Law, Gender Justice, and the Dynamics of Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

This paper examines democratic backsliding through the lens of gender justice, focusing on recent political developments in Israel. Since early 2023, the ruling coalition has advanced a judicial overhaul designed to reduce judicial independence and consolidate executive control. These changes should be understood in tandem with a wave of suggested legislation targeting gender equality, women’s rights, and protections against discrimination in public life, education, and civil services. A qualitative analysis of governmental legislative initiatives reveals a troubling pattern: efforts to erode judicial independence are closely followed by laws that institutionalize gender segregation and undermine gender justice. This sequence reflects a deliberate strategy—first dismantling the legal safeguards, then attacking the rights they once protected. In response, women have played a leading role in Israel’s pro-democracy protest movement, using highly visible, gendered forms of resistance to signal that gender justice is a core democratic concern. The paper concludes that democratic backsliding in Israel is gendered in both its structure and its consequences, and any assessment of its impact must account for its disproportionate harm to women and marginalized communities.

1. Introduction

Across the globe, democratic backsliding has been accompanied by intensified assaults on gender equality and the institutions that uphold it. From Hungary and Poland to the United States and India, illiberal regimes have often paired their consolidation of power with efforts to curtail reproductive rights, suppress gender studies, erode protections against gender-based violence, and roll back institutional commitments to equality. These developments are rarely coincidental. As feminist scholars have increasingly shown, attacks on democratic norms often go hand in hand with patriarchal retrenchment, as authoritarian populisms rely on gendered hierarchies to consolidate control, mobilize conservative constituencies, and marginalize dissent (Krizsán and Roggeband 2019; Lombardo et al. 2021). Gender justice—the commitment to dismantling structural inequalities based on gender and ensuring the full inclusion and protection of women and gender minorities—thus becomes one of the early and most enduring casualties of democratic decline.

This article explores the Israeli case as part of this broader global trend. It offers a gendered perspective on the judicial overhaul and broader legislative agenda advanced by Israel’s 37th government, arguing that the current process of democratic backsliding poses a systemic threat to gender justice. The first part of the paper analyses how key elements of the judicial overhaul—most notably, the weakening of judicial review, the politicization of judicial appointments, and the annulment of the grounds of reasonability—undermine institutional protections for women’s rights. For decades, the Israeli Supreme Court has played a critical role in advancing gender justice, from combatting workplace discrimination and mandating gender representation on public bodies to striking down unequal retirement policies and supporting the right to equality in religious and secular spheres (Thon Ashkenazy 2023). Eroding the court’s independence would severely restrict the legal tools available to challenge discriminatory legislation or state practices. What makes this pattern especially alarming is the strategic sequencing it reveals: first, the government works to disable judicial oversight and remove institutional checks on executive power; then it pushes forward legislative measures that infringe upon civil rights and democratic principles, including gender equality. This approach resembles a deliberate offensive doctrine—first dismantle the defences, then launch the attack.

The second part examines the broader legislative landscape, focusing on a wave of anti-democratic legislative initiatives that promote religious conservatism, gender segregation, and the erosion of civil rights—particularly those of women and other marginalized groups. These bills constitute a coherent ideological project shared by key actors in the governing coalition. Drawing on empirical analysis of gender-relevant legislation from the 25th Knesset, the article shows how legal initiatives are being used to institutionalize patriarchal norms, dismantle existing equality mechanisms, and shrink the civic space available to feminist and human rights organizations. This assault on gender justice does not take place in isolation but is embedded in a wider authoritarian political shift that threatens democratic pluralism, minority rights, and institutional accountability. For example, when weakened judicial oversight coincides with legal carve-outs for gender segregation, the expansion of religious tribunals into civil law, and partisan capture of equality institutions, the result is a coordinated shift that constrains pluralism, shields officials from scrutiny, and normalizes rights-restricting policies toward marginalized groups.

The third part turns to the public response and the gendered dynamics of resistance. Women have emerged as central actors in Israel’s pro-democracy protest movement, not only as participants but as agenda-setters and symbolic leaders. Feminist protest forms—including the prominent “Handmaid’s Tale” performances, red-shirt women’s blocs, women’s strikes, and new civic coalitions—have signalled that gender justice is not a side issue but a core democratic concern. Protest data and public opinion surveys also reveal a consistent gender gap in attitudes toward the judicial overhaul, with women significantly more likely to oppose the reforms. In the months leading up to the 2023 municipal elections (later postponed due to the Israel-Gaza war)1, liberal women’s organizations mobilized to increase women’s political representation and forge alliances across local authorities as a counterweight to the national government’s agenda.

Taken together, these three dimensions—the erosion of legal protections, the proliferation of regressive legislation, and the emergence of feminist resistance—reveal that gender justice is both a target and a barometer of democratic backsliding in Israel. The Israeli case underscores how assaults on democratic institutions are deeply gendered in their impact, and how women’s rights cannot be decoupled from the broader struggle for liberal democracy. By placing the Israeli experience in dialogue with global trends, this article contributes to the growing body of scholarship that insists on the centrality of gender in understanding and resisting democratic erosion.

2. Democratic Backsliding and Gender Justice

The past decade has seen a global trend of democratic backsliding, marked by the weakening of institutional checks and balances, suppression of civil liberties, and a decline in civic participation (Haggard and Kaufman 2021; Krizsán and Roggeband 2021). This erosion of democratic norms has profound consequences for gender justice.2 As feminist scholars have argued, the link between democratic governance and gender equality is not merely aspirational—it is structural and essential to the functioning of inclusive political systems (Lombardo et al. 2021). Feminist legal theorists have long debated the limits of legal reform within masculinist state structures, questioning whether law can truly deliver gender justice or merely reproduce existing hierarchies (McLoughlin and O’Brien 2019). Nonetheless, when democracy weakens, so too do the institutions and discourses that support the protection and advancement of women’s rights.

Recent scholarship highlights that backsliding democracies often target gender equality initiatives as part of broader attacks on liberal rights and pluralism. Reproductive rights, in particular, have become a central battleground in many liberal democracies, where conservative backlash exploits longstanding ambiguities in the legal status of women’s bodily autonomy (Gozdecka 2020). Anti-gender movements—often supported or amplified by state actors—have become prominent vehicles for democratic erosion, mobilizing opposition to sexual and reproductive rights, gender studies, and LGBTQ+ rights under the banner of protecting national values (Roggeband and Krizsán 2020; Sosa 2021). These movements not only reflect ideological backlash but are also instrumentalized by authoritarian and populist leaders to consolidate power and delegitimize feminist and human rights activism (Arat 2022).

