Search Results (4)

Bitcoin is a payment system that generates a decentralized digital currency without ensuring temporal constraints in its transactions; therefore, it is vulnerable to double-spending attacks. Karame has proposed a formalization for a successful double-spending attack based on meeting three requirements. This focuses on fast payment scenarios where the product is delivered immediately after the payment is announced in the mempool, without waiting for transaction confirmation. This scenario is key in Bitcoin to increase the probability of a successful double-spending attack. Different approaches have been proposed to mitigate these attacks by addressing one or more of Karame’s three requirements. These include the following: flooding every transaction without restrictions, introducing listeners/observers, avoiding isolation by blocking incoming connections, penalizing malicious users by revealing their identity, and using machine learning and bio-inspired techniques. However, to our knowledge, no proposal deterministically avoids double-spending attacks in fast payment scenarios. In this paper, we introduce DiFastBit: a distributed transaction differentiation scheme that shields Bitcoin from double-spending attacks in fast payment scenarios. To achieve this, we modeled Bitcoin from a distributed perspective of events and processes, reformulated Karame’s requirements based on Lamport’s happened-before relation (HBR), and introduced a new theorem that consolidates the reformulated requirements and establishes the necessary conditions for a successful attack on fast Bitcoin payments. Finally, we introduce the specifications for DiFastBit, formally prove its correctness, and analyze DiFastBit’s confirmation time. Full article

Two double-spend attack strategies on a proof-of-stake consensus are considered. For each strategy, the probability of its success is obtained, which depends on the network parameters and the number of confirmation blocks. These results can be used to define how many confirmation blocks a vendor should wait after a correspondent transaction before sending goods or services. Full article

Our aim in this paper is to investigate the profitability of double-spending (DS) attacks that manipulate an a priori mined transaction in a blockchain. It was well understood that a successful DS attack is established when the proportion of computing power an attacker possesses is higher than that of the honest network. What is not yet well understood is how threatening a DS attack with less than 50% computing power used can be. Namely, DS attacks at any proportion can be a threat as long as the chance to make a good profit exists. Profit is obtained when the revenue from making a successful DS attack is greater than the cost of carrying out one. We have developed a novel probability theory for calculating a finitetime attack probability. This can be used to size up attack resources needed to obtain the profit. The results enable us to derive a sufficient and necessary condition on the value of a transaction targeted by a DS attack. Our result is quite surprising: we theoretically show how a DS attack at any proportion of computing power can be made profitable. Given one’s transaction value, the results can also be used to assess the risk of a DS attack. An example of profitable DS attack against BitcoinCash is provided. Full article

As of today, Bitcoin suffers with restrictive transaction throughput of 3–7 transactions per sec and the transaction confirmation takes several min as bitcoin blockchain was designed with a block creation time of 10 min and each block is restricted with less blocksize for fast transmission. In this paper, we obtained the optimal transaction throughput for a Proof-of-Work (PoW) based longest chain rule blockchain network (called bitcoin protocol). This is done by modeling the delay diameter (D) and double spending attack in a Erd $\ddot{o}$ s-R $\acute{e}$ nyi random network topology as constraints. Through numerical results, it is shown that the throughput can be significatly improved without compromising the fairness of the network. Full article