amran et al., 2014; Kuo et al., 2015; Liu & Jiang, 2020; Mukherjee & Sen, 2022; Urquhart & Zhang, 2022; Rahman & Chen, 2023; Nguyen et al., 2023; Siregar et al., 2023; El Abiad et al., 2024; Han & Jo, 2024; Chen et al., 2025).

Although existing literature has studied CEO characteristics and their impact on corporate performance, most studies have focused on developed or emerging markets, leaving frontier markets relatively unexplored. While frontier markets are characterized by smaller economies, limited liquidity, weaker financial systems, and heightened political and economic risks, they also offer growth potential due to untapped resources and early investment opportunities (Andrikopoulos et al., 2016). Unlike developed and emerging markets, frontier markets are marked by underdeveloped governance structure—making managerial decision making and leadership quality even more critical.

Jordan, classified as a frontier market by MSCI,1 provides a compelling context for examining the relationship between CEO attributes and corporate performance. As a relatively small economy with a less developed governance system compared to emerging or developed markets, Jordan presents distinct institutional and economic conditions. The country has faced numerous external and internal challenges, including the reflections of regional conflicts, structural economic reforms, and global financial crises. Despite these obstacles, Jordan continues to offer promising investment opportunities in key sectors such as tourism, agriculture, technology, and services. Notably, since the introduction of the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code in 2006,2 there has been measurable progress in the adoption of corporate governance practices. Nevertheless, the corporate environment continues to display characteristics common to many frontier markets—such as concentrated ownership, significant government involvement, and the gradual evolution of regulatory frameworks (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010). These institutional dynamics make Jordan an informative case study, and the findings of this research may have broader relevance to other frontier markets facing similar governance and structural dynamics.

Research in Jordan mainly focused on the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in general. For instance, Marashdeh (2014) examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms—such as board of directors and ownership structure—on firm performance using a sample of industrial and service companies over the period 2000 to 2010, and found that the influence of governance mechanisms on firm performance varies by context. Similarly, Saidat et al. (2019) examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the financial performance of family and non-family firms using a sample of non-financial firms over the period 2009 to 2015, and found evidence that governance mechanisms do not have uniform effects but are influenced by ownership structure. More recently, a few papers have incorporated the CEO attributes and examined their impact on various corporate attributes such as: real earning management (Alhmood et al., 2020), risk-taking (Bsoul et al., 2022, and investment efficiency (Shaheen et al., 2024)). Despite these efforts, a critical gap remains in the literature, as no study has directly examined how CEO characteristics influence firm performance in Jordan. Addressing this gap is important given Jordan’s classification as a frontier market, where underdeveloped governance structures raise the importance of managerial decision making and leadership quality.

Specifically, this study investigates the impact of CEO attributes on corporate performance in Jordan, a representative frontier market. The sample consists of 416 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2015 to 2023. CEO age and education are considered as socio-demographic attributes, while CEO tenure and origin are considered as corporate governance traits, with ROA and ROE as proxies for firm performance. To assess the relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance, the study employs system GMM to estimate dynamic panel data models. This methodology is chosen to address potential endogeneity and capture the dynamic nature of firm performance, providing consistent and efficient estimates suitable for frontier markets with varying institutional and economic conditions.

The results show that CEO age is positively related to firm performance, but statistically insignificant. This is partially consistent with the Upper Echelons Theory, suggesting that the advantages associated with older CEOs, such as expertise and stability, are insufficient to make a significant contribution to corporate performance in Jordan. Consistent with Human Capital Theory, we find that CEO education is positive and statistically significant, asserting that CEOs with higher levels of education (master’s degree or above) enhance strategic decision making and firm adaptability in unstable environments, thereby improving firm performance. In line with Stewardship and Resource Dependence Theories, we also find that CEO tenure significantly enhances corporate performance, addressing the benefits of longer-tenured CEOs—associated with accumulated knowledge and strong stakeholder networks. Conversely, CEO origin demonstrates a statistically negative effect, suggesting that insider CEOs are better positioned to improve firm performance than outsiders in dynamic environments. The significant effects of CEO education, tenure, and origin—observed in the models that also account for firm- and country-level controls—reflect their distinct contribution to firm performance in frontier markets. Robustness checks, addressing the impact of COVID-19 pandemic and industry effects, further confirmed our main findings.

This study contributes to the literature by addressing the link between CEO characteristics and firm performance in frontier markets, with a specific focus on Jordan. Whereas prior research has largely examined developed and emerging economies, limited evidence exists on how CEO traits influence corporate performance in markets characterized by institutional underdevelopment, concentrated ownership, and evolving governance structures. By performing the analysis in Jordan, the study extends the empirical evidence on leadership and governance in frontier economies by demonstrating the applicability of established theories—namely Upper Echelons, Stewardship, Resource Dependence, and Human Capital theories—while identifying the CEO traits that drive success under unique institutional and economic conditions

The findings of this study provide both theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical perspective, the findings partially confirm the applicability of the Upper Echelons Theory, as well as the relevance of Human Capital, Stewardship, and Resource Dependence Theories, in frontier markets like Jordan, showing that CEO attributes play an important role in improving firm performance even in environments with underdeveloped governance structures and economic uncertainty. Practically, the study provides guidance for shareholders and board members in selecting qualified CEOs; particularly, firms can benefit from appointing CEOs who are highly educated, possess long tenure, and promoted from within the firm. Finally, the findings of this study reflect the importance of selecting CEOs who are capable of balancing dual roles—providing strategic vision, ensuring operational efficiency, managing risks, while simultaneously driving sustainable growth, innovation, and organizational adaptability. By encouraging this dual-leadership governance model, policymakers can help firms to achieve a balance between long-term transformation and short-term stability, thereby strengthening corporate governance practices and enhancing firm performance in frontier markets like Jordan.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and hypotheses development. Section 3 is the data and research methods. Section 4 provides the empirical results. Section 5 is the discussion. Section 6 provides robustness. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