The rollback of gender equality policies often goes hand-in-hand with the closure of civic space. These dynamics are compounded by the global ascendancy of neoliberalism, which shifts responsibility for equality from the state to the individual and systematically weakens institutional protections for women (Thornton 2015). Feminist NGOs and grassroots movements are particularly vulnerable to legal harassment, defunding, and smear campaigns (Lombardo et al. 2025). Such strategies not only silence dissent but erode the institutional infrastructure that has enabled incremental progress on gender justice over the past few decades. In countries such as Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and most recently the United States, governments have used executive power to dismantle gender equality mechanisms while maintaining a façade of democratic legitimacy (Bush and Zetterberg 2024; Lombardo 2023).

A key mechanism through which democratic backsliding undermines gender justice is the erosion of judicial independence. Courts play a crucial role in upholding rights-based claims, enforcing gender equality legislation, and providing legal recourse in cases of discrimination or gender-based violence. When populist or authoritarian-leaning governments seek to consolidate power, they frequently target the judiciary by politicizing judicial appointments, curbing the autonomy of constitutional courts, and weakening judicial review (Kelemen 2020; Pech and Scheppele 2017).

These changes not only compromise the rule of law, but they also directly affect the ability of marginalized groups—including women and LGBTQ+ individuals—to access justice and defend their rights (Sosa 2021). In Poland, for instance, the dismantling of judicial independence was accompanied by sweeping restrictions on reproductive autonomy, most notably the near-total ban on abortion. These developments were paralleled by intensified attacks on LGBTQ rights, reflecting a broader agenda aimed at reinforcing conservative social norms (Roggeband and Krizsán 2020). A similar pattern has unfolded in Hungary, where the weakening of democratic checks and balances has coincided with government-led efforts to delegitimize women’s rights organizations, labelling them as “foreign agents” accused of undermining national identity (Roggeband and Krizsán 2020). In this context, Hungary’s reluctance to uphold its commitments under the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (the Istanbul Convention) has been justified by officials as a defence of traditional family values and the preservation of the institution of marriage. These examples illustrate how the rollback of democratic norms and institutions often goes hand in hand with efforts to restrict gender equality and curtail the rights of marginalized groups (Sadurski 2019). The hollowing out of judicial independence thus serves to entrench patriarchal and conservative values under the guise of legality, while foreclosing feminist legal strategies that had previously advanced gender rights through litigation (Lombardo 2023; Bush and Zetterberg 2024).

Moreover, the weakening of judicial oversight often occurs alongside the dismantling of equality bodies and ombudsperson institutions, further eroding institutional mechanisms designed to promote gender justice (European Commission 2023a, 2023b; Roggeband and Krizsán 2018). These developments contribute to a broader legal environment in which discriminatory policies are more easily implemented and less likely to be challenged, affecting not only formal rights but also undermining the symbolic power of law as a vehicle for gender norm change. The loss of independent courts therefore represents both a practical and normative blow to feminist agendas within backsliding democracies. Importantly, the effects of democratic erosion on women’s rights are not uniform. Intersectional perspectives show that women from racialized, migrant, or LGBTQ+ communities are disproportionately affected by authoritarian governance and the rise of exclusionary nationalism (Cohen 2024).

While the threats are significant, feminist resistance has proven resilient. Across Latin America, North Africa, and Eastern Europe, women have been at the forefront of democratic resistance, mobilizing both in formal politics and through informal networks (Brechenmacher et al. 2024). Strategic litigation, transnational solidarity campaigns, and digital activism are increasingly used to challenge the rollback of rights and to pressure international organizations to defend democratic and gender-equal standards (Caravantes et al. 2024). The relationship between democratic erosion and gender justice is thus dialectical: the weakening of democracy undermines gender equality, but feminist mobilization often serves as a critical line of defence for democratic values.

3. The Judicial Overhaul: Implications for Women’s Rights and Minority Protections

Since early 2023, Israel has witnessed an intense and highly controversial process of judicial overhaul, which has become a focal point in debates about the country’s democratic trajectory. The overhaul centres primarily on curbing the powers of the Supreme Court and reshaping the judiciary’s role within the system of checks and balances. Key features of the overhaul include significant changes and politization of the judicial selection process, limitations on judicial review, and the expansion of parliamentary supremacy over the judiciary (Roznai and Cohen 2023). As Ginsburg (2023) notes in comparative perspective, such reforms are often framed as technical adjustments or even anti-corruption measures, but in practice they serve broader populist strategies of eroding checks and balances and consolidating executive dominance. The pace and layering of these proposals resonate with what Akirav (2025) terms a “constitutional blitz,” whereby multiple, overlapping reforms are advanced rapidly to overwhelm institutional checks.

One of the most contentious aspects is the proposed alteration of the judicial selection committee’s composition. Traditionally, the committee consists of a balanced mix of judges, politicians, and representatives from the Israel Bar Association, ensuring professional and independent judicial appointments. The overhaul seeks to shift this balance by granting the governing coalition greater influence over appointments, thereby politicizing the judiciary and undermining its independence (Fuchs 2023). This shift is expected to reduce the judiciary’s capacity to act as a neutral arbiter and increase executive control over the courts.

Another central feature of the overhaul is the introduction of legislative override powers, which would allow the Knesset to re-enact laws invalidated by the Supreme Court, even if these contradict basic laws or constitutional principles. This effectively weakens judicial review and threatens the principle of constitutional supremacy, central to the protection of minority rights and the rule of law.

Additionally, the overhaul proposes restricting the grounds of reasonability based on which courts can review government actions, including limiting the judiciary’s ability to intervene in decisions deemed “political.” Such limitations risk eroding the courts’ capacity to check executive excesses and protect fundamental rights, including those related to equality and non-discrimination. Navot (2023) emphasizes that such measures should not be viewed in isolation: individually they may appear as limited reforms but taken together they form part of a broader populist project aimed at restructuring the balance of power and weakening judicial independence.

