Search Results (4)

This article offers a comparative analysis of authoritarian governance in Egypt and Türkiye through the lens of two pivotal state–Islamist alliances: the early partnership and eventual rupture between Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the strategic collaboration followed by confrontation between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Gülen Movement (GM). Despite operating in different historical and institutional settings—a postcolonial military regime in Egypt and an electoral, hybrid regime in Türkiye—both leaders allied with influential religious actors during moments of transition to gain popular support and dismantle entrenched power structures. These alliances were instrumental and temporary: once religious movements developed autonomous influence, they were recast as threats and suppressed through legal, institutional, and religious mechanisms. This study traces how religious institutions like Egypt’s al-Azhar and Türkiye’s Diyanet were co-opted to delegitimize these former allies and justify state repression. While the MB pursued overt political goals and the GM functioned through civic and technocratic channels, both were ultimately excluded from the political order once they had been considered as threats to the central authority of the regime. This comparison underscores the strategic use of religion in authoritarian statecraft and the enduring tension between religious autonomy and centralized political control in Muslim-majority polities. Full article

This article examines the implications of banning Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, from running in elections and the effect of the Bangladesh government’s co-optation of the radical Islamic group Hefazat-e-Islam. The article contends that more Islamic radicalization occurs as the opportunity for moderate Islamist parties decreases. Using a variety of qualitative methods, the article finds that banning Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami led to a rise in perceptions of the Bangladesh government as anti-Islamic. To counter that sentiment, the Awami League (AL) government co-opted the more radical Islamist organization Hefazat-e-Islam. Such acts increased Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’s tendency to engage in violence. Moreover, radical Islamists working under Hefazat-e-Islam secured a window of opportunity for country-wide Islamic radicalization. Together these findings illuminate the tradeoffs faced by the Bangladesh government when confronted with religious radicalization in the political sphere, offering insights into how the Bangladesh government can better manage such tradeoffs in the future. Full article

In a recent publication, I introduced the theoretical framework of neosecularisation with regard to the Orthodox Church and society in Bulgaria. I argued that neosecularisation, as a complex process of decline of religion’s importance and the hold of religious authority over the social system, while genealogically different from communist secularisation, explicates patterns of continuity with the communist past. Important aspects of this continuity include the persistent grassroots feminisation of the Church and the co-optation of the Church by the state. Drawing on those theoretical insights, in this paper, I seek to understand the rise of anti-gender politics in Bulgaria since 2018 in relation to the condition of neosecularisation and its impact on the Church. I argue that (neo)secularisation remains a much feared “threat” for the Church and plays a role in ecclesiastical anti-gender mobilisation. However, the Church is not a major factor in anti-gender politics in Bulgaria; the roles of far-right nationalists and certain transnationally connected evangelical actors are to be seriously considered. Furthermore, anti-genderism cannot be understood merely as a religious or cultural backlash. It needs to be discussed as a larger protest movement against liberal democracy’s failure to live up to its promises and against the pathologies of neoliberal globalisation, a movement in which the Orthodox Church is only tangentially involved. Full article

On 16 December 2012, India erupted in national outrage against the rape of a 23-year-old female student in New Delhi, christened “Nirbhaya” (fearless). In the aftermath, there was a convergence of multiple discourses that framed post-independent India’s feminist consciousness. In 2020, four men convicted of Nirbhaya’s rape and murder were executed. An eight-year old girl in Kashmir was brutally raped and murdered in January 2018. The trial court sentenced the main accused to life in prison. In December 2019, four men held in yet another horrific rape and death of a 27-year veterinarian in Hyderabad were killed by the police in what has been called an extrajudicial killing. More recently, in 2020, a 19-year old was raped and killed in rural Uttar Pradesh. The victims came from different social locations, castes, tribes, and religious communities. This paper presents a feminist critique of the legal discourse on rape and the death penalty. It looks at an ironical cooptation of the critique of sexual violence by a patriarchal discourse on social injury and collective conscience. The paper examines how fleeting rage against the culprits and the call for death penalty immunizes larger misogynist cultural assumptions. This myopic rage is oblivious to sexual violence in women’s daily lives. Finally, the paper looks at why legal reforms triggered by brutal acts of sexual violence, receiving widespread media attention, fail to achieve systemic societal changes. Full article