2.1. Theoretical Background

Our discussion of the impact of CEO characteristics on corporate performance is based on four theoretical perspectives. The Upper Echelons Theory developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984), which states that “organizational outcomes—strategic choices and performance levels—are partially predicted by managerial background characteristics”. Precisely, it suggests that CEOs’ decision-making process and actions are driven by their attributes (Shen, 2021). The Stewardship Theory developed by Donaldson and Davis (1991) suggests that managers are naturally motivated to perform well, maximize company profits and bring good returns to stockholders. They act as responsible stewards, prioritizing the firm’s success over their own interest. Davis et al. (1997) demonstrate that CEOs that act as stewards have centralized control of the firm and view firm performance as their own wealth maximization. Another theory is the Resource Dependence Theory developed by Pfeffer (1972) which explores the role of top executive managers in offering company access to various resources such as information, expertise, and communication that would protect it from various environmental threats and foster business performance. This was further explored in Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who argue that organizations are shaped by their dependence on external resources, which creates constraints and power dynamics that they must strategically manage to survive and thrive. Finally, the Human Capital Theory developed by Becker (1964) suggests that the more skilled and competent the organization’s personnel are, the more likely the organization will attain its strategic goals and hence benefit the overall corporation.

2.2. Empirical Evidence

2.2.1. Developed Markets

Several studies have examined the relationship between CEO characteristics and corporate performance in developed markets and yield inconsistent results. For instance, Kuo et al. (2015) investigated the impact of CEO traits on earnings performance using a sample of 729 publicly listed U.S. firms from the ExecuComp database over the period 2001–2010. Employing a random effects panel model, they found that older CEOs tend to enhance earnings performance. However, the study also revealed that in poorly performing firms, both CEO age and tenure negatively affect earnings, whereas in high-performing firms, older CEOs contribute positively to earnings outcomes. Similarly, Urquhart and Zhang (2022) analyzed 435 firms listed on the FTSE 350 index in the United Kingdom between 1999 and 2017. Their findings indicate a positive association between CEO educational attainment and firm performance, with an even greater impact observed when the CEO graduated from a highly ranked university, suggesting that educational background contributes to more effective strategic decision making. Recently, El Abiad et al. (2024) examined family-owned businesses listed on Euronext in the post-COVID-19 period and, using both OLS regression and GMM estimation techniques, found that CEO tenure has a positive effect on corporate performance. More recently, Chen et al. (2025) assessed the influence of governance structures, industry conditions, and strategic choices on CEO succession outcomes. Drawing on data from U.S. publicly traded firms listed on COMPUSTAT between 2009 and 2020, they concluded that companies that promote CEOs from within tend to perform better than those that appoint external successors, highlighting the performance advantage of insider CEOs due to their familiarity with firm-specific operations and culture.

2.2.2. Emerging Markets

The relationship between CEO characteristics and corporate performance in emerging markets has been extensively investigated and yielded mixed results. For example, Amran et al. (2014) analyzed 80 government-linked companies in Malaysia over the period 2005–2009 and found a negative association between CEO age and firm performance, suggesting that younger CEOs may drive better outcomes in this context. In a study of Chinese listed firms, Liu and Jiang (2020) used 10,446 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2016 and employed a quantile regression approach. Their results indicated a significant negative relationship between CEO tenure and corporate performance, while CEO age did not exhibit any statistically significant effect. Mukherjee and Sen (2022) examined the impact of CEO attributes on corporate reputation, financial performance, and sustainable growth using a sample of 138 leading non-financial firms listed on India’s NSE from 2011 to 2018. Their findings suggest that CEO age, education, and tenure have no measurable influence on corporate financial outcomes. Conversely, Rahman and Chen (2023) conducted a comprehensive analysis using 16,010 firm-year observations from A-share private companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2010 and 2020. Their study found that both CEO age and tenure were positively associated with corporate performance, indicating the potential benefits of experience and long-term leadership in the Chinese market. Nguyen et al. (2023) investigated the relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance in Vietnam, utilizing data from 386 companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (2016–2020). Their findings revealed a positive relationship between CEO age and performance, whereas CEO education, tenure, and outsider origin were all negatively associated with corporate outcomes. Finally, Siregar et al. (2023) explored the impact of CEO origin and ownership in non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2018. Their results demonstrated no significant relationship between CEO origin and firm performance, highlighting the limited influence of origin in the Indonesian corporate environment.

2.3. Hypothesis Development

While empirical studies examining the relationship between CEO attributes and corporate performance have showed mixed results across different markets, theoretical and empirical development supports the use of directional hypotheses. In frontier markets like Jordan—characterized by unique economic, political, and institutional conditions—the role of the CEO becomes even more important. In such contexts, CEO characteristics can greatly affect corporate performance. This study focuses on four key CEO attributes: two socio-demographic factors (age and education) and two governance-related factors (tenure and origin). Based on established theories and taking into account the specific features of the frontier market environment, the study developed hypotheses that reflect theoretical foundations, while acknowledging the mixed evidence provided in prior research.

2.3.1. CEO Age

The age of the CEO plays an important role in the firm’s decision-making process, and thus in its performance. In frontier markets, which offer growth potential due to untapped resources and early-stage investment opportunities, experience and strategic judgment are important for business success. In such dynamic environment, older CEOs often bring extensive industry knowledge, possess valuable expertise and provide leadership stability, which can improve decision making and enhance corporate performance. In Jordan, where firms must adjust to institutional gaps, economic uncertainties, and structural constraints, CEOs who are likely to provide stability, effective risk management, and long-term strategic vision—traits commonly associated with older CEOs, may positively contribute to corporate performance. Hence, our first hypothesis is:

H1: 

There is a positive relationship between CEO age and corporate performance.