The judicial overhaul has elicited widespread domestic and international concern regarding its implications for democracy and the protection of civil liberties in Israel. Critics argue that weakening judicial independence may lead to the entrenchment of majoritarianism at the expense of minority protections, including gender justice and rights of marginalized groups (Ariely 2024).3 This concern builds on earlier patterns of democratic erosion identified under Netanyahu’s previous tenure (Oren and Waxman 2022). Some analyses further suggest that the primary motivation behind the judicial overhaul was to shield coalition agreements with ultra-Orthodox parties—most notably on issues such as military service exemptions and extensive financial subsidies—from judicial scrutiny. From this perspective, the overhaul was intended less as an ideologically gendered project and more as a political instrument to cement the alliance between Likud and its ultra-Orthodox partners. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that public support for democratic backsliding can be rooted in distributive and identity-based grievances (Gidron et al. 2025). Yet, these objectives are not mutually exclusive to the gendered consequences this article highlights. On the contrary, strengthening ultra-Orthodox autonomy in the public sphere has historically gone hand in hand with institutionalizing gender segregation and undermining protections for women’s rights. Thus, even if the immediate target was to secure coalition interests, the foreseeable result is a profound erosion of gender justice alongside the weakening of democratic institutions more broadly.

This is especially concerning given that fact that women’s rights in Israel remain insufficiently protected across multiple spheres of public and private life. Women are significantly underrepresented in senior positions within the legislature, government ministries and local authorities (Itzkovitch-Malka and Oshri 2024; Kenig 2024). In the domestic sphere, many women continue to face persistent threats of violence. Economic disparities are also pronounced: women experience substantial wage gaps compared to men, and a considerable proportion of employed women—particularly those belonging to historically marginalized communities such as ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinian citizens of Israel—are concentrated in low-wage, precarious employment. These structural inequalities underscore the ongoing vulnerability of women in Israel’s political, social, and economic systems (Itzkovitch-Malka 2021).

For years, the Supreme Court has served as a vital safeguard for women’s rights across a broad spectrum of legal and social issues. Its jurisprudence has invalidated wage discrimination based on gender, upheld affirmative action policies aimed at increasing women’s participation on the boards of state-owned enterprises, and prohibited gender segregation in public spaces, including its use in cases involving domestic violence and protection orders, which have offered vital—if uneven—legal recourse for women facing abuse (Yassour-Borochowitz 2016). The Court has also strengthened legal protections for women’s privacy in cases of sexual harassment, abolished gender-based discrepancies in retirement age, and reinforced women’s inclusion in public institutions. In the political realm, it has acted to secure women’s representation in political parties and key decision-making bodies by enforcing the Women’s Equal Rights Law and mandating the removal of gender-exclusive language from party bylaws (Thon Ashkenazy 2023).

However, the judicial overhaul promoted by Israel’s current government severely threatens the court’s ability to defend women’s—as well as other minorities’—rights. By constraining the judiciary’s power of constitutional review—whether through eliminating the grounds of reasonability standard, requiring an unattainably high threshold for striking down discriminatory laws, or barring review of Basic Laws—the overhaul weakens the court’s ability to uphold women’s rights. This risk is amplified by the suggested “override clause,” which allows any coalition holding a minimal 61-seat majority to reinstate legislation struck down by the Court. This provision—unique in democratic systems and lacking gender-specific protections—would make it nearly impossible to block discriminatory laws, turning judicial protection for women into a hollow promise. Another grave concern is the limitation on the Court’s ability to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws, which are increasingly used to enshrine substantive policies into near-untouchable constitutional status. Given the absence of formal criteria for enacting or defining a Basic Law, the Knesset could exploit this route to insulate discriminatory provisions from any judicial scrutiny (Thon Ashkenazy 2023).

Further weakening judicial independence, in March 2025 the government passed a law restructuring the Judicial Selection Committee. The new composition no longer ensures a majority of professionals or maintains balanced representation; instead, it would grant near-total control to the ruling coalition. The implications for women’s representation are particularly stark: under the current coalition—with only nine women out of 64 Knesset members, and several parties that include no women at all—politicized judicial appointments could reduce the likelihood of selecting judges committed to gender equality and further diminish the already insufficient representation of women, particularly those from marginalized backgrounds, across the judiciary (Forum of Law Professors for Democracy 2023; Lurie 2023).

Lastly, the abolition of the grounds of reasonability—as passed in July 2023 and later revoked by the Supreme Court—removes a key judicial tool for scrutinizing administrative decisions for fairness, logic, and non-discrimination. This standard has historically enabled the Court to invalidate practices such as forced early retirement for women or to ensure equitable public service appointments. Without it, arbitrary or biassed administrative actions that harm women will go unchecked.

Together, this overhaul dismantles the minimal but vital protections that the Israeli judiciary has offered to women, especially those outside the political and socioeconomic elite. The overhaul poses particularly acute dangers to marginalized groups of women in Israel, including ultra-Orthodox, Arab Palestinian, and asylum-seeking women. An intersectional prism shows that weakening the judiciary and limiting the power of civil society organizations will disproportionately harm these women. Arab Palestinian women, for example, face triple discrimination as women, as members of a marginalized national minority, and as participants in patriarchal communities. They are especially vulnerable to the erosion of protections historically afforded by the courts, including safeguards against discriminatory legislation and state neglect in cases of gender-based violence. Government proposals to restrict civil society activity and amend anti-discrimination laws further endanger Arab Palestinian women’s rights—both within Palestinian society and in their treatment by state institutions (Pinto 2015). Likewise, ultra-Orthodox women—excluded from their own parties and political processes—rely on courts to challenge institutionalized barriers to participation, while asylum-seeking women are at heightened risk of poverty, trafficking, and sexual violence without robust judicial oversight. These women stand to lose the most from a legal system stripped of its independence and its ability to uphold equality and human dignity (Forum of Law Professors for Democracy 2023; Refugee and Asylum Seeker Organizations Forum in Israel 2023; Shushan and Mery 2023).

4. Methodology

This paper analyses the gendered dimensions of democratic backsliding in Israel by examining the legislative and political developments introduced by the 37th government, with a focus on their implications for gender justice. The study employs a qualitative content analysis of legislative initiatives, mostly private members’ bills (PMBs), submitted to the 25th Knesset, particularly those with the potential to undermine women’s rights or gender equality. The legislative proposals analyzed are cross-referenced with relevant Supreme Court rulings, Basic Laws, coalition agreements, and previous legal reforms. In addition, the study examines gendered patterns of public resistance to these initiatives, including the role of feminist movements and women’s visual protest strategies. By situating these developments within broader global patterns of democratic erosion, the paper integrates legal, political, and feminist perspectives to provide a comprehensive account of Israel’s gendered democratic crisis.

