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Keywords = convictional certainty

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20 pages, 249 KiB  
Article
Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty
by Modesto Gómez-Alonso
Religions 2025, 16(2), 174; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16020174 - 4 Feb 2025
Viewed by 1112
Abstract
In this article, I argue that Newman’s emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the Grammar of Assent and Wittgenstein’s On Certainty [...] Read more.
In this article, I argue that Newman’s emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the Grammar of Assent and Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I claim that Wittgenstein, like Newman, challenges both the claim that justification must be neutral and the prejudice according to which any form of persuasion that is not demonstrative is irrational or arational. Arguments are mainly focused on the picture of Newman’s epistemology provided lately by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard misrepresents Newman’s conception of the illative sense so as to ascribe to him the thesis that religious belief is evidentially grounded in a broad sense of evidence. This creates a false dichotomy between the arational view of religious principles and the account of religious certainties as epistemically grounded. I suggest that Newman’s reference to both living persuasion and the role played by the will in religious conviction is part of his attempt to expose this false dichotomy. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
13 pages, 960 KiB  
Article
Agnostics’ Well-Being Compared to Believers and Atheists: A Study in Europe’s Religious–Cultural Zones of Christian Heritage
by Moise Karim and Vassilis Saroglou
Religions 2024, 15(12), 1502; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15121502 - 9 Dec 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3030
Abstract
Past research suggests three distinct major trends regarding the links of religion with well-being. First, religious faith contributes to well-being, with believers showing higher well-being than nonbelievers. Alternatively, it is certainty about one’s own worldviews, be they religious or irreligious, that predicts well-being. [...] Read more.
Past research suggests three distinct major trends regarding the links of religion with well-being. First, religious faith contributes to well-being, with believers showing higher well-being than nonbelievers. Alternatively, it is certainty about one’s own worldviews, be they religious or irreligious, that predicts well-being. Finally, secularization moderates the above, making nonbelief normative. We investigated these trends by focusing on agnostics, who, compared to believers and atheists, combine a lack of faith and uncertainty about worldviews and should, thus, be the lowest in well-being. By analyzing European Values Study 2017 data from 29 countries and controlling for personal variables, we found that in countries of Western Christian heritage, be they religious or secularized, agnostics were the least happy compared to believers and atheists. Religionists, compared to atheists, were happier (countries of Protestant heritage) or equally happy (countries of Catholic heritage). In countries of Eastern Orthodox tradition, believers were happier than nonbelievers, agnostics, and atheists alike—but again, agnostics were the lowest in the less religious countries. In sum, uncertainty makes agnostics, consistently across religious cultures, to be the lowest in well-being, whereas the effect of religious faith on well-being varies across cultures. Full article
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9 pages, 259 KiB  
Article
Moral Certainty of the Judge in the Canonical Process to Determine the Nullity of Marriage v. the Principle Testis Unus Testis Nullus
by Karol Krystian Adamczewski
Religions 2023, 14(3), 405; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030405 - 16 Mar 2023
Viewed by 2441
Abstract
The present article discusses the issue of moral certainty in the canonical process for the annulment of marriage and analyzes the problem of applying the procedural principle testis unus testis nullus. The reason for undertaking the subject was the publication in 2015 [...] Read more.
The present article discusses the issue of moral certainty in the canonical process for the annulment of marriage and analyzes the problem of applying the procedural principle testis unus testis nullus. The reason for undertaking the subject was the publication in 2015 of two papal documents of the rank of apostolic letters, which introduced significant changes in the area of the process for the annulment of marriage. One of the aspects that underwent legislative modification was the principle testis unus testis nullus. It was decided that in marriage cases the testimony provided by a single witness may have the value of complete proof, provided that certain conditions are met. Therefore, the current considerations are an attempt to find an answer to the question whether the judge who takes a decision in marriage cases on the grounds of a single-witness testimony is able to achieve inner conviction (certitudo moralis) with regard to the factual state of the matter, and pass a verdict in accordance with the truth. In addition, the article outlines the legal construct of moral certainty, characteristic of canon law, and discusses the principle testis unus testis nullus within the framework of the existing canon law, taking into account a broad historical perspective, including both the biblical-canonical tradition as well as Roman law. Full article
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