Search for Articles:
Title / Keyword
Author / Affiliation / Email
Journal
Article Type
 
 
Advanced Search
 
Section
Special Issue
Volume
Issue
Number
Page
 

Saved Queries

Sign in to use this feature.

Search Filter Reset All

Years

Between: -

Subjects

remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
Add Subjects Reset
Select Subjects

Journals

remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
Add Journals Reset
Select Journals

Article Types

remove_circle_outline
Add Article Types Reset
Select Article Types

Countries / Regions

remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
Add Countries / Regions Reset
Select Countries / Regions
Update Search
share announcement

Search Results (2)

Search Parameters:
Keywords = shareholder-creditor conflicts of interests

Order results
Result details
Results per page
Show export options expand_more Show export options expand_less
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:
32 pages, 458 KiB  
Article
(How) Does Mutual Fund Dual Ownership Affect Shareholder and Creditor Conflict of Interest? Evidence from Corporate Innovation
by Lei Gao, Ying Wang and Jing Zhao
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2023, 16(6), 287; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm16060287 - 25 May 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2611
Abstract
We examine the impact of mutual fund dual ownership (i.e., simultaneous holdings of stocks and bonds of the same company by mutual fund families) on corporate innovation. Our findings indicate that dual ownership is positively associated with innovation quantity, quality, generality, and originality. [...] Read more.
We examine the impact of mutual fund dual ownership (i.e., simultaneous holdings of stocks and bonds of the same company by mutual fund families) on corporate innovation. Our findings indicate that dual ownership is positively associated with innovation quantity, quality, generality, and originality. This effect is mainly driven by non-index funds, which are more likely to be active monitors. Consequently, both stocks and bonds held by dual owners tend to generate higher returns, particularly for more significant, groundbreaking innovations. These results suggest that mutual fund dual ownership mitigates conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, thereby enhancing innovation and firm value. However, the relation between dual ownership and innovation turns negative during the recent financial crisis, suggesting that shareholder-creditor conflicts culminate in extreme financial distress, exacerbating dual holders’ risk aversion, and hence, hindering corporate innovation. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Practical Applications of Investments’ Assessment in Organizations and Economies)
10 pages, 253 KiB  
Article
Risk Aversion, Managerial Reputation, and Debt–Equity Conflict
by Anna Dodonova
Games 2022, 13(2), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020025 - 30 Mar 2022
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3294
Abstract
When a firm finances a new project by issuing debt, it has an incentive to invest in excessively high-risk projects because shareholders enjoy all the benefits in case the project is successful but have limited liability when it fails. Anticipating such behavior, creditors [...] Read more.
When a firm finances a new project by issuing debt, it has an incentive to invest in excessively high-risk projects because shareholders enjoy all the benefits in case the project is successful but have limited liability when it fails. Anticipating such behavior, creditors may require a higher interest rate or may even refuse to provide capital. This debt–equity conflict is alleviated by the fact that most investment decisions are made by risk-averse managers who are not as well diversified as shareholders. This paper investigates the debt–equity conflict in firms in which the managers have an unobservable degree of risk averseness. Since managerial risk averseness is a desirable quality, such asymmetric information makes managers undertake actions that increase the market’s perception of them as being highly risk-averse. Consequently, such reputation building leads to a lower number of excessively high-risk projects being undertaken. This paper compares the entrepreneurial economy, in which managers are the sole owners of the firms, with the corporate economy, in which managers are hired by shareholders. Using the overlapping generations model, this paper shows that managerial reputation building can partially resolve the debt–equity conflict and improve efficiency in both economies; however, such improvement is larger in the entrepreneurial economy. Full article
Show export options expand_more Show export options expand_less
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:
 
Displaying article 1-50 on page 1 of 1.
Back to TopTop