As many have argued, the changes to Israel’s judicial system represent only one component of a wider campaign being waged by the current government against liberal democracy. The dismantling and politicization of the judiciary are accompanied by additional measures that threaten human rights, electoral integrity, the civil service, freedom of the press, religious pluralism, and the public education system. The Anti-Democratic Bills Monitor Project of the Forum of Political Scientists for Israeli Democracy has been tracking anti-democratic legislative initiatives introduced since the elections to the 25th Knesset in November 2022 (Shomer and Lavi 2025). The Monitor applies the “Hungarian Protocol,” which identifies anti-democratic initiatives as those aimed at undermining judicial independence, weakening electoral integrity and good governance, capturing independent media, curtailing the rights of minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals through religious coercion, and restricting academic, cultural, and artistic freedoms. According to this analysis, by December 2024 the ruling coalition had submitted 336 bills classified as anti-democratic. These patterns not only echo earlier waves of anti-democratic legislation identified in the 20th Knesset (Gild-Hayo 2018) but significantly escalate them, underscoring that the current agenda intensifies this trajectory.

From this broader corpus, I identified a subset of proposals deemed harmful to gender justice. For the purposes of this study, such proposals are those that (a) institutionalize or expand gender segregation; (b) weaken legal protections against gender- or sexuality-based discrimination; (c) expand the jurisdiction of religious authorities in ways that undermine women’s autonomy; or (d) restrict women’s substantive participation in political, economic, or public life. These criteria are grounded in feminist scholarship that conceptualizes such measures as mechanisms for entrenching patriarchal norms and eroding democratic equality (Krizsán and Roggeband 2019; Farris 2017; Forest and Lombardo 2012; Lombardo et al. 2021; Roggeband and Krizsán 2020).

Classification was based on a close reading of each proposal’s content, stated objectives, and explanatory notes. This process yielded 13 bills introduced between November 2022 and December 2024 which stand out as particularly harmful for gender justice and are qualitatively analyzed. While this classification inevitably carries interpretive elements and does not capture the full range of indirect or long-term effects, it provides a transparent and conceptually consistent framework for identifying how democratic backsliding in Israel manifests through gendered legal initiatives.

All the legislative proposals to be analyzed were submitted as Private Member Bills. This is not incidental. A striking feature of the current government’s legislative strategy—particularly regarding controversial and anti-democratic measures, including the centrepiece proposals of the judicial overhaul—is its systematic use of private bills. This tactic enables coalition members to advance ideologically driven legislation while circumventing some of the formal checks associated with government bills, such as enhanced scrutiny by the Attorney General’s Office and more robust public oversight. While private member bills are often considered symbolic instruments to signal responsiveness to the governing coalition’s base, the current government has significantly expanded their strategic use. From our perspective, this signalling role is itself consequential: by placing discriminatory measures on the parliamentary agenda, these bills contribute to shifting the boundaries of legitimate discourse, normalizing exclusionary ideas, and intensifying the broader authoritarian trend. Moreover, monitoring data indicate an exponential rise in anti-democratic legislative initiatives during the 25th Knesset, with 21 already enacted—with about one third of them originating as private members’ bills (Shomer and Lavi 2025). Thus, in the present context, PMBs should not be dismissed as mere symbolism but recognized as a substantive mechanism of democratic backsliding.

5. Analysis of Anti-Democratic Legislation and Its Impact on Gender Justice

The following analysis aims to demonstrate the tangible and escalating risks facing women in Israel’s current political climate. The convergence between efforts to dismantle judicial independence and explicit legislative attempts to curtail women’s rights constitutes a particularly dangerous development and a serious threat to the status and protection of women in Israel today.

Importantly, the legislative initiatives to be analyzed are the practical manifestation of the coalition’s policy intentions, as expressed in the coalition agreements signed upon the formation of the government. Such agreements include commitments to amend anti-discrimination laws in ways that would permit gender segregation in public services, higher education, and public transportation; to expand the jurisdiction of rabbinical courts to civil and property matters; and to reject the ratification of the Istanbul Convention for the prevention of violence against women.

5.1. Institutionalizing Gender Segregation and Discrimination in the Public Sphere

A central feature of the current coalition’s gender agenda is the effort to institutionalize gender segregation in multiple areas of the public sphere—ranging from private services and education to state-managed recreational spaces. A series of legislative proposals submitted during the 25th Knesset seeks to recast segregation not as discrimination, but as a legitimate form of religious expression, even when it results in the exclusion of women and others from full participation in public life.

The most far-reaching proposal is the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services, and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places Law (Amendment—Harm to Religious Belief), 2022 (Bill No. P/222/25), which proposes an amendment to the 2000 Anti-Discrimination Law. The proposed amendment would legalize discriminatory practices in the provision of services and access to public spaces when such practices stem from the religious beliefs of the service provider or are justified as protecting the religious sensibilities of the public. Specifically, the bill adds an exemption to Section 3(d) of the law, stating that discrimination will not be considered unlawful:

“When it is done due to the religious belief of a person engaged in supplying a product or public service or operating a public place, or in order to prevent harm to part of the public due to its religious belief in the provision of a public product or service, entry into a public place or provision of a service in a public place”.

(P/222/25)

The only constraints placed on this exemption are that it does not apply to state services or to essential services where no reasonable alternative exists under the circumstances. This carve-out effectively enables private actors to deny services or access to women, LGBTQ+ individuals, or others if doing so conflicts with religious convictions—so long as the service is not considered “essential.” The explanatory notes to the bill emphasize the intent to “balance private property rights and the desire to avoid actions that contradict religious faith with the obligation to provide equitable services to the general public.” But in practice, this proposal lays the legal groundwork for widespread and lawful exclusion on religious grounds in areas ranging from healthcare to public transport to education.

A related proposal, the Student Rights Law (Amendment—Gender-Segregated Study Tracks), 2024 (Bill No. P/4884/25), further entrenches gender segregation in higher education. The bill amends the Student Rights Law to explicitly permit the establishment of gender-segregated academic tracks and institutions. According to the amended Section 4(b):

“The existence of separate institutions or separate academic tracks for men and women on religious grounds… shall not be considered discrimination under this law or under the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places Law.”

Moreover, the new Section 4(b1) affirms:

“The existence of separate institutions or separate academic tracks for men and women on religious grounds shall be deemed part of the institution’s freedom of operation”.

(P/4884/25)

The explanatory notes defend this move as an expression of religious freedom and cultural autonomy, noting that “the prevailing approach in Israel is that not every gender separation in the public sphere constitutes unlawful discrimination,” and citing comparative examples from countries such as the UK, US, and Australia.