2.3.2. CEO Education

Higher educational attainment equips CEOs with enhanced analytical skills, strategic decision-making abilities, and structured approaches to planning and risk management. These capabilities can help CEOs to better understand the core business principles, to improve their ability to analyze economic data, and to make more informed strategic decisions, and are expected to directly enhance firm performance. In frontier markets such as Jordan, where firms often operate in uncertain and under-regulated environments, CEOs with higher educational background can be better prepared to implement effective performance management practices and make informed strategic decisions needed to improve firm performance. Hence, our second hypothesis is:

H2: 

There is a positive relationship between CEO education and corporate performance.

2.3.3. CEO Tenure

CEO tenure refers to the time a person spends in the CEO position in a given organization. In frontier markets such as Jordan, where companies might be subject to weak institutional support and high economic uncertainty, longer CEO tenure is essential, as they have a deep understanding of the company’s operations and challenges, and good relationships with partners and regulators. In addition, long-tenured CEOs may also feel greater responsibility and commitment to the company’s long-term success. Although longer CEO tenure can lead to excessive control or resistance to change, in settings like Jordan, their advantages often outweigh the risks. Hence, our third hypothesis is:

H3: 

There is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and corporate performance.

2.3.4. CEO Origin

Corporate boards must decide whether to appoint an outsider CEO or promote an insider successor when selecting new CEO. This critical choice may affect the firm’s future performance. Outsider CEOs may bring new ideas. But in frontier markets like Jordan, insider CEOs may be more effective because they already understand how the company works, have better relationships with staff and owners, and are familiar with local customs and regulations. Hence, our fourth hypothesis is:

H4: 

There is a negative relationship between CEO origin and corporate performance.

As shown in Figure 1, the conceptual framework proposes the four CEO attributes (age, education, tenure, and origin) as independent variables influencing corporate performance.

3. Data and Research Methods

3.1. Data

Our initial sample comprises 167 companies listed on the ASE as of 31 December 2023. Consistent with previous studies in the area of corporate governance and firm performance (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2023), financial companies are excluded from the sample (93 companies), due to their own regulatory requirements and accounting practices, which differ significantly from those listed on other sectors. We also exclude companies with missing data of the study variables over the period from 2015 to 2023 to ensure that the sample is balanced panel (22 companies). The final sample consists of 52 non-financial companies with 416 observations. Data on the variables used in the study were collected from the company’s annual reports, the ASE website,3 and the World Bank website.4 Data used in this study are provided in Table S1.

3.2. Research Methods

3.2.1. Variables

Dependent Variables

Corporate performance is used in this study as the dependent variable. Numerous studies have employed a variety of financial metrics to assess corporate performance, including both accounting-based measures like return on assets ($ROA$) and return on equity ($ROE$), and market-based measures like Tobin’s Q. While no single metric is globally accepted as superior, $ROA$ and $ROE$ are widely used in corporate governance and performance studies due to their strong alignment with internal management effectiveness and the firm’s current financial status. Unlike market-based measures, which reflect investor expectations and are influenced by external market conditions—particularly unreliable in frontier markets like Jordan—accounting-based measures are more stable and representative of actual business performance. $ROA$ reflects how efficiently a company uses its assets to generate profits, while $ROE$ measures returns to shareholders, making both directly relevant to assessing managerial efficiency and shareholder value creation. Despite criticisms related to their historical nature and sensitivity to accounting policies, this study uses $ROA$ and $ROE$ as proxies for corporate financial performance due to their ease of interpretation, comparability across firms, and ability to capture internal corporate performance.

Independent Variables

CEO attributes are used as independent variables. CEO age ($Age$) and CEO education ($Edu$) are used as socio-demographic attributes, CEO tenure ($Ten$) and CEO origin ($Orig$) are used as corporate governance attributes. $Age$ is calculated as the difference between the year of the firm’s annual financial report disclosure and the CEO’s year of birth. $Edu$ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO holds a master’s degree or higher, and 0 otherwise. $Ten$ is calculated as the difference between the year of the firm’s annual financial report disclosure and the year the CEO was appointed. Finally, $Orig$ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is an outsider (appointed from outside the company) and 0 if the CEO is an insider (promoted internally).

Control Variables

-

Firm-specific variables

To control firm-level characteristics that may affect performance, we include firm size ($Size$) and the book-to-market ratio ($BM$) in our regression models. $Size$ is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Larger firms often perform better due to advantages like economies of scale, easier access to financing, and stronger management. $BM$ reflects how the market values of a firm compared to its accounting value. A high $BM$ ratio may indicate undervaluation or financial distress, while a low $BM$ ratio often suggests growth potential. Including $BM$ helps separate the impact of CEO attributes on performance from market valuation effects, as shown in earlier studies.

-

Country-specific variables

Two country-specific variables are included in this study. Foreign direct investment ($FDI$) and the annual percentage change in the gross domestic product per capita ($GDPPC$). $FDI$ is expressed as net inflows of capital from abroad that are directed toward acquiring a lasting management interest—defined as 10 percent or more of voting shares—in Jordanian enterprises relative to Jordan’s gross domestic product (GDP), and captures the extent to which foreign investors establish or expand their ownership and control in local firms. It reflects the degree of foreign investor confidence in the Jordanian economy and its business environment. $GDPPC$ is calculated by dividing the country’s total GDP by the total population. It reflects both the size of the economy and how efficiently resources are translated into income at the individual level. $FDI$ and the annual percentage change in the $GDPPC$ are widely used in empirical studies to capture macroeconomic conditions that influence firm performance, investment decisions, and market stability.

Table 1. Summary of variables.

Variable Category		Variable Name	Symbol	Measurement	Data Source
Dependent Variables		Return on assets	$ROA$	net income/total assets	Company reports
		Return on equity	$ROE$	net income/total equity	Company reports
Independent Variables		CEO Age	$Age$	Financial reporting year—CEO’s birth year	Company reports
		CEO Education	$Edu$	1 if the CEO has a master’s degree or higher, 0 otherwise	Company reports
		CEO Tenure	$Ten$	Financial reporting year—CEO’s appointment year	Company reports
		CEO Origin	$Orig$	1 if the CEO is an outsider, 0 otherwise	Company reports
Control Variables	Firm-specific	Book-to-market ratio	$BM$	Book value per share/market closing price per share	Company reports, ASE.
		Firm size	$Size$	Natural logarithms of total assets	Company reports
	Country-specific	Foreign direct investment	$FDI$	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	World Bank
		Gross domestic product per capita	$GDPPC$	GDP per capita growth (annual %)	World Bank

presents a summary of the variables used in this study, including their category, name, symbol, measurement, and data source.

