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Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model

by 1 and 2,*
1
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China
2
School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Danny C. K. Ho
J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res. 2021, 16(5), 1791-1804; https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16050100
Received: 2 April 2021 / Revised: 26 May 2021 / Accepted: 28 May 2021 / Published: 3 June 2021
Recently, the showroom model has developed fast for allowing consumers to evaluate a product offline and then buy it online. This paper aims at exploring the optimal information acquisition strategy and its incentive contracts in an e-commerce supply chain with two competing e-tailers and an offline showroom. Based on signaling game theory, we build a mathematical model by considering the impact of experience service and competition intensity on consumers’ demand. We find that, on the one hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to obtain demand information directly or indirectly, which leads to forecast revenue. On the other hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to distort optimal decisions, which results in signal cost. The optimal information acquisition strategy depends on the joint impact of forecast revenue, signal cost and demand forecast cost. Notably, in some conditions, the offline showroom will not acquire demand information even when its cost is equal to zero. We also design two different information acquisition incentive contracts to obtain Pareto improvement for all supply chain members. View Full-Text
Keywords: information acquisition; e-commerce supply chain; offline showroom model; competition; signaling game information acquisition; e-commerce supply chain; offline showroom model; competition; signaling game
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MDPI and ACS Style

Li, M.; Zhang, X. Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model. J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res. 2021, 16, 1791-1804. https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16050100

AMA Style

Li M, Zhang X. Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research. 2021; 16(5):1791-1804. https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16050100

Chicago/Turabian Style

Li, Mengli; Zhang, Xumei. 2021. "Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model" J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res. 16, no. 5: 1791-1804. https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16050100

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