While the proposal claims to rest on the existence of “broad alternatives” for non-segregated academic studies, it in fact paves the way for dual-track education systems. It also paves the way for segregation to become fully legal without limitation across all types of academic studies. As a result, gender-separate tracks in higher education—currently limited to ultra-Orthodox students—will be opened to religious observant students and to anyone who declares that they do not wish to study with members of the opposite sex for religious reasons. Separate tracks will also be extended to master’s and doctoral programmes, in contradiction to a ruling by the High Court of Justice on the matter (HCJ 8010/16, Barzon v. State of Israel).

The proposed bill will permit segregation not only in classrooms but also throughout the campus, including hallways, courtyards, and cafeterias—again, contrary to the Court’s ruling. The expansion of segregation is expected to further harm female faculty, who already face difficulties in securing employment and tenure in institutions that offer segregated education, since they are prohibited from teaching male students, while male lecturers are allowed to teach female students, making them more cost-effective hires for these institutions.

The extension of segregation into leisure spaces is pursued through two further bills. The Regulation of Bathing Places Law (Amendment—Designating Hours for Gender-Segregated Bathing at Nature Sites), 2023 (Bill No. P/1551/25) proposes an amendment to the law that would require the Israel Nature and Parks Authority to establish gender-segregated bathing hours at all relevant sites. The law mandates that:

“At least 15% of the monthly operating hours of a site must be designated for separate use by men or by women.”

The justification provided is that:

“At least 20% of the population in Israel, across all religions, avoid bathing in places that do not offer separate hours for men and women due to religious reasons… These groups are discriminated against compared to the rest of the citizens”.

(P/1551/25)

The bill’s sponsors further claim that the absence of segregation in state-run nature reserves and springs amounts to a violation of equality, since religious populations are effectively excluded from full use of public resources that belong to all citizens.

A companion proposal, the Regulation of Bathing Places Law (Amendment—Designation of Areas for Gender-Segregated Bathing), 2023 (Bill No. P/1498/25), would require municipalities with at least six recognized beaches to allocate one beach exclusively for women and one exclusively for men, open every day of the week. It also mandates that the size of the segregated areas and number of related facilities (showers, bathrooms, etc.) be updated every three years based on a survey of usage. The rationale is that existing “separate beaches” are insufficient to meet the growing demand:

“In many municipalities, the area and number of facilities at the segregated beaches have remained unchanged for decades, despite the increase in the population that seeks to use them”.

(P/1498/25)

Legalizing gender segregation in nature reserves and recreational sites may have unintended consequences even for the religious communities that advocate for it. By formalizing separate access to springs and beaches, such policies risk reinforcing and intensifying existing gender norms within ultra-Orthodox society—potentially limiting women’s and girls’ opportunities to participate in family outings and public life, while allowing men and boys greater freedom of movement and access to the public sphere (Forum of Law Professors for Democracy 2023).

While these bills are framed as efforts to increase accessibility for religious populations, their effect is to legally entrench gender segregation and thereby narrow the scope of public participation and mobility for women. Drawing on feminist critiques of gendered space (Forest and Lombardo 2012; Farris 2017), such policies risk institutionalizing patriarchal control under the guise of multicultural or religious sensitivity. Rather than fostering inclusion, these measures reify traditionalist gender hierarchies and reduce the visibility of women in public life. Moreover, as gender segregation becomes legally sanctioned, its implications will reverberate beyond public bathing sites.

Another proposal that reflects the coalition’s broader gender agenda is an amendment to the Students’ Rights Law (Amendment—Preventing Harm to a Student Due to Activities Conducted in an Educational Institution Contrary to the Child’s Best Interests and the Parents’ Wishes), 2023 (Bill No. P/2813/25). While not formally mandating segregation, the bill advances a conservative worldview that treats non-normative gender identities as a threat to children and society. It seeks to restrict discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity in schools, especially for younger students, and imposes strict conditions on such content for older students. In practice, it may lead to the exclusion of LGBTQ students and deny them access to support or recognition.

As in other proposals, the restriction is framed as protecting “the dignity, liberty, and privacy of the students,” yet the explanatory notes describe gender diversity as an “absolute loss of identity” and argue that raising such topics “inherently carries a risk of irreversible harm” to children. This logic redefines exposure to gender diversity as a form of harm, reinforcing efforts to erase such identities from the public and educational sphere in the name of tradition.

Importantly, recent efforts to weaken the judiciary undermine the courts’ historical—though partial—role in protecting rights-based claims, particularly in cases involving gender equality and religious coercion. Without a strong and independent judiciary, the balance between religious pluralism and gender equality is tipped decisively in favour of the former, at the expense of the latter. This is not accidental—it reflects the political logic of Israel’s current ruling coalition, in which ultra-Orthodox and religious-nationalist parties play a central role. These parties advance a normative vision of the state in which collective religious identity supersedes individual liberal rights, particularly those related to gender and sexuality (Avigur-Eshel and Filc 2021).

Supporters of these legislative initiatives, however, often justify them in the language of pluralism, cultural autonomy, and religious freedom. They argue that gender-segregated spaces or the expansion of rabbinical authority provide greater inclusion for religious communities who might otherwise be excluded from public institutions. From this perspective, such reforms are framed not as discriminatory, but as expanding access and respecting cultural diversity. Yet, as feminist scholars have argued, this framing risks obscuring how pluralism can be instrumentalized to entrench patriarchal norms, restrict women’s mobility, and subordinate individual rights to collective religious authority (Farris 2017; Forest and Lombardo 2012; Tirosh 2024). Acknowledging these counterarguments underscores that the debate is not only about institutional design but also about the normative boundaries of democracy itself.

What is ultimately at stake is the redefinition of citizenship: the codification of gender segregation in public law and policy serves to reconfigure the boundaries of participation and belonging in the Israeli public sphere.

5.2. Expansion of the Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts

One of the central developments in the 25th Knesset is the effort to expand the jurisdiction of rabbinical courts beyond matters of marriage and divorce. This trend is reflected in two key legislative proposals: the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law (Amendment—Jurisdiction by Consent in Civil Matters), 2023 (Bill No. P/1567/25), and the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction by Consent Law, 2022 (Bill No. P/416/25).

These bills seek to formalize the authority of rabbinical courts to adjudicate not only in personal status matters but also in broader civil disputes, provided the parties agree in advance and in writing. According to bill P/1567/25,

“a rabbinical court shall have jurisdiction over a civil matter, or over a matter that is religious in essence... provided that (1) all relevant parties have expressed written consent, and (2) at least one of the parties is Jewish”.