3.2.2. Empirical Models

Because CEO attributes and other factors may affect corporate performance gradually and with different time lags, we estimate the following general dynamic panel data model:

$$\begin{gathered} {{CP}_{i,t}=\beta }_0+{\beta }_1{CP}_{i,t-1}+\sum _{j=1}^K{\beta }_{1+j}{CEOAtribute}_{j,i,t}+\sum _{z=1}^M{\beta }_{K+z}{Firm-specific}_{z,i,t} \\ +\sum _{s=1}^N{\beta }_{M+s}{Country-specific}_{s,t}+{\epsilon }_{i,t} \end{gathered}$$

(1)

where ${CP}_{i,t}$ denotes the performance of corporate $i$ at time $t$, ${CEOAtribute}_{j,i,t}$ is the CEO attributes $j$ for corporate $i$ at time $t$, ${Firm-specific}_{z,i,t}$ is the firm-specific variable $z$ for corporate $i$ at time $t$, ${Country-specific}_{s,t}$ is the country-specific variable $s$ at time $t$, and ${\epsilon }_{i,t}$ is the error term. Corporate performance in our study is measured by two alternative measures (return on assets and return on equity). Hence, model (1) takes the following two analytical forms in our study:

$$\begin{gathered} {{ROA}_{i,t}=\beta }_0+{\beta }_1{ROA}_{i,t-1}+{\beta }_2{Age}_{i,t}+{\beta }_3{Edu}_{i,t}+{\beta }_4{Ten}_{i,t}+{\beta }_5{Orig}_{i,t}+{\beta }_6{BM}_{i,t} \\ +{\beta }_7{Size}_{i,t}+{\beta }_8{FDI}_t+{\beta }_9{GDPPC}_t+{\epsilon }_{i,t} \end{gathered}$$

(2)

$$\begin{gathered} {{ROE}_{i,t}=\beta }_0+{\beta }_1{ROA}_{i,t-1}+{\beta }_2{Age}_{i,t}+{\beta }_3{Edu}_{i,t}+{\beta }_4{Ten}_{i,t}+{\beta }_5{Orig}_{i,t}+{\beta }_6{BM}_{i,t} \\ +{\beta }_7{Size}_{i,t}+{\beta }_8{FDI}_t+{\beta }_9{GDPPC}_t+{\epsilon }_{i,t} \end{gathered}$$

(3)

where $ROA$ denotes the return on assets, $ROE$ is the return on equity, $Age$ is the CEO age, $Edu$ is the CEO education, $Ten$ is the CEO tenure, $Orig$ is the CEO origin, $BM$ is the book-to-market ratio, $Size$ is the firm size, $FDI$ is the foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), $GDPPC$ is the GDP per capita growth (annual %), ${\beta }_x(x=\mathrm{1,2},\dots ,9)$ is the beta coefficients, and finally $\epsilon$ is the residual.

3.2.3. Econometric Method

We employ the system generalized method of moments (System GMM) approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) to estimate Equations (2) and (3). This dynamic panel specification addresses two key empirical challenges: potential endogeneity among explanatory variables used in the estimations and the persistence of firm performance over time. To capture firm performance dynamics, our model includes the first lag of the dependent variable to capture performance dynamics while accounting for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.

Traditional fixed or random effects estimators would be inconsistent in this context, because firm-specific effects are inherently correlated with the lagged performance measures. As a solution, Arellano and Bond (1991) introduces the difference GMM estimator for such models, which instruments first-differenced endogenous variables using their lagged levels. However, subsequent research (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) shows that these lagged level instruments may provide little information about the first differences. To overcome this limitation, Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a system GMM estimator by combining the regression in first differences with the regression in levels, using lagged differences in the variables as additional instruments.

The system GMM is more suitable—for our dataset—compared with other panel regression methods, as the number of firms exceeds the number of time periods; the dependent variable is dynamic (persistent); explanatory variables may be endogenous and the data exhibit firm-specific heterogeneity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation. Since the country-specific variables vary over time and across firms, they are treated as exogenous variables and included directly in the specification rather than being instrumented in the GMM framework.

For the consistency of the system GMM estimator, two key assumptions are required: No serial correlation in the error terms beyond first order, and the instrument set is valid. We verify these conditions using the Arellano–Bond test for second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals, and the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions to assess the validity of the instruments. The difference and system GMM estimators have one-step and two-step variants. The two-step system GMM uses residuals from the one-step estimates and is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step.

4. Empirical Results

4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
$ROA$ (%)	3.34	8.95	−85.71	59.93
$ROE$ (%)	5.01	13.62	−129.95	55.74
$Age$	57.92	11.07	29	88
$Edu$	0.30	0.46	0	1
$Ten$	7.73	5.17	1	26
$Orig$	0.64	0.47	0	1
$BM$	1.36	1.66	0.17	29.51
$Size$	17.47	1.42	13.61	21.42
FDI	2.67	1.22	1.34	4.87
GDPPC	−0.84	2.26	−5.58	1.77

$ROA$ is the return on assets. $ROE$ is the return on equity. $Age$, $Edu$, $Ten$, and $Orig$ are the CEO age, education, tenure, and origin, respectively. $BM$ and $Size$ are the book-to-market ratio and firm size, respectively. $FDI$ is the foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). $GDPPC$ is the GDP per capita growth (annual %). Statistics reported are mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std. Dev.), minimum (Min), and maximum (Max).

