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Substantial grounds exist to doubt the universal validity of the Newtonian Paradigm that requires a pre-stated, fixed phase space. Therefore, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, stated only for fixed phase spaces, is also in doubt. The validity of the Newtonian Paradigm may stop at the onset of evolving life. Living cells and organisms are Kantian Wholes that achieve constraint closure, so do thermodynamic work to construct themselves. Evolution constructs an ever-expanding phase space. Thus, we can ask the free energy cost per added degree of freedom. That cost is roughly linear or sublinear in the mass constructed. However, the resulting expansion of the phase space is exponential or even hyperbolic. Thus, the evolving biosphere does thermodynamic work to construct itself into an ever-smaller sub-domain of its ever-expanding phase space at ever less free energy cost per added degree of freedom. The universe is not correspondingly disordered. Entropy, remarkably, really does decrease. A testable implication of this, termed here the Fourth Law of Thermodynamics, is that at constant energy input, the biosphere will construct itself into an ever more localized subregion of its ever-expanding phase space. This is confirmed. The energy input from the sun has been roughly constant for the 4 billion years since life started to evolve. The localization of our current biosphere in its protein phase space is at least 10^–2540. The localization of our biosphere with respect to all possible molecules of CHNOPS comprised of up to 350,000 atoms is also extremely high. The universe has not been correspondingly disordered. Entropy has decreased. The universality of the Second Law fails. Full article

Since early cybernetics studies by Wiener, Pask, and Ashby, the properties of living systems are subject to deep investigations. The goals of this endeavour are both understanding and building: abstract models and general principles are sought for describing organisms, their dynamics and their ability to produce adaptive behavior. This research has achieved prominent results in fields such as artificial intelligence and artificial life. For example, today we have robots capable of exploring hostile environments with high level of self-sufficiency, planning capabilities and able to learn. Nevertheless, the discrepancy between the emergence and evolution of life and artificial systems is still huge. In this paper, we identify the fundamental elements that characterize the evolution of the biosphere and open-ended evolution, and we illustrate their implications for the evolution of artificial systems. Subsequently, we discuss the most relevant issues and questions that this viewpoint poses both for biological and artificial systems. Full article

Using insights from cybernetics and an information-based understanding of biological systems, a precise, scientifically inspired, definition of free-will is offered and the essential requirements for an agent to possess it in principle are set out. These are: (a) there must be a self to self-determine; (b) there must be a non-zero probability of more than one option being enacted; (c) there must be an internal means of choosing among options (which is not merely random, since randomness is not a choice). For (a) to be fulfilled, the agent of self-determination must be organisationally closed (a “Kantian whole”). For (c) to be fulfilled: (d) options must be generated from an internal model of the self which can calculate future states contingent on possible responses; (e) choosing among these options requires their evaluation using an internally generated goal defined on an objective function representing the overall “master function” of the agent and (f) for “deep free-will”, at least two nested levels of choice and goal (d–e) must be enacted by the agent. The agent must also be able to enact its choice in physical reality. The only systems known to meet all these criteria are living organisms, not just humans, but a wide range of organisms. The main impediment to free-will in present-day artificial robots, is their lack of being a Kantian whole. Consciousness does not seem to be a requirement and the minimum complexity for a free-will system may be quite low and include relatively simple life-forms that are at least able to learn. Full article