(P/1567/25)

The proposed law further allows the court to adjudicate such cases according to halakha (Jewish religious law), with a caveat that such rulings must not infringe upon fundamental rights enshrined in Israeli civil law—specifically, the Equal Rights for Women Law and the Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law.

On its face, the legislation is framed as a means of providing alternative and culturally appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly for ultra-Orthodox and religious communities. Bill P/416/25’s explanatory note emphasizes this rationale:

“The state should offer distinct populations state-sanctioned legal tools to resolve disputes in a manner consistent with their communal norms, especially when it comes to halakhic adjudication”.

(P/416/25)

Nonetheless, these proposals have sparked significant concern among legal scholars, feminist researchers, and human rights organizations. While advocates frame them as an expression of legal pluralism and respect for religious autonomy, critics view them as part of a broader process of institutional religionization—extending the influence of religious norms, which often conflict with gender equality, into the civil legal sphere.

Empirical research has consistently shown that the rabbinical courts in Israel operate within a highly gendered power structure, which results in systemic discrimination against women and the infringement of their rights (Halperin-Kaddari 2004). Women—especially those navigating divorce—must often rely on a judicial body composed exclusively of men, governed by halakhic principles that do not require gender equality (Hacker 2012). Even written consent to appear before a rabbinical court may not always reflect genuine voluntariness, particularly in the context of familial, economic, or communal power dynamics. Moreover, there is a legitimate fear that expanding rabbinical jurisdiction could influence civil legal precedent—especially in cases involving the interpretation, enforcement, or annulment of agreements, or monetary disputes—thus blurring the line between religious and civil law.

Proponents of the legislation have cited the 2006 ruling in HCJ 8638/03, Amir v. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem, in which the High Court of Justice held that rabbinical courts require explicit statutory authorization to adjudicate civil matters. The bills at hand appear to provide precisely that legal foundation. However, even in that decision, the Court emphasized the risks inherent in granting judicial powers to bodies not bound by the same principles of equality, transparency, and judicial independence as the state’s civil courts.

This legislative push must also be seen in the context of additional bills designed to bolster the authority and political immunity of religious officials. For example, the Rabbinical Immunity Bill, 2023 (Bill No. P/1555/25) seeks to grant rabbis immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution for statements made in the course of their religious duties, even if such statements are discriminatory, inflammatory, or in violation of existing civil protections. If passed, such legislation would significantly diminish public accountability and further entrench the influence of religious authority figures in shaping public discourse and policy.

In a similar vein, another recent bill—the Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law (Amendment—Appointment of Rabbis Ordained by the Council of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel), 2024 (Bill No. P/4919/25), seeks to amend the Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law by restricting the definition of “rabbis” who are eligible to participate in the election of the Chief Rabbinate Council. The bill would limit this definition to those ordained specifically by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel. This proposal follows a recent Supreme Court case (HCJ 7583/22, The Ruth and Emanuel Rackman Center for the Advancement of the Status of Women at Bar-Ilan University v. The Chief Rabbis of Israel) in which a majority of justices interpreted the term “rabbis” to include women with religious education, while a dissenting opinion endorsed a narrower reading aligned with Orthodox tradition. The bill thus aims to codify a more restrictive and exclusionary interpretation, effectively barring female religious scholars from participating in the electoral process of religious leadership. As such, it reinforces a patriarchal religious authority structure and signals another move by the current coalition to consolidate control over religious institutions by Orthodox male elites, to the exclusion of alternative religious voices—especially women.

In sum, the proposed expansion of rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction over civil matters represents not a mere technical adjustment or accommodation of existing practices, but a profound structural shift in Israel’s legal and constitutional framework. Cloaked in the language of accessibility and cultural sensitivity, this legislative agenda risks undermining women’s rights, creating a dangerous dual legal system, and amplifying the influence of patriarchal religious norms on civil law.

5.3. Politicization of the Public Sector and Its Impact on Women’s Representation

A significant dimension of the current government’s efforts to reshape gender policy in Israel has been the politicization of the Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women, the central governmental body tasked with promoting gender equality. Established in 1998 and situated within the Prime Minister’s Office, the Authority operated for decades with a professional mandate: to monitor gender mainstreaming across government ministries, develop policy initiatives, and serve as an independent watchdog promoting women’s rights and equality in state institutions (Chazan 2018). Although the Authority was never entirely immune to political influence, it typically maintained a degree of professional autonomy and was widely regarded as a critical institutional pillar for advancing gender equality in Israel (Halperin-Kaddari and Yadgar 2010).

Under the current government, however, the Authority has been weakened both structurally and politically. One key step was its transfer to the newly created Ministry for the Advancement of Women—a ministry lacking bureaucratic infrastructure or autonomy. This move, justified on administrative grounds, effectively downgraded the Authority’s institutional standing and subjected it to more direct political oversight. More significantly, the appointment of a new director—an ultra-Orthodox woman without prior experience in gender equality work and with strong political affiliations—raised concerns among civil society organizations and feminist policy professionals. This shift marked a departure from professional leadership to a politically appointed figure aligned with the governing coalition’s conservative agenda.

These developments culminated in a PMB titled the Advancement of Women in Israel Bill, 2023 (Bill No. P/3670/25). While the bill purports to enhance the status of women, its structure and content signal a profound institutional transformation. It proposes dissolving the existing Authority and establishing a new governmental body under the direct control of the Minister for the Advancement of Women. The bill subordinates the Authority’s work to ministerial discretion, exempts the director’s appointment from civil service requirements, and eliminates key mechanisms of accountability and transparency.

Crucially, the bill redefines the Authority’s mission from promoting gender equality through professional oversight to implementing ministerial policy, irrespective of its impact on women’s rights. It also introduces a new advisory committee appointed by the minister, without safeguards for including independent feminist experts or representatives of women’s organizations. These changes risk transforming what was once a semi-autonomous professional agency into a politically compliant body, constrained in its ability to advance gender equality or critique regressive policies.