provides the descriptive statistics of all variables. The results show that $ROA$ has a mean of 3.34% and a standard deviation of 8.95% with values ranging from near −85.71% to 59.93%. $ROE$ has a mean value of 5.01% and standard deviation of 13.62%, with a range of −129.95% to 55.74%. The positive mean of $ROA$ and $ROE$ indicates that the market is profitable in general. Their standard deviation shows that the firm’s performance varies substantially. Also, their wide range reflects the different performance levels of Jordanian firms. For the CEO attributes, $Age$ has a mean of 57.927 years and a standard deviation of 11.07 with a range from 29 to 88 years. This average age might indicate a preference for older CEO, while the wide age range suggests some openness to younger CEO across the Jordanian companies. $Edu$ has a mean of 30% and a standard deviation of 46%. The mean suggests that only 30% of the CEOs hold postgraduate degrees, while the substantial standard deviation indicates some heterogeneity in educational expectations across Jordanian firms. $Ten$ has a mean of 7.73 years and a standard deviation of 5.17, ranging from 1 to 26 years. This moderate average tenure suggests regular CEO turnover. The maximum tenure of 26 years indicates some long-standing CEO positions. $Orig$ has a mean of 64% and a standard deviation of 47%. This relatively high mean indicates that external CEO hires are more common than internal ones. The standard deviation suggests a substantial variation in the CEO hiring process across Jordanian firms. For the firm-specific variables, the $BM$ has an average of 1.36 and a standard deviation of 1.66 and ranges from 0.17 to 29.51, suggesting significant divergence between accounting and market-based valuations across firms. The substantial variation reflects heterogeneous growth prospects and differential market assessments of firm fundamentals. $Size$ has a mean of 17.47 and a standard deviation of 1.42. The range from 13.61 to 21.42 indicates some size variation in the sample. $FDI$ has a mean of 2.67% and standard deviation of 1.22% ranging from 1.34% to 4.87%, suggesting moderate but varying levels of foreign capital inflows into Jordan. Finally, $GDPPC$ has a negative mean of −0.84 with standard deviation of 2.26%. It ranges from −5.58% to 1.77%, reflecting the economic challenges faced by Jordan during the sample period.

Table 3. Pairwise correlation.

	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{A}$	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{E}$	$\mathit{A}\mathit{g}\mathit{e}$	$\mathit{E}\mathit{d}\mathit{u}$	$\mathit{T}\mathit{e}\mathit{n}$	$\mathit{O}\mathit{r}\mathit{i}\mathit{g}$	$\mathit{B}\mathit{M}$	$\mathit{S}\mathit{i}\mathit{z}\mathit{e}$	$\mathit{F}\mathit{D}\mathit{I}$	$\mathit{G}\mathit{D}\mathit{P}\mathit{P}\mathit{C}$
$ROA$	1
$ROE$	0.83 ***	1
$Age$	0.06	0.06	1
$Edu$	−0.00	−0.00	−0.02	1
$Ten$	0.07 *	0.06	0.38 ***	−0.07	1
$Orig$	0.03	−0.07 *	0.38 ***	0.04	0.30 ***	1
$BM$	−0.18 ***	−0.21 ***	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.06	1
$Size$	0.13 ***	0.30 ***	0.10 **	0.01	−0.13 ***	−0.04	−0.05	1
$FDI$	0.11 **	0.09 **	−0.03	0.01	−0.12 ***	0.07	0.01	−0.02	1
$GDPPC$	−0.08 *	−0.04	0.04	−0.02	0.11 **	−0.04	0.02	0.04	−0.47 ***	1

$ROA$ is the return on assets. $ROE$ is the return on equity. $Age$, $Edu$, $Ten$, and $Orig$ are the CEO age, education, tenure, and origin, respectively. $BM$ and $Size$ are the book-to-market ratio and firm size, respectively. $FDI$ is the foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). $GDPPC$ is the GDP per capita growth (annual %). ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

provides the pairwise correlation among the alternative variables. Corporate performance measures ($ROA$ and $ROE$) show a strong positive correlation. CEO attributes are weakly correlated with $ROA$ and $ROE$. For firm-specific variables, $BM$ is negatively correlated $ROA$ and $ROE$ while $Size$ is positively correlated. For country-specific variables, $FDI$ is positively correlated with corporate performance indicating that foreign capital inflows are associated with better performance. In contrast, $GDPPC$ shows a negative correlation. $FDI$ and $GDPPC$ are strongly negatively correlated, reflecting the macroeconomic dynamics of Jordan where periods of stronger capital inflows are often associated with slower domestic growth, and vice versa.

4.2. Regression Results

Table 4. Results from the system GMM estimation.

	Model 1	Model 2
Dependent Variable	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{A}$	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{E}$
Dependent variable (Lag 1)	0.2434 ***	0.2123 ***
	(0.0077)	(0.0099)
$Age$	0.0084	0.0413
	(0.0388)	(0.0433)
$Edu$	2.2189 ***	3.9249 ***
	(0.5354)	(0.7729)
$Ten$	0.2883 ***	0.5189 ***
	(0.0519)	(0.0876)
$Orig$	−2.4200 ***	−6.0216 ***
	(0.5803)	(1.1973)
$BM$	−0.3470 ***	−0.6605 ***
	(0.0722)	(0.1142)
$Size$	1.4573 ***	3.1591 ***
	(0.2119)	(0.3505)
$FDI$	0.4894 ***	1.0512 ***
	(0.0575)	(0.0994)
$GDPPC$	0.2990 ***	0.4997 ***
	(0.0418)	(0.0657)
Constant	−26.0062 ***	−57.1118 ***
	(5.3427)	(7.4096)
Obs.	416	416
Wald test (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	13,804.93 ***	8585.24 ***
Hansen test of overiden. (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	43.18	46.45
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) ($\mathrm{z}$)	−1.08	−1.03
Difference in Hansen tests
Excluding group (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	42.92	42.82
Difference (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	−0.26	3.63