The politicization of gender policy institutions is part of a broader trend of weakening meritocratic norms and increasing political control over the public sector. Several additional bills, though not explicitly focused on women, further erode the professionalism of civil service appointments and disproportionately harm women’s access to decision-making positions. One such bill, the Government Companies Law (Amendment—Special Qualification), 2022 (Bill No. P/411/25) proposes removing the requirement that nominees for executive positions in state-owned companies disclose political affiliations, claiming that “political affiliation should not constitute a disqualification for public appointment.” This effectively paves the way for partisan appointments without requiring candidates to demonstrate exceptional qualifications. A second bill, the Government Companies Law (Amendment—Definition of Personal or Political Affiliation), 2023 (Bill No. P/3734/25), seeks to redefine political affiliation by excluding membership in internal party institutions—such as party committees or caucuses—from the legal definition of a ‘political link’ that disqualifies appointments. A third proposal, the Government Companies Law (Amendment—Appointments Review Committee and Structural Reform of the Authority), 2024 (Bill No. P/4863/25), seeks to fundamentally restructure the Government Companies Authority by placing it under direct control of the responsible ministry. Most notably, the bill alters the composition and functioning of the Appointments Review Committee—the body responsible for vetting candidates for senior roles in state-owned companies. It removes the representative of the Attorney General and instead empowers the minister to appoint a replacement of their choosing. In addition, the bill eliminates the Government Companies Authority’s representation on the committee and weakens procedural safeguards designed to promote professionalism and political neutrality in appointments.

Taken together, these measures significantly weaken the mechanisms meant to ensure fair and merit-based appointments in state institutions. They also undermine the implementation of the Equal Representation Law in Government Companies, which mandates gender parity on the board of directors of government companies and was itself the product of a landmark Supreme Court ruling (HCJ 453/94; 454/94). By facilitating politically motivated appointments and reducing transparency, these initiatives risk displacing women from decision-making bodies in the public sector and eroding equality of opportunity. This trend is particularly concerning given the current political climate, in which no women serve as officially appointed director-general of government ministries. Only two women hold such roles—one as an acting director-general and another as an unofficial appointee. This reality led to a landmark ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court in February 2025 (HCJ 1363/23), which accepted a petition by several women’s organizations, which ordered the state to adopt, within six months, concrete guidelines that would ensure the actual implementation of gender equality in senior appointments. The decision also condemned the practice of informal male-dominated networks (“old boys club”) that systematically excluded women from top decision-making circles. This ruling reinforces the concern that the proposed legislative initiatives, which would enable politicized and non-transparent appointments, could further marginalize women and undermine the fragile gains achieved through legal and judicial efforts over the past decades.

6. Feminist Protest and Gender-Based Mobilization: Women’s Role in Protesting Israel’s Judicial Overhaul and Anti-Democratic Legislation

Feminist mobilization has long played a central role in global struggles for democratic rights and equality, often intensifying in response to democratic backsliding and illiberal governance (Krizsán and Sebestyén 2019; Molyneux et al. 2021). In such contexts, gender justice becomes a flashpoint where broader democratic struggles converge with the defence of hard-won feminist gains. Feminist protest frequently emerges in response to threats not only to specific women’s rights, but also to the very political and institutional structures that guarantee them (Brechenmacher et al. 2024). In the Israeli case, the anti-overhaul mobilization has been analyzed as a broader movement against democratic backsliding that combines grassroots contention with wide societal coalitions (Shultziner 2023). The salience of feminist protest issues—whether reproductive rights, gender-based violence, or political representation—plays a critical role in shaping mobilization, particularly under regimes that attempt to concentrate power and suppress dissent (Gwiazda 2024).

Recent scholarship demonstrates that feminist issue salience increases when perceived threats align with prior grievances and occur in a repressive or unresponsive political environment. In Poland, for example, the assault on reproductive rights under the Law and Justice (PiS) government catalyzed a mass mobilization of feminist protesters, many of whom linked the rollback of rights to broader democratic decline (Graff and Korolczuk 2022; Gwiazda 2024). By contrast, more limited feminist protests in Hungary under the Fidesz regime reflected weaker pre-existing mobilization structures and more effective government co-optation (Krizsán and Roggeband 2019).

In the Israeli context, these dynamics have also materialized in distinct and powerful ways. The government’s 2023 judicial overhaul triggered one of the largest protest movements in the country’s history. For many women, however, this was not simply a struggle over legal norms or constitutional procedures. Rather, it was a fight for the very conditions that make gender equality possible in a democratic society. Feminist organizations, activists, and ordinary women perceived the proposed judicial overhaul as directly threatening the state’s capacity to enforce gender equality, particularly in light of parallel legislative initiatives aimed at expanding religious influence, permitting gender segregation, and undermining anti-discrimination protections.

Within this broader protest movement, a distinctly gendered protest sphere emerged. Women’s groups, feminist activists, and civil society organizations mobilized explicitly as women and framed their activism through a feminist lens. Visual performances—such as the now-iconic “Handmaid’s Protest” inspired by Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale—became symbols of the looming dystopia of gender subjugation. These performances, which featured rows of women dressed in red robes and white bonnets, silently marching or standing in formation, conveyed a potent message: that the erosion of liberal democracy in Israel would entail the rollback of women’s rights, bodily autonomy, and political voice. Alongside the Handmaid’s Tale esthetic, red became the dominant visual language of feminist resistance in Israel’s protests. Women demonstrators wore red T-shirts emblazoned with slogans such as “The Women’s Struggle”, a term that came to symbolize the gendered dimension of the struggle against authoritarian drift. These red garments appeared in mass marches, rallies, and public addresses, unifying disparate groups of women under a shared feminist-political banner. The strategic use of red—a colour long associated with both warning and power—was intended to symbolize the danger of backsliding and the determination of women to resist it.

The gendered character of the protest was not merely symbolic. As Brechenmacher et al.’s (2024) comparative analysis shows, Israel stands out among global cases of democratic erosion for the extent to which feminist claims were central to the protest discourse. The Israeli feminist mobilization showed a high level of political articulation and effective coalition-building across sectors, as feminist concerns were integrated into wider democratic demands. New and existing women’s organizations coalesced into groups such as Bonot Alternativa (“Building an Alternative”), which foregrounded both feminist and democratic messages. Women-led marches, all-women protest days, and thematic messaging (“Harming women’s rights—Not on our watch”) emphasized both the political agency of women and the gendered stakes of the crisis.

Survey data further affirm the gender gap in attitudes toward the judicial overhaul. According to a February 2023 survey by the Israel Democracy Institute, 62.8% of women expressed concern over potential setbacks in gender equality resulting from the government’s legislation, compared to only 40% of men. Moreover, 65% of women opposed curbing judicial oversight under the grounds of reasonability—compared to 58% of men. Similarly, 46% of women opposed passing an override clause with a 61-legislator majority, while only 19% supported it. Among men, the public was evenly split (34% opposed and 34% supported), highlighting that gender itself emerged as a political cleavage in the context of democratic backsliding (Thon Ashkenazy 2023).

While there is no systematic data on gender gaps in actual participation in the protests against the judicial overhaul in Israel, there is some suggestive evidence that women were more likely than men to take part in such protests. Survey data from the Israeli Voice Index available for February and March 2023 (Israel Democracy Institute 2023) indicate that women reported slightly higher levels of participation in the protest compared to men (22.1% vs. 15.7% in February 2023; 23.8% vs. 21.0% in March 2023). While the differences are consistent, they do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. These findings suggest a tendency for women to be somewhat more active in the protest movement, though the gender gap is not statistically robust.

Furthermore, feminist protest extended beyond the streets and into institutional arenas, particularly in the lead-up to the October 2023 local elections (which were later postponed due to the Israel-Gaza war). Feminist activists focused on increasing women’s political representation at the municipal level, launching initiatives to support female candidates and foster alliances among liberal local governments. One prominent example was the 50–50 initiative, which aimed to ensure gender parity in local councils and positioned women’s representation as essential to democratic resilience. The political and social context created a powerful convergence between the push for greater representation of women in local government and the effort to strengthen liberal municipalities as a counterweight to national-level authoritarianism.

Importantly, feminist actors within the protest also engaged in critical self-reflection. Some scholars and activists have argued that feminist engagement should not be confined to moments when women’s rights are explicitly under threat. Rather, they emphasize the need for solidarity with all marginalized groups and a commitment to resisting all forms of exclusion—whether based on ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, or migration status. This critique highlights tensions within liberal feminist protest movements, particularly in contexts like Israel, where democratic backsliding is entwined with the broader structural inequalities of occupation and ethnonational hierarchy.

These protests catalyzed a vibrant and multifaceted feminist mobilization. Drawing on international repertoires, feminist theoretical frameworks, and domestic grievances, Israeli women crafted a protest movement that was both gendered in its form and feminist in its content. This mobilization not only reinforced women’s central role in democratic defence but also underscored the deep interconnection between gender equality and the preservation of democratic institutions.

7. Conclusions

Israel’s current political trajectory offers a stark example of how democratic backsliding and gender injustice are tightly interwoven. This assessment aligns with broader diagnoses of Israel’s democratic crisis as rooted not only in institutional reforms but also in deeper societal and political dynamics (Gidron 2023). As this paper has shown, the judicial overhaul is not merely a constitutional reform—it reflects a broader ideological project that redefines the boundaries of democratic governance in ways that intersect with gender power structures. The simultaneous weakening of judicial oversight, promotion of gender segregation, and erosion of anti-discrimination protections indicate that gender justice is not simply an unintended consequence, but a vulnerable and contested domain in the reconfiguration of political authority. Time will ultimately determine the full scope of these changes, but the combination of enacted reforms, coalition commitments, and legislative initiatives already signals a trajectory with potentially far-reaching implications for gender equality. Viewed in light of comparative cases of democratic erosion, this trajectory raises serious concerns that gender justice may increasingly become an explicit site of contestation and retrenchment.

At the same time, the Israeli case highlights how gender also shapes the resistance to democratic decline. Women have mobilized not only in defence of democratic institutions but also to advance a broader vision of equality, justice, and inclusion. Feminist actors have played a central role in shaping the discourse and strategies of democratic resistance, emphasizing that the struggle for gender justice is inseparable from the struggle for democracy itself. Through protest, advocacy, and coalition-building, they have positioned gender equality as a core democratic principle rather than a peripheral concern.

Yet the burden of democratic erosion is not borne equally. Those who live at the intersection of multiple forms of marginalization—such as ultra-Orthodox, Arab-Palestinian, migrant or refugee, and LGBTQ women—face heightened vulnerability to its effects. Intersectional analysis reveals that authoritarian policies often intensify pre-existing structural inequalities, disproportionately harming individuals whose identities place them at the margins of both gender and nation. Recognizing these layered forms of exclusion is essential to understanding the full impact of democratic backsliding and the diverse constituencies resisting it.

The analysis also carries important policy implications. International organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, and global human rights NGOs can play a critical role by monitoring democratic backsliding, conditioning cooperation on adherence to equality standards, and offering support for feminist and human rights organizations under pressure. Global indices such as Freedom House and V-Dem provide systematic monitoring of democratic quality and can amplify international awareness of the gendered dimensions of democratic erosion, thereby creating leverage for domestic actors resisting authoritarian trends. Feminist civil society in Israel has already shown remarkable resilience and creativity in mobilizing against democratic erosion; sustaining and expanding this mobilization will require both domestic alliances and transnational solidarity networks. Finally, legal professionals remain crucial actors in safeguarding rights and defending judicial independence. Their engagement is vital in maintaining institutional checks and amplifying gender justice concerns within broader struggles over the rule of law. By underscoring these roles, the Israeli case highlights not only the risks of democratic decline but also the avenues through which resistance and resilience can be cultivated.

The convergence of authoritarian retrenchment and gendered resistance in Israel reflects a wider global pattern in which struggles over democracy are also struggles over gendered power. Understanding democratic backsliding through a gender lens reveals not only who is most vulnerable to institutional collapse, but also who is leading the charge to defend—and redefine—democracy itself.

Note on the Israel-Gaza War

This paper does not seek to analyze the Israel-Gaza war directly, but it is written in the shadow of the devastating events that began on 7 October 2023. On that day, Hamas launched a brutal and unprecedented attack on Israeli communities, killing over 1200 people—many of them civilians—and taking more than 250 hostages into Gaza, some of whom remain in captivity. In response, Israel launched a large-scale military campaign in Gaza, resulting in a deepening humanitarian crisis characterized by mass displacement, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the loss of tens of thousands of lives. Both the atrocities of October 7 and the catastrophic situation in Gaza have profoundly reshaped Israel’s political and social landscape and have introduced an ongoing national trauma on both sides of the border.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Israeli government declared that it would halt its judicial overhaul and other controversial legislative initiatives in light of the wartime emergency. However, these promises have not been upheld. Instead, the government has continued to advance its agenda—often more quietly and with diminished public scrutiny—using the war to justify the expansion of executive power and to suppress opposition. This includes legislative and administrative actions that further erode democratic norms and undermine gender justice.

While recognizing the magnitude of the war and its consequences, this paper focuses specifically on the gendered dimensions of democratic backsliding in Israel, a process that began before the war and continues alongside it. The current crisis underscores the need to remain attentive to how authoritarian measures, attacks on civil liberties, and rollbacks of gender equality can persist—and even accelerate—in moments of national emergency.