The table reports the results of the system GMM estimations for Equations (1a) and (1b), denoted by Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. $ROA$ is the return on assets. $ROE$ is return on equity. $Age$, $Edu$, $Ten$, and $Orig$ are the CEO age, education, tenure, and origin, respectively. $BM$ and $Size$ are the book-to-market ratio and firm size, respectively. $FDI$ is the foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). $GDPPC$ is the GDP per capita growth (annual %). The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Wald χ² statistics test the joint significance of the regressors. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, Arellano–Bond AR(2) test, and difference-in-Hansen tests are reported to assess instrument validity and model specification. ***, **, and * denote significance p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively.

provides the system GMM estimation results for Equations (2) and (3), denoted as Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. The table reports the tests related to the regression coefficients for the two models. Both models show a strong persistence in performance, with statistically significant lagged dependent variables, at 5% significance level. which supports the dynamic nature of the models. The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable in the two models suggests that approximately 24% (21%) of the corporate current performance, measured by $ROA$ ($ROE$), can be related to its last-year performance. As for the CEO traits, the regression coefficient of $Age$ demonstrates a positive relationship between CEO age and corporate performance, as presented in both models; however, in neither the effect is statistically significant. While the direction of the relationship is consistent with $\mathrm{H}1$, the lack of significance indicates that the hypothesis is not supported in the context of frontier markets, particularly for Jordanian firms. $Edu$ coefficient is positive and statistically significant in both models, supporting hypothesis ($\mathrm{H}2$) which proposed a positive relationship between CEO education and corporate performance. This indicates that firms led by highly educated CEOs tend to exhibit higher performance. The results also provide support for hypothesis ($\mathrm{H}3$) that CEO tenure is positively related to corporate performance. As shown in the two models, $Ten$ coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that firms led by long-tenured CEOs tend to perform better. $Orig$ coefficient is negative and statistically significant in both models, supporting hypothesis ($\mathrm{H}4$). This suggests that firms led by externally appointed CEOs (outsiders) tend to underperform relative to those led by internally promoted CEOs. (insider), particularly, outsider CEOs’ appointment is associated with lower firm performance. Additionally, the test results for the firm-specific variables show that both the book-to-market ratio and firm size can predict firm performance in the two models. Specifically, the regression coefficient for $BM$ is negative and statistically significant. Conversely, the coefficient for $Size$ is positive and statistically significant. Finally, for country-specific variables, the test results show that both $FDI$ and $GDPPC$ have positive and statistically significant coefficients, indicating that higher foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) and the GDP per capita growth (annual %) are associated with improved corporate performance in frontier markets like Jordan.

The Wald test’s results in the two models indicate that the null hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly zero is rejected, confirming that the regressors explain the variation in firm performance, as measured by $ROA$ and $ROE$. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions produces χ² statistics of 43.18 for Model 1 and 46.45 for Model 2. Since the p-values associated with these statistics are above the conventional significance levels, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments used are valid and uncorrelated with the error term. This supports the appropriateness of the instrument employed in the System GMM estimation. The Arellano–Bond test fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the error term, supporting the validity of the dynamic panel model specification. The robustness of the instruments specification in the two models is further confirmed using the difference-in-Hansen test which provides statistical evidence for the validity of the instruments used, suggesting that the instruments are appropriately specified and not correlated with the error term. Overall, these diagnostic tests confirm that the dynamic panel models are correctly specified, and the instruments employed effectively control for potential endogeneity and autocorrelation.

5. Discussion

This study examined the influence of CEO attributes—age, education, tenure, and origin—on corporate performance in the context of Jordan, a representative frontier market.

5.1. CEO Age

While CEO age, as a socio-demographic trait, exhibits a positive relationship with corporate performance, the effect is not statistically significant. This finding is partially consistent with the Upper Echelons Theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984). Specifically, the results suggest that although older CEOs may bring extensive industry experience, valuable expertise, and leadership stability, these advantages do not translate into a measurable impact on firm performance. In frontier markets like Jordan, where firms face institutional gaps, economic uncertainties, and structural constraints, the traditional benefits associated with older CEOs—stability, effective risk management, and long-term strategic vision—appear insufficient to significantly enhance corporate performance in dynamic environment. This is consistent with Liu and Jiang (2020) and Mukherjee and Sen (2022), who reported no significant impact of CEO age on firm performance in the Chinese and Indian emerging markets, respectively. However, the result contrasts with the evidence reported in Kuo et al. (2015) for the U.S. market, where older CEOs were found to significantly enhance corporate performance due to their rational decision making, deep organizational knowledge, and extensive business experience, as well as with the findings of Amran et al. (2014) in Malaysia and Han and Jo (2024) in South Korea, who showed that younger CEOs may deliver superior performance by being more risk-seeking and inclined to pursue bold, high-risk investments. Collectively, these studies indicate that CEO age does matter, suggesting that the benefits associated with CEO age are more likely to become observable in contexts characterized by strong governance structures and stable institutional environments. Overall, the evidence indicates that the impact of CEO age on corporate performance is subject to the institutional maturity of the market and the quality of the implemented governance regulations.

5.2. CEO Education

Education, as a socio-demographic CEO trait, impacts corporate performance. This is consistent with the Human Capital Theory of Becker (1964). Specifically, the results show that CEO education is positively associated with firm performance. Highly educated CEOs have the potential to adopt proper strategic planning tools, to use efficient analytical thinking, and to apply international business principles that improve the ability of the firm to respond to economic challenges and obstacles, which in turn enhances corporate outcomes. In frontier markets such as Jordan, marked by uncertainty and institutional gaps, and companies are exposed to international competition, a CEO with higher education is able to deal with the dynamic economic environment and have the capability to implement proper policies that enhance corporate performance. The result is consistent with the findings in UK reported in Urquhart and Zhang (2022) who suggest that better-educated CEOs possess finer training, enhanced cognitive abilities and knowledge, that improve the decision-making quality and encourage more strategic action, which in turn can positively influence corporate performance. The result; however, contrast with those of Mukherjee and Sen (2022) Nguyen et al. (2023), who found the CEO with higher education have either no impact or a negative one, in India and Vietnam, respectively.

5.3. CEO Tenure

CEO tenure, as a corporate governance CEO trait, impacts corporate performance. This is consistent with both the Stewardship Theory of Donaldson and Davis (1991) and the Resource Dependence Theory of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Specifically, the results show that CEO tenure has a positive impact on corporate performance. Longer-tenure CEOs feel greater responsibility and commitment to the company’s long-term success. In addition, they might have a better understanding of the company’s operations and challenges and build valuable relationships with partners and regulators. These factors enhance corporate performance. In frontier markets such as Jordan, where companies might be subject to weak institutional support and high economic uncertainty, long-tenured CEOs may act as stewards, enhancing strategic continuity and improving trust with partners and regulators, and build strong internal and external networks, which are essential for improving corporate performance. The evidence is consistent with El Abiad et al. (2024) for family-owned businesses listed on Euronext and Rahman and Chen (2023) for China, suggesting that long-tenured CEOs gain a deep understanding of their company’s operations and resources, which enables them to make more effective decisions that bring in better corporate performance. However, the evidence contrasts with the those reported in Liu and Jiang (2020) for A-level shares in China, Nguyen et al. (2023) in Vietnam, and Mukherjee and Sen (2022) in India, where longer CEO tenure has a negative or no impact on corporate performance.

5.4. CEO Origin

CEO origin, as a corporate governance CEO trait, impacts corporate performance. This is consistent with both the Stewardship Theory of Donaldson and Davis (1991) and the Resource Dependence Theory of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Specifically, the results show that CEO origin is negatively related to corporate performance. Outsider CEOs have a detrimental effect on corporate performance relative to insider CEOs. In fact, insider CEOs tend to have stronger commitment to the firm’s long-term interests. They already understand how the company works, have better relationships with staff and owners, and are familiar with local customs and regulations. In frontier markets such as Jordan, where familiarity with informal governance systems, local market dynamics, and existing stakeholder networks are important, insider CEOs are more valuable than outsiders to enhance corporate performance. The evidence is consistent with Nguyen et al. (2023) and Chen et al. (2025) in Vietnam and the US, respectively, who suggest that insider CEOs are generally less risky than outsider CEOs, as corporate boards possess greater knowledge of their capabilities and management style, which in turn improve corporate performance. However, the evidence contrasts with Siregar et al. (2023), where CEO origin has no impact on corporate performance.

6. Robustness

6.1. COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic represented a significant challenge for firms and may have impacted CEOs’ traits and firm performance dynamics. Hence, it is reasonable to conduct a robustness test that addresses this concern. We re-estimated the models (Model 1 and Model 2) by including a COVID-19 dummy variable, denoted by $COVID$, that takes the value 1 for the year 2020 and zero otherwise. The results are presented in

Table 5. Results from the system GMM estimation with COVID-19 effect.

	Model 1	Model 2
Dependent Variable	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{A}$	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{E}$
Dependent variable (Lag 1)	0.2292 ***	0.1900 ***
	(0.0092)	(0.0119)
$Age$	−0.0088	0.0543
	(0.0408)	(0.0425)
$Edu$	1.8740 ***	3.0800 ***
	(0.5296)	(0.8128)
$Ten$	0.3447 ***	0.4852 ***
	(0.0614)	(0.0905)
$Orig$	−2.9319 ***	−6.6850 ***
	(0.7113)	(1.1977)
$BM$	−0.2973 ***	−0.7543 ***
	(0.0913)	(0.1160)
$Size$	1.3575 ***	3.5160 ***
	(0.3200)	(0.4012)
$FDI$	0.4803 ***	0.8756 ***
	(0.0455)	(0.1028)
$GDPPC$	0.1521 **	0.1334
	(0.0733)	(0.1301)
$COVID$	−0.8403 **	−2.1744 ***
	(0.4017)	(0.5546)
Constant	−23.2190 ***	−62.4107 ***
	(7.1070)	(7.9968)
Obs.	416	416
Wald test (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	17,716.85 ***	9647.91 ***
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	41.76	43.28
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) ($\mathrm{z}$)	−1.07	−1.04
Difference in Hansen tests
Excluding group (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	41.64	41.01
Difference (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	0.12	2.26

The table reports the results of the system GMM estimations for Equations (1a) and (1b), denoted by Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. $ROA$ is the return on assets. $ROE$ is return on equity. $Age$, $Edu$, $Ten$, and $Orig$ are the CEO age, education, tenure, and origin, respectively. $BM$ and $Size$ are the book-to-market ratio and firm size, respectively. $FDI$ is the foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). $GDPPC$ is the GDP per capita growth (annual %). $COVID$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for years affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and 0 otherwise. The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Wald χ² statistics test the joint significance of the regressors. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, Arellano–Bond AR(2) test, and difference-in-Hansen tests are reported to assess instrument validity and model specification. ***, **, and * denote significance p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively.

. It shows that the coefficient on the $COVID$ dummy is negative and statistically significant in both models, indicating that firm performance declined on average during the pandemic year. Importantly, the inclusion of this variable does not impact on the sign, magnitude, or the statistical significance of the other variables. This suggests that while the COVID-19 pandemic significantly affects firm outcomes, the relationships between CEO characteristics and firm performance identified in our baseline models remain robust.

6.2. Industry Effect

As a second robustness check, we re-estimated the models (Model 1 and Model 2) by including control for industry effect, with industry represented by two categories: service and industrial. Specifically, we include an industry dummy, denoted by $IND$, that accounts for the structural differences between service and industrial sectors.

Table 6. Results from the system GMM estimation with industry effect.

	Model 1	Model 2
Dependent Variable	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{A}$	$\mathit{R}\mathit{O}\mathit{E}$
Dependent variable (Lag 1)	0.2422 ***	0.1958 ***
	(0.0086)	(0.0094)
$Age$	−0.0544	−0.0119
	(0.0360)	(0.0448)
$Edu$	2.6862 ***	2.3112 ***
	(0.6628)	(0.7487)
$Ten$	0.2740 ***	0.3984 ***
	(0.8621)	(0.1005)
$Orig$	−2.9080 ***	−4.6528 ***
	(0.8621)	(1.2004)
$BM$	−0.4530 ***	−0.7773 ***
	(0.0870)	(0.1345)
$Size$	1.1621 ***	3.1700 ***
	(0.2837)	(0.3781)
$FDI$	0.4976 ***	0.9963 ***
	(0.0473)	(0.1089)
$GDPPC$	0.3462 ***	0.5833 ***
	(0.0417)	(0.0596)
	−0.7211	−1.0830
$IND$	(0.4445)	(0.7764)
Constant	−16.3300 ***	−52.7235 ***
	(6.0643)	(7.4734)
Obs.	416	416
Wald test (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	37,471.55 ***	16,006.31 ***
Hansen test of overiden. (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	39.78	37.57
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) ($\mathrm{z}$)	−1.08	−1.08
Difference in Hansen tests
Excluding group (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	42.17	43.02
Difference (${\mathsf{\chi }}^2$)	−2.38	−5.44

The table reports the results of the system GMM estimations for Equations (1a) and (1b), denoted by Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. $ROA$ is the return on assets. $ROE$ is return on equity. $Age$, $Edu$, $Ten$, and $Orig$ are the CEO age, education, tenure, and origin, respectively. $BM$ and $Size$ are the book-to-market ratio and firm size, respectively. $FDI$ is the foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). $GDPPC$ is the GDP per capita growth (annual %). IND is the industry dummy variable. The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Wald χ² statistics test the joint significance of the regressors. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, Arellano–Bond AR(2) test, and difference-in-Hansen tests are reported to assess instrument validity and model specification. ***, **, and * denote significance p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively.

provides the results. It shows that $IND$ had no significant effect on corporate performance. The inclusion of this variable slightly changed the sign of CEO Age (from positive to negative) but it remained statistically insignificant, while all other main results are unaffected. This confirms that our key results are robust and not driven by unobserved industry-specific heterogeneity, thereby reinforcing the reliability and validity of the baseline model specifications.

7. Conclusions

This study examines the impact of CEO attributes on corporate performance in Jordan, a representative frontier market. Analyzing 52 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange over the period from 2015 to 2023 and applying the system GMM methodology, we provide robust evidence on how CEO characteristics shape corporate performance in a setting marked by institutional gaps and economic uncertainty. Our findings reveal that while CEO age is positively linked to corporate performance, it is statistically insignificant. CEO education and tenure positively affect firm performance, and both are statistically significant. However, CEO origin has a statistically negative impact on corporate performance, reflecting the value of insider CEOs. The significant effects of CEO education, tenure, and origin—observed in the models that also include firm-specific and country-specific variables—emphasize their incremental contribution to firm performance robustness checks, including controls for the COVID-19 pandemic and industry effects, confirm our findings.

The study extends the empirical evidence on leadership and governance in frontier economies by demonstrating the applicability of established theories—namely Upper Echelons, Stewardship, Resource Dependence, and Human Capital Theories—while identifying the CEO traits that drive success under unique institutional and economic conditions. Theoretically, the findings of the study partially confirm the applicability of the Upper Echelons Theory, as well as the relevance of Human Capital, Stewardship, and Resource Dependence Theories, in frontier markets, addressing the importance of CEO traits in shaping corporate performance within the contexts of weak institutional frameworks where governance structures are underdeveloped. Practically, the findings of this study provide guidance for shareholders and board members in CEO selection, suggesting that firms may enhance performance from appointing CEOs who are highly educated, possess long tenure, and are promoted from within the corporation. It also reflects the importance of selecting CEOs who are capable of balancing dual roles—providing strategic vision, ensuring operational efficiency, managing risks, while simultaneously driving sustainable growth, innovation, and organizational adaptability. By encouraging this dual-leadership governance model, policymakers can help firms to achieve a balance between long-term transformation and short-term stability, thereby strengthening corporate governance practices and enhancing firm performance in frontier markets like Jordan.

This study is subject to several limitations. First, it includes a limited set of control variables—firm and country specific variables—which may not fully capture other important determinants of corporate performance. Second, the analysis considers only four CEO attributes: age, education, tenure, and origin. This narrow focus restricts the broader understanding of CEO characteristics and their potential influence. Third, the study omits CEO personality traits, like the Big Five personality trait framework of Tupes and Christal (1992), which may significantly affect decision making and firm performance. Fourth, mediating mechanisms between CEO attributes and firm performance, such as sustainable growth rate, are not explored (Nour et al., 2024). Lastly, the study focuses solely on the CEO, overlooking the broader executive team that also contributes to firm performance (Li, 2025).

Given these limitations, the current study can be extended in several directions. Future research could incorporate a more comprehensive set of firm-level and country-level controls—such as capital structure, economic freedom, and ownership concentration—to better isolate the effects of CEO traits. Expanding the range of CEO characteristics to include other traits such as nationality, founder status, ownership, and board memberships would enrich the understanding of leadership dynamics in frontier markets. Researchers might also consider integrating psychological dimensions by applying frameworks such as the Big Five personality traits which capture deeper managerial behaviors that may affect corporate performance. Exploring mediating variables such as the sustainable growth rate could reveal the mechanisms through which CEO attributes translate into performance. Finally, extending the analysis beyond the CEO to include the characteristics of other top executives could provide a more holistic perspective on how executive team composition and internal monitoring mechanisms shape corporate performance, especially in contexts with underdeveloped governance structures.

Recently, Sajja et al. (2025) draws attention to the manner in which the growing adoption of AI-driven solutions in areas such as inventory management and supply chain forecasting is transforming operational effectiveness. Building on this perspective, future research could investigate how CEO traits—particularly education and tenure—shape the willingness and ability of firms in frontier markets to integrate such performance-enhancing technologies. For instance, highly educated CEOs may be more likely to recognize the strategic value of AI-driven tools and embed them into organizational processes, thereby accelerating technological adoption and enhancing long-term competitiveness.